

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Philosophy Section

PROGRESS OF BRAHMA-VIDYĀ FROM THE UPANIṢADS TO THE SŪTRAS.

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I

The interesting suggestion has been made by a Bengali writer that the various schools of Vedānta that we find blooming forth after the Sūtras, with the different *Bhāṣyas* had already been in existence even before the Sūtras were composed[1]. The same idea has been expressed by V. S. Ghate also in his book *The Vedānta*, (p. 51). In itself the suggestion does not mean very much and need not be controverted. For, it can be easily understood that the germs of the various systems were contained in the utterances of the Upaniṣads themselves. The Upaniṣads were brief in their expression and sometimes even cryptic; and were capable of more than one interpretation. Besides, the very fact that all the different schools ultimately relied or professed to rely on the texts of the Upaniṣads, is itself an evidence that these texts could be strained or twisted to yield more than one meaning. So, in a sense it is literally true that all the schools of Vedāntic philosophy were in existence before the Sūtras.

Not only can the germs of the different schools be traced in the Upaniṣads themselves, but if we recollect the fact that the Upaniṣads were not a sealed book for the centuries lying between their appearance and the composition of the Sūtras—that there had been other interpreters of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads who preceded the

(1) Svami Prajnanananda—*History of Vedantism* (in Bengali), p.69.

author of the Vedānta-Sūtras, then, we may even admit that all of them did not follow the identical line of interpretation. And if a difference in the lines of interpretation is conceivable, then it is also conceivable that the diversity that has manifested itself in the schools after the Sūtras, was potentially in existence even before them. So far there is no difficulty in agreeing with the writers quoted above. The schools of Vedānta were in existence even before the Sūtras. The Upaniṣads continued to be studied and interpreted even before the Sūtras and all interpreters did not agree in all points.

But this, after all, means only a potential existence for them. A school implies more than a mere passing interpretation placed on some isolated texts or other: the difference between one school of Vedānta and another, as we know them, is much deeper and more fundamental than a difference in the interpretation of individual texts. In this sense, therefore, it is difficult to admit that real, full-fledged schools were actually established previous to the composition of the Sūtras. We have not got evidence enough for such a categorical conclusion. If there had been such schools, the existing Sūtras would have been more unambiguous in their attitude; and traces of the contest with, and final conquest of, those other schools would not havh been altogether wanting in them. But, in the first place, we do not think that the Sūtras are quite definite in their leanings towards any particular school[1]. In the second place, the Sūtras do not look like the surviving fittest among a number of contending systems of interpretation of Upaniṣadic philosophy. The war that they

(1) Cf. Ghate, *op. cit.* pp. 181-183.

wage against rival systems like the Sāṅkhya, is quite manifest; but no such war against other systems of interpretation has left any trace in them. The probability, therefore, is that there was no such war: no such rival schools of interpretation really existed. It is even difficult to say that many synthetic studies of the Upaniṣadic literature as a whole were attempted before the author of the Sūtras.

But at the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that the individual books of the Upaniṣads continued to be studied and interpreted in their respective *Śākhās* of the Vedas. We frequently come across the Upaniṣadic scholar—the scholar who specialised in the Upaniṣad branch of *Śruti* literature. He is sometimes spoken of as the *Brahmavādin*, sometimes as the *Rahasya-vid* and sometimes by other equivalent names He was a respected Brahmin in society, both for his scholarship as well as for his rank as a Brahmin[1]. That the Upaniṣads as an important part of Śruti literature had to be studied, is clear enough. And that all the important *Śākhās* of the Vedas had their own independent Upaniṣasds is also certain. But at the same time, it seems equally certain that an ordinary Brahmin would, in the first instance, study the Upaniṣad of his own *Śākhā*; it is not at all evident that, before the author of the Brahmasūtras, there were many Upaniṣadic scholars who attempted synthesis of *all* the Upadiṣads. And, strictly speaking, schools of Vedānta do not appear to have been in existence before the composition of Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, as has been already pointed out. Yet, on the other hand, though the study was mainly confined to the Upaniṣad of each

(1) *Indian Historical Quarterly*, September, 1927, p. 443.

scholar's own *Śākhā*, there were certainly a large number of scholars and interpreters. And it is not inconceivable that they did not always agree. So, the possibilities of a diversity of schools were already there.

Indeed, it seems too much to think that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa came into being as a full-fledged system all at once. Nor did they come immediately after the Upaniṣads. A considerable time must have elapsed between the one and the other; and it is impossible to think that the whole of this period was an absolute blank On the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose that the Sūtras, as they have come down to us, assumed their present form through successive stages, some of which can be traced even now[1]. Not only this, but it is even reasonable to think that, apart from the gradual evolution of the Sūtras as we see them now, the author of the nucleus of these Sūtras even, was not furrowing a virgin soil. Other tentative attempts must have been made before him to construct a philosophy of the Upaniṣads. They were either overshadowed by the existing Sūtras and forgotten, or, were merged and unified in them. In any case, they have not come down to us. But it is unthinkable that no other attempt at synthesis of the Upaniṣads, however imperfect, was made before Bādarāyaṇa.

The study of the Upaniṣads was, broadly speaking, a study for each *Śākhā*. But the difference between the Upaniṣad of one *Śākhā* and that of another, was very seldom fundamental: and some minds were always there, gifted with a breadth of vision and power of imagination,

(1) See my paper on "*Land-marks in the Evolution of Vedanta-sutras* in the proceedings of 4th OrientalConference.

who could see the underlying unity of thought in the various Upaniṣads and who could thus think of them as teaching but one philosophy. It would be too much to regard them as founders of schools in the same sense as those that came after Bādarāyaṇa; but still they were there and they led up to the great land-mark in the interpretation of the Upaniṣads, *viz.*, the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Most of these thinkers and teachers have been forgotten, except those whose names have been preserved in the Brahma-sūtras themselves. An account of their teachings and general learnings as philosophers, can be attempted by an analysis of the questions in connection with which they are referred to in the Brahma-sūtras. This will also give us an idea of the progress of Brahmavidyā from the Upaniṣads to the Sūtras.

It should not be forgotten here that our information about these writers is drawn almost exclusively from the Brahmasūtras themselves. Some of these names occur elsewhere also, but there they are mentioned only as individuals ; little is given of their teachings as philosophers (*e. g.* Jaimini in Mbh. *i.* 63. 89.). And reference to them in the Brahmasūtras also does not definitely determine their time ; it only shows that they were not posterior to the author of those Sūtras. Whether they preceded him, and if so, by what distance of time, or whether they or any of them were only contemporaneous with him, is more than can be definitely settled.

It must also be noted here that to the earlier interpreters of Brahma-vidyā, the whole of Śruti literature presented itself as more or less one mass ; and the sharp antagonism between *karma* and *jñāna* had not yet come into being.

The stupendous effort that writers of the Śaṅkara School make to prove that *karma* was not necessary for salvation was a thing of later growth. For this reason, the interpreters of Upaniṣads who preceded Bādarāyaṇa, were interpreters of Śruti rather than of any particular branch of it in exclusion of others ;—strictly speaking, they were interpreters of all that required interpretation in Śruti. Differences of view as to the relative importance of *karma* and *jñāna* must have already arisen ; but the Upaniṣads had not yet been sundered from the main trunk of Śruti. This is evident from the fact that the man who was the founder of the school of *karma* philosophy, *viz.*, Jaimini, is also quoted frequently enough in connection with problems of Brahma-vidyā. And the reputed founder of Brahma-vidyā out of which anti-*karma* doctrines were developed, that is to say, Bādarāyaṇa himself, does not pass without a mention in the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

II

We may now turn to an analysis of the doctrines of those interpreters of Upaniṣads who preceded, or were at least contemporaneous with Bādarāyaṇa and who have been mentioned by him. We give below their names and also the number of the Sūtras in which they are referred to[1]:

1. Jaimini :—i. 2. 28 ; i. 2. 31 ; i. 3. 31 ; i. 4. 18 ; iii. 2. 40 ; iii. 4. 2 ; iii. 4. 18 ; iii. 4. 40 ; iv. 3. 12 ; iv. 4. 5 ; iv. 4. 11.
2. Āśmarathya :—i. 2. 29 ; i. 4. 20.
3. Bādari :—i. 2. 30 ; iii. 1. 11 ; iv. 3. 7 ; iv. 4. 10.
4. Bādarāyaṇa :—i. 3. 26 ; i. 3. 33 ; iii. 2. 41 ; iii. 4. 1 ; iii. 4. 8 ; iii. 4. 19 ; iv. 3. 15 ; iv. 4. 7 ; iv. 4. 12.

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(1) The numbering of sutras followed throughout is that of Sankara.

5. Auḍulomi :—i. 4. 21 ; iii. 4. 45 ; iv. 4. 6.
6. Kāśakṛtsna :—i. 4. 22.
7. Kārṣṇājini :—iii. 1. 9.
8. Ātreya :— iii. 4. 44.

It will be noticed that the name of Bādarāyaṇa, who is traditionally supposed to be the author of all the Sūtras, also occurs in this list. It is open to doubt if these particular Sūtras were really composed by him, or were subsequent additions. It will be noticed, however, that his name is specifically given only in these Sūtras, and not in others, though, *ex hypothesi*, all of them express his views. And his name is quoted generally in connexion with a controversial point about which he frequently differed from others whose names and views also are given along with his. We may, therefore, retain his name in this list, without thereby implying that he was a different person from the author of the Sūtras.

There is another name in this list which deserves more than a passing mention : it is that of Bādari. Who was Bādari ? On the face of it, it looks like the name of Bādarāyaṇa's father ; more than this, we do not know and cannot say. Little else do we know of the other names either; but there is no indication that they belonged to the same family or even to the same *Śākhā* of Brahmins. The name of Bādari, however, bears a closer resemblance to the name of the school.

A close inspection of the numbers of the Sūtras will reveal another interesting fact. The names usually appear in groups of two, three or more ; obviously they appear in connexion with a controversy to which they must have contributed and about which they held diverse views ; and

Bādarāyaṇa's own views are expounded after a consideration of these views. This will be clear if we arrange the names according to the groups of the Sūtras in which they are found.

(i) Sūtra i. 2. 28. Jaimini
„ i. 2. 29. Aśmarathya
„ i. 2. 30. Bādari
„ i. 2. 31. Jaimini.

(ii) Sūtras i. 3. 26., i. 31., & i. 3. 33. contain the names of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(iii) Sūtra i. 4. 18. has the name of Jaimini.

(iv) Sūtras i. 4, 20, i. 4, 21., & i. 4, 22 ; names of Aśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kaśakṛtsna.

(v) Sūtras iii. 1. 9., & iii. 1. 11. contain names of Kārṣṇājini and Bādari.

(vi) Sūtras iii. 2, 40. & iii. 2. 41. names of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(vii) Sūtras iii. 4. 1., iii. 4. 2., & iii. 4. 8 ; names of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(viii) Sūtras iii. 4. 18. & iii. 4. 19; names of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(ix) Sūtra iii. 4.40; name of Jaimini.

(x) Sūtras iii. 4. 44. & iii. 4. 45; names of Ātreya and Auḍulomi.

(xi) Sūtras iv. 3. 7., iv. 3. 12. & iv. 3. 15; names of Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(xii) Sūtras iv. 4 5., iv. 4. 6. & iv. 4. 7; names of Jaimini Auḍulomi and Bādarāyaṇa.

(xiii) Sūtras iv. 4. 10., iv. 4. 11. & iv. 4. 12; names of Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(i) In the first of the above groups of Sūtras, the dispute arises in connexion with the interpretation of the texts of Ch. Upaniṣad v. 11 *et seq*. The question is: What does the term *'Vaiśvānara'* mean in those passages? The author of the Sūtras suggests that it means *Brahma*. Three names have been quoted here. It appears that, so far as the use of that particular term is concerned, all of them had suggested the same meaning; the difference lay mainly in the way in which the meaning was derived. Besides, there are certain symbolic expressions which offered some difficulty, and to obviate it, the authority and the suggestions of these names are quoted.

Jaimini is quoted as having derived the term *'Vaiśvānara'* in such a way that it directly referred to Brahma without meaning the ordinary fire or digestive fire in the body; whereas the author of the Sūtras was disinclined to ignore the primary meaning of the term and derived the secondary meaning of Brahma by interpretation.

Aśmarathya's opinion is quoted with reference to the use of an expression of measure, *viz.*, half-a-cubit (prādeśa) in Ch. v. 18. 1., in the same context. According to him, the term implies a possible manifestation of Brahma.

Bādari thinks that the term 'prādeśa' is used only to help meditation of Brahma.

Jaimini is quoted again to show that the use of these terms is quite appropriate.

It must be pointed out here that the commentators on the Sūtras, though agreeing in general, differ among themselves in smaller details. But these differences are not very material. The whole question to be decided here is : Whether the term '*Vaiśvānara*' in Chapter V means Brahma or fire. And as to that, all the names cited agree. There are some difficulties in the way of accepting the meaning of the word, owing no doubt to the employment of certain other expressions in that context. These difficulties are met in different ways by the different authorities quoted. Bādarāyaṇa seems to have no leanings in the matter; to him any way out of the difficulty is quite as good as any other. He indicates the different attempts made by other thinkers to escape the difficulty and is content with the final conclusion of them all, *viz.*, that '*Vaiśvānara*' in Ch. V. means Brahma and not anything else.

(ii) In the second group of Sūtras, the question under discussion is : Whether the gods also have any need of Brahma-vidyā. Bādarāyaṇa avers that they have. He gives the reasons and meets anticipated objections. In i. 3. 31, a specific objection of Jaimini is examined, presumably because it was considered of more than ordinary importance and also because of the eminence of the man who advocated the view. This Sūtra refers to passage like Ch. iii. 1. 1., where a form of worship of Brahma is suggested by meditating on the different deities. This form of worship is not feasible for the deities themselves. And so Jaimini cannot accept the position that the gods also must practise Brahma-vidyā.

Like many others, this Sūtra also has been differently explained by the different commentators. Śaṅkara seems to suggest that according to Jaimini, the gods had no need

of Brahma-vidyā as a whole ; while, as Rāmānuja interprets this Sūtra, Jaimini's objection was that those specific forms of worship of Brahma did not belong to the gods and could not possibly be practised by them.

Whichever interpretation may be accepted, it is clear that these two master minds of ancient India, *viz.*, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, did not agree as to the relation of the gods to Brahma-vidyā. But Bādarāyaṇa shows Jaimini the courtesy of considering his views on the matter.

(iii) In i. 4. 18., Jaimini's name occurs again ; and all commentators, except Madhva, agree that the text under discussion in that group of Sūtras is the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru incident as it is narrated in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.

Madhva refers to Ch. vi. and Muṇḍaka i. 1., and interprets the Sūtras to mean that, according to Jaimini, *karma et cetera* are also necessary for the attainment of the knowledge of Brahma: (" *paramātma-Jñānārtham karmmādikam-api vadatīti Jaiminih* "). Madhva's interpretation is opposed to that of all others and on that ground alone, it might be rejected. Besides, although the opinion ascribed by him to Jaimini might well be his view, yet the citation of that particular dictum of Jaimini is not quite in place here.

According to the other commentators, the reference here is to Kauṣītaki iv. and the question is : Whether certain terms used there which are ordinarily indicative of the individual, mean the individual or Brahma. The conclusion of the author of the Sūtràs is that, in that context, they mean Brahma and he gives his reasons in i. 4. 16 and 17. And Jaimini's authority is cited to confirm his own

convictions; and we are told in Sūtra i. 4. 18., that, according to Jaimini, though such expressions are ordinarily applicable to the finite soul, yet they also mean 'something other than it' (*'anyārtham'*) and that is what they do in the passages under discussion.

(iv) In i. 4. 20-22., as in i. 4. 28., also, Madhva proceeds on a line of interpretation quite different from that of the other commentators. As in i. 4. 18., so here also, the question that is being discussed, according to Madhva, is the place of *karma* in the life of the Vedāntin. His quotations (*e.g.* Sv. iii. 8: *'nānyah panthā vidyate' yanāya &c.*), show that he is not referring to the same text as the other commentators.

But according to the other commentators, the text under review here is the famous Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī incident in Br. ii. 4 and iv. 5; and the question to be decided is: Whether the object described there as the final goal of knowledge, *viz., Atman*, is the individual soul or the infinite soul. All the earlier authorities quoted by the author of the Sūtras, agree with him in holding that it means Brahma. There are no doubt some passages in that text which apply more appropriately to the individual soul; but they can also be treated as indicative of Brahma. And for this, different reasons have been given by the different authorities quoted.

Now, these different reasons involve different theories about the relation of the finite to the infinite soul. And to that extent, they have been classed as belonging to different schools of Vedāntic thought of which we hear so much in later times. One of them suggests absolute monism, *i.e.*, unreality of the individual; another suggests qualified

monism, and so on (*cf. Vallabha* on the Sūtras). But so far as the main contention of Bādarāyaṇa is concerned, *viz.*, that the Upaniṣad text in question speaks of Brahma and not of individual soul like the '*puruṣas*' of Sāṅkhya, there is no differerence of opinion between him and his predecessors (*cf.* Rāmānuja and Baladeva).

(v) In the fifth group of Sūtras, *viz.*, iii. 1. 9. *et seq.*, the texts under discussion are Ch. v. 10 and the theory advanced is that when a soul has had gone to certain places after death and has had experienced the fruits of its *karma*, it comes back to this world and assumes corporeal forms again, according to the '*anuśaya*' or unspent momentum, so to speak, of its *karma*.

But in the Upaniṣadic passages referred to above, there is a certain term ('caraṇa') which usually means *conduct*, as distinguished from *śāstric karma* or rites prescribed by the Scriptures. Hence an objection is apprehended here : Is it according to a man's good or bad conduct, or according to the ritualistic *karma* performed by him, that the assumption of his next body is determined ? The author of the Sūtras has suggested that it is the *karma* that determines it. With regard to the use of the term 'caraṇa', he cites the opinion of Kārṣṇājini, that, by implication, this term also may mean 'anuśaya'. Bādari, however, thinks that this can be the direct meaning of the term as well, so far as it means good and bad actions(iii. 1. 11). Rāmānuja points out that Bādari's view is our author's view.

Here the different authorities are cited only with a view to show how certain difficulties could be got over. The general conclusion is the same for all ; there was some difficulty about a particular term ; but it could be avoided in more than one way.

(vi) In iii. 2. 40-41, the matter under discussion is the character of Brahma as the dispenser of the results of good and bad actions. As might be expected, Jaimini in this connection holds that *Dharma, i. e., karma* as prescribed in the Scriptures, ensures its own results. Bādarāyaṇa, however, is not prepared to accept this position. He thinks that it is Brahma and Brahma alone, who can dispense the fruits of *karma.* Jaimini's opinion is cited as a rival interpretation of certain dicta of *Śruti.*

(vii) In the seventh group of Sūtras, iii. 4. 1-8., the subject under discussion is whether the highest goal of human life (*puruṣārtha*) is to be attained by knowledge (*vidyā*) or by the action (*karma*) As in the previous case, here also, Jaimini differs from Bādarāyaṇa. Without perhaps meaning any depreciation of *Vidyā* Jaimini suggests that *karma* also is necessary. This is a fundamental difference between the two schools. And as several other cases, by quoting and refuting his views, Bādarāyaṇa honours his rival in the interpretation of *Śruti,*

(viii) In iii. 4. 18-19, the subject under discussion is more or less the same as the above. Though the Madhva school puts slightly different interpretation on these Sūtras, among other commentators, there is a general agreement as to the main question at issue. In the previous group of Sūtras, an attempt was made to establish the proposition that *vidyā* is independent of *karma.* One of the arguments advanced in support of this dictum was that pursuit of *vidyā* has been prescribed even for those in the later *āśramas* for whom *karma* is not prescribed. To this Jaimini's objection is that, an *āśrama* without *karma, i. e.,*

the last *āsramas*, are not, strictly speaking, sanctioned by *Śruti* and, therefore, are not quite valid. Hence *vidyā* without *karma* was not considered by *Śruti* a sufficient means for the attainment of the highest goal.

Bādarāyaṇa meets this objection here and claims to have finally established the general conclusion already put forward. It is needless to say that both of them ultimately rely upon texts of *Śruti* and differ in their interpretation. Śaṅkara (under Sūtra iii 4. 18 and iii. 4. 20.) seems to think that this tiresome discussion would not have been necessary if the matters had only referred to Jābāla Up 4.

(ix) The Sūtra iii. 4. 40. has been differently read (*vide* Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara) and also differently explained (*vide* Madhva and others). But as is clear from its very construction, this Sūtra points to an agreement and not difference between Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa ; and the commentators also have emphasised this fact. Now, what is this point of agreement? A literal translation of the Sūtra would mean : " Those who have become *such*, do not become other than such". Reasons for this proposition also are given in the Sūtra itself. But commentators differ as to the meaning of '*such*' here. Madhva suggests a particular form of existence, such as *deva, asura,* &c. Vallabha understands by '*such*' the state of *bhakti* (or, devotion to the Lord). Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka suggest the state of attaining the higher *āśramas*. The last meaning seems to be more sensible here and more pertinent. According to it, the author of the Sūtras is understood to mean that once a man has gone up to a higher *āśrama,* there is no going back for him. Herein both the masters, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, agree.

(x) Sūtras iii. 4. 44 45, make mention of two names—Ātreya and Auḍulomi. But these Sūtras have given rise to a curious diversity of interpretation. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand them to refer to a question which, strictly speaking, is no a question of Brahmavidyā at all. But the whole of that section of the Sūtras, is devoted to questions of this kind. And this again shows that the separation of the Upaniṣadic cult from the cult of *karma* was not yet an accomplished fact. The stubborn opposition to *karma* that we find in some of the later writers, does exist in the Sūtras. The fairly elaborate discussion of the respective duties of the *āśramas* and the references to ceremonial performances that are found in this chapter of the Sūtras, conclusively show that the two branches of *Śruti* had not yet become hostile to each other. Even according to Śaṅkara, the above Sūtras discuss a question which was rather a question of *karma* than of *Jñāna*.

The question discussed here is: Certain details of worship have been prescribed in some passages (*e. g. Ch. ii.*); are they to be performed by the *Yajamāna* himself, *i.e.*, one who employs the *ṛtvik* for the performance of sacrifice, or, are they to be performed by the *ṛtvik*, *i. e.*, the Brahmin employed for the purpose? Ātreya thinks that they are to be performed by the employer (*yajamāna*), while Auḍulomi thinks that they should be performed by the employee (the *ṛtvik*). We need not discuss the reasons given by either of them.

Madhva gives rather a round-about interpretation to these Sūtras and takes them to mean that real attainment of Brahma is possible only for the gods: "*Brahma-vid āpnoti param-ityādi phalaṃ svāmināṃ devānām eva bhavati*

etc." And he takes Audulomi's theory (as suggested in iii. 4. 45.) to be that some of this benefit accrues to beings lower than the gods also: "Alpaṃ phalaṃ prajānām-api bhavatīti Audulomir manyate".

Vallabha gives yet another and a more Vaiṣṇava interpretation. The nature of this interpretation will be sufficiently indicated if we say that he even refers to the women of *Vraja* and their devotion to the Lord of Gokula.

(xi) Sūtras iv. 3. 7., iv. 3. 12. and iv. 3. 15. contain the names of Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa respectively. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Madhva read them as part of the same *adhikaraṇa* or section; Śaṅkara and Vallabha read the first two Sūtras as constituting parts of one discourse and the third one as dealing with another topic.

The Upaniṣadic text referred to is *Ch.* iv. 15; and the question raised is: Whether the goal attained by *devayāna* is *para* Brahma, or, *apara* Brahma also called *kāryya* Brahma. According to Śaṅkara, Bādari's opinion given in Sūtra iv. 3. 7., is also the opinion of the author of the Sūtras. According to Vallabha, our author agrees with Jaimini. In other words, it is *apara* Brahma according to the first and *para* Bramha according to the second view, that is attained. According to both of them, the third Sūtra here refers to a different question.

According to the other commentators, however, Bādarāyaṇa's own view is given in the third Sūtra in the above triad; and he accepts neither the position of Bādari nor that of Jaimini.

(xii) Sūtras iv. 4. 5-7. discuss the question suggested by *Ch.* viii. 3. It is this: When the finite soul attains Brahma, as described in *Ch.* viii. 3., what exactly is the nature of its existence? What are its attributes then?

According to Jaimini (iv. 4. 5), the soul has the attributes of Brahma as described in *Ch*. viii. 7. 1., etc.

Auḍulomi (iv. 4. 6) holds a slightly different view and thinks that the soul's existence at that stage is mere consciousness.

Bādarāyaṇa does not see that there is much difference between these two positions (iv. 4. 7).

(xiii) In Sūtras iv. 4. 10-12., the question discussed is: Does the liberated soul retain the powers of physical senses? Bādari thinks it does not; Jaimini thinks, it does. Bādarāyaṇa suggests that there are Śruti texts to support both the views; but a synthesis of all these texts would mean that, even after liberation, the soul retains, not the actual senses, but all potentialities; *i.e.*, it can give to itself any form it likes.

III.

It will be be seen from the above that the names quoted in the Vedānta-Sūtras, appear in connection with some controversial question and that all their views have not been presented. Yet from what has been preserved there, it is possible to attempt a general definition of their philosophical stand-point. But before we launch upon such an undertaking, we may note the following points:

(1) Even Jaimini, the reputed founder of the school of *karma* philosophy, was an interpreter of Upaniṣad texts as well. He also has his views on such philosophical questions as the nature of the soul after liberation.

(2) Though it is not at all evident that fully developed schools were there, yet from the fairly long list of Upaniṣadic interpreters quoted in the Sūtras, it is clear that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa did not grow on a virgin

soil. As the most comprehensive and thorough-going system, however, it eclipsed all others.

(3) Some of the names quoted, including that of Bādarāyaṇa himself, are also quoted by Jaimini in his Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras. This is a very important fact. It shows that originally there was but one class of interpreters of Śruti; and it was only gradually that the differences among them grew sharper and sharper and two opposing schools appeared in the field. But even at the time of the Sūtras, both of Bādarāyaṇa and of Jaimini, the difference of opinion between them and, therefore, the opposition between *jñāna* and *karma*, had not given rise to a complete split.

The common names between Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā are. (*i*) Bādarāyaṇa, (*i*) Jaimini, (*ii*) Kārṣṇājini, (*iv*) Atreya and (*v*) Bādari.

(4) One of the crucial doctrines that subsequently gave rise to the different schools of Vedānta, was that of relation of the soul to Brahma. Different theories about that relation appear to have emerged even before the Sūtras; but it was mainly confined to iterpretation of specific texts and was not yet considered as an independent doctrine.

We may attempt now to define the stand point of the individual thinkers, as far as the available materials will allow us to do so.

1. *Jaimini:*—Apart from the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā school of which he is the universally accepted founder, Jaimini appears to have been an interpreter of Upaniṣad texts also. The doctrines attributed to him involve mere interpretation of texts as well as enunciation of more fundamental philosophical tenets.

He is fully aware of the theory of Brahma and knows and explains the texts of Śruti on which this theory is based. In Vedānta-Sūtra i. 2. 28. & i. 2. 31, we find him interpreting specific texts of Upaniṣads and giving reasons why certain terms used therein should mean Brahma as distinguished from what they mean in common parlance.

But at the same time, the Vedānta advances a theory about the minor gods which he does not accept. V. S. i. 3. 31 refers to his reasons for holding that the gods had no need of and could not possibly practise Brahma-vidyā. The theory is full of interest and is not free from difficulty. Even for the Vedānta, the gods were not unreal; and for the Mīmāṃsā, they were very much real. The Vedānta had its own solution of the problem of their relation with Brahma. The position of the Mīmāṃsā is not quite clear from the references contained in the Vedānta. But it is clear that Jaimini believed in Brahma—a Being other than and superior to the multiplicity of deities (V. S. i. 4. 18).

There can be no doubt that these references are to the same Jaimini who is reputed to have founded the school of *karma*. Although we have just seen that he believed in Brahma as the highest reality, yet his characteristic doctrine of *karma* was not renounced by him. In V. S. iii. 2. 40, we find a reference to his opinion which shows that even as an interpreter of Brahma-vidyā, his faith in *karma* was unshaken. According to him, *karma*, we are told, dispensed its own fruits, and whatever other characteristics Brahma might have possessed, the power to alter or modify the inevitable consequences of *karma*, i. e., of virtue and vice, did not belong to him.

In V. S. iii. 4. 2, Jaimini is quoted again as asserting a doctrine similar to the above. According to him, *karma* not only brought its own reward and punishment, but it was indispensable for the attainment of the highest good: *vidyā* alone did not suffice.

The emphasis on *karma* was Jaimini's specific contribution to the interpretation of Śruti. And he went so far as to say that all the praise that has been bestowed on *vidyā* in Śruti literature, means no more than that it should accompany the practice of *karma*. Accordingly, he even suggested that the later *āśramas* in which *karma* could be altogether abdicated, were not sanctioned by Śruti (V. S. iii. 4. 18.). These *ā'ramas* were in existence and *Smṛtis* no doubt admitted them; but Jaimini contended that *Śruti* did not sanction them and as such they were invalid and certainly were not binding. He would not admit the validity of an *āśrama* in which *vidyā* alone survived and *karma* could be given up.

Jaimini's view about *karma* seems to have been rather rigid, and consequently, his view about *āśramas* also very rigid. In V. S. iii. 4. 40., as the Sūtra has been explained by Śaṅkara, he is found to have held that once a man has gone over to a higher *āśrama*, he connot be permitted to descend to a lower one. This Sūtra has been differently interpreted; but there is no doubt that it speaks of an agreement between Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini; and put in general language, it suggests a certain amount of rigidity in the conduct of life and that one should not be permitted to change his mode of life——his *āśrama*——at pleasure.

Not only was Jaimini a believer in Brahma, but from V. S. iv. 3. 12., he appears even to have accepted the

Vedāntist's distinction between *para* and *apara* Brahma, as manifested in the world of experience.

Jaimini's views about the condition of the soul after emancipation, are referred to in V. S iv. 4. 5 ; and we are told there that according to him, the soul in that condition possesses all the attributes that have been ascribed to Brahma in Ch viii. 7. 1., &c., viz, it can realise whatever it wishes, &c.; and it retains the potentialities of any physical form. In other words, it has the power of enjoying all kinds of blissful experiences, the hard-earned fruits of a virtuous life, without, however, any risk of falling down again into a life of misery and suffering.

2. *Āśmarathya:*—This is the second name in our list. As to his philosophical teachings, much information is not available. In Sūtra i. 2, 29., we find that he, too, like the rest, was interpreter of Upaniṣadic texts and that, as such, he had a position. His opinion is quoted with reference to certain controversial passages and he had his reasons for giving a particular interpretation to those passages (see above).

But Āśmarathya's real importance lies in the fact that in V. S. i. 4. 20., we find him advocating a definte theory about the relation of the finite soul to the infinite. He thought that in essence the finite soul was indistinguishable from the infinite; yet there was between them the relation of cause and effect, just like that between a spark and a fire from which it springs. In the language of Śaṅkara: "Āśmarathyasya tu yady-api jīvasya paraśmād-ananyatvam abhipretam, tathāpi pratijñā-siddher-its sāpekṣatvābhidhānāt kāryya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ kiyān-apy-abhipreta iti gamyate" (V. S. i. 4. 22. cf. also Vallabha, under i, 4. 20),

According to Rāmānuja also, Āśmarathya's meaning was that the finite souls are born of Brahma.

Prajñānānanda[1] thinks that Āśmarathya's theory was the same as what was subsequently held by the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* school. But it does not seem to be correct. For, had it been so, we could expect Rāmānuja accepting this position and passing it off as the position of the author of the Sūtras himself. But he does not do so; on the contrary, he says that the view ascribed to Kāśakṛtsna in Sūtra 1. 4. 22., is the view of the Sūtrakāra. "Kāśakṛtsnīyam-eva matam sūtrakāraḥ svīkṛtavān". Surely, no commentator can advocate a view which is not the view of the Sūtrakāra according to him. So what Rāmānuja thinks to be the opinion of the sūtrakāra, is his own opinion also. Now, Rāmānuja's view is the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view; and he does not accept Āśmarathya's view. Āśmarathya, therefore cannot be regarded as belonging to the Viśiṣṭādvaita School.

Prof. Radhakrishna says: "Āśmarathya holds the *bhedābheda* view of the relation of the soul to Brahman"[2]. This also does not appear to be correct. For as Prajñānānanda points out, the *bhedābdeda* view is advocated rather by Auḍulomi than by Āśmarathya. Śrīnivāsa, the commentator on Nimbārka-*bhāṣya*, says under 1. 4. 21. "Evam bhedābheda-vākyārtha ity-Auḍulomerācāryyasyābhiprāyaḥ". Śaṅkara also says the same thing under Sūtra 1. 4. 22. "Auḍulomi-pakṣe punaḥ spaṣṭam-evāvasthāntarāpekṣau *bhedābhedau* gamyete etc."

All this shows that Āśmarathya cannot be taken either as advocating the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or as advocating the *Bhedābheda* theory. Neither of these names has been

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1. *History of Vedantism* (in Bengali). p. 69.
2. *Indian Philosophy*, V. II. p. 432.

ascribed to him by any of the commentators. Vācaspati relying on the same Upaniṣad text as Rāmānuja, understands him to mean that the souls are 'transformations' of Brahma (*'Brahma-vikārāḥ'*) and are neither essentially different nor essentially non-different from Brahma ('na brahmaṇo' tyantam bhidyate..................nā'pi atyantaṃ na bhidyate'). Āśmarathya thus seems to favour a view which was very much like the *bhedābheda*, but this technical designation was not applied to his position: this shows that it was not quite the same thing.

Āśmarathya's name occurs also in the Mīmāṃsā–Sūtra of Jaimini (vi. 5. 16.) He is quoted there as holding a particular view regarding the performance of a ceremony. Though his view is not fully subscribed by Jaimini, yet it is obvious from the subject matter of the controversy that he too, like Jaimini, was an interpreter not only of Upaniṣads but also of other branches of Śruti.

3. **Bādari**:—The philosophical tenets of this thinker as preserved in the Vedānta-Sūtra, are not many. If, as the name seems to imply, he was the founder of the family of which the author of the Sūtras was a more distinguished scion, then, it is very likely that many of his opinions were absorbed and assimilated in the Sūtras without acknowledgment. But the few references to him in the Sūtras are enough to show tht he held an important position among the interpreters of the Upaniṣads.

In V. S. 1. 2. 30., we find him as one of several exponents of a controversial passage; and he is represented offering a line of interpretation which deserved consideration.

In iii. 1. 11., we find him quoted again, as holding

a specific view regarding primarily a text of Upaniṣad but secondarily an important doctrine of Brahma-vidyā viz., the return of the soul to this life after experiencing its *karma* in a hereafter.

In iv. 3. 7., we find him again chiefly as an exponent of the meaning of texts, but secondarily as laying down a theory which is not unacceptable to the author of the Sūtras. He held that when Śruti texts speak of *reaching* up to Brahma, they mean the manifested Brahma (*apara Brahma*) and not ultimate Brahma. This is opposed to the view of Jaimini. Śaṅkara tells us that the author of the Sūtras does not accept Jaimini's position, and it is with a view to reject it that he confronts it with that of Bādari.

In iv. 4. 10, Bādari is said to have held that when the soul has attained the knowledge that emancipates, it does not retain the body and the senses.

Bādari also is quoted in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras. In iii 1. 3., he is quoted in connection with a detail of *karma*. In vi. 1. 27., he appears to have favoured the view that under certain conditions, even a Śūdra could perform a Vedic ceremony. In viii. 3. 6., he is quoted in reference to the interpretation of texts using terms of duration. And in ix. 2. 33., he is quoted as holding a particular view as to how a letter—a vowel or consonant—could be altered in a song (*sāma*). These quotations show that Bādari too, was an interpreter of both branches of Śruti.

4. **Bādarāyaṇa**:—This is the undisputed author of the Sūtras and his philosophy is the philosophy of the entire system of Sūtras. Yet in some of these Sūtras, his name is specifically mentioned, though he is supposed to have

been the author of them all. No serious attempt has been made by any of the commentators to justify this rather unusual procedure. Vallabha suggests that the author of the Sūtras takes his own name just to show that the views of other scholars against whom he sets his own view, are unsound (see Vallabha under Sūtras *i.* 3. 26., *i.* 3. 33., *iii.* 4. 1.; etc.,). But this is hardly an adequate explanation. At the same time, it must be conceded that Bādarāyaṇa's own name occurs only along with those of some others and always in a controversial matter; it is not impossible, therefore, that his name was cited just to show how he solved a particular difficulty about which diverse solutions had been offered, and also perhaps to emphasise his position. If that be so, then it would appear that in other matters—in the broad outlines of his system—he claims unanimity with his predecessors. But we have not materials enough to decide whether this was actually the case or not: whether and how far Bādarāyaṇa accepted the conclusions of his predecessors and how far he repudiated them. In some cases he must have accepted their conclusions without express acknowledgment; and it is equally likely that in some other cases, he rejected their opinions without feeling the necessity of controverting them.

So, Vallabha's suggestion that Bādarāyaṇa's own name is taken only to tell us that other people's views on the subject under discussion are unacceptable to him, does not appear to be unimpeachable. It is rather when in a controversial question he holds a decided view, that his name is specifically mentioned. When, however, his own view is not quite definite, he notices the different views held by others and passes off without always attempting to

reconcile them (*e.g.*, in *i.* 4. 19, *et seq.*). And naturally the commentators, according to their own inclinations, select any one of these views and proclaim it as the view of the Sūtrakāra. Thus, in the above group of Sūtras, several views have been suggested by different authorities as to the relation of the soul to Brahma; and Bādarāyaṇa's own view not being quite definitely indicated, some commentators (*e.g.*, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja) have ascribed the view of Kāśakṛtsna, some (*e.g.*, Vallabha) the view of Auḍulomi, to him.

From the above it will appear that the only safe conclusion in this connection is that Bādarāyaṇa's own name occurs in those cases where (*i*) he held quite definite views and where (*ii*) the rival views were equally definite, were advocated by men of authority and position, and could not therefore be quietly brushed aside without notice. When his own view was not quite pronounced, he refers to the controversy and gives us even the names of the participants in the controversy, but omits his own name. And when the rival view was not espoused by very prominent men, he quietly ignored it. So, it is not always that whenever he condemned an opinion, he indicated his position by taking his own name. To this extent, we cannot accept Vallabha's explanation as sufficient. But apart from this explanation, is it not thinkable that the entire groups of Sūtras in which Bādarāyaṇa's own name is found, were later additions? The qnestion is not free from difficulty and we must leave it here.

With regard to Bādarāyaṇa, there is another important fact to be noted here. He was more than the founder of the school of Brahma-vidyā: just as he quotes Jaimini, the latter also has occasions to quote him in the Mīmāṃsā-

Sūtras (*e.g.*, *i.* 1. 5., v. 2. 19., etc.). This shows that he, too, like many others, was an interpreter of Śruti as a whole, though he bestowed his special attention on the Upaniṣads.

5. **Auḍulomi**:—This name does not occur in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras. Yet in V.-S. iii. 44. 5., we find him joining in a controversy which was not far removed from theories of rituals. There he advocates the view that, certain details of worship prescribed in Śruti texts (*Ch.* ii. 3.), were to be performed not by the *yajamāna*, but by the *ṛtvik*.

In V. S. iv. 4. 6., we find him advocating a theory about the condition of the soul after emancipation. His opinion is that in that condition the soul is nothing more than pure consciousness.

But the more important philosophical contribution of Auḍulomi is referred to in V. S. i. 4. 21. There he is represented as having held the view that, before emancipation the soul is different from Brahma; but after emancipation, it becomes one with him. He stands, therefore, for the view which in later times was known by the name of '*bhedābheda*' theory (*cf.* Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa, etc.).

6. **Kāśakṛtsna**:—This name occurs only once in the Vedānta-Sūtras in *i.* 4. 22. There, in spite of other differences between themselves, both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja understand him as holding the view that the finite soul is essentially the same as Brahma. They further agree that the view here ascribed to Kāśkṛtsna, is the view of the Sūtrakāra also. "Tatra kāśakṛtsnīyam mataṃ śrutyanusārīti gamyate," says Śaṅkara; and "Kāśakṛtsnīyam eva mataṃ sūtrakāraḥ svikṛtavān," says Rāmānuja.

As to the second point, other commentators do not agree with Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. For instance, Madhva says that the view attributed to Kāśakṛtsna, is only a *partial* statement of the truth; and Nimbārka thinks that the view ascribed to Auḍulomi in the previous Sūtra, is really the view of the author of the Sūtras (*cf.* Śrīnivāsa).

As to the first point, all commentators agree in a general way that Kāśakṛtsna believed in an identity of the soul and Brahma. But the exact nature of this identity is not clear from the brief reference in the Sūtra. And the fact that both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja accept Kaśakṛtsna's view as the view of the Sūtrakāra, and therefore, as their own view, shows that the identity of soul and Brahma, according to Kāśakṛtsna, was not defined in such a way as to leave no room for controversy. The points in which the schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja differ, were apparently not covered by this Sūtra, and perhaps were not anticipated by Kāśakṛtsna himself.

7. **Kārṣṇājini** :– He is mentioned only once in V. S. *iii*. 1. 9. There he is quoted with reference to the interpretation of a particular Upaniṣad text (Ch. v. 10. 7). The general meaning of this and similar texts is given by the Sūtrakāra himself. The question is about the way in which the soul comes back to life again after a sojourn in places of existence to which it goes according to its *karma*. Certain terms used in those Śruti texts offer some difficulties; and Kārṣṇājini is quoted as suggesting one of several possible solutions. It seems however, that the Sūtrakāra is more inclined to accept the solution associated with the name of Bādari (" Atra Bādari-matam eva svamatam "—Rāmānuja and Madhva also.)

In Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra iv. 3. 17., Kārṣṇājini is quoted as holding a particular opinion about the performance of specific sacrifices. And in vi. 7. 35., we find him quoted again as holding the view tha t, with regar to these sacrifices which were to last for a thousand years, the performance was to be continued by son after father and by grandson after the son, and so on, until it was concluded. That is to say, the ordinance about such ceremonies was to apply, according to him, not to an individual, but to a family.

Kārṣṇājini is another instance of an Upaniṣadic scholar being at the same time an interpreter of other branches of Śruti as well.

8. **Atreya** :—In V. S. *iii.* 4. 44., we find this name associated with the view that certain items of worship as suggested in texts like Ch. *ii.* 3., are to be performed by the Yajamāna himself, for he it is that will reap the benefit thereof. The mention of his name here shows that Atreya was an Upaniṣadic scholar ; but what other contribution he made, or, whether he made any other contribution at all to the advancement of Brahma-vidyā, we do not know.

But his name occurs several times in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras. In iv, 3. 18., he advocates a particular view about the performance of a ceremony and its consequences. In v. 2. 18., he is quoted as holding the view that certain libations which constitute adjuncts of other principal performances, are to be offered at a specific point in the course f that performance. And ih vi. 1. 26., he is found joining the controversy whether a Śūdra can perform any sacrifice. We may note here in passing that the decision

of the Mīmāṃsā in this matter is identical with that of the Vedānta as given in *i*. 3. 34., &c. In both, the Śūdra is denied the right either to practise a Vedic ceremony or to pursue Upaniṣadic meditation.

This concludes our attempt to reconstruct the philosophies of those who preceded Bādarāyaṇa in the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. The available materials do not permit us to do more than this.

IV

We have seen above that some of the Upaniṣadic scholars were also quoted as authorities in the Mımāṃsā-Sūtras. We may note here that most of these names have also been referred to in the *Gṛhya* and *Śrauta* Sūtras. Thus, Āśmarathya is quoted in Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra, v. 13., Bhāradvāja Śrauta Sūtra, *i*. 10., etc. In Baudhāyana Gṛhya occur the names of Ātreya (*i*. 3. 15. & *i*. 4. 43), Bādari (*i*. 4. 43.) and Kāṣakṛtsna (ibid). (cf. Radhakrishnan, *Idian philosophy*, vol. *ii*., p. 433).

It is needless to say that in the Gṛhya and Śrauta Sūtras these names are quoted *not* for their philosophical views but rather as authorities on ritualistic matters ; but there is their opinion about the way in which certain domestic and religious rites were to be performed. This confirms the suggestion that we have been repeatedly making, that originally the interpretation of the Upaniṣads as well as other branches of Śruti, was in the hands of the same class of men. And this fact in its turn indicates the nature of the gradual growth of Brahma-vidyā from the Upaniṣads to the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. A class of scholars had arisen who interpreted the obscurities of Śruti ; to them all Śruti was equally binding and equally

authoritative. Gradually, however, some among them specialised in the Upaniṣads, and it was this latter class that led up to the Sūtras.

It must be repeated with regard to these men that we cannot claim to possess all their philosophical and religious tenets. Many of these probably have been incorporated, beyond recognition, in the subsequent systems of thought; and some may even have been discarded and forgotten. Only in respect of some of their teachings, their name is still found associated. So, the available materials do not warrant us in presuming that we know all about them. But we can certainly form some idea of the course of the progress of Brahma-vidyā, through years of interpretation of the sacred texts, until we come to the comprehensive system of Bādarāyaṇa. It is not at all certain if anything like *systems* preceded Bādarāyaṇa; and whatsoever attempts at system-building may have been there, were all eclipsed and superseded by his system. But still there were some problems which had been dealt with in more or less thorough manner.

The problems that chiefly engaged the attention of Bādarāyaṇa's predecessors, were:

(i) First and foremost, the interpretation of difficult and obscure passages, specially those that admitted of more than one meaning. (See above. 1st group of Sūtras).

(ii) Another question that seems to have troubled their brain was, "Who were entitled to the study of Vedānta?" (Group 2, above). This must have been due to the growing class-consciousness of the superior castes.

(iii) Incidentally, the position of the minor deites also became a problem with them. And on this, as on several

other questions, diverse views continued to be held even after the Sūtras. (Group 2, above).

(iv) The relation of the soul to Brahma had already become an important question and led to divergent views which could never be finally synthesised. (Group 4, above).

(v) Migration of the soul was another vexed question with them. (Group 5).

(vi) The nature of Brahma was of course a difficult question ; but the particular aspect of this question that produced considerable difference of views, before or about the time of Badarāyaṇa, was : Whether his will had anything to do with the results of actions done by men. (Group 6).

(vii) The question of *karma* and *jñāna*--of action and meditation had already laid the foundation of two opposite schools, which, inspite of many subsequent attempts at reconciliation, were never perhaps made to agree. (Group 7).

(viii) Questions of *āśramas* were also receiving attention and were leading to sharp differences of opinion. (Groups 8 & 9).

(ix) Incidents of the performance of ritualistic actions were still considered important and they were not yet divorced from questions of Brahma-vidyā strictly so-called (Group 10).

(x) The course of the soul's emancipation and its condition after emancipation, was undoubtedly a big question and could not be solved with anything like unanimity. (Groups 11-13).

These, in brief, were the problems that led to considera-

ble discussion previous to the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The questions do not appear to have arisen out of independent and extraneous sources and were certainly not read into the Śruti texts. On the contrary, it must be conceded, in fairness to these thinkers, that the questions were suggested to them by the very texts which they regarded as sacred and which they sought to understand and to interpret.

For how long these streams of interpretation had flowed, it is difficult to ascertain ; but they must have flowed for a considerable time. The very traces preserved indicate the magnitude of the labour and attention bestowed upon a correct understanding of these holy texts even before Bādarāyaṇa.

METRICAL BASIS OF THE MĪMĀṂSĀ SUTRAS OF JAIMINI.

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No definite date has yet been assigned to the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini. Still there can be no doubt that this branch of study had a long history preceding these Sūtras. It is proved not only by references to older authorities of whom not less than nine (*i.e.*, आत्रेय, आलेखन, आश्मरथ्य, ऐतिशायन, कामुकायन, कार्ष्णाजिनि, बादरायण, बादरि and लावुकायन) are mentioned in the Sūtras, but also by the style of the work. The same conclusion is supported by quite an unexpected piece of evidence which, I think, is for the first time presented to scholars in this paper.

In course of my readings of the Sūtras it struck me that a large number of them sounded like so many metrical

pieces. On examining the whole work in this light and on comparing it with other works in the Sūtra style I am led to the conclusion that the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras must have had a metrical basis which though recast in the Sūtra style has still left its traces in the present work. It is intended to set forth in detail the results of this examination in this paper.

It would appear from what follows that a very large number of Sūtras or parts of Sūtras are identical in form with metrical pieces: Ślokas, three-fourths of Ślokas, Ardha-Ślokas and Pādas. All such cases, I hope, have been noticed in the following examination.

But there are also cases where two or more consecutive Sūtras together make up one or more metrical lines. For instance, Sūtras I. 2,42 and 43 (परिसंख्या+अर्थवादो वा) together make up a Pāda. All such cases are not noticed in this examination.

Again, there are many cases where the omission of an unnecessary little word, like इति, वा, च, turns one or two Sūtras into a metrical form. For instance, Sūtras I. 3, 5 (शिष्टाकोपेऽविरुद्धमिति चेत्), I. 2, 13-21 (लोकवदिति चेत्+न पूर्वत्वात्), II. 3, 6 (अगुणा च कर्मचोदना) with the omission of इति and च can be easily turned into Pādas. Such cases also are not, as a rule, noticed here.

It will also be noticed that there are cases where a finite verbal form is quite unnecessarily included in a Sūtra, *e.g.*, उपपद्यते in I. 4, 19 and स्यात in II. 4, 5—a practice which is not quite in keeping with the Sūtra style in general, and the only justification of which probably has to be found in the fact that such words are a survival of the original metrical basis.

Again, it will be found that in some cases it is only through the restoration of an Avagraha that a Sūtra or a part of a Sūtra is turned into a metrical form. Such cases are, as a rule, included in this examination. It is unnecessary to point out in this connection that similar restoration of Avagraha is often resorted to, in order to complete the hemistiches, even in such metrical works as the *Bṛhad-devatā* and the *Ṛgveda-Prāti'akhya.*

Finally it may be added that the present work contains a large number of such cases where a Sūtra or a part of a Sūtra or a number of Sūtras taken together can be turned into an Ardha-Śloka or even into a larger metrical piece by means of a transposition of two or more regular Pādas. There is nothing inconsistent in this with the theory of this paper. Similar in nature are those cases—a few of them are pointed out in the following—where a very slight change in the order of the words of a Sūtra turns it into a metrical form.

It may also be added that nowhere in the following examination parts of compounds are taken to form a metrical line or lines.

After these preliminary remarks we now come to the main parts of this paper.

ŚLOKAS.

Let us first begin with the cases of complete Ślokas.

No less than seven such cases I have so far noticed in the present work.[1] In view of their small number and

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1. For the text and numbering of the Sutras I have referred to the *Jaimini-Sutra-Vrtti, Subodhini,* edition Nityananda Parvatiya, Benares, Series 1956. The Bib. Ind. edition of the Savara Bhasya (in two parts) has been consulted only very occasionally.

of their great interest it is worth while to give them here in full.

(1) III. 1, 3:—

शास्त्रास्यानतिशङ्क्यत्वान्न च द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते ।

तेनार्थेनातिसंबन्धात् क्रियायां पुरुषश्रुतिः ॥

Here a part of a Sūtra is in the form of a complete Śloka.

(2) VI. 21, 9:—

अशास्त्रात्तूपसंप्राप्तिः शास्त्रं स्यान्न प्रकल्पकम् ।

तस्मादर्थेन गम्येत अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत् ॥

Here by means of restoration of an Avagraha a complete Sūtra assumes the form of a complete Śloka.

(3) VI. 1, 5—6:—

कर्तुर्वा श्रुतिसंयोगाद्विधिः कार्त्स्न्येन गम्यते ।

लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात् पुंयुक्तमैतिशायनः ॥

This is an instance of a complete stanza formed by two complete Sūtras

(4) VI. 2, 22:—

शास्त्राणां त्वर्थवत्त्वेन पुरुषार्थो विधीयते ।

तयोरसमवायित्वात्तादर्थ्ये विध्यतिक्रमः ॥

Here a complete Sūtra is identical in form with a complete Śloka. विधायतas printed is a mistake for विधीयते; cf. comm. and the Bibi Ind. edition of the Śāvara Bhāyṣa, pt. I. page 645.

(5) II. 1, 7—8—9:

तानि प्रधानभूतानि यैर्द्रव्यं न चिकीर्ष्यते ।

द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वाद् यैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते ॥

तस्यद्रव्यप्रधानत्वाद्गुणास्तत्र प्रतीयेत ।

धर्ममात्रे तु कर्म स्यादनिर्वृत्तेः प्रयाजवत् ॥

Here three complete Sūtras, by transposition of two Pādas, make up two complete stanzas.

(6) X. 4, 21—22:—

विधिशब्दस्य मन्त्रत्वे भावः स्यात्तेन चोदना।

शेषाणां चोदनैकत्वात्तस्मात्सर्वस्य श्रूयते ॥

An instance of a complete stanza formed by two complete Sūtras. The extra syllable वा found in the Subodhinī in Sūtra 22 is wanting in the Śāvara Bhāṣya (Bibi. Ind.) Part II. page 456.

(7) X. 6, 3—4:

कालमात्रं परार्थत्वात् स्वदेशं प्रति विकृतम् ;

एकाहवद् द्विसामत्वं पृष्ठयस्य युगपद्विधेः ॥

Here the two Sūtras in the form of two hemistiches, both of which require transposition of their Pādas, make up a complete Śloka. It is probable that several other cases of a similar nature might be discovered in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras as a result of a more minute examination.

THREE-QUARTERS OF STANZAS.

The number of cases where a Sūtra or a part of a Sūtra makes three-quarters of a Śloka, so far noticed by me, is also not very large. For this very reason they are given in the following.

(1) VI. 2, 2:—

अपि वोत्पत्तिसंयोगाद्यथा स्यात्सर्वदर्शनम् ।

तथा भावो विभागे स्यात्

This Sūtra taken together with the following one makes up one complete Śloka *plus* a Pāda.

(2) VI. 2, 2:—

प्रतिषेधेष्वकर्मत्वात्

क्रिया स्यात् प्रतिषिद्धानां विभक्तत्वादकारणम् ।

Here a Śloka without the 2nd Pāda is formed by a complete Sūtra.

(3) VI. 3, 4 :—

प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात्कर्माभेदं तु जैमिनिः ।

सर्वेषामुपदेशः स्यात्

In this instance one Pāda requires transposition.

(4) X. 3, 71 :—

प्रतिषिद्धस्य कर्मत्वान्न च गौण प्रयोजनम् ।

अर्थः स दक्षिणानां स्यात्

A case of a part of a Sūtra identical in form with three-quarters of a Śloka.

(5) X. 7, 5 :—

तेषां वा द्व्यवदानत्वं विवक्षन्नभिनिर्दिशेत् ।

पशोः पञ्चवदानत्वात् ॥

Here a Sūtra is in the form of three-quarters of a Śloka.

(6) II. 1, 7 :—

This case has already been noticed under the previous heading.

(7) II. 1. 8 :—

This instance also has been noticed under the previous heading.

It will be noticed that all the above instances are cases of either complete Sūtras or parts of Sūtras and that no account is here taken of the cases of three-quarters of Ślokas formed by combination of two or more Sūtras. Two more cases of three quarters of stanzas are noticed in the following table.

ARDHA-ŚLOKAS.

(1) Regular Ardha-Ślokas.

Let us now take up the cases of regular Ardha-Ślokas of which not less than 35 have been so far discovered by me. Most of them are formed by a Sūtra or a part of a Sūtra. A few cases of Ardha-Ślokas formed by two complete Sūtras, in the form of two Pādas, have also been noticed; *e.g.* II. 4, 5 and 6; XI. 2, 41 & 52. But it is certain that a more minute examination will reveal a very large number of such cases. Some cases of Ardha-Ślokas are based on the restoration of Avagraha; *e. g.*, VII. 2, 11; II. 1, 1 (beginning with the word तेभ्यः. In one case (XI. 1, 43) the order of the words कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् is required to be changed to कारणात्स्यादतिक्रमः

It would not be without interest to quote here a few cases of regular Ardha-Ślokas for the sake of illustration.

I. 2, 19:—

विधिर्वा स्यादपूर्वत्वाद्वादमात्रं ह्यनर्थकम् ।

III. 5, 5:—

अशेषत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात्सर्वदानादशेषता ।

XI. 4, 29:—

अपिवेन्द्राभिधानत्वात्कृत्स्यादुपलक्षणम् ।

XII. 2, 17:—

तन्त्रमध्ये विधानाद्वा सत्तन्त्रासवनीयवत् ।

VIII. 4, 21:—

तन्त्राभावस्य हेतुत्वाद्गुणार्थे स्याददर्शनम् ।

2. ARDHA-ŚLOKAS BY TRANSPOSITION OF PADAS.

About 41 cases of Ardha-Ślokas which require transposition of their Pādas and are based mostly on complete Sūtras, to some extent on parts of Sūtras and in one instance also on two complete Sūtras have been so far

noticed by me. Here also in one case (V. 1, 15) the order of the words यथाक्रमं प्रतीयेत is required to be changed to प्रतीयेत यथाक्रमम् ।

PĀDAS.

As would appear from the following table the number of Śloka-Pādas is very large in the present work. It is true that the majority of them are formed only by parts of complete Sūtras, still the number of those Pādas which singly or unitedly are formed by complete Sūtras is quite considerable. The number of cases of the latter kind when a complete Sūtra consists of two Pādas is quite large. But there are also instances when a complete Sūtra may be divided into three (*e. g.* III, 1, 25 and 26; III. 7, 19; IV. 3, 9), four (*e. g.* III. 2, 1; VI. 6, 10), five (*e. g.* VIII. 4, 28; X. 3, 4) or even seven (*i. g.* IV. 3, 10) Pādas

There is one fact in this connection which cannot be easily passed over. It will be found on examination that a large majority of the Pādas consist only of odd (अयुजः *i. e.* the first and third) Pādas. Still I have found that second variety of Pādas (*i. e.* युजः or second and fourth) is also not lacking completely.

The following table based only on my cursory reading from this point of view of the Sūtras will give more or less an exact idea of the metrical basis of these Sūtras:—

Adhyāyas	Pādas or Sections	Sūtras in all	Ślokas	¾ of Ślokas	Ardha-Ślokas	Mere Pādas in all	Pādas formed by complete Sūtras	Miscellaneous remarks.
I	1	32	......	......	......	14	7	Sūtras 11+12 =Ardha-Śloka
I	2	53	......	......	3	24	10	Sūtras 40+41 =Ardha-Śloka
I	3	35	......	......	......	29	16	
I	4	30	......	......	......	19	10	
II	1	47	2	......	1	25	11	
II	2	29	—	......	2	21	6	
II	3	29	......	......	5	18	9	
II	4	32	—	......	......	21	10	S. 5+6=½ Śloka
III	1	26	—	1	1	26	18	
III	2	43	......	......	......	26	12	
III	3	46	......	—	—	25	6	
III	4	51	—	—	......	19	7	
III	5	54	—		1	15	10	
III	6	46	......	......	......	19	13	
III	7	52	......	......	1	18	9	
III	8	42	......	......	......	24	15	
IV	1	48	1	......	1	29	12	
IV	2	31	......	......	......	16	5	

Adhyāyas.	Pādas or Sections.	Sūtras in all.	Ślokas.	¾ of Ślokas	Ardha-Ślokas.	Mere Pādas in all.	Pādas formed by complete Sūtras.	Miscellaneous remarks.
IV	3	39	......	......	1	27	20	
IV	4	41	......	......	2	40	22	
V	1	35	......	......	3	19	11	
V	2	23	......	......	1	15	2	
V	3	44	......	......	......	22	8	
V	4	26	......	......	1	13	7	
VI	1	52	2	......	1	43	31	
VI	2	33	2	2	3	21	11	This pada is very important.
VI	3	42	......	2	......	24	11	
VI	4	48	......	......	......	21	7	
VI	5	56	......	......	......	21	12	
VI	6	39	......	......	2	25	14	
VI	7	41	......	......	1	20	10	
VI	8	45	......	......	......	19	9	
VII	1	23	......	......	1	19	12	
VII	2	21	......	......	3	13	4	
VII	3	35	......	......	......	15	3	
VII	4	20	......	......	1	13	3	
VIII	1	43	......	......	......	22	18	
VIII	2	32	......	......	......	11	6	
VIII	3	37	......	......	......	16	8	
VIII	4	28	......	......		10	7	

Adhyāyas.	Pādas or Sections.	Sūtras in all.	Ślokas.	¾ of Ślokas.	Ardha-Ślokas.	Mere Pādas in all.	Pādas formed by complete Sūtras.	Miscellaneous remarks.
IX	1	57	......	......	4	42	20	
IX	2	60	......	......	1	35	24	
IX	3	45	......	......	......	28	7	
IX	4	56	......	......	2	39	18	
X	1	58	......	......	2	36	12	
X	2	73	......	......	......	37	16	
X	3	75	......	2	2	61	25	
X	4	58	......	......	4	37	13	
X	5	88	......	......	1	35	8	
X	6	80	......	......	2	50	13	
X	7	71	......	1	1	34	10	
X	8	68	......	......	3	59	27	
XI	1	70	......	......	8	46	15	S. 59+60=½ Sloka.
XI	2	66	......	......	2	38	17	
XI	3	53	......	......	......	24	3	
XI	4	57	......	......	1	31	10	
XII	1	46	......	......	......	23	6	
XII	2	37	......	......	1	18	3	
XII	3	38	......	......	......	29	17	
XII	4	47	......	......	......	17	5	
Total	60	2732	7	9	72	1556	691	4 Ardha-Slokas each formed by two complete Sutras.

A COMPARISON WITH OTHER SŪTRA—WORKS.

In spite of this evidence it might be urged that most of the instances (especially as far as the metrical Pādas are concerned), given as reasons for the theory of this paper, are only accidental. In order to meet this objection I examined, in this light, some other Sūtra-works, such as as the Vedānta-Sūtra and the first Adhyāya of the Kātyāyana—Śrauta-Sūtra. The result of their examination is as follows.

The Vedānta-Sūtra in all contains 555 Sūtras in four Adhyāyas each sub-divided into four Pādas. In the whole work I could find out only 30 metrical Pādas, *i. e.*, nearly 5 per cent of which only 15, *i.e.* nearly 2½ per cent are formed by complete Sūtras.

As regards the first Adhyāya of the Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra which contains 256 Sūtras in all, there are only 13 metrical Pādas, *i. e.*, nearly 5 per cent only 7 of which *i. e.*, about 2½ per cent are formed by complete Sūtras.

As compared with these, the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, which contains 2732 Sūtras in all contains, excluding Ślokas etc., 1556 metrical Pādas in general (*i. e.*, nearly 57 per cent.) of which 691 Pādas (*i. e.*, about 25 per cent.) are formed by complete Sūtras. Even without taking into consideration the important fact that the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra contains many instances of Ślokas, three-quarters of Ślokas and Ardha-Ślokas, the very large percentage of the metrical Pādas cannot be regarded, by any means, as accidental, however it may be so with the former two Sūtra-works.

CONCLUSION.

In view of all these facts one cannot help inferring that the present recension of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras must be based on one which was in the metrical form. If this conclusion is true, we must be prepared to revise the generally accepted view that the Sūtra-style on the whole preceded the Śloka-style. The evidence of such works as the Bṛhad-devatā as compared with the Ṛgveda-Sarvānukramaṇī (Cf. A. A. Macdonell: *Bṛhad-devatā,* Part I, Introduction pp. XXI—XXII, and pp. 147—153) and the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya as compared with the other Prātiśākhyas in two of which are found embodied several stanzas support the view that the Śloka-style is not only not necessarily later than the Sūtra-style, but is very probably anterior to the latter. The artificiality of the Sūtra-style as compared with the relative simplicity of the former also supports the same view.

ANTIQUITY OF THE SĀṄKHYA SŪTRAS.

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It is an admitted fact that Kapila was the founder of Sāṅkhya Philosophy, but the modern scholars, eastern and western, practically all of them, believe that either he did not write any book at all or if he wrote any it is not known to the world. There are a few who say that "Tattva Samāsa" a short treatise of 22 aphorisms was written by him.

There is another book "Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtras", (Sāṅkhya Ṣaḍadhyāyī), the author of which is not known to modern scholars. It is strange and surprising that the authorship of so important a work may remain untraced upto this time. It becomes even more surprising when we see, that the modern scholars believe that the Sūtras were composed even after Sāyaṇa's time, long before which the Sanskrit authors began to write their names, residence and lineage etc.

Again it is worth considering, as to how far the tradition, which ascribes these Sūtras to Kapila, is well founded, and as to why the scholars of to-day have not turned their attention to a question of so great an importance.

I am writing a book which I shall call "A History of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy", and in this book the question will be dealt with at length. This paper is a brief summary of about two chapters of the same book. The purpose is to show to the scholars that these Sūtras are very old, and that the autorship of these can be ascribed to Kapila.

The grounds for believing that the Sūtras were composed after the 14th century are as follows :—

1. These Sūtras contain the names of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The views of Jainas and Bauddhas are refuted in them.

2. Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspati, Sāyaṇa and others have not quoted the Sūtras in their works.

3. The construction of the Sūtras agrees with that of the Kārikās. As the Sūtras could not be composed in the form of verses, so some body made them on the basis of the Kārikās.

In the presence of these facts that the Sūtras may contain the names of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and the refutation of the views of the Bauddhas and the Jainas, and further that they might not have been quoted in the philosophic literature of India, for a very long period ; and the Kārikās may be found quoted instead in many books ; and the construction of the Sūtras and the Kārikās may agree to a great extent, the mind tends to believe that Kapila who is said to be the first learned man could not be the author of such a work. But when we go a little deeper, then we find that it is proved from these very books that, no body but Kapila can be the author of the Sūtras.

We shall examine these statements one by one :—

1. To consider the first argument advanced above, we must go a little deeper into the Sūtras. On a careful examination of the construction and sense of the Sūtras, we find that the " Ṣaḍadhyāyī " (Sūtras in six chapters) contains some Sūtras the authorship of which can by no means be ascribed to Kapila. These were interpolated afterwards by certain learned men for certain reasons.

It is quite clear that the first portion of these interpolated Sūtras is chapter I, Sūtras 20 to 54. Our grounds for considering them as interpolated ones may be briefly mentioned as follows :—

In the Sūtras 7 to 18 the causes of bondage of soul have been told and then refuted. Final goal, as mentioned in the beginning of the book, is the release of the soul, which is not possible if the soul is not bound before that. It is, therefore, necessary to tell the causes of bondage of the ever free soul. All of the causes mentioned in the Sūtras 7 to 18 are those of the " pūrvapakṣa " (पूर्वपक्ष), the author, therefore, goes on refuting them side by side. In the 19th Sūtra the author mentions his own view. The wording of the Śūtra is as :—

"न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते"

The meaning is quite clear ; that is, 'the bondage of the ever free spirit is not possible without contact with the matter.' The words तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते' ' of the Sūtra are specially worth considering. Here the first " tat " (तत्) means 'bondage' and the second 'tat' (तत्) means ' matter'. There is no difference of opinion between the commentators upon this point, when we have known that the bondage is brought about only by coming in contact of the spirit with the matter, then naturally, the question 'How is the ever free spirit entangled in matter' suggests itself. Now the very Sūtra which may contain the answer to this question, should, according to the construction and sense, immediatelly follow this Sūtra. Such a Sūtra nowadays is the 55th. It reads as :—

' 'तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकात् "

This clearly means that the contact with or entanglement in matter is brought by ' aviveka ' (अविवेक—igno-

rance). The words, 'तद्योगस्तद्योगाद्दते' of the 19th Sūtra and 'तद्योगोऽपि' of the 55th Sūtra say expressly that the latter should follow the former instantaneously, without any interval. The sentence can be complete in sense, only if, these are placed in this very order and none else. The Sūtras 20 to 54, therefore, are later interpolations.

These very Sūtras contain the name of Vaiśeṣika and the refutation of the views of the Jainas and the Bauddhas. Had all these Sūtras been composed by the same author, it would not have been possible that he might have told the 'pūrvapakṣa' first, then after telling his own view, might he have again mentioned the causes of bondage in the form of 'pūrvapakṣa'. At the same time we find that from the 20th Sūtra onwards, in the beginning the causes of bondage are being mentioned in the form of 'pūrvapakṣa', but as we proceed further we find that the author forgets to mention the causes of bondage of soul, and is entangled in refuting the views of the Jainas and the Bauddhas. All this is quite irrelevant.

At the same time the sense of the last three Sūtras of this section (52, 53, 54) is a repetition of the Sūtras 15 and 16. Not only the sense but the words as well are practically the same. One and the same author cannot, after writing a thing, himself forget it so soon. Repetition, therefore, is not possible. It is even more so, when the thing repeated, has got no connection with the subject-matter.

The time, when these Sūtras were interpolated is made clear, by the occurrence of the word 'Srughna' and 'Pāṭaliputra' mentioned in a Sūtra of this section. It is only possible, if both these cities had been well known. It is

proved by history that this was the case from 400 B. C. to 500 A. D. So possibly these Sūtras could be interpolated at that time.

There are some other small sections of interpolations, which shall be left out in this small paper. The attention is drawn only. towards a sufficiently big interpolation. This occurs in the 5th chapter. In the Sūtras preceding this interpolotion the forms of release have been mentioned and then refuted. This portion, preceding the interpolation, covers the Sūtras 74 to 83 ; but in this portion the Sūtras 79 and 80 are interpolated ones. Neither does their construction agree with the preceding and the following Sūtras, nor is there any need of these for completing the sense. The Sūtras which contain the refutation of the forms of release in 'pūrvapakṣa' run as follows :—

नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात् । न विशेषगुणोच्छित्तिस्तद्वत् । न विशेषगतिर्निष्क्रियस्य । न सर्वोच्छित्तिरपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात् । **एवं शून्यमपि । संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता मरणान्तश्च जीवितम्** । न भागियोगो भागस्य ।

This construction makes it clear that the Sūtras 79 and 80 are interpolated ones. The Sūtra 79 is a repetition in sense of the Sūtra 78. The sense of the Sūtra 80 is clearly seen in the extra 83. The Sūtra 80 seems altogether to be a colloquial proverb. This is a well known proverb, that :—

"संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता मरणान्तश्च जीवितम् ।"

'Combination must result in decomposition, and death is the end of life'. Some so called gentleman has put this also as a Sūtra.

Now, this is clear, that in the Sūtras 74 to 83 different forms of release have been mentioned, and refuted,

Whatever according to Sāṅkhya should be the real form of release as 'siddhāntapakṣa', is not shown just after these Sūtras. Now according to the construction of the Sūtras either some other 'pūrva pakṣa' should be shown or the right form of release should be mentioned as the 'siddhānta-pakṣa', after the Sūtra 83. Without giving the 'siddhānta-pakṣa' the subject can in no way be considered to be complete. Therefore the Sūtras which may mention the right form of release must immediately follow the Sūtra 83. Those Sūtras are from 116 to 119. The Sūtra V, 102 contradicts this 'siddhānta'. The Sūtras 84 to 115 are therefore interpolated ones.

These very Sūtras contain many repetitions. Many of them are against the Sāṅkhya principles. These very Sūtras include such Sūtras as have been mentioned as containing the refutation of the six and sixteen categories of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya by name; and the refutation of many other Nyāya principles by name. But when we come to understand it clearly that the construction does not tolerate any thing at all between the Sūtras 83 and 116; it becomes clear that the Sūtras 84 to 115 are not the work of Kapila. Max Muller's words, therefore, have no meaning at all.

These two big interpolations are such as contain such Sūtras, or such words, due to which the modern scholars think themselves bold enough to say that the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are a work of recent times.

Now the sense and the construction make it clear that some of the Sūtras are not the work of Kapila. As far as these Sūtras are concerned we quite agree with the modern scholars, when they say that Kapila cannot be the author of these. But their argument cannot go any further,

With this argument that, as some Sūtras contain the names of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and they mention the Jainas and the Bauddhas in some form or other, therefore the whole work is a recent one, and that it is not the work of Kapila ; their statement contains 'ativyāpti-doṣa.' Their argument applies to a part of the work and does not extend to the whole ; while they, by examining a few Sūtras, without going deep into the construction say that the whole book is not the work of Kapila, that is, they make an assertion which cannot be true, when we think a little deeper on the basis of the sense and the construction, so their first argument falls to the ground like a building, the foundation of which has been laid on sand.

2. The second argument which is advanced, is that Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspati, Sāyaṇa and others have not quoted the Sūtras anywhere in their works ; while the 'Kārikās' are found quoted there, the Sūtras have, therefore been composed after the time of the above scholars.

But this argument is proved to be quite baseless when we see the Sūtras quoted in the works which are admitted on all hands to be older than these scholars. Some of them are even older than the 'Kārikās. According to modern scholars the date of the 'Kārikās' is 4th century A. D. We shall here show the quotations of the Sūtras in the works written before this date.

(*a*) Vātsyāyana, the commentator of Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama, while showing the Sāṅkhya principle of 'satkārya-vāda ' (the existence of effect in the cause), and commenting upon the Sūtra IV. 28, has. quoted the first Sūtra of that part of Sāṅkhya, as an argument. The sūtra runs as :—"उपादाननियमात्"

This very Sūtra has been quoted again in the introduction of the Nyāya Sūtra IV. 1·50, where the word 'iti' (इति), the sign of direct quotation is also present. In the 'Kārikā' this sense is given by the words 'उपादानग्रहणात' but Vātsyāyana has quoted the words of the Sūtra and not those of the 'Kārikā'.

(*b*) Again commenting upon the Sūtra V. 2·26 of Nyāya 'एकप्रकृतीदं व्यक्तम्' (there is one cause of this 'vyakta'), affirming this as the principle of Sāṅkhya, Vātsyāyana for proving this affirmation, has given the argument परिमाणात्; then after refuting this argument himself, for completing his argument, he gives another argument 'समन्वयात्'. Both of these Sūtras in this very form are the Sāṅkhya Sūtras I. 130 and I. 131. In the Sāṅkhya also they have been given to prove this very thing. Although both of these arguments have been given in the 'Kārikās' as well, and in these very words but it is an admitted fact that the 'Kārikās' did not exist in the time of Vātsyāyana. He, therefore, could take them only from the Sūtras.

We advance another reason, why the commentator could not take these arguments from the Kārikās. The Kārikā 15 contains this argument in the form भेदानां परिमाणात्. Here the word 'भेदानाम्' has been used to make the argument clear. Had the commentator picked up this argument from this place, he must have placed the same word 'भेदानाम्' but he has placed the word 'विकाराणाम्' instead. This makes it clear that Vātsyāyana has taken this argument from the Sūtras, and to complete the sense he has added the word 'विकाराणाम्' himself.

(*c*) In his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra IV. 1·28 Śaṅkarācārya has written about Sāṅkhya principles:—

"देवलप्रभृतिभिः कैश्चिद्धर्मसूत्रकारैः स्वग्रन्थेष्वाश्रितः।"

It seems from this that Devala accepted the Sāṅkhya principles. No complete book of Devala is found at this time. While commenting upon the 109th verse of the 'prāyaścitta' chapter of Yājñavalkya smṛti, in the Aprārka commentary, Aprāditya, whose date is admitted to be the 11th century A. D, quotes the much older smṛti author Devala. It seems from his words that he must have seen Devala's book. After writing the words तथा च देवलः (so says Devala), Devala's book which he quotes runs as follows:—

"पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानं सांख्यम् ।...एतौ सांख्ययोगौ चाधिकृत्य यैर्मुक्तिः समयतश्च पूर्वप्रणीतानि विशालानि गम्भीराणि तन्त्राणि इह संक्षिप्योद्देशतो वक्ष्यन्ते, तत्र सांख्यानामेका मूलप्रकृतिः ।......षोडश विकाराः ।......पञ्च वायुविशेषाः । त्रयो गुणाः । त्रिविधो बन्धः । त्रीणि प्रमाणानि । त्रिविधं दुःखम् । विपर्य्ययः पञ्चविधः । त्रयोदश करणानि । अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा ।

तुष्टिर्नवधा । सिद्धिरष्टधा । प्रत्ययभेदाः पञ्चाशत् ।......... इति दश मूलिकार्थाः ।.......प्रकृतेर्महानुत्पद्यते, ततो ऽहङ्कारः । अहङ्कारात्तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि च तन्मात्रेभ्यो विशेषा इत्युत्तिक्रमः ।...

By seeing this we come to know that in Devala's time there existed detailed and voluminous works on Sāṅkhya, which he has summarised and given the chief points of the Sāṅkhya principles. It appears clearly from the summary that he has tried to give these principles in the words of the original book. It contains some Sūtras of 'Tattva-samāsa' and some of 'Sāṅkhya ṣaḍadhyāyī' (six chapters), quoted verbatim. The Sūtras which have been quoted from Tattva-samāsa run as follows:—

(१) षोडश विकाराः । तत्त्वसमास सूत्र २

(२) त्रिविधो बन्धः ,, ,, १८

(३) दश मूलिकार्थाः । ,, ,, १६

The following Sūtras differ by a word or two from the Tattva-samāsa:—

तत्त्वसमास	देवल
(१) त्रैगुण्यम् । सू० ४ ।	त्रयो गुणाः ।
(२) त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् । सू० २१ ।	त्रीणि प्रमाणानि ।

(३) पञ्च वायवः सू० १० ।   पञ्च वायुविशेषाः ।

The following Sūtras agree word for word with some Sūtras of Ṣaḍadhyāyī:—

(१) अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा । सां० ३ । ३८ ।

(२) तुष्टिर्नवधा   सां० ३ । ३९ ।

(३) सिद्धिरष्टधा ।   सां० ३ ।४०।

In the Tattva-samāsa the words which are given to express this sense, differ as:—

(१) अष्टाविंशतिधाऽशक्तिः ।

(२) नवधा तुष्टिः ।

(३) अष्टधा सिद्धिः ।

In this way the adjecctive and the object qualified have changed places here. This makes it clear that Devala must have taken these Sūtras from the Ṣaḍadhyāyī.

The following Sūtras agree with the Sūtras of Ṣaḍadhyāyī with the difference of a word or two:—

Sāṅkhya	Devala
(१) विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च सां० ३।३७।	विपर्ययः पञ्चविधः ।
(२) करणं त्रयोदशविधम् सां० २।३८।	त्रयोदश करणानि ।
(३) प्रकृतेर्महान्महतोऽहंकारः, अहङ्कारात्पञ्चतन्मात्राणि, उभयमिन्द्रियं, तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि । सां० १।६१।	प्रकृतेर्महानुत्पद्यते, महतोऽहङ्कारः, अहङ्कारात्तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि च, तन्मात्रेभ्यो विशेष इति ।

In addition to the above there are some sentences in Devala's book which agree both with the Kārikās and the Ṣaḍadhyāyī with a very little difference. They can be called similar in sense only.. But even those could not be taken by Devala from the Kārikās. To prove this statement we give only two arguments here: -

1. In Kārikā 71 Īśvara Kṛṣṇa says that he has got this 'Ṣaṣṭi-tantra' by many teacher-and-taught-traditions, after Āsuri and Pañcaśikha. The commentator Māṭhara has cleared to some extent that tradition in his commentary upon this Kārikā. A line of his commentary is quoted below:—

"तस्माद् भार्गवोलूकवाल्मीकिहारीतदेवलप्रभृतीनागतम्,
ततस्तेभ्य ईश्वरकृष्णेन प्राप्तम् ।"

From these words of Māṭhara, it cannot be said that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's time was just after Devala. But it is a decided fact that Devala is much older than Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

2. There is another very strong argument in favour of the statement that Devala is a very old author. At many places the name of Devala is mentioned in the list of Sāṅkhya teachers in the Mahābhārata. According to the western scholars the date of the completion of the Mahābhārat is 2nd century B. C. Devala, therefore, cannot be brought to this side of 200 B. C. Īśvara Krisna is believed to be an author of the 4th century A. D. So it is proved that Devala is much older than Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. For Devala, therefore, it was impossible to quote Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

These quotations from Devala's book make it clear that Devala gave a summary of the Sāṅkhya principles by placing before him, and following closely the Sāṅkhya-ṣaḍadhyāyī and the Tattva-samāsa, which is only a list of contents of the former.

(*d*) Patañjali says in his great commentary on Pāṇini:—

षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनुपलब्धिर्भवति—अतिसन्निकर्षाद् अतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तर-व्यवधानात् तमसावृतत्वात् इन्द्रियदौर्बल्यात् अतिप्रमादादिति ।"

Here, clearly, six causes, of not being seen or known of an existing object, have been told. Kaiyyaṭa in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, in the introduction to these lines writes as follows:—

"इतरो विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह षड्भिरिति ।"

It is clear from these quotations that Patañjali has taken these causes from some other place, and then stated here. That place cannot be the 7th Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa; because this fact is historically well established that Patañjali lived long before Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Then wherefrom could he take these causes, is a question worth considering. As far as our knowledge goes, these causes are found at no other place than the Sāṅkhya Sūtras I. 108, and 109 may be compared.

In this connection there is another very important thing which comes before us. In the Sūtras only five causes of 'anupalabdhiḥ' (an object not being seen or known) are mentioned. Patañjali has changed one of them and added one more, and mentioned six; but in the Kārikās the number has gone up to eight. This order of number seems us to have an effect upon their order of dates. It seems to be certain that Sāṅkhya Sūtra, which mentions only five causes, is the oldest ; Patañjali, and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa have copied from that very place afterwards.

Kaiyyaṭa has written the following line before the above introduction :—

"सदपि लिङ्गं सूक्ष्मत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणाशक्यं ग्रहीतुम्, तत्कृतकार्यदर्शनादनुमीयते ।"

This line seems to have been written on the basis of the following Sāṅkhya Sūtras :—

"सौक्ष्म्यादनुपलब्धिः । कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ।' सां० १।१०९, ११० ।

A 'prahasana' named Bhagavadajjukīyam was published in the year 1925. The editor of the work ascribes it to a date not later than the 7th century A. D. T. R. Chintamani, also, in his article in the Journal of Oriental Research (April 1928) ascribes it to the same period. He says, that the play is mentioned in an inscription of the 7th century A. D.

This play contains certain Sūtras of the Tattvasamāsa. In the printed book the reading which may be compared with the Tattvasamāsa, is as follows :—

परिव्राजकः—अस्ति किञ्चदपि ज्ञातम् ।

शाण्डिल्यः—अत्थि, अत्थि. । पभूदं पि अत्थि ।

अस्ति, अस्ति प्रभूतमपि अस्ति ।

परिव्राजकः—भवतु, श्रोष्यामस्तावत ।

शाण्डिल्यः—सुणादु भअवो ! (शृणोतु भगवान्)—"अष्टौ प्रकृतयः,

षोडश विकाराः, आत्मा, पञ्च वायवः, त्रैगुण्यं, मनः, सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरश्चेति" । एव्वं भअवदा जिणेण पिडअ पुत्थएसु उत्तं ।(एवं भगवता जिनेन पिटकपुस्तकेषु उक्तम्) ।

परिव्राजकः—शाण्डिल्य ! सांख्यसमय एषः, न शाक्यसमयः ।

शाण्डिल्यः –बुभुक्खाए ओदणगदाए चिन्ताए अण्णं चिन्तिदं अण्णं मन्तिदं (बुभुक्षया ओदनगतया चिन्तया अन्यत् चिन्तितम् अन्यत् मन्त्रितम्) ।

It may be compared with the Tattvasamāsa in the following way :—

Bhagavadajjukīyam.	Tattvasamāsa.
अष्टौ प्रकृतयः ।	अष्टौ प्रकृतयः । सू० १
षोडश विकाराः ।	षोडशः विकाराः । ,, २
आत्मा ।	पुरुषः ,, ३
पञ्च वायवः ।	पञ्च वायवः ,, ११
सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरश्च ।	सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरः" ५

Only there is puruṣaḥ (पुरुषः) in the Tattvasamāsa and Ātma (आत्मा) in the Bhagavadajjukiyam. The manaḥ

(मनः) is missing altogether, the rest of the reading is just the same in both the works.

T. R. Chintamani in his article referred to above, gives the reading 'pañcāvayavaḥ' (पञ्चावयवः) instead of pañca vāyavaḥ (पञ्च वायवः) in the Bhagavadajjukīyam and Tattvasamāsa both. He has given the reading prati-sañcaraḥ, and has omitted it altogether while giving the Tattvasamāsa Sūtras. He seems to have been misled by some misprint, or in some other way. The word पञ्चावयवः has got no sense here in Sāṅkhya, and in the printed book Tattvasamāsa, the Sūtra exists as 'सञ्चरः' 'प्रतिसञ्चरः' । (Sañcaraḥ pratisañcaraḥ).

It is, therefore, clear that the source of this reading of Bhagavadajjukīyam is the Tattvasamāsa.

(*f*) The following may also be compared :—

1. Suśruta Saṃhitā, Śārīrasthāna I, 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; and 10 with Sāṅkhya Sūtra I, 61. II, 26; III, 59; I, 1.6 and with Tattvasamāsa Sūtra 1 and 2.

(2)	Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā		Sāṅkhya.
	IV,--16—81		I, 61.
,,	II, 25	,,	I. 12-14
,,	XIII, 25	,,	III, 13
,,	XIII, 9	,,	I, 1
(3)	Mahābhārata XII, 228, 8	,,	III, 17
,,	XII, 45, 54	,,	III, 9
(4)	Bhagvadgītā XIV, 6-9	,,	I, 127
,,	XIV, 18	,,	III, 48-50
,,	XIII, 34	,,	III, 65

Argument ex-nihilo is not a proof of the absence of a certain book at any time. There can be hundred and one reasons for the absence of certain quotations in certain books. But on the other hand the presence of the quota-

tions of a certain book in a certain other book is a positve proof of the presence of that book during the time when those books were written.

By showing the quotations of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras in the works like Devala Smṛti and others older than Śaṅkarācārya and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, we have proved beyond all doubt that the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are much older than the Kārikās.

(III) The third statement of our opponents is that the construction of the Sūtras agrees with that of the Kārikās, and as it was not possible to compose the Sūtras in the form of verses so somebody composed them on the basis of the Kārikās. Now when the second statement has been refuted, this argument becomes a ridiculous one. The position of this statement is just like a building, the foundation of which has been removed. Just as that building falls to the ground at once, in the same way this argument cannot stand any longer. Although it is so, even then we shall examine the argument advanced by the scholars to prove this statement. Their strongest argument is that many Sūtras are metrical in construction, it is natural that the construction of the Kārikās may be verse-like, but there is no possibility of the Sūtras being in the form of verse. Naturally, therefore, it is suggested to the mind that this verse-like construction can come only from the Kārikās.

On hearing this argument one thinks that there might be a good many Sūtra in the metrical construction, but when we take up the book and see them we find that in a work of about 550 Sūtras, there are only three such Sūtras, the construction of which is verse-like. Those Sūtras run as follows:—

(1) हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् । सां० १, १२४। का० १०।

(2) सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्त्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् । सां २, १८ । का० २५ ।

(3) सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च । सां० २ ३१ । का० २९ ।

Out of these the first two Sūtras possess variants according to which they are not verse-like at all. The reading of the first Sūtra is as follows:—' हेतुमदनित्यं सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ''

This Sūtra does not contain the word avyāpi. The older commentator Aniruddha has given this very reading, and he has not commented upon the word avyāpi (अव्यापि). The reading of the second Sūtra is as follows:—

"सात्त्विकमेकादशकं वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।"

The first thing is that the Kārikā contains सात्त्विक एकादशकः the masculine reading. The other thing is that the old manuscript with us does not contain the verb ' pravarttate ' (प्रवर्त्तते).

Now there is only one Sūtra left, the construction of which is verse-like. This third Sūtra is the half of Aryā metre, but the words of this Sūtra are such that if their order is changed, then it becomes the half of another metre, as:—

"सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्याः पञ्चवायवः ।"

This is half of the anushṭup metre. We, therefore, can safely assert that the author might not have composed this Sūtra with the set purpose of making it metrical, but the words might have been placed by chance in such a way that the construction became metrical.

In such a condition if the construction of only one Sūtra, out of about 500 Sūtras is metrical, and even if it is taken for granted for the sake of argument that the construction of all the three Sūtras is metrical, even then it cannot be said that the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās.

The presence of many Sūtras in the metrical form in many Sūtra works about which none can claim that they have been written on the basis of some work in verses, supports our view. Some of them are quoted below.

पाद्वमत्स्यमृगान् हन्ति, परिपन्थञ्च तिष्ठति ।
तदस्मै दीयते युक्तं, श्राणामांसौदनाट्टिठन् ॥

अष्टाध्यायी, ५ । ४ । ३५, ३६; ६६, ६७ ।

फेनमीनौ कृषेर्वर्णे बन्धेर्ब्रधिबुधी तथा ।
धापृवस्यज्यतिभ्यो नो लक्षेरट् मुट्च वर्णितः ॥

उणादिकोष: ३, ३,—७॥

In the presence of these Sūtras then it shall become necessary to believe that all these works are based on some metrical works. This position is clearly absurd; and our opponents also agree with us on this point. Why then should we accept the view that the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are based upon the Kārikās, only because the construction of a Sūtra or two is metrical?

It is therefore proved beyond doubt that the Sūtras have not been based on the Kārikās. Why then do the order of the subject matter and that of the construction agree wholly in spite of the fact that the Sūtras have not been derived from the Kārikās we shall tell presently.

The three arguments advanced to prove that the Sūtras were composed at a recent date have been fully examined. Now it becomes clear that the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are very old, older than even the Mahābhārata, as it has been proved above.

KAPILA THE AUTHOR OF THE SĀṄKHYA SUTRAS.

Now even if it has been proved that the Ṣaḍadhyāyī is a very old work, even then one thing more deserves consideration. "Did Kapila write any book or not, if he

did, then what was it?" "If he wrote anybook then can it be Ṣaḍadhyāyı or not?"

We have discussed these problems in detail in our book. The sum and substance of that discussion is that Kapila wrote a book upon Sāṅkhya. The name of that book is *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. We have got sufficient evidence from the Jain literature and Vedic philosophic' literature, that there is a book of Kapila on Sāṅkhya, Ṣaṣṭitantra by name. Some of such quotations are given below:—

(1) In the first chapter of Jain book Kalpasūtra, which has been translated into English by Rev. J. Stenewsan, D.D., while writing the life of Mahāvira Swāmı, and mentioning the names of books in which the Swāmī would be well versed, the author writes a sentence:—

' सट्ठितन्त विसारए"

While commenting upon this sentence Yaśovijaya writes ' षष्ठितन्त्रं कापिलशास्त्रम्, तत्र विशारदः पण्डित:. This clearly means that according to the commentator, who understands the sense of the Kalpasūtra, there was a work Ṣaṣṭitantra by name, the author of which was Kapila; in the time of Mahāvira.

"जं इमं अण्णाणिएहिं मिच्छद्दिट्ठीहिं सच्छंदबुद्धिमइविगप्पियं तं जहा भारहं रामायणं भीमसुरुक्कं कोडिल्लयं घोडयमुहं "कणगसत्तरी वेसियं वइसेसियं बुद्धसासणं काविलं लोगायत सट्ठियंतं माठरपुराणवागरणनाडगाइं।"

Anuyogadwara Sūtra, 41.

This Sūtra contains the names of certain Vedic books. It says that these works were composed by foolish, false and non-sense people. Here there is a word (लोगायतम्) between (काविलं) and (सट्ठियन्तं); certain modern scholars have been led astray. They think, that, (काविलं) is a different work and साट्ठियन्त a different one. But when we think deeply upon all the

words of the Sūtra, then we come to another conclusion. It seems that the author has not cared about the order while naming the books. The reason might be that either he might have heard only about the books and might not have got sufficient knowledge about them, or even if he possessed knowledge, he might not have purposely cared about order. First of all he mentions the Rāmāyaṇa and Bhārata. Proceeding further there is a word (कणगसत्तरं) which means (कनकसप्तति) Kanaka Saptati or Svarṇa Saptati which is the name of a well known (work Sāṅkhya Saptati) of Iṣvarakṛṣṇa. This is a fact which is proved by the Chinese tradition. Keith also agrees with us upon this point in his book Sāṅkhya System. Then the name of Vaiśeṣika is given. Then after some interval comes the name of Māṭhara, which is only a commentary of Sāṅkhya Saptati. Will the modern scholars who think "Kāvilam" and "Saṭṭhiyantam" as two different works only because they are written with an interval of a word, say that Kanaka Saptati and Maṭhara are different works? It therefore seems that the author has not paid any attention towards the order.

We think also, that the word (लोगायतं) should be placed just after the word (बुद्धसासणं). In this way it becomes clear that Vaiśeṣika, Buddhaśāsana, Lokayātam, and Kāpilaṣaṣṭitantra are different works. There is another thing, that the word "Kāvilam" can only be an adjective, the word which is qualified by it must be found there, and if the word "Saṭṭhiyantam" is not connected with it, then the sense does not become clear.

(३) यदि ब्रह्मैवोपादानकारणं च, ततः कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतषष्टितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेरनवकाशो निर्विषयत्वम् ।" Brahma Sūtra commentary of Bhāskara II, 1, 1.

These words of Bhāskara make it clear that Ṣaṣṭitantra was written by Kapila. The word (आख्या) Ākhyā

makes this fact still more clearer, that the name of the book written by Kapila is Ṣaṣṭitantra.

(4) In the 12th Chap. of Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, the most authoritative book of the Pañcarātra sect, is written as follows :—

"सांख्यरूपेण संकल्पो वैष्णवः कपिलादृषेः ।
उदितो यादृशः पूर्वं तादृशं शृणु मेऽखिलम् ॥१८॥
षष्टिभेदं स्मृतं तन्त्रं सांख्यं नाम महामुनेः ।
प्राकृतं वैकृतं चेति मण्डले द्वे समासतः ॥१९॥"

Here also it is clear that the name of the book the author of which was Kapila is Ṣaṣṭitantra.

Some scholars think that the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra is Vārṣagaṇya. There this idea has got the following basis :—

Maharṣi Vedavyāsa, while commenting on Yogasūtra, Kaivalya pāda, Sūtra 13 writes as follows :—

"तथाच शास्त्रानुशासनम् :—
गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम ॥"

In the introduction to this Vācaspati writes :—

'अत्रैव षष्टितन्त्रशास्त्रस्यानुशिष्टिः ।"

It appears from this, that Vācaspati Miśra thinks this Kārikā to be of Ṣaṣṭitantra. While commenting upon Brahma Sūtra II, 1. 3, Śaṅkara's commentary, in his Bhāmatī, he writes about this very verse :—

'अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः ।"

Then he quotes this very verse. Here it appears that Vācaspati thinks Ṣaṣṭitantra to be the work of Vārṣagaṇya.

To prove the statement, that Ṣaṣṭitantra is the work of Vārṣagaṇya, we have seen no other quotation than

this. One thing is worth noticing here, that, Vācaspati has written Vārṣagaṇya as योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता' and not an author of any work upon Sāṅkhya. On studying the Philosophic literature one thing suggests itself clearly to the mind that Ṣaṣṭitantra can be a book of Sāṅkhya and not of Yoga. This fact is clear from the above mentioned quotations. It seems that this verse must be from Vārṣagaṇya, who might have written a certain book upon Yoga. We have not seen this book quoted in any work upon Sāṅkhya. It is quoted in Yoga Śāstra only. In Vedānta also it has been quoted upon the Sūtra II, 1, 3 which runs as follows :—

"एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः।"

It is therefore clear that the Vārṣagaṇya is a commentator on Yoga and not on Sāṅkhya. Vācaspati, while commenting upon Yoga Sūtra writes :—

"षाष्टितन्त्रशास्त्रस्यानुशिष्टिः।"

It appears that Vācaspati is pointing towards Ṣaṣṭitantra Śāstra and not the book named Ṣaṣṭitantra. This kind of mention by name of the teacher of the work is very common in ancient literature. In this small summary we shall give only one instance :—

Bhaṭṭotpala, in his commentary upon Bṛhatsaṃhitā, quotes the Kārikās 22 to 30 of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Before quoting them he writes:—"तथाच कपिलाचार्यः।" It is a fact admitted and established beyond doubt that these Kārikās were composed by Īśvarkṛṣṇa and not by Kapilācārya; but with the idea of showing his principle, he gives the name of the founder of the Sāṅkhya. Just in that very way we should understand the writing of Vācaspati, other examples shall be found in our book.

(5) The following quotations from Śaṅkara and

Vācaspati also show that Kapila was the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra :—

"स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता"

Śāṅkar Bhāṣya, II, 1, 1.

Then follows the Bhāmatī commentary upon it :—

"तन्त्र्यते व्युत्पाद्यते मोक्षशास्त्रमनेन इति तन्त्रं तदेवाख्या यस्याः सा स्मृतिः तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिणा कपिलेनादिविदुषा प्रणीता ।"

This makes clear that a book Tantra by name was written by Kapila, the first learned man. This Tantra cannot be anything else than the Ṣaṣṭitantra. The word Ākhyā makes it more clear and certain that it is the *name* of the book which was written by Kapila.

(6) It seems that Pañcaśikha as well has used the word Tantra for Ṣaṣṭi-tantra in a Sūtra of his.

"आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद् भगवान्परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।"

An example from Vyākarṇa Mahābhāṣya, where it is said that a part of the name also denotes the name, makes it more clear :—

"देवदत्तो दत्तः सत्यभामा भामा इति ।"

Having considered all these points we can surely say that Ṣaṣṭitantra cannot be the work of Vārṣagaṇya. Therefore the acceptance of the view that Vārṣagaṇya was the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra, by Bālarāma Udāsīna, while commenting upon Yoga IV, 13 on the basis of Vācaspati's writing, and on the same basis, the acceptance of the same view by Keith in his book Sāṅkhya system page 62, is misleading.

A commentary upon Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudī is printed by the name of Bālarāma Udāsīna. The last portion of that book is written by Rāmāvatāra. The commenta-

tor accepts Pañcaśikhācārya as the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra in the last portion of that book. Keith also after telling it to be based upon the Chinese tradition, has refuted it. Really this theory is altogether baseless.

Ṣaṣṭitantra is the work of Kapila. In support of this theory we have got very strong evidence. It makes the thing clear beyond all doubt. After knowing that fact there remains no loophole for any doubt or hesitation in agreeing with us upon the point. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the Kārikās, admits this himself that his Kārikā-work is a summary of Ṣāṣṭitantra. The link of teachers which he has told and through which the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra has reached him, makes it clear that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra can be a work of Kapila and of no other man. Īśvarakṛṣṇa writes in Kārikā 69 :—

"पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।"

'Secret and salvation-giving (advantageous to puruṣa) knowledge has been well told by the great sage Kapila." Then in his 70th Kārikā he says:—

"एतत्पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।

आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥"

"This very sacred and leading (knowledge) was very kindly given to Asuri by the Muni Kapila. Asuri further gave it to Pañcaśikha, who in turn spread that knowledge in different ways)." The word (बहुधाकृतम्) of this verse has been translated by the commentator Māṭhara as 'बहूनां शिष्याणां प्रदत्तम्' that is he gave it to many pupils or preached it. Perhaps by the words (तेन च बहुधा कृत तन्त्रम्) some scholars might have been led to think that Tantra or Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is the work of Pañcaśikha but their idea is altogether meaningless; because in the first place the word (बहुधा कृतम्) cannot in any way be proved to

mean that it was written; the second thing is that Pañcaśikha himself has written in his book that Tantra or Ṣaṣṭi-tantra was given to Āsuri by the great sage Kapila in the Sūtra already quoted above. This much traditional link makes it clear that the very same book of sacred and salvation-giving knowledge which was written by Kapila was given by him to Āsuri who further taught it to Pañcaśikha who in turn preached it zealously by teaching and writing commentary etc. Īśvarakṛṣṇa writes further in 71st Kārikā:—

"शिष्यपरम्परयागतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥"

After this Īśvarakṛṣṇa of Arya wisdom after understanding the principle fully summarised into Āryā metre the Tantra which he got by a tradition of teacher-and-taught. In this Kārikā the word(एतद्) which is the object of(संक्षिप्तम्)is the antecedent of (tantram). It is, therefore, that the commentator Māṭhara has translated this word as Ṣaṣṭi-tantram.

There is another thing here worth paying heed to for those scholars who say that Vārṣagaṇya is the author of Ṣaṣṭi-tantra. Had Ṣaṣṭi-tantra been the work of Vārṣagaṇya then Īśvarakṛṣṇa must have mentioned his name somewhere in his Kārikās. It is as an impossibility that an author whose book is being summarised may not be mentioned at all, and the names of others might be mentioned. Had Īśvarakṛṣṇa thought that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is the work of Vārṣagaṇya, he must have mentioned the fact. At the same time the strange thing is that the commentator Māṭhara has not given the name of Varṣagaṇya in the link of teachers and taught while commenting upon the word Śiṣya-paramparayā. He has written as follows:—

"तस्मात् (पञ्चशिखात्) भार्गवोलूकवाल्मीकिहारीतदेवलप्रभृतीनागतम् , ततस्तेभ्य ईश्वरकृष्णेन प्राप्तम् । तदेव षष्टितन्त्रमार्याभिः संक्षिप्तम् "

Had Ṣaṣṭi-tantra been the work of Vārṣagaṇya, then is it a fact that all these people were so thankless as not even to mention his name? Or, is it a fact that they did not know even this much history that things which happened at an interval some years before their time, and the things which they could know very easily, they forgot, and did not write anything about them at all and left everything for us to decide? No, it cannot be so. The actual fact is that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra can in no way be the work of Vārṣagaṇya. Iśvarakṛṣṇa proceeds further and writes:—

"सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥"

"The subjects which have been dealt with in the Saptati (a book of 70 Kārikās) all of them belong to Ṣaṣṭi-tantra, but the explanatory tales and the views of the opponents have been left out." Iśvarakṛṣṇa has made it clear beyond doubt that he is summarising the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra. The substance of the whole discussion from the 69th Kārikā to this place is as follows:—

(1) Kapila composed the Tantra and taught it to Āsuri.

(2) Āsuri taught the very Tantra to Pañcaśikha.

(3) Pañcaśikha preached and spread it in different ways.

(4) The same Tantra reached Iśvarakṛṣṇa by a link of teachers and taught which ran as Bhārgava Ulūka, Vālmīki, Hārīta, and Devala, etc.

(5) After understanding its principles well Iśvarakṛṣṇa summarised it through Āryā metre.

(6) Therefore the subjects which are dealt with in the Saptati belong to the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra.

(7) The explanatory stories and the views of opponents have been left out.

This much description of the Kārikās leads us to a final conclusion that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is the work of Kapila. It cannot be that of Pañcaśikha, Vārṣagaṇya or any other man of the past or the present age.

This description makes clear the order of the contents and the order of the construction of the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra. We can know very well the book which has been summarised by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. We think that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is the Sāṅkhya Ṣaḍadhāyi and no other book. The subject matter of the 68 verses of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is that which has come in the first three chapters of Sāṅkhya Ṣaḍadhāyī. It is a wonderful fact that the order in which the different subjects have been dealt with in the two works agree fully. The resemblance does not finish at the order alone, but it goes still further. Just as anybody who begins to summarise a book does exactly in the same way Īśvarakṛṣṇa has done. Somewhere he has composed a verse from one Sūtra and at some places even from more. At some places he has left out five six, eight or even ten Sūtras. He has tried to place the words of the Sūtras in the Kārikās as far as possible. It is clear that the subject matter of the first twenty Kārikās has been taken from the 1st Chapter of Ṣaḍadhyāyi, and that of the Kārikās from 21 to 37 has been taken from Chapter 2, and that of the 38 to 68 from Chapter 3. To make it clear the Kārikās agree with the Sūtras in order, we give below a few instances:—

Kārikā	68	has	been derived from	III, 84.
,,	67	,,	,,	III, 82, 83
,,	64	,,	,,	III, 75
,,	63	,,	,,	III, 73
,,	62	,,	,,	III, 71, 72
,,	61	,,	,,	III, 70

and so on the whole order of the Kārikās and the Sutras agree. For a comparison our book may be consulted.

After writing that he has taken the whole subject matter from the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that he has left out the explanatory tales and the views of the opponents. Both of these things follow just in order. The tales are in IV Chapter and the views of the opponents are in V Chapter of the Ṣaḍadhyāyī. This also makes clear that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has summarised this very book.

As the name of the book which has been summarised by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is Ṣaṣṭitantra, and Ṣaṣṭitantra is the work of Kapila, therefore, the old name for Ṣaḍadhyāyī is Ṣaṣṭitantra and for no other book. Now there is no loophole for doubt regarding these facts.

We have seen only one quotation by the name of Ṣaṣṭi-tantra up to this time. That is found in exactly the same form in the commentary of Māṭhara on the Kārikās and the Gauḍapāda's commentary. Commenting upon the 17th Kārika Māṭhara writes:—

"अपिचोक्तं षष्टितन्त्रे—पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तते ।"

Gauḍapāda writes:—

"तथाचोक्तं षाष्टितन्त्रे—पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तते ।"

The basis of this quotation quoted by the name of Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is found nearly in the same words in the Ṣaḍadhyāyi.

"तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ।" सां० १, ९६।

This thing becomes very clear when we see the introduction of Aniruddha in his commentary on this Sūtra. He writes:—

"चेतनाधिष्ठानं विना नाचेतनं प्रवर्त्तते इत्याह—।"

The order of the construction of this introduction and of the above quotation quoted by the name of Ṣaṣṭi-tantra agrees fully. Just as Aniruddha has written this line by taking the sense of this Sūtra, similarly it seems that Gauḍapāda aud Māṭhara also have written this line by depending upon the sense of this very Sūtra. In the ancient literature we see at many places that some teachers (Ācāryas) write the sense of another teacher and his work and write it by his name.

The quotation also leads us to the conclusion that Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is the name of Ṣaḍadhyāyī.

The agruments advanced to prove that the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are a recent work and that they are not the work of Kapila are briefly that in the Sūtras the names of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and the refutation of the views of Jainas, and Bauddhas occur, and further that Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspati Sāyaṇa and others have not quoted them, these and such other agruments have been examined fully by us. We have been able to decide after full discussion that:—

1. Kapila was the author of a work on Sāṅkhya.
2. The name of that very book is Ṣaṣṭitantra.
3. Ṣaṣṭi-tantra is another name for Ṣaḍadhyāyī.
4. Therefore Ṣaḍadhyāyī is the work of Kapila.

Finally I bring my paper to a close with the expectation that learned men will think further upon the subject.

THE YOGĀCĀRA THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

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Of the available original Sanskrit texts of the Yogācāra School, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which is believed to be the earliest exposition of the Vijñānavāda philosophy, lays down that the Vijñāna or rather the Ālayavijñāna is the only reality and that the external world is non-existent. Vijñāna when it is under the influence of Avidyā, appears in the form of the external world of experience. In the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga, we find similar arguments. There it is said that Avidyā works through the force of the Vāsanās which have no beginning in time and as a result of this, the empirical world of name and form derives its phenomenal existence. In the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Vasubandhu, the same theory is advocated. Sthiramati in his commentary on the Vijñaptimātratā attempts at the same time to prove that the so-called external objects can neither be atoms nor conglomerations of atoms. Similar arguments can be found in the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita.

Valuable information regarding this theory of the Yogācāras can be gathered from other sources also. This theory has been elaborately discussed and criticised by the non-Buddhist philosophers, especially, the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas Udyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika quotes those arguments of the Vijñānavādins by which they try to refute the reality of the external world. Vācaspati in the Tātparyaṭīkā deals elaborately with the question. In the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta, these arguments are discussed in detail. Among the Jaina philosophers, Samantabhadra, Prabhācandra, Vidyānandin

and others quote those arguments and in the Syādvādamañjarī of Mallisena, we find a detailed account of the Yogācāra position. In Kumārila and Śaṅkara also these arguments are discussed and Vacaspati in the Bhāmatī explains the arguments of the Vijñānavādins in detail.[1]

Apart from Chinese and Tibetan sources, it may be possible with the help of these Sanskrit books to reconstruct the main Yogācāra position regarding the origin and nature of the external world. The present paper is an attempt towards that direction. Here we shall try to collect some of the most important arguments by which the Yogācāras support their theory of the voidness of external reality against the realists who maintain that there is some other reality, namely, matter, existing side by side with the Vijñāna.

The most important argument preferred by the Yogācāras in favour of Vijñānavāda is that external objects do not exist. Vasubandhu, is said to have begun his work to refute two extreme theories;—(1) the theory of the Sarvāstivādins, who maintain that object (Vijñeya) is equally existent with the Vijñāna, and (2). the theory of the Mādhyamikas who hold that the Vijñāna has only a phenomenal existence like the external objects, *i.e.*, it does not exist unconditionally. Against the second theory of the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras propounded the theory of the Vijñānavāda and against the theory of the Sarvāstivādins, they maintained that objects are not real in the sense in which Vijñāna is real.

The so-called object, says the Vijñānavādin is nothing but a modification of the Vijñāna.[2] We are accustomed to

1. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, Levi's ed. p. 15   2. *Ibid* p. 16.

attribute existence to the soul and the Dharmas which are in reality non-existent. This two-fold presumption (of the existence of the ātman and the dharmas) takes place in the modification of the Vijñāna. The ātman and the dharmas have no objective existence. These are but two names attributed to the modification of the Ālayavijñāna. That which appears to us as the ātman or as the dharmas, is the Vijñāna, and our misconception is due to and is continually nourished by the Vāsnās that have no beginning in time.

After enunciating the general result of his philosophical enquiry, Vasubandhu now proceeds to give some positive arguments in support of his theory. There is no external object. The phenomenal world of experience is due to the modification of the Vijñāna. Now, if there is no object, the question necessarily arises how is it possible for the Vijñāna to appear in the form of external objects when actually there is no object? The external object, therefore, must be admitted as a support-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) of the origin of the Vijñāna in the form of objects and as having the capacity of producing a reflex of itself.[1] Here Vasubandhu's answer is that no support-condition is necessary for the Vijñāna to take the form of external objects. Vijñāna, Avidyā and Vāsanā are sufficient to explain everything that is to be met with in the world of experience.

The subtle atoms (Paramāṇu), says Sthirāmati, cannot be the support of the Vijñāna.[2] For, the atoms are, by definition, suprasensible. So it is not possible for an individual atom to be the support of the Vijñāna. Neither is it possible for the Vijñāna to have for its support the

1. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, p. 16. 2. *Ibid* p. 16.

atoms when they are collected together. In fact, when the atoms are in the condition of being collected together, they have not any difference in their being in comparison with the condition of their not being collected together. That is to say, these atoms cannot have any modification in their being when they are collected together. Moreover, a conglomeration of some suprasensible atoms must necessarily be suprasensible. Hence, neither individually nor collectively can the atoms be the support of the Vijñāna.

On the other hand, it cannot be maintained that the Paramāṇus are existent in the sense in which a pillar is said to be existent, for, a pillar occupies some space, and has three dimensions. But the Paramāṇus cannot occupy any space, nor can they have any dimension. This definition of the Paramāṇus, brings them very near to the conception of the Vijñāna. Paramāṇus in this sense, become formless and can have no extension, *i.e.*, the atoms lose their character of materiality. In this way, Vasubandhu rejects the atomic theory and holds that there can be no external reality beyond Vijñana.

Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṃgraha, gives almost the same argument to establish his theory of the Vijñānavāda. The external object, such as blue and yellow are really non-existent and knowledge cannot perceive them. Knowledge does not perceive any reality which is external and the so called external reality cannot be the object of knowledge. The objects of perception such as blue, yellow, etc., do not really differ from the precepts of blue, yellow etc. So he concludes that Vijñāna alone is the existent reality.

If the object given in perception, he continues, is supposed to be some external reality, then, if it be a plurality, it must be identical with the Paramāṇus; if it

be a unity, it must either be a conglomeration of atoms or some gross object having no relation with the atoms. Now, the first position, *viz.*, the object is atomic in its nature, is untenable; for, in our consciousness there is no perception of the forms of atoms which are indivisible and many in number. Knowledge always presents in our consciousness the form of some gross object. Moreover, the Paramāṇus, by definition, are indivisible, which implies that they can have no form. So even if Paramāṇus exist, we cannot know them. Hence the necessary conclusion is that there is no external object which is atomic in its nature.[1]

Similarly Śāntarakṣita proves that external object cannot be a conglomeration of atoms. If we cannot prove the existence of atoms how is it possible for us to maintain that the external object is made up of these imaginary atoms? So this hypothesis also cannot stand scrutiny. In the same manner, Śāntarakṣita shows that even the third alternative, *viz.*, the external object is gross in its nature, cannot be advocated.

These are some of the arguments of the Vijñānavādins against the reality of the external object as we find them in the available original sources. Now we shall take up the non-Buddhist philosophers and try to collect some important arguments of the Vijñāvavādins in favour of the theory of the voidness of external reality.

From the Nyāya-vārttika [2] of Udyotakara we get some information regarding the refutation of external reality by the Vijñānavādins. The Vijñānavādins, first of all, attempt to show that the so-called external object can neither be regarded as a whole made up of parts (avayavī), nor as parts

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1. Tattvasamrgraha. P. 551. 2. Ch. IV. Ah. 2. S 7-10.

or atoms. If the external object exists, it cannot be a whole made up of parts. If it be a whole, then, in what relation does it stand to its parts? Do the parts inhere in the whole or does the whole inhere in the parts? If we suppose that the parts inhere in the whole, then the question would be—do the parts inhere wholly or only partially? If it is admitted that the parts inhere wholly in the whole, then there is a difficulty. The parts cannot inhere in the whole wholly, for, there is a difference between the magnitude of the parts and that of the whole. Each of the parts is of a smaller magnitude, while the whole is comparatively of a larger magnitude, and so the part cannot pervade the whole. Hence the parts cannot inhere wholly in the whole. Similarly, it can be shown that the parts cannot inhere in the whole even partially.

On the other hand, if we suppose that the whole inheres in the parts, then, the whole cannot reside in each part wholly. If we admit that the whole resides in the parts only partially, then, the consequence would be that the whole must be considered as made up of other parts than the present ones. In short, if the external object is considered to be a whole made up of parts, then, we cannot explain the exact relation between the whole and the parts.

Moreover, we cannot reasonably maintain that the whole is essentially different from the parts; for, if the whole exists as something distinct from the parts, then such a whole is to be found in experience; and the whole having no relation with the parts would be eternal in character. But in fact, it is not so.

Neither can it be maintained that the whole is only a conglomeration of parts. The whole is not merely an

attribute of the parts; for, in this case also, there will be the same difficulty with regard to the relation between the substance and the attribute. For all these reasons, the Vijñānavādins conclude that the whole is non-existent.

Similarly the Vijñānavādin attempts to prove that atoms (Paramāṇus) are also non-existent. [1] Objects, such as a cow or a pot, says he, cannot possibly exist; for such objects cannot be experinced in parts. When we carefully analyse the idea of a cloth, we see that from the stand-point of the threads which make up the cloth, the cloth is non-existent. Similarly, from the point of view of the cotton, the threads are non-existent. In the same manner, we may come down to atoms which when analysed will be reduced to nothing. So we find that the idea of an object is merely a construction of our imagination. In reality the object has no existence in the external world.

These arguments of the Nyāyavārttika are elaborately discussed in the Tātparyaṭīkā of the famous Vācaspati-miśra and in the Pariśuddhi of Udayana. Vācaspati's account is more or less the same that we find in his Bhāmati. We shall discuss those arguments in connexion with the Vedāntists.

The Nyāyamañjarī [2] of Jayanta contains valuable information regarding the theory of Vijñānavāda. According to the theory of the Vijñānavādins, says Jayanta, an objective unitary being does not exist. Vijñāna alone is real; it is momentary, appears and disappears now as this, now as that, and constitutes a series without a beginning. In perception, of course, a diversity of objects is presented to consciousness; these objects seem to be different from one another. If

1. Nyayavarttika. Ch. IV. Ah. 2, S. 26. 2, P. 536-539.

there are no objects beyond consciousness, how is this diversity possible? Knowledge means knowledge of something. If there be nothing, how can that be knowledge? To this objection the Vijñānavādin will answer as follows;—let us examine whether a perception of blue or yellow corresponds to something beyond it, assuming of course, that there is such a thing. If it does not correspond to something beyond itself, then the Vijñāna is proved beyond doubt. If on the other hand, the form of the perception corresponds to that of the corresponding object, then the question would be, to which of these two perception and object, does the form belong? If it is supposed that the form belongs to the object, then, the question will be, how can it enter consciousness? The assumed object being inert matter, how can it enter consciousness which is opposed to matter? Something else must mediate between these two, in order that material objects may enter into pure consciousness. If it be replied that the object itself is both the knower and the known, then, it must further be admitted that the same thing is also knowledge. In that case, the distinction between external and internal will be meaningless. The diffrence between the knower and the known is really the distinction between the internal and the external. This distinction is not a mere physical distinction. If the knower is conceived as identical with the known, then, there being no separation between the two, the theory is at bottom the same as Vijñānavāda, and the quarrel is one only about names. In other words, whether we should believe in an external reality or not, the real quarrel between the Arthavāda and the Vijñānavāda is about the separateness of subject and object. If it has to be admitted that there is no distinction between the two—that the object itself

appears as the knower and the known—then there is no difference between this kind of Arthavāda and Vijñānavāda except in name. Now, if it is agreed that the form of the perception is the same as the form of assumed object, then, the Vijñānavādin contends, an identity between the knower and the known is suggested. If on the other hand, it is argued that there is a difference between the form of the perception and that of the object, then the object cannot enter consciousness except through the mediation of a tertium quid. This is an untenable position. Therefore, it has to be admitted that there is an identity of form between the perception and its assumed object, and if this identity is admitted, the quarrel between Arthavāda and Vijñānavāda vanishes. There is no dispute as to the fact of knowledge, the quarrel is, whether knowledge represents an object beyond it or not. If it has to be admitted that the form of the knowledge is the same as that of the assumed object beyond it—and we have just shown that it must be admitted—then, an object beyond consciousness is only an assumption and an assumption without justification.

If the form is conceived as the form of knowledge, then, there is no difficulty ; for, it is admitted by the other side also that knowledge reveals the object ; an object does not reveal itself—it may exist without being known. In that case, there is no relation between it and the knower. Knowledge alone brings the two together. So even the Arthavādin must admit that for consciousness the object exists only when it is known. It appears in consciousness simultaneously with the knowledge. We cannot conceive an interval of time between the knowledge of an object and

its appearance in consciousness. For, if it were the case, that the object appears in consciousness after its form, or idea, then, it will have to be admitted that the idea does not reveal the object—that something else is necessary for the revelation of the object. But this is not so, according to hypothesis. So the form reveals the object instantaneously. Hence, even the Arthavāda must admit the appearance of idea in consciousness as recessary for the revelation of the object. Whenever anything is perceived we say, we have *perceived this, i. e.,* the fact of perception is necessary for the object. Now knowledge cannot appear in consciousness without the form. That being so, the form of knowledge is not dependent on anything beyond it.

Even if the existence of external objects is assumed, the form of knowledge must be admitted. Then the question would arise: When there are so many objects in the outside world, why should knowledge at a particular time assume the form of one of them instead of any other? All objects can impart their forms to knowledge, why should not all of them be allowed to do so at the same time? Again, a man's desire is guided by his knowledge; why should it not be directed to all objects instead of only one at a time? If any specific form of knowledge, such as blue, is to be explained by any external object at all, then the assumption of a blue object is not enough; the operation of light as an external agency and the function of the eye must also be taken into account as being necessary for that particular form of knowledge. Hence, it is safer rather to say that the objectivity of blue itself is due to the form of the corresponding knowledge and not *vice versa.* There is really no external object. It is Vijñāna or knowledge

which assumes the form of, and appears as an object. This is the true explanation of objectivity as involved in knowledge.

Knowledge alone is enough; the only addition to it that is necessary is its form and this form must be ascribed to knowledge itself. As a matter of fact, however, even in common parlance, people ascribe the form to knowledge, thus men say, "The object is blue, because I *perceive* it as blue". Even if there be objects outside, their forms must be assumed by knowledge. It is enough, therefore, if we admit that knowledge can have forms and that there are no objects outside.

Some say, continues the Vijñānavādin, that consciousness is pure and transparent in itself, and that the transformations of such as blue, yellow etc., are due to the influence of external objects just as the clour in a glass is due to the presence of a coloured object near by. Hence though the external object as distinguished from the transformations of consciousness is not presented to the mind separately, yet its existence can be inferred as the necessary cause of the transformation of consciousness which cannot otherwise take place. So it has been said that external objects can be shown to exist according to the principle of Vyatireka, which means that whenever the object is absent, the transformation of consciousness also is not present. But this postion is untenable; because the corresponding Anvaya (necessary sequence) is not known. That is to say, the opponent cannot prove that whenever there are objects, there are corresponding transformations of consciousness also. Moreover, those who say that external objects are always known by inference and whenever an object is

presented to consciousness, consciousness undergoes a corresponding transformation and when the object is away, consciousness has no form whatsoever, have another difficulty to meet: consciousness being formless in itself, how is it known at all? The analogy of coloured object and glass is not quite applicable to this case; for the glass is not formless in itself, and we can perceive it in itself and also as coloured, by the proximity of coloured object. But so far as jñāna is concerned, we never know it in its formless condition and representing no object.

On the other hand, we have no knowledge of two forms—the form of the object and the form of the knowledge itself. If it were contended that the form of the object is known by the form of the knowledge, then that would give rise to a *regressus ad infinitum* (anavasthā). If knowledge has no form and if the form of knowledge is imparted to it by an object, then, this knowledge with form being Sākāra, must itself be the object of another knowledge and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence, knowledge must itself be with form and self-revealing. Knowledge being with form (Sākāra) and self-illuminating (Svaprakāśā) and no other object besides knowledge being presented to consciousness, no such object exists. There is no law that there must be objects to give form to knowledge. What is the harm if knowledge itself is regarded as assuming forms like blue etc.? If it is contended that when knowledge assumes a form like blue, it itself is the object, well then, the dispute is only about Terms.

There being no second to knowledge and knowledge being pure and transparent and form being a modification of it, there must be some cause of this modification. This cause is the Vāsanā generated by Avidyā. The beginningless

series of forms appearing in knowledge is due to the diversity of Vāsanās without beginning; that being so, there is no justification for inferring the existence of external objects. What is called an object, is only a form of knowledge. That knowledge can assume forms independently of external objects is also proved by the fact of imagination and hallucination. Hence the Vijñānavādins conclude that there is no external object.

From the Jaina philosophical literature, we get valuable information regarding the refutation of external reality by the Vijñānavādins. In the Yuktyānuśāsana and the Parīkṣāmukham we get references to the Vijñānavāda phiolsophy. The Aṣṭasāhasrī, a commentary by Vidyānandin on the Āptamīmāṃsā deals with the Yogācāra philosophy. Similarly, the Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa and other important Jaina works give us important arguments of the Vijñānavādins against the reality of the external objects. Most of those arguments are more or less the same as those discussed above.

The Syādvādamañjarī, of Mallisena Sūri gives a detailed account of the refutation of external reality by the Vijñānavādins. Some of those arguments are as follows: The external object cannot stand scrutiny: for, what is this external object? Does it consist of atoms or of grosser parts? It does not consist of atoms; for, there is no proof; proof is either perception or inference. Perception cannot prove the existence of atoms. Perception may be either of a Yogin or of ordinary men like us. It is not the first, for we have, respect for Yogin's perception, but it is not a proof for ordinary men like us. Perception of atoms is not possible for ordinary men either; for ordinary experience

is against it. We never perceive atoms even in dream. Our perception is always of gross objects and not of atoms.

Neither can inference prove the existence of atoms. The atoms being incapable of perception, no invariable connexion between them and some other sign or mark can be established, with the help of which their existence could be inferred.

Again, if atoms really exist, they must either be permanent or impermanent. If they are permanent, do they act successively or simultaneously? They cannot act successively, for, in that case, the difference in their nature would suggest their impermanence. They cannot act simultaneously; for, having fulfilled their function in one moment, the next moment, having no function, they would be non-existent. So we cannot hold that atoms are permanent. If they are impermanent, they must be either momentary or live for duration of time. If they are momentary, they must have either a reason for being so, or be without a reason. If they are without reason, then they may appear at any time or may not appear at all, for they are independent of any reason. That makes their appearance uncertain at any moment of time. If they are momentary for some reason, then their reason may again be either gross or atomic. It cannot be gross, because by hypothesis, all external objects are atomic in character. The reason of their being momentary can neither be atomic; for, then the quesion would be—do they produce their effects by being existent, or non-existent or both? If they produce the effect (the momentariness of atoms) by being existent, then, do they produce it at the Time of their own generation or at some other moment of Time? They cannot produce this effect at the Time of their own generation,

for then they are busy with their own appearance into being. But if it is said that being and causality are the same—that an atom can produce its effect when it itself is trying to be, then, why should not the atom of the visible object (Rūpāṇu) produce an atom of taste-object, and why not atoms of visibility be the material for the atoms of taste quality, appearance into existence being the same in both cases? The objection simply means this;—an atom cannot be the cause of the momentariness of another atom, except after it has become what it is; for, if it could be supposed that an atom could produce its effect before it has attained its own specific character—that is, before it has become itself, then any atom might produce any other; and taste-quality might be due to an atom which is supposed to produce visibility and so on; so atom cannot produce its effect at the time of its being. Nor can it produce its effects afterwards; for atoms according to hypothesis being momentary, do not exist at the next moment.

If atoms produce their effect without necessarily being themselves existent, then, once their moment of existence is over, they would continue to produce effects permanently; for, there is no difference between one moment of non-existence and another and if they can produce an effect after they have ceased to exist at a particular moment, they can do it the next moment also and so on eternally.

With regard to the third alternative, namely, that atoms produce their effect being both (existent and non-existent), the objection is that the arguments that apply against the existence-theory and non-existence-theory, are both applicable to this theory. Therefore, this also is an un-

tenable position. Therefore, atoms cannot be regarded as momentary. Nor are they existent for a duration ; for they are open to the same objections stated above. Moreover, if the atoms are existent for a duration of time, do they exist without producing any effect or do they continue to produce effect so long as they exist ? If the first alternative is accepted, that is, if you ascribe to atoms existence for a duration without being productive of any effect, then, like a flower in the sky, they are as good as non-existent. If you take the second alternative, then, the question will be do they produce an effect which is existent, non-existent, or both ? If they produce an effect which is non-existent, then, why cannot they be the cause of the horns of an hare ? If their effect is existent, even then, there would be no certainty as to the effect they should produce. The third alternative is tainted with the faults of both the above alternatives. Therefore, an object cannot be atomic in character.

The external objects can neither be gross in their nature. Since we cannot prove the existence of a single atom, how can we prove the existence of many such atoms which collected together, make up a gross object ? Atoms being unproved, a gross thing is only a name. Again, a gross thing is conceived as having many parts. Now, if the parts are different from one another, then the thing cannot be called one, opposing qualities being attributed to it. If the parts are not different from one another, then there they cannot be perceived as parts and one thing cannot be distinguished from another thing. If all constituent parts are homogeneous, then, in any one thing, we could perceive diverse qualities such as motion and rest, red

and not-red etc. In our perception, the difference between red and not-red is present and by hypothesis, the so called external objects which produce these perceptions are homogeneous in their constituent parts. It follows, hence, that in a homogeneity of elements we perceive diversity of attributes. That would imply that anything might give rise to the perception of any quality.

The gross thing consists of parts according to hypothesis. Now does a thing exist completely in each one of the parts or in any one of them ? If it is fully present in each one of the parts, then, it is not really made up of parts—rather being complete in each one of the parts, it is not one thing, but many. If, however, it is present partially in one part and partially in others, then it cannot be perceived as an unitary object. If the object is conceived not as one whole but as composed of diverse parts, then, are the parts different from one another or not different ? If they are different from one another, then again, the whole as one is regarded as existing in more than one part and the question will again arise whether it is present completely in each part or only partially and so on *ad infinitum*. If the parts are not different from one another, then, they are not parts at all, but a homogeneous whole. So it is impossible to prove the existence of an external object. So it has been said, "What has been called external (dṛśya) is not sensed in the ordinary sense of the term. But is due to Vijñāna assuming that particular form." Moreover, Prajñākaragupta, the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra, says, "If you are conscious of blue, you are conscious of the percept blue and not of an external thing ; if you are not conscious

of anything, say blue for instance, there is nothing to be called external." That is to say, we are conscious of this and that, but we are not conscious of an externality.

If the question is asked: to what is the consciousness of this and that due, if there are no external objects? The answer is that this consciousness is independent of anything else and has no support in the so called extérnal world and is due to the beginningless Vāsanā.

Similarly in the Mīmāṃsa philosophy, specially in the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila, we find references to the Vijñanvāda theory. Kumārila, and his commentator Pārthasārathi miśra deal with the problem elaborately. But most of the argnments are the same as those discussed above.

Śaṅkara, in his commentary to the Brahmasūtra, gives a brief summary of the Yogācāra arguments against the reality of the external world. The external world is non-existent. "For, if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as pots and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of pots and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor again can the outward things be aggregates of atoms, such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms. Moreover, the cognitions which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness —undergo according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of wall, now the idea of a jar and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily

admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the object is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuitous.''[1]

Vācaspati Miśra, in the Bhāmatī, discusses the arguments of the Vijñānavādins. The external object supposed to be the support of Vijñāna, says he, cannot be atomic in character. In knowledge we get an appearance of some gross thing and not that of an exceedingly subtle atom ; and what appears in knowledge cannot have reference to something other then itself ; for, if that were so, then, by an extension of the same principle, anything might make known any other thing and the consequence would be omniscience for all; but this is not the case. Therefore, if the appearance in knowledge is to be regarded as revealing an object beyond, then the character of such an inferred object cannot be atomic. Neither can the nature of the supposed object be gross; for such an hypothesis is not free from difficulty :—Is this grossness a character of the knowledge which is supposed to reveal the object which according to hypothesis is atomic, or is it the character of the object itself at the time of its appearance in knowledge? If the first hypothesis be accepted, then in that case indeed knowledge would depend on a part of itself, namely, the grossness, which, by hypothesis, is one of the characteristics of knowledge. If the second hypothesis be accepted, *i. e.* if it be supposed that grossness is the quality of the object at the time of its presentation to consciousness, then grossness would be the accumulated result of the units of perception as it were perceived in an unbroken sequence and resulting in one act of cognition.

1. Brahmasutra Bhasya Thibaut's Tr. p. 418

In other words, the supposed external object is atomic in character whether it be an object of visual perception or auditory preception, or perception of any other kind, but to consciousness it is presented in a gross form ; this is due to the fact that the cognition of the object is the accumutated result of the perception of an unbroken series. Thus, when we hear a sound, we hear something gross and not atomic in character; but the thing, which is the source of the sound, is atomic. What happens is this :—Atoms of sound as it were, rush upon consciousness in an unbroken and rapid succession and produce the consciousness of a gross thing.

But if that be so, then the qualities present in consciousness, such as blue etc. do not really belong to the supposed object, for, it is, according to hypothesis atomic, and blueness is not present in each one of the successive atoms of perception. Grossness belongs to the atoms at the time of their appearance in consciousness ; it can belong to them only in that condition, and can belong only to the collection and not to the individuals. Just as manyness is a property which can belong to a collection and not to an individual, so grossness too can belong, according to hypothesis, only to a series taken as a whole and not to its component units. So it has been said : though an act of cognition grasps a series of units, the form is that of the series as one whole ; and this form is dependent on the cognition of the series as a whole and does not belong to any one of the units in the series. The perception of manifold objects does not contradict 'this position ; for, thinghood is a perception of collection and nothing else, and our perception of thing cannot be regarded as an error. In

other words, although the units of perception constitute an unbroken and interminable series, it is yet possible to have perception of a diversity of objects ; for an object is nothing but a certain collection of units in this series ; and one object is different from another because we are not always cognising the same combination of units. If we take one combination, we perceive an object A, and if we take a different combination, we perceive another object B. Hence the multiplicity of objects does not in any way contradict the theory that an object is nothing but a collective perception of a series of atomic units and that the grossness belongs to the perception of collection as such and not to the units included in the collection.

Now, the above position, the Vijñānavādin contends, is untenable. It assumes that there is an unbroken sequence of units of perception. This, however, is a mistake. We do not have an unbroken series of units of visual perception, they are interspersed with the units of other kinds of perception, such as smell, taste, etc., *i.e.*, it cannot be contended that we have an uninterrupted series of visual perceptions and then have one act of cognition, then we have another uninterrupted series of taste perceptions and have one act of taste cognition and so on. In fact, there is an interval between one visual perception and another and this interval may be filled up by preception of any other kind. And so the grossness of a visual form cannot be attributed to an unbroken series of visual perceptions. Just as when we see a forest at close quarters, we see that there are distances between the trees, but when these trees are viewed from a distance, they appear as one compact mass, so these units of perception are really separate from one another: the series is not unbroken, yet it appears as

one whole mass. And just as the perception of the trees in the forest as one compact mass is an error, so the perception of the series of units as one mass is an error. And hence grossness cannot be regarded as rising out of an unbroken series of perceptions. Hence the perception of a gross thing like a pot cannot be regarded as Pratyakṣa according to the above theory of the atomic character of things; for although such a perception is free from imagination (Kalpanā), it is not free from error, and like the perception of a yellow conch, it is an erroneous perception. Hence, the supposed external object cannot be conceived as atomic.

Nor can external objects be regarded as wholes made up of atoms as parts. For, if the wholes are not different from the atoms, then they are nothing but atomic. But this is untenable as already proved. If, however, the wholes are different from the parts (the atoms), then, as in the case of a cow and a horse, they must be essentially different. And there can be no identity between them. Nor can the whole be regarded merely as a collection of the parts, for that view is also untenable. Hence, as what appears in consciousness cannot by any argument be shown to have any basis in the external world, and as there is no proof that what does not appear in consciousness, yet exists in the outside world, it must be concluded that perception is independent of the so-called external reality.

Another important argument against the reality of external objects, advanced by the Vijñānavādins is that blue (external object) and the perception of blue are identical because of the rule of their being perceived together (sahopalambha-niyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ). This argument was first put forward by the famous Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇāvārttika. But this book is unfortunately

lost in Sanskrit. This argument has been quoted by Jayanta, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimiśra, Vidyānandin, Mallisena and others. That was surely an important argument in favour of the Yogācāra theory. If the objects were at all independent of the act of knowledge, observes Jayanta in the Nyāyamañjarī, then, they should have been knowable independently of the act of knowledge, just as a thing independent of another thing is sometimes seen apart from it. But it is not so. Hence knowledge and its so-called objects are not different things. "From the fact, moreover," quotes Śaṅkara, "of our always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously, it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we (Vijñānavādins) maintain that there are no outward things."[1]

If knowledge must correspond to a supposed external reality in order that we may know it, then what we really know is this transformation of Vijñāna and there is no evidence that there is anything beyond this transformation. For what is always and necessarily perceived along with another, cannot be different from that other; in reality, the two must be identical; thus, a second moon (*e.g.*, the reflexion of the real moon in water) if perceived at all, is always perceived along with the real moon, and therefore, is not different from it. The relation between the transformation of Vijñāna and the so-called external object is one of inseparable co-perception, *i.e.*, neither of them can be

1. Brahmasutra. Thibaut's tr. p. 419.

had without the other. When things are different, say A and B, either of them may certainly be perceived without the other, if not always, at least on some occasions. Thus even when two stars are inseparable units in a constellation and rise and set together, it is possible to perceive one of them without the other on some occasions, when for instance, a cloud appears in the sky. This is so because the stars are really different. Hence the rule is: when two things are really different, it is sometimes possible to have one without the other, however intimately they may be connected. But in the case of knowledge transformation and the so called corresponding object, we see that this rule does not apply. That is, we never can have one of them without the other; the two are absolutely inseparable, which means that there is no external object.

Here the Vijñānavādin has to meet an objection of the Sautrāntikas[1] who maintain the existence of external reality. If there be no external object, says the Sautrāntika, how can there be a diversity in our perceptions, such as blue, yellow, etc.? The Sautrāntika thinks that if something, say A, being present, another thing B is sometimes absent, then B must be dependent on a cause other than A, just as the fact that sometimes I do not wish to speak or wish to go shows that this desire to speak or go is caused by something other than the mere continuum of consciousness; in the same way, although there is the Alayavijñāna, the six kinds of perceptions under dispute are not present; sometimes they appear, sometimes they do not. It follows naturally, therefore, that they are dependent on something other than the general conscious-

1. Bhamati. p. 469.

ness. This something which is the cause of the occasional appearance of these perceptions and which is other than the general consciousness, is the external reality. It may be replied that Vāsanā itself matures or attains fruition now and then only and therefore the corresponding perceptions also arise now and then. But to this it may be objected that Vāsanā is after all the power of the general consciousness to lead to individual objects. If it is argued that the maturity of Vāsanā consists in its tendency to generate an appropriate object for itself and the condition of this maturation is the immediately preceding moment in the series of conscious moments, because there is no other moment intervening between them, then in that way, all these, arising in the consciousness-continuum should be regarded as the cause of the maturation of the Vāsanā; no one of them can be singled out as the cause, for, in regard to their appearance in consciousness-continuum, there is no difference between one moment and another. And so we cannot say that one moment is the cause of the maturation of the Vāsanā and another is not. If it be suggested that difference in time means difference in power or capacity, and so, as a specific moment belongs to a specific moment in time, it can be the cause of a specific individual perception, then how can we have the perception of blue at one moment and continue to have an understanding of it at the next moment? If the same perception continue in consciousness for successive moments, then how can it be said that each moment being different from each other in time-order produces different effect? In such cases, all moments in the consciousness continuum are causes of a perception, but in that case, there can be no

diversity of perception. The causality of the moments is always there; and since there is no difference in the causality of one moment and that of another, as has just been shown, they ought to produce the same effect. If perceptions were dependent on the consciousness-continuum then the temporary character of individual perceptions should not have been there and our perception would have been the same for all times; but as a matter of fact, it is not so; perceptions change from moment to moment; it follows, therefore, that there must be other causes of perception. The Vijñānavādins also admit that perceptions have for their cause something other than the general consciousness. But this something is itself always present and so cannot be the cause of the temporary character of perceptions. The temporary character of perceptions and their diversity cannot be explained unless we assume the existence of external objects. Hence the Sautrāntikas conclude that the existence of external objects can be proved by inference.

To this objection, the Vijñānavādins give the following reply:[1] the real difficulty is this—even though consciousness-continuum is continuous and unbroken, perceptions vary from moment to moment, how then can these perceptions be caused by the Ālaya-series? Hence consciousness should not be regarded as the only and necessary cause of perceptions. But even if perceptions were due to the existence of external things, how is it that we sometimes perceive blue and sometimes yellow? If it be answered that this is due to the nearness or otherwise of such objects, then, why is it that we do not have the perception of blue

1 Bhamati p. 470.

even when a blue object is present? If it be said that a yellow object has a capacity of producing corresponding perception where as blue has the capacity of producing a perception of blue, then, how arises this difference in capacity? If it is answered that this is due to different causes, then the moments in consciousness-continuum also may be conceived as having different capacities owing to different reasons. Although the moments come in a continuous series, yet they are the causes of different effects and they are different with respect to different effects. The continuity of the series is not to be conceived as the common cause of the moments so that moments cannot be distinguished from one another. No doubt it has been said that the difference in the capacity of producing a perception is not to be attributed to the difference or otherwise in the moments, for it is seen that different moments also may possess the power of producing the same perception. If difference in the moments meant difference in the perception then we could not have the same perception twice; for, the moment which has the capacity of producing this perception would be gone and we could not possibly have the same preception over again and other moments cannot be supposed to have the same capacity. But as a matter of fact, it is not so. We do have the same perception more than once at different moments; hence, even if the moments be different, there is not necessarily a difference in their capacity. The difference in the capacity may be due to the difference in the series. But this also is not true. If however, it is admitted that different series mutually separated in time, can have the capacity of producing identical perceptions, then, the different moments also, owing to the difference


in their own causes, may produce different perceptions, and when there is no difference in their causes, they may produce identical perception. In other words, the idea of series as distinguished from moments as the cause of identity as well as difference in perception is not an improvement of the case. The fact to be explained is this; we sometimes see blue, sometimes yellow; and we may see blue again and again and yellow also again and again. One blue is identical with another, but is different from yellow. It is this identity and difference that have to be explained.

The series-theory suggests that all perceptions of blue constitute one series, all perceptions of yellow another and so on; and whenever we are placed in contact with any one of these series, we have the corresponding perception and when we are away from the series, we do not have that perception; but have that perception of the series with which we are connected.

But the Vijñānavādins contend that the same logic applies to moments also. The simple fact that one moment is separated from another by other intermittent moments does not necessarily mean that it cannot give the same perception. Hence the Vijñānavādin concludes that there is but one store-house consciousness or the Ālaya-Vijñāna; and of the moments appearing in it, one has a peculiar capacity by virtue of which it gives the perception of blue and another moment has another peculiar capacity by virtue of which it gives the perception of yellow This peculiarity of character manifested in the peculiarity of corresponding perceptions has another name and is called Vāsanā.

The Vijñānāvadins, therefore, conclude that there is no external object. Vijñāna, when it is under the influence of Avidyā, appears in the form of the world of experience. Avidyā works through the force of the Vāsanās which are responsible for the variety of forms we find in our experience. The world of experience, therefore, is non-existent when the operation of Avidyā is withdrawn. This is realised in the state of Nirvāṇa.

As regards the arguments of the Vijñānavādins, we cannot say from which particular author of the school, they have been taken. Our Sanskrit sources cannot help us much in this matter. Some of the arguments, however, were collected from the works of Dharmakīrti. As regards others, we cannot definitely say anything. But on the authority of philosophers like Udyotakara and Jayanta, Kumārila and Śaṅkara, Pārthasārathimiśra and Vācaspati, Vidyānandin and Mallisena and others, we feel justified in holding that these arguments truely represent the Vijñānavāda philosophy as it was professed by the Yogācāra Buddhists.



THE HISTORY OF EARLY BUDDHISM IN INDIA.

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At all times and in all ages orthodoxy has always been shadowed by heterodoxy. So long as human instinct is what it is, we cannot mark out an epoch or period of history in any country when all the inhabitants in that period in that country were members of absolutely the same religious sect. Broadly the religion followed by

the whole country may be the same in general principles; but it is open to any sect of the vast community to embrace certain beliefs and customs which may be the consequence of environment and culture. We know for certain the influence of geographical conditions on history. What is true of one culture is also true of others. Coming to India, ever since the dawn of her history, we unmistakeably find heterodoxy flourishing side by side with orthodoxy almost always in the camp of orthodoxy itself. To make ourselves more clear, in the so-called Vedic times of our history there was certainly the orthodox party following the Vedic prescriptions and injunctions. In the heydey of this Vedic supremacy we find different communities like the Vrātyas, the Dānavas and the Dasyus, who were, to all intents and purposes, members of the great community and religion* but still held different views of life, had different names and customs, most of them being heterodox to the

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* There is an opinion in certain circles that these classes were un-Aryan and opposed to the Vedic cult. It all depends on what one means by the word "Aryan". If by the term "Aryan" we mean an orthodox member of the community, to that extent, the Vratyas, the Danavas were un-Aryan. Surely they did not possess orthodox views of religion but took a different view of life and religion. The traditional interpretation easily solves the tangled problem of races, classes, and other subdivisions of the peoples which belong of right to the domain of ethnology. Before social polity or the division of the whole society into four communities the Brahman, the Ksatriya, the Vaisya and the Sudra came to stay in this land, the whole community of peoples was classified into three broad divisions: the Sattvika, the Rajasa and the Tamasa, according to their qualities and aptitudes in life. Those who were Sattvikas were, we can say, the so-called Aryans meaning in its widest sense were orthodox. Those who were of the Rajasic temperament were known by the term Asuras, literally असुषु रमन्तेइति असुरा: those who enjoy life and at the same time keep some show of their splendour and magnificence. The Raksasas belonged to the Tamasic class. Ignorance prevailed among these people. They revelled in wordlly pleasures and charms of life. 'Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof' was their motto. With the establishment of the social *sthiti* or social order, later on communities of peoples became divided into four classes for the sake of the world's progress and country's welfare. This is known by the term Varnasramadharma. As before among each of the four varnas there were Aryans, Asuras and Raksasas. For example among the Brahmanas there were Arya Brahmanas and Raksasa Brahmanas, again among the Sudras the Arya Sudras, the Asura Sudras, the Raksasa Sudras. According to tradition Ravana was a Raksasa Brahmana. In the light of this interpretation we venture to remark that the so called unorthodox classes were members of the same religious fold though with a diffrent bent of mind.

devout follower of the Veda. We shall presently show that the Buddhist sect was one such unorthodox sect, the origin of which can be traced as early as the Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad literature of the Hindus.

That the Buddhistic movement came into birth before the teachings of Gautama Buddha is evident. The form of belief known to us as Buddhism existed long, long before this event. The words 'Buddha' and 'Śramaṇa' as pointed out by Weber[1] are titles of honour given to sages and seers of the Vedic and Vedāntic Schools, though in later times appropriated by the Buddhists as peculiarly their own. Weber remarks "The Buddhist doctrine was originally of purely philosophical tenor, indentical with the system afterwards denominated the Sāṅkhya and that it only gradually drew up into a religion in consequence of one of its representatives having turned with it to the people"[2]. The same authority is disposed to connect the Śākyas, who are the family of which Buddha himself came, with the Śakāyanins of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and also with the Śakāyanyas of the Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad. The doctrines promulgated by Yājñavalkya in the Bṛhad-Araṇyaka are in fact completely Buddhistic as also are those of the later Atharvopaniṣads belonging to the Yoga system.[3]

These references, though not directly to Buddhism as we now understand by it, serve to indicate the tendencies and influence of theories other than the accepted orthodox ones. Differences of views as regards philosophical notions existed always and were respected also. A wordy warfare was certainly indulged in by the exponents of the different theories, and as certain as

1 History of Sanskrit Literature, P. 27.
2 Ibid p. 284.
3 Ibid p 285.

anything the othodox party came out successful. Among such ardent exponents of Schools of thoughts the Buddha takes the first rank. For, example is better than precept. Though other teachers waxed eloquent over their precepts it was the Buddha who put them in practice so that the significance of his doctrines might appeal to the people. Thus we can say that a fresh impetus was given to the already growing movement by the preachings of Gautama, and even here it is not plausible to argue that he founded a new religion altogether different from the established religion of the land. The pieces of evidence are mainly literary and are to be gathered from canonical and other books reduced to writing centuries after the *Nirvāṇa* of the Buddha. The voluminous legends which have grown around this notable sage of ancient India may or may not be historical. Granting that tradition is well-founded, we have reasons to show that tradition narrates that the Buddha founded not religion but a monastic sect. We shall presently demonstrate, however, in founding this sect of monachism that all rules and regulations of the prevalent orthodox sect of Saṃnyāsins formed a convenient model to copy and to follow.

Let us now proceed to examine the important practices and institutions of Brahminic ascetic life and incidentally trace the rise of the Kṣatriya ascetic orders. According to Hindu social polity or the Varṇāśramadharma system, the whole community was divided into four classes, and four orders or stages of life. The new society provided certain conventions and regulations to keep up orderliness in the community. It was prescribed that vocations of all these different classes be hereditary and hence practically fixed. While the first class included the group of

philosophers and teachers, the second included the group of warriors and rulers. It was further prescribed that the first class or the Brahman had four stages of life (Aśrama), the Brahmacarya or the life of the bachelor, Gṛhastha or the life of the householder, Vānaprastha or forest-life, and the Saṃnyāsa or a life of renunciation. The second and third classes, the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas were debarred from the last āśrama, the Saṃnyāsa, though Vijñaneśvara quotes a view of one Sūtrakāra that they are also eligible for Saṃnyāsa

'त्रयाणां वर्णानां वेदमधीत्य चत्वार आश्रमा.' इति
सूत्रकारवचनञ्च द्विजातिमात्रस्याधिकारमाहुः ॥

The reasons are obvious. From the duties expected of those classes, namely, protection and commerce it would not be practical politics to allow them to take to a life of renunciation. If this were allowed it would defeat the great principle of the Nīti literature—the *lokayātra* or the progress of the world. Penance and meditation would be only fruitful in a country where the hand of protection is assured from both internal and external enemies of the kingdom and where again people live in peace and plenty, because of increased trade and commercial transactions[1].

But as time rolled on there were certain changes in the regulations of social order. So long as the Kṣatriyas found their avocations by fighting and by ruling the realm the old order continued. According to tradition as transmitted in our Purāṇa texts, the Kṣatriya rule of ancient India came to an end with the great Nandas. The extirpation of the Nanda dynasty and the usurpation, victory, and establishment of the Mauryas in Magadha

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1 प्रचारसमृद्धिः of Kautalya.

saw the downfall of monarchs of true Kṣatriya blood. The social order was set at naught and he who was the most powerful, of whatever caste he may be, won the crown. It must not be understood that this social disruption came only after the Nandas or even immediately before the Nandas. The embers of discontent with the existing order were smouldering for long, and fanned by the flames of Mahāvīra and Gautama burst into glowing fire in post-Buddhistic epoch.

Mahāvīra and Gautama then can be regarded as the representatives of the Kṣatriya movement which aimed at ascetic life. Both of them were Kṣatriyas. After a period of worldly life both became disgusted with the vanity of the world and took to ascetic robes with the firm conviction that such a life alone would tend to salvation, Mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, Kaivalya, Mukti or what you will, all connoting the same meaning. When influential members of the society became translated to a new cult no doubt they commanded a pretty number of adherents to that cult. Such deviations are brought to the notice of the sages and seers of the epoch of the Upaniṣads. For the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad calls him a *parivrājaka* (Hindu Saṃnyāsin) who gives up the pleasures of family life,[1] who discards wealth[2] and who disregards everything worldly and material[3] and who lives by begging[4] knowing himself[5]. Commenting on the word "प्रव्रजन्ति" the Mitākṣarā says, 'Those who relinquish absolutely all Karmas[6].'

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1 पुत्रैषणायाः
2 वित्तैषणायाः
3 लोकैषणायाः
4 भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ।
5 आत्मज्ञः (Brhad Ch. IV 4. 22).
6 प्रकर्षेण सर्वाणि कर्माणि न्यस्यन्तीऽति ।

The Saṃnyāsa is of two kinds. One is विविदिषासंन्यास and this means "he who hankers after the knowledge of Atman and who therefore proceeds by the beaten track, namely, the study of the Vedas, the performance of Yajñas, the bestowing of gifts, and the doing of penance without expecting any reward." The other kind of Saṃnyāsa is 'विद्वत्संन्यास'. This is to become an ascetic without undergoing all the discipline but abandoning the world so soon as one gets Vairāgya. This is the stage when a man subdues all passions and desires, and becomes completely indifferent to the worldly pleasures and sorrows. There is no *niyama* or injunction for this. At any stage of life a certain person can take himself to this form of asceticism[1]. From the term 'ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति' of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad we have to infer that the first kind of Saṃnyāsa is mainly intended for members of the Brāhmaṇa community. Though the *vidvatsaṃnyāsa* is equally applicable to that community again still it is reasonable to assume that members of the Kṣatriya community sought shelter under the second category and took to the fourth Āśrama though according to the orthodox opinion this kind of Saṃnyāsa was no Āśrama Saṃnyāsa.

That the Kṣatriyas had the right of Saṃnyāsa and the institution was in practice is evident from the tradition transmitted in the Mahābhārata. After the carnage at Kurukṣetra Yudhiṣṭhira feels disgusted with life and all its pleasures and expresses his innermost desire to take to Saṃnyāsa. Bhīma accepts the Saṃnyāsa system as Śāstric and remarks that it is welcome only in times of danger, old age or when a powerful enemy is at the gate[2].

Arjuna in dissuading him narrates the story of Janaka,

1 तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेनैतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति ।

2 Śanti, Ch. 10, 17.

King of the Videhas, who gave up palace life to one of a wandering mendicant[1]. Thus Arjuna speaks of Kṣatrisiya Saṃnyāsa in practice. In replying to his brothers Yudhiṣṭhira is firm in his opinion and says[2] I know the Śāstras and what they aim at. The Vedas declare only two words: Do your duty (Karma) and give up the world (त्यज.) The fruit of the latter is eternal bliss.[3] In other words, ritual and asceticism are two aspects of Indian religion[4]. In about 10 chapters there is a learned discussion as to the utility and the right of a Kṣatriya to embrace asceticism. For criticism and discussion of theological character were never resented. In the course of the lengthy argument we are led to infer that several Kṣatriyas perhaps of a lower order donned mendicants' robes thereby to find means of subsistence[5], though a few were really actuated by honest motives. Members of all castes took to ascetic life which grew to be the 'accepted mode of religious culture.' As an ascetic the unemployed layman or woman assured himself or herself of some sort of livelihood either from the public or from the state. Such things are mentioned in the Kauṭilya as of common occurrence. The expressions: परिव्राजका वृत्तिकामा[6] and मुण्डी वा जटिलो वा वृत्तिकामः[7] point out to their existence long prior to Kauṭalīya. Perhaps the system of feeding the ascetic without the latter endeavouring for it began with the Buddha. Or rather the provision of food, clothing, housing and medicaments was itself an endeavour on the part of the Saṅgha to inspire it[8].

1 Santi Chap. 18.
2 Santi, 19. 1.
3 *Ibid* 30.
4 See Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, Volume I, p. 73.
5 Santi 18, 34.
6 Book I, 10.
7 Book 1, 11.
8 Vinaya I, 58. See for more details Lord Chalmers, Further Dialogues of the Buddha, Volume I, p. XVII.

The word ‘ dvija ’ in Sanskrit literature is used in two senses. It simply means the twiceborn. The investing of the sacred thread or the ceremony of Upanayana to the members of the first three classes makes them twiceborn. Originally the term connoted a wider interpretation referring to the members of the three communities. But later on it seems to have been restricted to the members of the Brāhmaṇa community alone. The reason is not far to seek with the ushering in of Kaliyuga and the consequent intermixture of castes, the pure type of the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya classes disappeared. The four castes practically reduced themselves to two, the Brāhmaṇas and the non-Brāhmaṇas At this time the *dvija* meant a Brāhmaṇa only. This is how we have to reconcile the Hārita and other texts which make the *dvija* take to ascetic life.[1] Vijñāneśvara also contends on the authority of Manu and the Śruti that asceticism is only for the Brahman and not other castes[b].

उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां मनुना ब्राह्मणस्यैवाधिकारप्रतिपादनाद् ब्राह्मणाः प्रव्रजन्तीति श्रुतेश्चाग्रजन्मन एवाधिकारो नाद्विजातिमात्रस्येति ।

We have to take that when Buddha became enlightened to the knowledge of self, there were restraints which deterred the members of the Kṣatriya community from becoming ascetics. By constant *Saṃskāras* in different previous births, Gautama had attained to the stage of Vairāgaya. Most of the names occuring in the Buddhist legends, as the names of the Buddha in his prior births are found in the Vedic literature. Thus the superme knowledge came to him unasked and then he set out on a wandering life leaving the pleasures of palace life. But still he was in the Kṣatriya fold and hence the orthodox opinion was against him. Necessity then drove him

1 Harita Samhita V1, 4.
2 See commentary on yaj. III, 56-57 ‘yassatthayaKulaputta sammrad eva.

to gather a few adherents from among his own community. Thus we find the Buddha in his first sermon at Benares speaking of his doctrine as that for the sake of which sons of noble famalies leave the house and enter the state of houselessness[1]. Thus it was a dissenting sect to the established ones. It was primarily intended for the Kṣatriyas as against the prevailing opinion that the fourth Āśrama was for the Brāhmaṇas alone.

Gautama realized the weakness of his sect with a handful of followers. He wished to organise it so as to give a permanent character to it. Towards this end he did not make any new innovation The Brāhmaṇa order was a convenient model and he unhesitatingly copied it. He wanted to give a new colour to keep it alive. So he argued that Vijñāna or knowledge is Ātmā which the Vedāntins philosophised that the Ātmā is Vijñāna or Vijñānamaya. In other details the views, practices, and opinions of the orthodox School were followed[2]. Says professor Jacobi; 'Both Jainism and Buddhism owed to the Brahmans especially the Sanyasins the ground-work of their philosophy, ethics and cosmogony[3]'. Here it is suggestive to notice that the Jains were originally a branch of the Buddhist sect. This observation is not entirely new, for, Weber in Indische Studien (XVI, 210) and Lassen, Indische Alterthumskunde (IV, p, 763) have given a similar opinion. Though there are more points of coincidence, as ably pointed out by Lassen, between the two sects, there

1 Agarasma anagariyam pabbajuti'
See S. B. E. Vol. XXII, "Jaina Sutras" Pt. I by Hermann Jacobi, Intro. P. XXXI; Alaso Oldenberg Buddha P. 15 etc.)

2 Cp. Max Muller Hilbert Lectures p. 351.

3 Dr. Hoernle's Presidential address 1 98, before the Asiatic Society of Bengal. qdoted by Rev. G. P. Taylor in his introdustion to the Heart of Jainism by Mr. Sinclair Stevenson.

was this distinction which made them separate themselves into two branches of the common stock. While the lay adherent formed an integral part of the Jaina organisation not even a formal recognition was made of them in the Buddhist order[1]. In other words the Buddhists were purely a monastic community and took no lay disciples and hence did not interfere with the caste system. The Jains on the other hand admitted lay disciples and accepted the institution of caste. The Caturvidha Saṅgam of the Jains included the Sādhu, the Sādhvī, the Śrāvaka and the Upāsaka. The Upāsaka of the Buddhist was not a *defacto* member of the Buddhist Saṅgha. It may be pointed out here with advantage that such theories that Buddhism and Jainism were against the caste system and its conclusiveness have no leg to stand on.

This is also provable on other grounds. It is a true observation of A. Weber that the Buddha recognised the existing caste system and explained its origin as the Brāhmaṇas themselves did, by the dogma of rewards and punishments for prior actions[2]. Gautma acknowledged that in some ages the Brāhmaṇas were superior to the Kṣatriyas, and if a supreme Buddha then appeared, he was born of the Brahmanical caste[3]. In the Jātakas again Gautama speaks on the authority of one Vidura that there are ten kinds among the Brāhmaṇas (Daśa Brahma Jātaka). In another Jātaka tale he recognises the superiority and the inferiority of castes (Sambhūta Jātaka)[4]. In one place the Master commands that the pious Buddhist householders[5] "ought to perform the five

1 S. B. E. Vol XXII. Intro. p. XXXII.
2 History of Indian Literature, p.?
3 Spence Hardy, a Manual of Buddhism, p. 74.
4 See also Brahmanaka Dhammasutta in Sutt. Nip. p. 50.
5 Gaupati Ariya Savaka.

balis: to the family, the forests, the pitṛs, the king and the Gods[1]." There is another interesting passage quoted from Aṅguttara Nikāya (I. p. 149 "Attāni, Pursia, Jāuāti saccaṃ vā yadi vā musā") by H. Kern who is of opinion that it may probably be a quotation of Dharma'śāstra. This confirms our view more and more that the Buddha had great regard to the existing creed and codes, and utilised them so far as they suited his doctrines, which were not so much at variance as some scholars would make us believe[2]." In the treatise of Sigālovāda, says Kern, the Buddha teaches a layman the duties generally acknowledged in the Indian Smṛtis[3]. Again in the Dhammapada for which Buddhaghosa wrote a commentry in Pāli in the first half of the 5th century A. D. there is an interesting Chapter (XXVI) on the Brāhmaṇa. Here it is said " Because a man is rid of evil therefore he is called a Brāhmaṇa. Because he walks quietly therefore he is called Śamana: because he has sent away his own impurities, therefore he is called a Pravrajita" Again " in whom there is truth and righteousness he is blessed, he is a Brāhmaṇa[4]."

NOTE.—The Pāli Buddhist canon is divided into three Piṭakas, the Vinaya, Sutta and Abhi Dhamma. Of these the Sutta Piṭaka consists of five Nikāyas - Dighanikāya Majjhima, Samyutta, Aṅguttara and Khuddakanikāya. About fifteen works come under the category of Khuddakanikāya and one of them is the Dhammapada. In the *Buddhagosauppatti,* though a later work, is the

1 Ang. Nika. II p. 68.
2 Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 68.
3 Ibid p. 70.
4 S. B. E. Vol. X.

story of a *mahāthera* reciting the three Vedas and explaining the knotty points therein to Buddhaghosa when the latter was young[1].

But what is more valuable and important is a portrayal of the attitude of the Buddhists towards the Brahman householders to whom they owed their sustenence in the *Itivuttakā*[2] one of the canonical books of Buddhism under the second division of the Piṭakas, the Sutta Piṭaka, claimed to be the authentic Logia of Buddhas. To quote the passage will be indeed interesting.

" 107. Exceedingly helpful to you, O monks, are Brahman householders who present you with garments, offerings (piṇḍapāta), beds, seats, requisites for sickness, medicines and utensils. And ye verily, O monks, are exceedingly helpful to the Brahman householders for ye point out to them the law of their first, middle, and last good actions, and ye do proclaim unto them the life of chastity, with its meaning and its characteristics absolutely complete and perfect. Thus by mutual reliance, O monks, a life of chastity is lived for the sake of crossing the flood (of earthly longings) and for the sake of properly making an end of misery".

From these it is provable that there is no warrant to the theory that the Buddha was against the caste system as such.

The equally interesting theory, that is again untenable as we shall presently see, is that the Buddha was against the Vedic sacrifices. This is an examination of the concept of *ahiṃsā* as realized by the founder of the creed. Among the four points of coincidence between Jainism and

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1 Life of Buddha Gosha by B. C. Law, p. 29
2 Itivuttaka, Trans. by J. H. Moore (New York) p. 125.

Buddhism drawn attention to by Lassen[1] one is *ahiṃsā* or non-injury to living beings. Though the Jains carried this principle too far, the Buddhist conception was the same as found in the several books of the great Indian epic, the Mahābhārata. It would not be out of place to quote a few texts from the Mahābhārata. It is a most excellent creed to be non-violent towards all creatures[2]. In Chapter 113 115 of the Ānuśāsanika Parvan of the Mahābhārata there is a learned discussion as regards the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* and the question of flesh-eating It is Yudhiṣṭhira who says that the principle of *ahiṃsā* is recognised by the Veda as the *dharma*[3]. Lord Kṛṣṇa who preached with all eloquence at his command, to Arjuna that he must fight out and kill all his kith and kin in the battle, preaches also the principle of *ahiṃsā* to him[4]. This means that one could be non-violent without prejudice to his Svadharma, for Svadharma is always superior to any other dharma or practice of virtuous qualities.

There seems to be an opinion that the Vedic Yajña was questioned at first by the Buddha. But tradition as transmitted in the epic literature may be credited with having started already a similar theory. In more than one place the intrinsic value of the so-called bloody sacrifices has been questioned. In Chapter 92 of the Aśvamedha Parvan there is the following story. Once there was no rain for a long time. Famine stalked the land in all nakedness. People preferred death to living.

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1 Ind. Alter. IV p. 763.

2 अहिंसा सर्वभूतानामेतत्कृत्यतमं मतम् । M. B. H. Asv. Parva L. 2.

3 अहिंसालक्षणो धर्मो वेदप्रामाण्यदर्शनात् । *Ibid*. Chap. 176, 2.

4 Bhagavat Gita. X. 5.

At that time Agastya began what was known as the *Dvādaśa Vārṣika Yajña.* But still it was not fruitful. The state of rainlessness continued. The sage burst into anger and spoke of 'creating another Indraloka, etc. There he expresses that he would adopt चिन्तायज्ञः and स्पर्शयज्ञः forms of sacrifice where there will be no question of *hiṃsā.* The Ṛtviks bestow praise on Agastya and speak with approval the removal of *hiṃsā* from the sacrifices:

भवतः सम्योगष्टा तु बुद्धाहिंसा विवर्जिता । 92 33.

एतामहिंसां यज्ञेषु ब्रूयास्त्वं सततं प्रभो ।

प्रीतास्ततो भविष्यामो वयं तु द्विजसत्तम ॥ *Ibid*, 34.

In the Anuśāsnika parvan, there is a prohibition against flesh-eating. In the opinion of superior *Śiṣṭas* the non-eating of flesh and meat will tend to endow one with health, fame, long life, prosperity and heaven:

धन्यं यशस्यमायुष्यं स्वर्ग्यं स्वस्त्ययनं महत् ।

मांसस्याभक्षणं प्राहुर्नियताः परमर्षयः ॥ 177, 36.

It is said further by Bhīṣma that meat in whatever form attracts the sensation of taste and enslaves him who eats it. The meat of animals is compared to the flesh of one's own son. The flesh is considered as the vilest of human beings. He concludes that non-violence is the basis of all religions. In the Chapter 178 Yudhiṣṭhira asks the grandsire Bhīṣma that in one place he said that meat was sacred to Gods, to *pitṛs* and others and in another he preached abstention of meat. He added he was unable to reconcile both the statements. Bhīṣma says that several discourses took place between the sages in ages gone by and the result of such discussions was that *ahiṃsā* was the great *dharma*, virtue, gift, penance, sacrifice, bliss, friendship,

happiness, and unequal merits.[1]

But an householder can use meat sanctified with *mantras* in Vedic rites as an *akāma*. If he does as a *sakāma* he commits sin[2]. In those days, they say, being doubtful about the propriety of eating flesh, the sages performed sacrifices with seeds.[3] Still the doubt lingered in their minds. They, therefore, approached Vasu the king of the Cedis to have their doubts cleared. The king recommended that flesh could be taken, and for committing this sin he lost heaven. When he was asked for a second time he repeated the opinion which he formerly held, and for this sin he was sent to the nether world. Upon this the sage Agastya prescribed once for all that wild animals be dedicated to the celestials[4].

Thus we see the question of sacrifice has been opened long before the age of the Buddha and in spite of discussions, the conclusion was that meat could be used in *vaidic* rites and ordinarily one must not indulge in meat[5]. While

1 अहिंसा परमो धर्मस्तथाऽहिंसा परो दमः ।
अहिंसा परमं दानमहिंसा परमं तपः ॥
अहिंसा परमो यज्ञस्तथा ऽहिंसा परं फलम् !
अहिंसा परमं मित्रमहिंसा परमं सुखम् ॥
सर्वयज्ञेषु वा दानं सर्वतीर्थेषु वा प्लुतम् ।
सर्वदानफलं वाऽपि नैतत्तुल्यमहिंसया ॥
अहिंस्रस्य तपोऽक्षय्यमहिंस्रो यजते सदा ।
अहिंस्रः सर्वभूतानां यथा माता यथा पिता ।
एतत्फलमहिंसायां भूयश्च कुरुपुङ्गव ।
नहि शक्या गुणा वक्तुमपि वर्षशतैरपि ॥ 178, 40-44.

2 M. BH. 179, 1.

3 व्रीहिमयःपशुः 177, 54

4 *Ibid*, 55-57.

5 विधिहीनं मांसं न भक्षयेत् '। Ibid, 177'53.

Brahmanical ascetics are strictly forbidden[1] to take dishes of meat the Buddhist monks did not abstain from fish and meat Under certain restrictions the Buddha allowed the eating of fish and meat though Devadatta raised the standard of revolt against such practice[2]. There are several Jātakas wherein there is infallible testimony that flesh-eating was common among the Buddhists. From the express prohibition of taking the flesh of men, elephants, horses, dogs, asses, etc. Kern rightly remarks that the flesh of other animals was no forbidden food, (Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 71). Further in Chapter IV of Mahāparinibhana Suttānta in response to an invitation by the Smith Cunda at Pava (Cundo Kammaraputto) the Buddha visited the latter place and partook of the dishes containing pork[3]. This brought on him an illness which proved fatal ultimately[4]. From these we infer that the principle of *ahiṃsā* preached by the Buddhist teacher was no more than what Bhiṣma taught to king Yudhiṣṭhira.

We have been addressing overselves so far to prove first that the Buddha did not attack the caste system, secondly, the principle of *ahiṃsā* was not peculiar to that sect, and lastly, that as far as possible the Buddhists did not break from the established tradition of the land. Says Kern; " He (the Buddha) repeatedly exerts the morals and virtues of the ancient ṛṣis. The Dharma says he, is the ensign of the Ṛṣis[5]. The exemplary ṛṣis were Asita,

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1 Apas. II 9. 22. 2. Manu VI. 14, Gau. III 31.
2 See VI 31·14, Cullavagga VII 3,15, Majjhima Nikaya I, 368.
3 Sukara Maddavam, Digha Nikaya, Vol. II, pp 126-28. Cf. S.B.E. Vol. VI, pp. 70.-72, and 84.
4 See also Spence Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, pp. 355-58,
5 Ang. Nik. II, p. 51.

and Devala notwithstanding their heterodox rules[1]."

That the Buddhists did not hesitate to adopt the articles of morality and other regulations concerning monachism of the Brahmans is obvious. One fundamental difference was in philosophy. There is an opinion not without reason that originally the sect had no moral, code except the general prescriptions and injunctions which were in common with the general laws of society. "The more we try to remove the difficulties the more we are driven to the suspicion that original Buddhism was not correctly that of the canonical books[2]. The ten precepts of the Buddhist order are; not to destroy life, not to steal, not to be impure, not to utter falsehood, not to serve intoxicants, not to take forbidden meals, not to take part in theatrical amusements, not to use pungents, not to go in for a soft couch, and not to have any lust for gold. The *dharma* peculiar to the Saṃnyāsins is given in similar terms in the Mānavadharma Śāstras[3]. The outfit of a Bhikṣu was that of a Brahman ascetic[4] So far as the ethics of the Buddhist sect were concerned, there is nothing strikingly original. The three signs of the body and four signs of speech, the three signs of mind and five other evils, are all found in the Dharmasūtras and the Dharmaśāstras[5]. That the Traividyā or the three vedas were not neglected or condemned, and the vedic idea of the union with Brahma was not disregarded is evident from a pregnant statement; "Verily this, Vasettha, is the way to a state of union with

1 (Bahirakamarga). Manual of Indian Buddhism p. 50.
2 Ibid II, 39 ff. Cp. Yaj. III, 56 ff.
3 Baud. II, 10, 17, 11.
4 See Hardy, Manual of Buddhism p. 477.
5 Tevigga Suttee III 2, S.B.E. Vol. XI, See also Itivuttaka (68) and (69) pp, 77-78.

Brahma" (Tevigga Sutt). Further tha Buddha has belief in the doctrine of Karma which Warren calls one of the hardest of doctrines[1]. The theory of rebirth according to Karma is the unassailable Hindu theory which Buddha could not easily ignore Also the Buddhist custom of holding meetings once a fortnight especially on the full moon and new moon days points to the borrowing of this custom from the Vedic rites—the *Aupavastha* and the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* performed on the *parva* days in every monht[2]. These meetings are said to be penetential gatherings wherein the faults committed are confessed and atoned for by every member of the order.[3] Furthermore the Buddha kept (*vassā* rainy season) three months every year surrounded by groups of his disciples, when kings and the wealthy contended for the honour of entertaining him and his disciples. This period being over, then began the season of itenerancy from town to town and village to village, some times with as many as five hundred disciples[4]. The *vassā* generally commenced the day after the full moon in the month of Aṣāḍha or one month after the full moon in the month of Aṣāḍha.[5] This is but a copy of the cāturmāsya of the Brahman Saṃnyāsins. Śaṅkha the law-giver prescribes two months' stay in the rainy season in the same place while Devala and Kaṇva prescribe four months from the Śrāvaṇa month. In other seasons Kanva rules a day's stay in the village and a five days' stay in a town[6]. What was done by the Buddha and what existed

1 Buddhism in Translation, H. O. S.
2 Mahavagga II 4, 2, also S.B.E. Vol XIII, the Vinaya texts.
3 Ibid.
4 H. Oldenberg Buddha, p. 142.
5 Vinayapitakam, Vol. I. Mahavagga III, 1. pp. 137—156.
6 See Mitakshara Commentary on Yaj. III, 58.
'ऊर्ध्वं वार्षिकाभ्यां मासाभ्यां नैकस्थानवासो' इतिशंखः ।
'श्रावणाद्यश्चत्वारो मास' वर्षाकाल: इति देवल:' ॥
एकरात्रं वसंद्ग्रामे नगरे रात्रिपञ्चकम् ।
वर्षाभ्योऽन्यत्र वर्षासु मासांस्तु चतुरो वसेत् । इति कण्वः

before him are still in practice to-day in our country. Our Śaṅkarācāryas spend their retreat in the rainy season with their disciples in a place from where there was an invitation. But these disciples are almost all lay people and not monks as the Buddha had. The congregation of Saṃnyāsins was not advocated. It is said by the law-giver if two monks join together it is a gathering, if three join together it is a grāma, and any number above four is a town. The reasons given for prohibiting congregation are also given as follows: taking part in present day politics, speaking about the alms themselves, breeding jealousy and hatred among themselves[1]. Unlike their Brahmanical brothern these Kṣatriya ascetics founded a congregation which naturally engineered such unhealthy influences which ultimately brought about its disruption.

To add to these the custom of worshipping footprints was already an old institution before the time of the Buddha. Its probable origin can be traced to the Vedic legend of Viṣṇu's stepping over the earth[2]. From the *Nirukta* of Yāska[3] Viṣṇupāda was at the Gayā Hill from which place, it was believed, Viṣṇu actually went up. This passage is therefore important as it shows that Gayā has long been regarded a sacred place and Buddha perhaps chose it to do meditation because it was a sacred

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1 Daksa quoted by Vijnanesvara.

एकोभिक्षुर्यथोक्तश्च द्वावेव मिथुनं स्मृतम् ।
त्रयो ग्रामः समाख्यात ऊर्ध्वं तु नगरायते ॥
राजवार्तादि तेषां तु भिक्षावार्ता परस्परम् ।
अपि पैशुन्यमात्सर्यं सन्निकर्षान्न संशयः ॥

2 'इदं विष्णुर्विचक्रमे त्रेधा निदधे पदम् '

3 *Daivata*, 6. 3. 19.

place of orthodox people who derived their cult from the Ṛg-Veda[1].

One other feature of the Buddhist congregation was the admission of women into the order. This was the weak spot of the whole system. We cannot say that there were no women Saṃnyāsins in the Brahmanical fold. Baudhāyana refers to the Saṃnyāsins from the fair sex. But there is a definite prescription that the male Saṃnyāsin should not mingle with the female Saṃnyāsin[2]. Now granting that the Hindu Smṛtis recognised Saṃnyāsins of the other sex, the authors of the law-code were careful to restrict their intercourse with the male Saṃnyāsins, with the result that everything went on without much ado. But this was not so in the Buddhist order. It is true that the Buddha was at first not inclined to take the female monks into his order. He had his own misgivings. But he was prevailed upon by Mahāprajāpati the Goutamī, sister of the mother of the Blessed one[3]. Strict regulations were made and an order of nuns soon came to stay. But still the Buddha said: " If, Ānanda, women had not retired from household life to the houseless one under the Doctrine and Discipline announced by the Tathāgata, religion, Ānanda, would long endure: a thousand years would the good Doctrine abide. But since, Ānanda, women have now retired from household life to the houseless one under the Doctrine and Discipline announced by the Tathāgata, not long, Ānanda, will religion endure, but 500 years, Ānanda, will the good Doctrine abide[4].

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1 Ind. Ant. 1918, p. 84 K. P. Jayaswal's note.

2 'एकारामः प्रंव्रजितान्तरेणासहायः सन्यासिनीभिः स्त्रीभिश्च'

3. Cullavagga. X, 1.

4 Mahaprinit V, 23. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, H. O. S. P. 447; See also Hinduism aud Buddhism, Vol. I. p. 160.

H. Kern remarks: "His (Buddha's) misgivings proved true by the subsequent events. The ladies, even Gautamī, were now and then fretful and sometimes afterwards when the Lord sojourned at Śrāvasti some nuns moved the indignation of the public by their scandalous behaviour[1]".

Notwithstanding the few variations from the Brahmanical codes the Buddhist sect in its early form practically followed such codes and we may close this section once again with the remark of H. Kern, "No one unless unacquainted with Brahmanic literature will fail to perceive that this superior morality is nothing else but the rule of life of the *dvija* in the fourth āśrama when he is a *yati* or *mukta*. The only plausible explanation is that all those superfluous details were bodily or, with some modifications taken from Dharmasūtras and Dharmaśāstras[2].

In the light of the above observations it would be wrong to speak of a Buddhist India as a separate entity cut off from Brahmanical India. Hinduism was so catholic that it absorbed within its fold all sects and sectaries though professing different views about life and God. Scholars of wide views and cautious judgment like Rhys Davids have called into question the intrinsic value of the well-founded tradition. We cannot definitely mark a time as the rise of Buddhism in India. It is a slow process of age-long evolution. The Buddha gave an impetus to the movement though Scholars like Emile Senart opine that the Buddha of whom the Buddhist tradition waxes eloquent has never lived as a man[3]".

1 Cullavagga, X, 9-27
2 Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 70.
3 Senart, Essai sur la legende de Buddha, Paris, 1875.

In our opinion in the face of such strong tradition to deny the existence of an historical figure is carrying research too far. Granting then the existence of the historical figure of the Buddha, is there any tangible evidence to indicate that Buddhism exercised any powerful sway in the Mauryan epoch or before? Rhys David remarks:— "We know whether from native or foreign sources very little of what happened during the century and half that followed after the Buddha's death[1]". This was the period of the Nandas and we have no details of their administration. In this period as in the time of the Buddha the Buddhist monks found hospitable home in Kośala and Magadha a small fraction of the vast continent of India. We cannot judge of the whole of India from these two small kingdoms even where the influence does not seem to have been great. From the Mānavadharma Śāstra and Yājñavalkya we gather that these Kṣatriya monks lived side by side with the Brahman ascetics the latter being asked to retire from villages inhabited by these unorthodox monastic sects[2].

To say that the Mauryas were followers of the Buddhism has little evidence to support it. Chandragupta, the first King of the Dynasty, owed his throne to the Brahman politician Kauṭilya who seems to have been an absolute follower of the old Vedic religion. Sacrificial halls or agnihotraśālās are mentioned as also worship to Indra, Varuṇa, Aśvins, etc. There are references in the Kauṭliya[3] to some heretical sects, the members of which found employment in the Intelligence Department,

1 Buddhist India, p, 259.
2 Manu, VI, 51; Yaj, III, 59.
3 Ar. Sas. Bk, I, Ch. 11 and 12.

and other offices. Other recluses deserving of regard were shown due honour and respect The same is the case with the great Maurya emperor and grandson of Candragupta, Aśoka. Though there is a consensus of opinion that Aśoka professed Buddhism and though there is another view that he was a Jain[1] we agree with the Reverend Father Heras S. J. that he was neither a Buddhist nor a Jain but a follower of the established religion of the land which we may now call the earlier form of Hinduism: He held catholic views about religion and life and thought it dharma to be of help to every religious sect prevailing in his empire[2]. As Father Heras has dealt with this rather elaborately I refrain from adducing reasons in favour of the theory that he was no Buddhist.

Still I shall make one observation. Every one knows that Aśoka abstained from war after the Kaliṅga carnage. Was it due to Jain or Buddhist influence? No, is our answer. The ideal which Aśoka set himself was not the ordinary Kṣatriya duty but that of a Kṣatriya of a higher order. More than once Yudhiṣṭhira who heard of the *ahiṃsā* doctrine from his grandsire Bhīṣma as the highest Vedic religion wanted to avoid battle. On the eve of the Kurukṣetra battle Arjuna refused to fight his own kith and kin. Did not Śrī Rāmacandra speak of Kṣatriya dharma as *adharma* in the guise of *dharma*[3]. With a deep religious bent of mind Aśoka followed the footsteps of his great predecessors Yudhiṣṭhira and Rāmacandra. Nothing more or nothing less was the ruling passion of the great Mauryan King.

1 Ind. Ant. Vol. V. Kern's article.
2 Qu. Journal of the Mythic society, Vol. XVII. No. 4.
3 Ramayana, Ayod. 109, 20

That Buddhism was not influential during the epoch of the early Mauryas is in evidence from the Kauṭilya's Arthśāstra. Jacobi's argument is convincing when he says that Kauṭilya recognised philosophy to be a science by itself, and hence he could bring in the Lokāyata, the character of whose contents must exclude it from the Trayī. If Kauṭilya could recognise the Lokāyata he could recognise as well the Buddhist philosophy if the latter had really deserved the name of philosophy in his time. There is no warrant to the view that the Buddhist philosophical systems were ignored by Kauṭilya. The probabilities are that these systems gained currency only after Kauṭilya's time, in the centuries immediately before and after the beginning of our era. (Indian Ant. 1918, Trans. by V. A. Sukthankar.)

With respect to successors of Aśoka there is evidence of a rare order, in inscriptions, which prove that they were not Buddhists. For instance Dāśaratha, the grandson of Aśoka, makes three grants to Ājīvaka monks by bestowing the caves in the Nāgārjunī-Hills[1]. Again about 184 B. C. the Sunga Dynasty was founded by Puṣyamitra. He was commander-in-chief to Bṛhadratha whom he overthrew by slaying him. The Buddhist annals make him out to be a persecutor of their faith and a strict follower of Brahmanism[2]. Puṣyamitra was not as tolerant as the Mauryan monarchs were and hence the Buddhists regarded him as a hater of their sect. Thus I am inclind to believe that there was no Buddhist ascendency either before or during the epoch of the Mauryas and therefore there

1 Ind. Ant. Vol. XX, p. 361
2 Cam. His. Ind, Vol. 1 g. 512.

was no reaction under Puṣyamitra or under his succesors. We grant that the Buddhist monks continued to live side by side with Brahman brethren in a state of harmony and peace. But the fact that they took part in politics and administration of their land, lived together in congregation to which, according to the Vinaya, were recruited unworthy people who renounced for belly's sake and who would go back to the world if food supply was refused, (the Kauṭilya[1] also shows that this was in practice) and allowed a large number of nuns to embrace their faith brought about their downfall. Whatever may be the later developments of these movements here and in other countries Buddhism and Jainism in their early forms did not exercise any appreciable influence in the History of land. Jarl Charpentier rightly remarks:—"It is a strange characteristic of these sects so far as I know them that they adopted in their ascetic practices and in their whole mode of life the rules which had been already fixed by their Brahman antagonists[2]". There is no warrant to the statements like that of Rhys Davids "The name was retained but the idea was entirely changed[3]". But it is correct estimate of Sir Charles Eliot "Though Hindu life may be cut up into castes and sects, Hindu creeds are not mutually exclusive and repellent. They attract and colour one another[4]."

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1 Temporary renouncing of the world by sick men to get healed by honourary physicians of the confraternity, by warriors to escape active service, by fugitives from justice, betters, runaways, slaves and impecunious old gentlemen (See Chalmer's Further Dialogues of the Buddha, Intro. p. 18).

2 Cam. His. Ind. Vol. pp. 150-51.

3 S. B. E. Vol. 11 p. 162.

4 Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. 1, Intro. p. 14.

VEDĀNTA COMMENTATORS BEFORE ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA.

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In the following an attempt has been made to bring together information about the commentators of the Brahmasūtras, the principal Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, that preceded the great Śaṅkarācārya. It is not intended to say anything about the author of the Vedāntasūtras or about the predecessors of the Vedāntasūtrakāra.

Śaṅkarācārya strikes one as not very anxious to support his exposition of Vedānta by reference to previous commentators. He hardly ever quotes any commentator of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā or of the Uttaramīmāṃsā by name except Upavarṣa and Śabara. His references to his predecessors' views are generally vaguely expressed in such words as 'some' (*kecit*), 'others' (*apare, anye* &c.,) or 'the teachers' (ācāryas).

In what follows the writers are arranged as far as possible in chronological order. About some of these scholars have already furnished information *e.g.*, about Bhartṛprapañca in the Introduction p. 15 of the Tarkasaṅgraha (Gaikwad's G. Series) and by Prof. Hiriyanna in Indian Antiquary for 1924 p. 77, about Dramiḍācārya in the Introduction to the Tarkasaṅgraha (p. 16), about Brahmadatta in the Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) for 1928 p. 1.

Bodhāyana.

Several authorities agree in saying that Bhagavad-Bodhāyana composed a *vṛtti* on the Vedāntasūtras. The

Prapañcahṛdaya (Trivandrum S. Series p. 39) says[1] that Bodhāyana composed a bhāṣya on the whole of the Mīmāṃsāśāstra consisting of 20 chapters (12 of the Sūtras of Jaimini, 4 of the Devatākāṇḍa and 4 of Uttaramīmāṃsā) that it was styled Kṛtakoṭi and that Bodhāyana's bhāṣya being prolix, Upavarṣa abridged it. Rāmānuja in his Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya (Bombay Series p. 1) says that Bodhāyana composed a lengthy *vṛtti* on the Brahmasūtras and that former *Ācāryas* abridged it[2]. This lends support to the remark of the Prapañcahṛdaya cited above. Rāmānuja in several passages of his Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya quotes the views of the Vṛttikāra. For example, the Vṛttikāra is cited (p. 2) as saying that the desire to know *Brahma* arises after the knowledge of actions that has been already set forth (in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) and that the Śārīraka (Vedāntasūtras) being welded together with the work of Jaimini in sixteen chapters, the two together constitute one Śāstra[3]. On the Sūtra 'Svāpyayāt' (Vedāntasūtra 1-1-10) a passage is quoted by Rāmānuja from the Vṛttikāra (p. 176)[4]. Śabara in his bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras often quotes or refers to the views of a *vṛttikāra*. All these are brought together in my paper on 'Gleanings from the

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1. तस्य विंशत्यध्यायनिबद्धस्य मीमांसाशास्त्रस्य कृतकोटिनामधेयं भाष्यं बोधायनेन कृतम् । तद् ग्रन्थबाहुल्यभयादुपेक्ष्य किंचित्संक्षिप्तमुपवर्षेण कृतम् । .... ब्रह्मकाण्डस्य भगवत्प द-ब्रह्मदत्त-भास्करादिभिर्मतभेदेनापि कृतम् । .... प्रपञ्चहृदय ।

2. भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः संचिक्षिपुः । श्रीभाष्य ।

3. तदाह वृत्तिकारः । वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्मविविदिषेति । वक्ष्यति च कर्मब्रह्ममीमांसयोरैकशास्त्र्यं संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिरिति । श्रीभाष्य ।

4. तदाह वृत्तिकारः । सता सौम्य तदा संपन्नो भवतीति संपत्त्यसंपत्तिभ्यामेतदध्यवसीयते । प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्त इति चाहेति । श्रीभाष्य ।

bhāṣya of Śabara' (in JBBRAS Vol. XXVI, pp. 83-84). There I had hazarded the conjecture that the vṛttikāra is the same as the one on the Vedāntasūtras, and that he is not the same as Upavarṣa. This conjecture now derives support from the passage of the Prapañcahṛdaya referred to above. In the Yatīndramatadīpikā (p. 2) there is a long list of Vedānta teachers obviously arranged in a chronological order, in which Bodhāyana is placed immediately after Vyāsa (the reputed author of the Vedāntasūtras)[1]. In the Vedārthasaṅgraha (reprint from Pandit, 1924) Bhagavad Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bhāruci are mentioned as venerable men (*śiṣṭas*) who approved of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine (p. 154). Śaṅkarācārya in his Śārīraka-bhāṣya often refers to the views of his predecessors some of which are attributed to the Vṛttikāra by his commentators. For example, it is pointed out by the Ratnaprabhā that Vṛttikāra dissolved the compound *brahmajijñāsā* as 'brahmaṇe jijñāsā', while Śaṅkara took it as 'brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā.' On V. S. 1-1-4 Śaṅkara says that according to some Brahma is not taught in the Upaniṣads as the principal and self-sufficient subject but only as a secondary topic that is subservient to and useful in the injunction about knowing (or contemplating on) *brahma*. This according to the commentators is the view of the vṛttikāra. As regards the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa (I 1-12 ff) the commentators say that the explanation first set out by Śaṅkara is that of the *vṛttikāra*. *Similarly*, the second explanation proposed by Śaṅkara on V. S. I. 1-31 is said to be the view of the Vṛttikāra. Whether the Vṛttikāra whose views are com-

1. व्यासबोधायनगुहदेवभारुचिब्रह्मानन्दिद्रविडाचार्यश्रीपराङ्कुशनाथयामुनमुनियतीश्वरप्रभृतीनां मतानुसारेण । यतीन्द्रमतदीपिका ।

bated by Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā (*e.g.*, on II. 11, IV. 18) is the same as the Vṛttikāra of the Vedāntasūtras is extremely doubtful.

Since Śabara cannot be placed later than the 4th or 5th century A. D. and since Upavarṣa was much earlier than Śabara and abridged Bodhāyana's *vṛtti*, it follows that Bodhāyana cannot be placed later than the first or second century of the Christian era. How much earlier than that date he flourished it is impossible to say in the present state of our knowledge.

Upavarṣa.

Śabara quotes the view of Bhagavān Upavarṣa on the question as to what constitutes the word. The same view is ascribed to Upavarṣa by Śaṅkarācārya in his bhāṣya on V. S. I. 3. 28. Śaṅkara further tells us in his bhāṣya on V. S. III. 3·53 that the venerable Upavarṣa remarked in his commentary on the first *tantra* (*i.e* the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) when the existence of the soul had to be established (in the course of discussion) that he would dilate upon it in (his commentary on) the Śārīraka (*i. e*, the Vedāntasūtras)[1]. Bhāskara also in his bhāṣya on the V. S. (pp. 62 and 6) ascribes the above two views to Upavarṣa and in another place (p. 124) speaks of Upavarṣācārya as the propagator (*pravartaka*) of the *Śāstrasampradāya*. From Someśvara's Nyāyasudhā it appears that the Tantravārtika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa bestows the epithet Mahābhāṣyakāra on Upavarṣa (*vide* for the quotation my paper on Śabara JBBRAS Vol. XXVI p. 84). From the Prapañcahṛdaya

1. अतएव च भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः । वेदान्तसूत्रभाष्य ।

it follows that Upavarṣa abridged Bodhāyana's *vṛitti* on the whole of the Mīmāṃsā and Rāmānuja's words that former *ācāryas* abridged the lengthy *vṛtti* of Bodhāyana lend some support to this assertion.

As Upavarṣa was a venerable (*bhagavān*) writer even to Śabara he cannot be placed later than the third century A.D.

Guhadeva.

Guhadeva is placed immediately after Bodohāyana in the Yatīndramatadīpikā and he is mentioned by Rāmānuja among the *Śiṣṭas* that approved of Viśiṣṭādvaita. No quotations from him could be discovered by me in the printed works on Vedānta.

Kapardin.

He is mentioned as a śiṣṭa in the Vedārthasaṅgraha. That is all that is known about him.

Bhāruci.

He is mentioned by the Yatīndramatadīpikā before Brahmānandin and also by the Vedārthasaṅgraha. I could find no quotation from him on Vedānta. In my paper on "the predecessors of Vijñāneśvara" (JBBRAS for 1925 pp. 209—213), I showed that Bhāruchi was an ancient writer on Dharmaśāstra and stood in special relation to the Viṣṇudharmasūtra wherein the worship of Viṣṇu is very strongly emphasized. Whether he is indentical with the Vedāntin it is impossible to prove.

Bhartṛhari.

Yāmunācārya in the Siddhitraya (p. 5) names a host of Vedānta writers among whom Bhartṛhari is one[1]. It is

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1. यद्यपि भगवता बादरायणेनेदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि विवृतानि च तानि परिमितगम्भीर-भाषिणा भाष्यकृता विस्तृतानि च तानि गम्भीरन्यायसागर-भाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणापि-तथाप्याचार्यटङ्कभर्तृप्रपञ्चभर्तृमित्रभर्तृहरिब्रह्मदत्तशङ्करश्रीवत्साङ्कभास्करादिविरचितसितासितविविधनिबन्ध-नश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो न यथावदन्यथा च प्रतिपद्यन्त इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये च युक्तः प्रकरणक्रमः। सिद्धित्रय।

hard to say whether he is indentical with Bhartṛhari the profound grammarian and author of the Vākyapadīya. It is worthy of note that the very first verse of the Vākyapadīya bears a close resemblance to the views of Śaṅkara and indicates that the author of the work was conscious of the Vivartavāda. If the two are identical, the Vedāntin Bhartṛhari must have flourished between 600—650 A. D. A Hari is quoted by the Śāstra-dīpikā (on Jaimini X. 2·59-60).

Bhartṛmitra.

He is named by Yāmunācārya as a writer on Vedānta. The Nyāyaratnākara on the Ślokavārtika (I. 10) says that Bhartṛmitra composed an ancient commentary on the Mīmāṃsā and made the Mīmāṃsāśāstra atheistic. A Bhartṛmitra is quoted by Mukulabhaṭṭa in his Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā, who appears from the quotation to be a *Mīmāṃsaka.* Whether this latter Bhartṛmitra is identical with the Vedāntin Bhartṛmitra is more than doubtful.

Brahmānandin (or Brahmanandin).

In the Yatīndramatadīpikā Brahmānandin is placed among Vedānta teachers after Bhāruci and before Draviḍācārya. Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī in his commentary on the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka III 218—220 (Benares ed.) tells us that the Vākyakāra spoken of by the latter is Brahmanandin, that the Bhāṣyakāra referred to in the next verse is Draviḍācārya, that Brahmanandin composed terse sentences resembling the Vedāntasūtras, the Brahmanandin, humouring the ways of ordinary people and their confirmed habits of thought, at first spoke of *Pariṇāmavāda* and then he gave up that position also as opposed to reasoning and accepted pure monism and *Vivartavāda* and that Dravi-

dācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the aphoristic *vākyas* of Brahmanandin conveys that the Vākyakāra approved of the view that Brahma is non-different from the pratyag-ātman[1]. *Vide* Saṅkṣepaśārīraka III 40 for another reference to Vākyakāra. This establishes that the Vākyakāra is earlier than Draviḍācārya (or Dramiḍā) and that both are earlier than the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, which was composed by a pupil's pupil of Śaṅkarācārya. Rāmānuja in Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya several times quotes the words of the Vākyakāra and the explanations of the Bhāṣyakāra thereon. For example, according to Rāmānuja (p. 9) the view of the Vākyakāra was that '*Vedanā*' (knowing) enjoined as a means of *mokṣa* in all the Upaniṣads was really *upāsanā* and that '*Vedanā*' led to *mokṣa* only when it was constantly practised, that *Upāsanaā* when constantly practised became *dhruvānusmṛti* (or *bhakti*). In another place Rāmānuja quotes (p. 11) a passage from the Vākyakāra wherein 'dhruvānusmṛti' is said to arise from *viveka, vimoka, abhyāsa, kriyā, kalyāṇa, anavasāda* and *anudgharṣa* and these technical words are explained in aphoristic form. Rāmānuja also quotes the explanations of these given by the bhāṣyakāra. In another place (p. 80) Rāmānuja says that the Vākyakāra, following such Vedāntasūtras as *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*' (III. 3. 11) held the position that it was only the *Saguṇa Brahma* that was to be the object of

1. अत्यन्तभेदसत्यत्वेऽभिनिविष्टचित्तस्य प्रथमत एव विवर्तवाद प्रवेशो दुर्घट इति तदभिनिवेशत्याजनाय व्यवहारदृष्टिं रक्षता परिणामवादः प्रथमतःसमुपपादितः । पश्चात्तद्दृष्टिमपि युक्त्यसहत्वेन शनैस्त्याजयित्वा तन्नोपि निकटं विवर्तवादमुपवर्ण्य शुद्धाद्वैतं रक्षति स्म ब्रह्मनन्दी ततस्तस्य परिणामोक्तिरपि युक्तेत्र सूत्रकारस्येवेत्याशयेनाह । ब्रह्मनन्दिविरचितवाक्यानां सूत्ररूपाणां भाष्यकर्ता द्राविडाचार्योपि अद्वयब्रह्मणः प्रत्यगभेदो वाक्यकाराभिप्रेत इति कथयति स्म ततो व्यवसीयते ब्रह्मनन्दिनो विकारवादोऽनभिमत इत्याह । मधुसूदन :

contemplation (*upāsanā*) and that there was an option with regard to the *vidyās* taught in the Upaniṣads, and that the Bhāṣyakāra also explained this view of the Vākyakāra. *Vide* pp. 18, 116 of Rāmānuja bhāṣya for other references to the Vākyakāra. Bhāskara in his bhāṣya on Vedāntasūtra I. 4. 25 (*ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*) says that the Vākyakāra approved of the *Pariṇāmavāda* and quotes a *vākya* from him *'pariṇāmastu syāddadhyādivat'* in support. It appears from the above that the work of the Vākyakāra was in the nature of a *Vārtika* on the Vedāntasūtras. The word Vākyakāra is aften applied to Kātyāyana the famous author of the Vārtikas on Pāṇini's *sūtras*. *Vide* Tantravārtika p. 958[1].

Dramiḍācārya or Draviḍācārya.

Rāmānuja in his Vedārthasaṅgraha speaks of Dramiḍa as a śiṣṭa who approved of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda. Rāmānuja in his Vedāntasūtra-bhāṣya several times (pp. 11, 80 etc.,) quotes the views of a *bhāṣyakāra* on the *Vākyas* of the Vākyakāra. We saw above that according to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī this Bhāṣyakāra is Draviḍācārya. Rāmānuja quotes from a Dramiḍabhāṣyakāra also. For example, on the well-known Sūtra *'bhoktrāpatter-avibhāgaścet syāl-lokavat'* (V. S. II. I. 19) a passage of the Dramiḍabhāṣya in a high-flown style (like that of Bāṇa) is quoted. In another place Rāmānuja quotes (p. 471) the words of the Dramiḍabhāṣyakāra to the effect that 'the position of the Śāstra is that people in order to secure (desired) rewards desire to propitiate the Atman by (performing *śāstric*) rites

1 यदा एकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थास्तदा कर्मादयो विशेषणत्वेनेति द्वाभ्यामपि वाक्यकारभाष्यकाराभ्यां बहुवचनवार्त्तिके अनभिहितवार्त्तिकेच द्वावपि कर्मत्वाद्येकत्वादिवाच्यत्वपक्षौ दूरमनुसृत्यान्ते निर्दोषतयावधारितम् । तन्त्रवार्तिक.

and actions and that he (the Ātman) being pleased is able to grant the rewards'. It follows from the above that the Bhāṣyakāra quoted by Rāmānuja is the same as Dramiḍācārya or Draviḍābhāṣyakāra. As Dramiḍācarya is, according to Madhusūdana, referred to as bhāṣyakāra by the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, the former must be placed at least as early as, if not earlier than, Śaṅkarācārya.

According to Ānandajñāna, Śaṅkarācārya in several places alludes to a Draviḍācārya, though he does not name him. Mr. Tripathi in his Introduction to the Tarkasaṅgraha of Ānandagiri (p. XVI) is of opinion that the Draviḍācārya alluded to by Śaṅkara is different from the one named by Rāmānuja. This opinion is not based on sound reasons. It appears to be based on the *a priori* ground that as Śaṅkara alludes to Draviḍācārya with veneration, the latter must be like the former a pure monist, whereas the Dramiḍācārya whom Rāmānuja quotes must be regarded as a Viśiṣṭādvaitin. But, on examination, this reasoning will not appeal to any one. In the days of Śaṅkara there was not sharp cleavage between pure monists and other Aupaniṣada interpreters who did not go as far as Śaṅkara. For example, Śaṅkara is prepared, in his bhāṣya on V. S. 1-3-19, to regard those who look upon individual souls as *pāramārthika,* as his partisans (*asmadīyāś-ca kecit*). Similarly Sureśvara in his great Vārtika tries hard to show that even Bhartṛprapañca, who was a *bhedābhedavādin*, must be regarded as favouring Vivartavāda when properly interpreted[1] (*vide* Bṛhadāraṇ-

1. भर्तृप्रपञ्चप्रस्थानमेत्रमेतद्यथोदितम् । इतोऽन्यमपि तद्भाष्यं गमयेदेवमेव तु ॥ ब्रह्मभाविरवं श्रुत्वा ये तु व्याचक्षतेऽन्यथा । तानुद्दिश्य विचारोऽयं प्रारब्धो गुरुभि: स्फुटः। सुरेश्वर ॥ ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यत्र ब्रह्मभावी पुरुषो ब्रह्मशब्देनोच्यत इति भर्तृप्रपञ्चवचः श्रुत्वा विवर्तवादं ते नेच्छन्ततीति ये भ्राम्यन्ति तानुद्दिश्य तद् भ्रान्तिध्वस्त्यर्थं विचारो भाष्यकारैरेवतारित इत्यर्थः ; आनन्दज्ञान ।

yakabhāṣyavārtika p. 666 verses 1164-65 and Ānandagiri thereon). Yāmunācārya (Siddhitraya p. 27) quotes with apparent approval Sureśvara's dictum in the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi (11-32). Therefore there is no cogent reason why the Dramiḍācārya alluded to by Śaṅkara should not be the same as the one on whom Rāmānuja relies as one of his great predecessors and authorities.

Dramiḍācārya not only composed a bhāṣya on the Vedāntasūtras, but seems to have written a vast commentary on the Chāndogya-upaniṣad. Ānandajñāna commenting on the opening words of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Chāndogya 'ṛjuvivaraṇam-alpagrantham' says that the word '*alpagrantha* (a treatise of small extent) is suggestive of the fact that Śaṅkara's work is smaller than the Drāviḍa-bhāṣya on the Chāndogya. Similarly on Chāndogya III. 10. 1-4, Śaṅkara cites the explanation given by the 'ācāryas', which Ānandajñāna refers to Dravidācārya. In his bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda's Kārikās (p. 94 Ānandāśrama ed.) Śaṅkara quotes the words 'Siddham tu nivartakatvāt' as a *sūtra* of those who know the Vedas, which Ānandajñāna ascribes to Dravidācārya. Sureśvara in his great Vārtika sets out the story narrated by some (*kecit*) of a prince, who was brought up in ignorance of high estate, in order to illustrate the proposition that the purport of the sentence 'tat-tvam-asi' is the identity (of the supreme self and Individual soul) and that the passages about the creation of the world that occur in the same Upaniṣad are only subservient to that main proposition. Ānandajñāna says that the story was first composed by Dravidācārya (*vide* Br. Up. Vārtika p. 970, verses 506 ff and com. thereon). Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on Bṛ. Up. II. 120 says that the story of the prince was narrated by those who know the 'sampradāya'.

The foregoing discussion shows that Draviḍācārya was later than Brahmānandin and earlier than Śaṅkara and Sureśvara *i.e.* he must have flourished before 750 A. D.

Brahmadatta.

In the Prapañcahṛdaya Brahmadatta is mentioned as a commentator of the Brahmasūtras along with Bhagvatpāda and Bhāskara. • Information about him, which is very meagre, has been furnished by Prof. Hiriyanna in his Introduction to the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi (p. XXIII) and by the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. II, Part I. p. 1. According to Ānandajñāna (on Sambandhavārtika p. 219 verse 797) Brahmadatta held the view that the purpose of the Upaniṣads was to lay down an injunction for people about the acquisition of the knowledge of the self as expressed in '*ātmetyevopāsīta*'. This is called *niyogapakṣa* and is frequently referred to by Sureśvara (*vide* Naiṣkarmya-siddhi I. 88 and Bṛ. Up. Vār. p. 592, verses 792-93 and p. 611, verses 884-886).

How much earlier than Śaṅkara Brahmadatta flourished cannot be said.

Maṇḍanamiśra.

Prof. Hiriyanna shows from references to Māṇḍana by Ānandajñāna (on Br. Up. Vār. p. 1852 verse 796) and from the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka (II. 174) that Maṇḍanamiśra and Sureśvara were not identical. In JBBRAS Vol III. (New Series) pp. 289-293 I tried to show that if the traditional date of Śaṅkara 788—820 (A.D.) be accepted then Maṇḍana flourished about a hundred years before Śaṅkara.

Gauḍapāda.

Much has been written about Gauḍapāda. It is not intended to repeat what has been already said by others. Śaṅkarācārya composed a bhāṣya on Gauḍapāda's Māṇ-

ḍūkya Kārikās and calls Gauḍapāda his *paramaguru* (teacher's teacher). In the bhāṣya on V. S. I. 4-14 he quotes Gauḍapāda's Kārikā (III. 15) and speaks of him as 'Sampradāyavidaḥ' and on V. S. II, 1–9 he quotes Kārikā I, 16 with the words 'it has been said by *Ācāryas* who know the *Sampradāya* about the (true) meaning of Vedānta texts.' Sureśvara also speaks of him as 'one who knows the Siddhāntas of the whole Veda,' calls him Gauḍācārya and quotes Kārikā III, 15 (*vide* Br. Up. Vār. p. 951 verses 386—387). In another place he speaks of others knowing the Sampradāya as relying on the verses of Gauḍapāda (*vide* Br. Up. Vār. p. 886—888). In the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (I. 44) he speaks of Gauḍa (Gauḍapāda) and Drāviḍa (Śaṅkara) in the same breath and as greatly venerated by him.

An important question is whether Gauḍapāda the author of the Kārikās is identical with the author of the commentary on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās. Scholars generally hold that they are not, but there is no insuperable obstacle in holding them as identical. The commentator of the Sāṅkhya-Karikās seems to have been an orthodox writer. He speaks (on Karikā 2) of *dharma* as what is enjoined by *śruti* and *smṛti* (which is what Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra says). He relies on the Gītā as an authoritative work (on Kārikā 12 '*Guṇā guṇeṣu vartante*' is quoted from the Gītā). On Kārikā 23 he refers to the orthodox fourteen *vidyās* (4 Vedas, 6 *aṅgas*, nyāya, mīmāṃsā and dharmaśāstra). On verse 51 he explains 'adhyayana' as 'Vedādiśāstrādhyayana.

Bhartṛprapañca.

Of all the predecessors of Śaṅkara, whose works have not yet been discovered, the amplest materials available

are those of Bhartṛprapañca. Prof. Hiriyanna has examined in some detail (in Indian Antiquary for 1924 pp. 76—86) the materials contained in the great Vārtika of Sureśvara and in the commentary of Ānandajñāna. In the following an effort will be made to bring out a few salient points about Bhartṛprapañca and to supplement what has been stated by Prof. Hiriyanna. To deal in detail with the large material available will require a separate paper of considerable length on Bhartṛhari.

The Siddhitraya of Yāmunamuni mentions Bhartṛprapañca as one of the authors who wrote on the Vedānta and on the Vedāntasūtras. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his commentary on the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka I. 7 says that although Vyāsa, while discussing the Bṛ. Up. passage (*tam-etam vedānuvacanena*) accepted that both the Karmakāṇḍā and the Brahmakāṇḍa are equally authoritative yet thereby alone he does not settle their real import and that some like Bhartṛprapañca while expounding his *sūtra* propounded *bheda* (dualism), which is not the (true) purport of the Veda, as its real import[1]. *Vide* Subodhini also on the verse (Vaktāram-āsādya Yam-eva &c.,) of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka. It is thus established that Bhartṛ. wrote a bhāṣya on the V. S. From Ānandajñāna's comment on the opening words of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Bṛ. Up. it follows that Bhartṛ. commented on the Mādhyandina recension, while Śaṅkara commented on the Kāṇva text of the Bṛ. Up. and that Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* was smaller in extent than that of Bhatṛ. on the same

11. भगवता व्यासेन च विविदिषावाक्यं विचारयता यद्यपि कर्मकाण्डब्रह्मकाण्डयोस्तुल्यमेव प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकृतं तथापि तावन्मात्रेण न स्वार्थसमन्वितता । कैश्चित्तत्सूत्रं व्याचक्षाणैर्भर्तृप्रपञ्चादिभिर्भेदादेरवेदार्थस्य वेदार्थत्ववर्णनात् । मधुसूदनः ।

Upaniṣad. Bhartṛ. appears also to have commented on the Kaṭha and Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad. One item of personal history seems to have puzzled Prof. Hiriyanna. Sureśvara in various places ridicules Bhartṛ. by saying that the latter is able to propound this or that wrong view merely on the strength of the *vara* (favour or boon of *Vaiśvānara* or *Jātavedas* or *hutabhuk*) (but not by means of correct reasoning) and that not being favoured with similar good fortune he (Sureśvara) cannot attempt to establish the impossible (to make a roll of the sky as if it were a piece of skin) or the illogical[1]. Prof. Hiriyana advances the farfetched explanation that reference is made to his doctrine of Hiraṇyagarbha and the doctrine of Bhakti. I hazard a simple explanation. It is not unusual for ancient writers to say that they were able to compose a work through the favour (*vara*) of this deity or that. For example, the great astronomer Varāhamihira says at the end of his Bṛhajjātaka that he composed the work after securing the favour (Varaprasāda) of the Sun in Kapisthala. Similarly it is probable that Bhartṛ. said in the Introductory portion of his *bhāṣya* that he was

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1. संसारदर्शनाभ्यासात्तन्मुक्तिं ये प्रचक्षते । नाकार्यं विद्यते तेषां वैश्वानरवराश्रयात् । वयं तु वरहीनत्वाच्चर्मवद्वोष्टितुं वियत् । न शक्नुमो विना युक्तीरतो न श्रद्दधामहे ॥ बृ० उ० वार्तिक p. 574, verses 700-70 नान्योऽस्मन्प्रकृतोऽन्योऽर्थो विरुद्धस्य विशेषणम् । ग्रहीतुं सुधिया शक्यो वैश्वानरवराहते बृ० उ वार्तिक p. 782, verse 1779 वैश्वानरवरादत्र केचिदाहुर्महाधियः । देहद्वयविमोकेऽपि नैव मुक्तः पुमानिति ॥ बृ० उ० वार्तिक p. 1154, verse 41 ज्ञातं ब्रह्म यथा वच्च न चापगात्ततस्तमः । इत्येतदविरुद्धं स्यात्प्रसादाज्जाततवेदसः ।।बृ०उ०वा०।। p. 164, verse 98 दृष्टिभेदमकृत्वैव द्रष्टेरित्यादिकां श्रुतिम् । केचिद् व्याचक्षते धीराः प्रसादाज्जातवेदसः ॥ वार्तिक p. 1236, verse 161

यथोक्तादन्यथैवेमं व्याख्यानायत्नतो बुधाः । श्लोकं व्याचक्षतेऽयुक्त्या हुतभुग्वरसंश्रयात् । वार्तिक p. 1785, verse 391.

able to expound the recondite teaching of the Bṛ. Up. through the favour of Agni (Vaiśvānara), indicating that he had, even though a *brahmavid*, sedulously performed the acts laid down by the Karmakāṇḍa for an *agnihotrin* and exemplified in his life his teaching about *jñāna-karma-samuccaya.* The bhāṣya of Bhartṛ. was available up to the days of Ānandajñāna who quotes large extracts from it in scores of places and hence it is not unlikely that if a proper search be made it may yet come to light. One interesting fact is that between Bhartṛ. and Śaṅkara a good deal of time elapsed. On Bṛ. Up. I. 4-10 (*brahma va idam-agra āsīt*) Śaṅkara says that some explain '*brahma*' here as 'brahmabhāvī puruṣo brāhmaṇaḥ.' Thereon Sureś-vara says that some interpreted the bhāṣya of Bhartṛ. on Bṛ. Up. I. 1-9 as favouring *pariṇāmavāda* (and not *vivartavāda*) because of this explanation of *brahma* in Bṛ. Up. I. 4-10, that the bhāṣya of Bhartṛ. on Bṛ. Up. 4-9 must really be understood as favouring *Vivartavāda* and that therefore in other places also the *bhāṣya* of Bhartṛ. must be so interpreted and so my teacher (*guru, i.e.,* Śaṅkara) enters upon a lengthy discussion as to Bṛ. Up. I. 4-10 in order to remove the error of those who held that Bhartṛ. does not approve of *Vivartavāda.* So according to Sureśvara, his master Śaṅkara was refuting the explanations of some followers of Bhartṛ. and that Bhartṛ. was such a great authority that even Śaṅkara thought it necessary to show to the school of Bhartṛ. that their master also favoured *vivartavāda.*

The references to Bhartṛ. fall under three heads. Śaṅkara, according to Sureśvara, in several places criticizes the views of Bhartṛ. though he nowhere mentions him by name. In the second class of cases though the bhāṣya of

Śaṅkara contains no express reference to Bhartṛ., Sureśvara himself criticizes or refers to the views of Bhartṛ. on his own account. There is a third class of cases in which neither Śaṅkāra nor Sureśvara directly refers to him, but it is Ānandajñāna who brings in the name or views of Bhartṛ. Examples of all three classes of cases are noted below. Examples of the first class are to be found in Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Bṛ. Up. 1.4.15 '*deveṣu lokam'* (Vār. p. 757 verses 1644-45), 1.4.15 *ātmānam-eva lokam-upāsīta* (Var. p. 767 verse 1692), II.3.6 *tasya ha etasya puruṣasya'* where Śaṅkara sets out the tenets (*prakriyā*) of some who regard themselves as Aupaniṣada (Vār. pp. 1011-1015 verses 112-148 where Ānanda on verse 115 quotes an extract from Bhartṛ. in which the words 'vidyākarma-pūrvaparajñā' used in the Śāṅkarabhāṣya occur), III. 2·13 (about *apavarga* being an *antarālāvasthā*) and Vār. p. 1154 verse 41, on III. 4·2 '*nadṛṣṭer draṣṭāram &c.*' (Vār. pp. 1236-1239 verses 167-186), III. 5. '*vittaiṣaṇā* (Vār. p. 1258 verse 113), IV. 4. 22 '*vedānuvacanena vividiṣanti* (Vār. p. 1890 verse 1032), V. 1. 1. '*pūrṇa-madaḥ pūrṇamidam'* (Vār. pp. 1953-1959 verses 28-63). For examples of the second class of cases reference may be made to pp. 1361, 1369, 1374, 1450, 1572, 1589, 1625, 1785-89 etc. For cases where Ānandajñāna alone refers to Bhartṛ. and there is no allusion in the Vār. itself, pp. 1225, 1728 may be consulted. Vārtika mentions Bhartṛ. by name only in a few cases (*e. g.* at pp. 666, 1789 and 1843). The reference at p. 1789 is jeeringly pompous[1]. In most cases he is cited for being refuted and Sureśvara ironically applies to him such high sounding epithets as 'mahādhiyaḥ',

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13. इतिश्रीमन्महाभर्तृप्रपञ्चस्य महीयसः । व्याख्यामधीयते धीरा न्यायागमबाहिष्कृताम् । वार्तिक ।

'dhīrāḥ', 'budhāḥ'. In a few cases it appears that Sureśvara accepts the interpretations of Bhartṛ. (*vide* pp. 1450-53, 1560, 829, 989). The school of Bhartṛ. is described in the Vār. as *samastavyastadarśana* (p. 1164) or of Bhakti.

As Śaṅkara is supposed by Sureśvara to have refuted the followers of Bhartṛ. the latter must have flourished at least two generations before Śaṅkara (if not more) and so Bhartṛ. cannot be placed later than the first half of the 8th century.

Ṭaṅka.

Yāmunācārya mentions ācārya Ṭaṅka, but whether he preceded Śaṅkara is doubtful.

Śrī-Vatsāṅkamiśra.

Yāmuna says that Śrī-Vatsāṅkamiśra wrote on the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa a work full of profound *nyāyas*. But from the way in which he is mentioned it appears that he was later than Śaṅkara (*vide* note 7.)

THE BUDDHISTIC CONCEPTION OF SUBLIMATION.

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Introduction:—The Nirvāṇa is the vehicle of sublimation or uplifting of the individual. There is no term so hopelessly misinterpreted, no notion so completely distorted as the Nirvāṇa is. The confused mass of misconceptions and ambiguities arises from various sources, *viz.*, the long litany of synonyms negative, contradictory and apparently irreconcilable, indefinite, definite etc. The confusion between " Nivṛtti " and " Nirvāṇa ", the twofold meaning of

the word " Nirvāṇa, *viz.*, cooling and extinguishing, are but the most prolific source of errors. To us the Nirvāṇa is shrouded in mystery, and with regard to its meaning our imagination has its full play, as the reality is unknown. But in spite of its numberless negative contents and description it has succeeded in attracting so many human beings during so many centuries and in so many climes. It has been one perennial source of hope and solace to the populations that have made out of it their spiritual good. What is done by the prophets in Judiah Lao-tse in China, the mystic religion in Greece, is also done by the Buddhism or the birth of the Nirvāṇa in India and in the greater part of Asia. The Buddhism with its celebrated doctrine of the Nirvāṇa is, like all other superior religions a sort of assurance against the death and the terrors and miseries following from it. So the Nirvāṇa can never be the annihilation of itself.

The negative contents of the Nirvāṇā leading on to its positive significance:—Buddhaghoṣa remarks: " The Nirvāṇa is one, but its names founded on its contraries are numerous". The variants of these contraries or negatives are cessation, destruction, detachment, nothingness; the negation of the *Prapañca or Saṃsāra*, the end of desire, aversion and blindness; the deliverance from sufferings, birth, evil, and death. The Nirvāṇa is destruction, the Buddha is the destructor. The *Saṃsāra* is *Valla*, the turn of wheel, the Nirvāṇa is *Vivatta* and the Buddha is the *Venayika*. Verily the Tathāgata says, " I am the King of the Law, born in the world in order to be the destructor of existence". In Mahāvagga (IV, 31, 4-7) the great teacher, while preaching to the Seeha the doctrine of abstinence from all evil actions of body, speech and

thought, says that he wishes others to destroy desire, hatred and blindness. In fact, the cessation of *Saṃsāra* without, and of *tenhā* within is made possible as by the total annihilation as by one eternity of happy existence. The suppression of the individual existence, and the supreme felicity arising out of the appeasement of thirst (corresponding to the two imports of the Nirvāṇa, *viz.*, extinction and cooling down) the negative and positive bliss affirmed of the Nirvāṇa do not exclude each other. On the other hand, the Nirvāṇa is positive bliss because it is annihilation. This can be easily inferred from the nature of the Nirvāṇa, from the teachings of the Buddha, etc.

The nature of the Nirvāṇa:—The Nirvāṇa is one. It does not admit of degree. It *is*, or it *is not*, just as a flame, as much as it burns, is not extinguished. So the Nirvāṇa could not be more or less complete. It is without relation with what may be other than itself. It receives nothing from some other cause. It is called the *Anupādeya*-nirvāṇa (Madhyamaka Vṛtti. XXV). It is above all time and space. There is no place where the Nirvāṇa is. And yet the Nirvāṇa is, and he who conducts his life properly, knows or realises it. It is like the fire: the fire is, and yet the fire is not in some part or position (Milinda Panho). *The distinction between Parinirvāṇa and Nirvāṇa is emotive and not logical.* The Nirvāṇa is the concept pure and simple, the idea of achievement that calls into play the feelings of those who understand it. One can be *Parinirvṛta*, and can continue to act in the world (Madhyamaka-vṛtti). Again, the Nirvāṇa is put under different categories by the Buddhistic teachers according to the different characters of the individuals that obtain it, *viz. Sanditthika* (immediate) Nirvāṇa, *Ditthe va dhamme* (Nirvāṇa in the

present life), *Sopādhiśeṣa-Nirvāṇa, nirupādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* (Nirvāṇa without attachment). There are other classifications of the nirvāṇa in the Nettiprakaraṇa that concern the *anāgamins* only. (I) The Sanditthika-nibbāna is indicative of the fruit obtained immediately by a Bhikṣu or an individual freed from passion, aversion and blindness. Having obtained it, he no more knows or feels the affliction caused by evil. In it he finds immediately the result of his work *i. e.*, the realization of the moral and spiritual conditions of the supreme appeasement (Aṅguttara-Nikāya, III, 55). (2) Again, in the Sutta-Nipāta we read that the Nirvāṇa can be obtained *in the present life, ditthe va dhamme.* The nirvāṇa is an incomparable island for those who are plunged into the water, carried away by the terrible current and preyed upon by old age and death. So it is the destroyer of old age and death. Those who have a full knowledge of it are extinguished in this very life and escape the power of *Māra.* In the *Dighī Nikāya* and other scriptures this nirvāṇa is not the sole monopoly of the Bhikṣus. "A Kṣatriya, a Vaiśya or a Brahman who has control over body, speech and thought has realised the favourable condition of the nirvāṇa and is extinguished in this very life." (3) *The Sopādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* is the nirvāṇa with a residue of substratum—a residue of the phenomenal life. (4) When the Karman is extinguished and there are no aggregates, the nirvāṇa is *the Nirupādhiśeṣa nirvāṇa.* The *Kleśas* (ignorance, passion etc.) are like the robbers that plunder a village. People chase them, and they conceal themselves; but the village is always there. It is the nirvāṇa with *Upādhi.* In the nirvāṇa without Upādhi, there are neither robbers nor any village (Madhyamaka Vṛtti). (5) The apratiṣthita-

nirvāṇa, the nirvāṇa without attachment, is held by the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools. The pratiṣṭhā is the base or point of attachment for some object. *The apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa is an ultra-phenomenal state having an exceptional charactor of transcendence.* In it there is neither particularisation, nor nimitta and the causal nexus, but there is the possession of knowledge without duality or polarity of subject and object, or without differentiation. (Pancakrama, VI). In such a state the common function of the sexual becomes with the Buddhas a source of infinite virtues and the knowledge procured by the intellect is wholly free from erroneous ideas (Mahāyāna-sutrālaṃkāra of Asaṅga). Having obtained their nirvāṇa the Tāyins are in the Saṃsāra, but do not suffer any injury from the contact with the world (Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva). Thus the apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa and the Saṃsāra are not exclusive of each other. *Now it is evident that the nirvāṇa can be attained even in this very life.* It is supreme felicity as it is extinction or freedom from passion, hatred, Karmaphala etc. The different orders of the nirvāṇa are built by the different schools, just suiting the different temperaments of the individuals. The different classes of the nirvāṇa are but the different steps towards the sublimation of the individual temperaments. The temperaments though they may be starved, cannot be destroyed altogether but sublimated or directed and uplifted towards a higher, healthier mental state. This temperamental purification is a stepping-stone to the next ultimate step, *viz.*, the absolute nirvāṇa. The difference between the absolute nirvāṇa and the other froms of the nirvāṇa is that the former excludes the Samsāra while the later do not.

The doctrine of the Buddha as the greatest conqueror of the human heart.—The Buddha has succeeded in conquering the greatest number of human hearts, as his doctrine is plastic enough for furnishing to all the religious food that is suitable for them. (*i*) To the devout laymen the paradisical felicity is offered by him as their reward, though threatened with the fear of dethronement and of rebirth and death. The constructions of different heavens (Svarga), (Buddha-kṣetras etc.) by the Buddhist monks, as rightly pointed out by Poussin, are simply meant to suit various temperaments of the people. Nevertheless, the absolute nirvāṇa though it is eternal bliss, is not the paradise. In the eyes of the Bodhisattva the abode in the heaven is not a reward. The joys of the heaven are nothing in comparison with the pure beatitude of the being that has been liberated. The fruit of the entrance into the stream (Sotāpatti) is infinitely superior to the empire of the earth, abode in heaven, and dominion of the entire world (Dhammapada). The entrance into the Sotāpatti is the first step towards the conquest of one good that is imperishable. The svarga is not the abode of the nirvāṇa, but rather opposed to it. Nor is the Buddha-kṣetra the place of the nirvāṇa, but a stage for reaching it.

(*ii*) To those who are tired of this world in which all are beginning and changing, birth and death, is offered by the Buddha the *ideal of sanctity* which is identified with the Nirvāṇa. Sanctity, regarded by Sariputra as the extinction of desire, aversion and blindness, rescues them from all forms of existence limited and decayed by old age etc. When one aspires to this form of nirvāṇa the new birth with the subsequent fear of death is considered as

damnation (Nittiprakarana). Whatever may be the conception of the nirvāṇa, whatever may be the ideal of bliss, millions of people put their faith and hope in the salvation which Buddha held out to them. The perspective to enjoy the profound peace consoled and tranquilised them. The Bhikṣu attaches himself to nothing, as the sensations are perishable. Without having any attachment he fears nothing. Because he fears nothing, he has the nirvāṇa (Majjhima-Nikāya). *Hence the* nirvāṇa consists in the liberation from the fear to die. So, *through the nirvāṇa is annihilation, it is not death, but the abolition of death.* It is immortality (*Amṛta*). In Mahāvagga we read: "Open the the door of the immortality......................................" In Sutta-Nipāta we read—"With him who has left all attachment for name and form, there is no more infection through which he can fall a victim to the power of death." The sage who, in realising the nirvāṇa, has banished from his heart all fears, lives from the very moment in full security (Yogakṣema). The greatest terror or suffering of man is his fear of death, and the nirvāṇa consists above all in liberating from the fear. If the mission of all great religions is to extirpate it, the Buddhism with its doctrine of the nirvāṇa has not failed in this mission. As it is impossible to kill the fear of death by uprooting it, the Buddhism has tried to transform and sublimate it by different methods, both subjective and objective, with its sterilizing principle of the nirvāṇa. In Sutta-nipāta and Majjhima-Nikāya it is said that a man in order to be free from the terror of death should consider the *world under the aspect of the empty.* To cling to anything, however supreme or sublime it may be, is to court the fear of death. In rejecting the idea of the soul, one triumphs over death. The nirvāṇa is one joy, intense and

divine at the moment of death. In preventing the death from projecting its umbra on the life, the nirvāṇa starts into life itself. Here the Buddha's pessimistic attitude towards the human body is more than compensated for by his optimistic attitude of the human life and mind as purified and strengthened by the nirvāṇa.

Nirvāṇa, positive or definite.—The nirvāṇa, called positive or definite, coincides with *the death of the Arhat.* Now the death is a dissolution for saints and common individuals alike, a dissolution of the aggregates, consciousness skandhas etc. *What then is the difference between this death and the death of the Arhat, called the nirvāṇa?* The difference is that the death of the common man does not extinguish the residues of the existence which act in some way or other as a centre of materialisation or a new complex for a new existence. The saint does not drag after him the germs of individualisation which are productive of all sufferings. His death puts an end to the individual continuity and precludes all possibilities of survival. It destroys the phenomenal and individualised existence. The nirvāṇa, as the cause of cessation of all becoming, concerns itself with the world of birth and death, but *in itself it belongs to one other system than the phenomenon.* To this system no measure can be applied. Does the consciousness exist in a being who has disappeared? Is he, or is he no more?"—Asked the venerable Upasiva. The Buddha replied, " To him who has disappeared, no measure can be applied. He disappears like a flame blown off by a gust of wind (Atthain gatassa na pramānam atthi) (Sutta-Nipāta). Thus the nirvāṇa puts all individuals above all dialectic categories outside of all contingence. It is something that is neither born nor made nor perfected. If there had not been that

something, it would have been impossible to escape from what is born etc. Thus the nirvāṇa forms a separate system of reality by itself.

The Nirvāṇa as a different system of reality:—But now the question is: how can we form an idea of, or define the nirvāṇa, as all ideas and words are related to the distinguishing characters of things of the Saṃsāra? In fact, the nirvāṇa has no such characters. It is impossible to say what it is. It is a region in which there is neither earth, nor water, nor perception etc. In it there is neither coming nor going, neither birth, nor death. It does not grow, has no point of support. In it there is neither Upādhi nor Upādāna, neither Skandha nor Saṃskāra and Vijñāna. It is like the Avidyā of the Vedāntins. All these negations are only for the Vijñāna, as the Vijñāna knows only the phenomenal world. But it (Nirvāṇa) is an ultra phenomenal knowledge. "By the ultramundane knowledge I shall open to all creatures the gate of the blissful destiny of the nirvāṇa (*Śikṣāsamuccya of Śāntideva*). This ultra-phenomenal knowledge has a definite value attached to it. For the *Yogācara*, the nirvāṇa is a thing religious par excellence. Asaṅga states a number of qualities that are not suppressed by the entry into the nirvāṇa, such as sovereignty, aiśvarya of the Boddhisattva, the pārmitta (Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga). If so much of Dharma remains intact in the nirvāṇa, it can never be an absolute destruction in itself. In some respects it may resemble the vacuity, as both deny the phenomenon, (*c.f.* Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins). Yet it is the supreme reality, unique truth as opposed to the phenomena and Saṃskāras which are untruths. Again, the nirvāṇa is the extinction of *Bhava* and Prapañca. It is the sūpreme felicity because it is the extinction. But how

can there be supreme felicity where there is no sensation or perception in it? It is precisely the perfect felicity as there is no sensation or perception in it. All sensation supposes duality, duality implies limitation, and limitation is suffering.

Though it may be admitted that the nirvāṇa is the annihilation as well as the eternal felicity, yet it may appear to be nothing in the absence of a permanent principle or soul. But, in fact, the nirvāṇa changes nothing except that it suppresses evil and suffering. It does not annihilate life but lifts it up. It is the life, and not the nirvāṇa, that kills life. The life, and not the nirvāṇa, is one incessant destroying (according to the law of momentariness of things and of conditional birth). If anywhere the absence of soul is felt, it is in the life and not in the nirvāṇa.

But how can the Nirvāṇa be the life and soul itself, if the continuity of life, perception, consciousness and all others will disappear for it. It is then really nothing. But though it eliminates all, it is a reality in itself. It creates a new state on the suppression of the Saṃsāra. So with the Buddhists the Saṃsāra is not the only imaginable form of existence. But the existence of state preserved in the nirvāṇa is neither phenomenal nor individual. It is rather away from both or suppresses both at the same time. Its negative contents carry us so far to its positive reality.

Conclusion:—(*a*) In fine, it may be said here that the Buddhism has put before all people two ideals or one in two *viz.*, the removal of suffering and the attainment of the nirvāṇa or absolute rest, or one by the other. The first is more moral and religious, while the second is more theosophic. The first is more open and plain, and faithful to the thought

of the founder, and the method to realise it is more simple *viz.*, purification of conduct, purging of intelligence and training of will. The second ideal, as it is more theosophic, is rooted in the doctrines of the Upaniṣads following as the corrolaries of the doctrine of the *Being*, *viz.*, impermanence of all things, rebirths of painful existences, impossibilities to escape from *Karmaphala*, assertion of the possible cure and of a permanent bliss in the absolute rest. The method to realise this second ideal is more or less the *intuitive* one, *viz.*, the method of meditation and illumination. So two under currents flow beneath the heart of the Buddhism. But they are made to flow towards the same end—the creation of the great man, Mahāpuruṣa or Arhat (the deserving) who has the heart freed (Saṃyutta Nikāya).

(*b*) The Buddhism has numerous points of contact with the Brahmanic speculation and other philosophical and religious systems of India. The end and the method are the same in all—the end being the pursuit of salvation by the annihilation of the limited and miserable existence, and the method being the introspective one described as a luminous appearance. The theory of the Jñāna and the Samāpatti are Yogic in its essential parts. The advance towards the Boddhi by the method of concentration with *Samādhi* and *Smathi*, with *Prajñā* and *Vipasyanā*, the advance towards the Boddhi by the method of ecstatic contemplation with the *Karmāsthānas*, *Dhyāna* and *Samāpatti* are essentially Yogic in character. Even the conception of the Boddhi is partly Vedantic—the Boddhi the thought of which opens, blooms, expands, even in sleep and in which the Bhikṣu with his heart appeased finds himself everywhere and indentifies himself with everything.

Again, the nirvāṇa has the characters of the Brahman or the universal soul. The nirvāṇa is "It alone is one, one".

But in spite of its agreement with other systems the Buddhism has distinguishing features of its own, without which it could not have justified its great fortune. The favourable circumstances, the great power of adaptability and organisation of the community, the propaganda and above all the chance element, can never solely account for the expansion and grandeur of the Buddhism. To survive for long time and with so much of vigour and strength it owes to its inner principle and not to its outward proceedings. It is the internal integral, religion, the Dharma that rules all and acts as the unique principle of cohesion and development. It matters little whether the contents of the religion are new or borrowed. But with the Buddhists they all acquire a religious significance, as the Buddhism utilises these gifts for explaining the origin of suffering and discovering the path of the ultimate recovery *i. e.*, the nirvāṇa. To acquire verity by the individual himself and to conduct others to it are the chief preachings of the Buddha and the keystone of the Buddhism.

(*c*) But to attain to the ultimate truth the purification and sublimation of the will is absolutely necessary. So, out of the seven factors constitutive of the illumination the will with its reserves of energy is one that really leads to the concentration of thought. And in the moral life of the individual it is the will or tendency, ***Āśaya*** that acts on the *Āśraya*, the psychic state at a given moment and manifests itself in the Karman on which depends the ultimate destiny of the individual. With the help of this sublimated will the individual can pass through the eight steps of the Jñāna and the ninth Samāpatti and

can acquire power and equilibrium of the mind and at last the ultimate truth If so much preparation and training are necessary for the attainment of the nirvāna, the nirvāna cannot be a negative and empty thing.

(*d*) The attainment of the nirvāna is thus solely made possible by the exertion of one's own self to conquer the fear of death. • The will is the beast of burden w ich carries the Bhiksu to his ultimate goal. But the ordinary man in his miserable and helpless condition, creates God in his own image. He casts his burden upon the Lord. His God is the repository of his highest hopes, the confident of his deepest troubles. His God is the God of justice, love and mercy, So God always stands for what is felt to be in the interests of troubled humanity. But the Buddha could see with his prophetic vision that man can never be freed from suffering or death by any kind of dependence whatsoever. His salvation lies in his own exertion. His ultimate end or nirvāna is perfect freedom (even from God or soul).

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"MURARESTṚTĪYAH PANTHAH"
MURARI MIŚRA'S DISTINCTIVE VIEWS ON CERTAIN TOPICS OF PŪRVAMĪMAMSĀ.

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ध्यात्वा तीर्थपतिं ततो गणपतिं सूनाभिधानां प्रसूं तातं श्रीजयदेवसंज्ञमनिशं सत्तर्कचूडामणिम् ।
नत्वा श्रीमधुसूदनं गुरुवरं श्रीमन्मुरारेर्मतं, छात्राणां हितकाम्यया वितनुते श्रीमानुमेशः कृती ॥

1. Introductory.

"**Murārestṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ**"—has become almost a proverb in Sanskṛta and like the origin of so many other proverbs, its origin too is still hidden in the dark. We are not quite sure of the significance of this saying and also of the personage of whom it is said. Truely speaking this name—Murāri—seems to have well nigh disappeared from the subsequent history of Indian Philosophical thought. But it appears from our study of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that there lived a great Mīmāṃsaka named Murāri Miśra, who was a great author and not merely a dialectician and who held quite independent views on several topics of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. His views were so distinct and convincing that he was recognised as the founder of a third school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, which was named as the school of Murāri Miśra. But it is a matter of great pity that his school, except for some books associated with his name, is practically extinct. All that we know of him and his views is from references and quotations in later literature. There are some published and some unpublished works which are attributed to Murāri Miśra, but, as will be clear from the following pages, they are from different pens, and although

one or two of these may be, with certain confidence, attributed to this Murāri, yet they do not throw any light on his views.

The following are the books associated with the name of Murāri Miśra:—

(1) *Anargharāghava;* (2) *Śubhakarma-nirṇaya;* (3) *Śuddhinibandha;* (4) *Iṣṭikālanirṇaya;* (5) *Parvanirṇaya;* (6) *Pitṛbhaktivyākhyā;* (7) *Śrāddhakalpaṭīkā;* (8) *Tripādīnītinayanam;*. (9) *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇam;* (10) *'Aṅgatvanirukti;* (11) *Murārerīyam;* (12) *Prāyaścitta-manohara;* (13) *Saptaśatīṭīkā;* (14) *Śabdārthamañjūṣā-prakāśa;* (15) *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtrabhāṣya.*

Of these, *Anargharāghava* is perhaps the earliest. It is a drama by a Murāri Kavi, the son of the Mahākavi Bhaṭṭa Śrīvardhamāna [1], of the *Maudgalyagotra.* His mother's name is Tantumatī. A close study of the text shows that the author was a *Naiyāyika,* a *Mīmāṃsaka* and a *Dharmaśāstrī.* But there is no proof which can show that this poet Murāri is identical with the *Mīmāṃsaka* Murāri whose views we are going to study in the present paper. As to the date of this author, it is believed that the Kashmirian poet Ratnākara makes a clear reference of this dramatist in his *Haravijaya.* As Ratnakara belongs to the middle of the ninth century A. D., this may be taken to be the latest date of this Murāri [2].

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1. Dr. Keith in his 'the Sanskrit drama' calls him as *Srivardhamanaka* (pp. 225), but the printed text of the drama reads it as given above.

2. But there is another suggestion. In Act V (Kavyamala Ed. pp. 191) Ravana appears in the *nepathya*, and calls himself as 'learned in the Vaisesika work named '*Katandi*'. No doubt, there is a reference in Padmanabha Misra's *Kiranavalibhaskara* that there was a Bhasya on Vaisesika-sutras by Ravana, but we do not know that the name of that Bhasya was *Katandi*. If, on the other hand, *Katandi* be a mistake for *Kandali* a commentary on *Prasastapada-Bhasya* by Sridharacarya, as Rucipati Upadhyaya of the fifteenth century A. D., while commenting upon that line of *Anargharaghava*, also suggests (although he wrongly attributes the authorship of the *Kandali* to Ravana), then as Sridharacarya composed this *kanduli* or *Nyayakandali* as it is generally known in 913 saka (त्र्यधिकदशोत्तरनवशतशाकाब्दम्) or 991 A. D. the author of *Anargharaghava* must have lived after 991 A. D. Then we would be compelled to take the reference of Ratnakara in the sense of 'God'.

We next come to the author of *Śuddhinibandha*[1]. This author, who was also called Murāri, was the son of Rudra Śarman, and the grandson of Hārihara, and great-grandson of Jayadhara, who were the Chief Judges of the Court of Mithilā-Kings Devasiṃha and Bhavasiṃha respectively, who ruled over Mithilā during 1359–1402 A. D. Hence this Murāri, who cannot be identical with the first Murāri should be placed somewhere about the first quarter of the 15th century A. D. I, therefore, call him here as the second Murāri.

Then I come to the author of *Śubhakarmanirṇaya*[2], *Iṣṭikālanirṇaya*[3], *Parvanirṇaya*[4], *Pitṛbhaktivyākhyā*[5] on Śrīdatta's Pitṛbhakti and *Śrāddhakalpaṭīkā* on Śrīdattopādhyāya's *Śrāddhakalpa*[6]. These five works are from the same pen, as is clear from the verse[7] at the beginning of these books. This Murāri belongs to a well-known family of *Sodarapura* in Mithilā[8]. He speaks of Rāmabhadra as his teacher, from whom he learnt all the *Śāstras* and of Keśava Miśra, a well-known Mithilā scholar of *Smṛti*, under whom Murāri Miśra read all the *Smṛtis*[9].

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1. *Vide* J. A. S. B 1915, pp 417.
2. The book is published from Benares Ed. by M. M. Paramesvara Jha.

3, 4. It appears from the notices of Sans. Mss. in Aufrecht's Cat. Cat. PP. 462 that this Murari Misra was the author of other works also, such as *Istikalanirnaya* and *Parvanirnaya*.

5. *Vide* the catalogue of the Mss. of Mithila Vol. I pp 285.
6. This Ms. is in the collection of Pandita Medhanatha Jha of Darbhanga, Mithila.
7. The verse—'विज्ञ्याखिलशास्त्रतत्त्वमखिलं श्रीरामभद्राद्गुरोः
मिश्रात् केशवतः स्मृतीरथ तयोः सारं विविच्य स्वयम् ।
पादाम्भोजयुगं प्रणम्य शिवयोः संख्यावतां प्रीतये is common with all these works.
8. *Vide* the colophon of the *Subhakarmanirnaya*.
9. *Vide* supra footnote 5.

Keśava Miśra is the grandson of Vācaspati Miśra II [1], who was the Court Paṇḍita of Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra, the kings of Mithilā, during 1450—1490 A. D. [2]. It was perhaps during the reign of Rāmabhadra that Keśava Miśra attained his wide fame as a Smṛtikāra. Rāmabhadra[3] himself was a great scholar.

As for Śrīdattopādhyāya, on whose work Murāri has commented upon, we know that he was perhaps the eldest son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Lakṣmī Dhara and grandson of Hṛdayadhara and the elder brother of Rudradhara, and Haladhara[4]. His approximate date is the beginning of the 14th century A. D. These things show that this Murāri most probably lived about 1490 A. D.

We have seen above that the author of Śuddhinibandha lived in Mithilā and was connected with the court of Mithilā kings. On calculation we find that the date of this Murāri is quite close to that of the author of *Śubhakarmanirṇaya* etc. Therefore, until further contrary evidences are found, I would like to say that the second Murāri is the author of these works also.

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1. As he himself says of Vacaspati II, 'इत्यस्मात्पितामहचरणपवित्रीकृतःपन्थाः'—vide *Suslistaparisistam* PP. 81, Benares Ed.

2. J. A. S. B. 1915, pp. 417-418.

3. It is also possible that there was another Ramabhadra who was the teacher of Murari, as Shyama Narayan Simha in his History of Tirhut also thinks. Vide the History of Tirhut pp. 160.

4. (*i*) 'एष श्रीभ्रातृचरणोन्नीतः समयप्रदीपानुसारी पन्थाः'—

End of *Vratapaddhati* of M M. Rudradhara (*Vide* Mithila Mss. Vol. I. pp. 402) Again, he says in the very beginning of that work—

'भ्रातृसूक्तिकृतोद्बोधश्रीरुद्रधरशर्म्मणा'

Now this *Samayapradipa* is a work of Sridatta himself (*vide* Mithila Mss. Vol. I. p. 488-90).

(*ii*) In the colophon of *Suddhiviveka* Rudradhara says— 'इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीलक्ष्मीधरात्मजमहामहोपाध्यायश्रीहलधरानुजमहामहोपाध्यायश्रीरुद्रधरकृतः शुद्धिविवेकः समाप्तः'—*vide* Mithila Mss. Vol. I. p. 46 and 444 and most probably this Laksmidhara is not different from the author of *Kalapataru*.

This second Murāri cannot be identical with the *Mīmāṃsaka* Murāri, with whose views the present paper deals; for in the *Śubhakarmanirṇaya*, Murāri quotes a line from the commentary of *Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa* by Vardhamāna; while this very Vardhamāna quotes the views of Murāri Miśra in the same book[1]. Hence these two Murāris cannot be identical.

Now I come to the author of *Aṅgatva-nirukti*. In the very beginning the author says that he is the follower of Kumārila.[2] In the text itself Murāri refers to the *Tantra-ratna*[3], a commentary on *Tuptīkā*, and *Śāstradīpikā* by Pārthasārathi Miśra[4]; *vidhirasāyana*, a work on Mīmāṃsā by Appayadīkṣita[5]; and lastly to *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* of Khaṇḍa-deva.[6] There are several passages in this book which closely follow the corresponding portions of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*. Now Appayadīkṣita was born in 1587 A. D. and died in 1658 A. D.;[7] while Khaṇḍadeva, who came in touch with Appayadīkṣita at Benares, may be put about the same time, that is in the middle of the 17th century A. D.[8] Hence this Murāri, the author of *Aṅgatva nirukti*, must be later than these and

1. *Vide* 'कुसुमाञ्जलौ वर्द्धमानचरणैः' *Subhakarmanirnaya* pp 49.
2. कुमारिलगेह्क मतानुसार Ms. with the writer of the present paper.
3. This work is being edited by Dr. Ganganatha Jha for Sarasvatibhavana, Benares.
4. Ms. Pages 26, 29, 30 etc.
5. Ms. Page 36, where Murari Misra says that in 'तप्ते पयसि' there is no possibility of *Mukhyartha* as the author of *Vidhirasayana* holds. Hence we should believe that there is a clear case of *Laksana*. Thus Murari criticises the view of Appayadiksita (*vide Vidhirasayana* pp. 148-149 Chowkh. Ed.)
6. Ms. p. 45.
7. *Vide* the Princess of Wales' Sarasvatibhavana studies Vol. VI pp. 178.
8. *Ibid.* pp. 178 and 184

cannot be identical either with previous Murāris or with the great Mimāṃsaka of whose views we are going to study in the present paper. This Murāri most probably lived somewhere in southern India, as is clear from the benedictory verse of this book, where he makes a salutation to the goddess-*Tulajā*.[1] This Goddess, as I am informed, is a well-known deity of the South. Hence this Murāri should be different from the other two.

As to the author of *Prāyaścittamanohara* there is some confusion. In the cotalogues of Mss.[2] we find that the book is written by Murāri Miśra, the son of Kṛṣṇa Miśra, but in a printed edition of the same we find that author of the book is named as Kṛṣṇa Miśra (or Kānhu Micra), the son of Murāri Miśra.[3] However, there is a reference of *Paṇḍitasarvasva* of Halāyudha, of Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa (perhaps the author of *Prāyaścittanirūpaṇa*) and of Lakṣmidhara, who lived about the end of the 12th century A. D ,[4] and of the latter's well-known work *Kalpataru*. This author appears to belong to Orissa, as all the Mss found up to this time are in the character of Orissa and as the editor of the book also holds a simillar view. At any rate, this Murāri should be later than the 13th century A. D. The study of this book does not show that its author was either a Mīmāṃsaka or a Naiyāyika of great reputation.

1. Another Ms. of this book, received from the Madras Manuscript Library, reads *Kulajam* in place of *Tulajam*.

2. Vide catalogue of Sanskrit and Persian Mss in Berar and Central Provinces, Ms. Nos. 3227-3228. pp. 298, Ed. 1926. Dr. R. L. Mitra's notices of Sanskrit Mss. Vol. VIII No. 302; and Aufrecht's Cat. Cat. pp. 462.

3. *Vide* the Printed Edition of the work from Puri.

4. *Vide* the Introduction of K. P. Jayaswal to 'A Deecriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in Mithila Vol. I. pp. vii.

There is no ground to prove the identity of this Murāri with any of the previous ones. I think it is better to give him a separate place.

Coming to the author of the commentary on *Saptaśatī*, I cannot say anything, for I could not trace the Ms. in the manuscript collection of Bhāratībhavana, Allahabad, in the catalogue of which I find it mentioned.[1]

Likewise, nothing can be said as regards the work *Murārereriyam,* except that Mr. Oppert mentions it in his catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. Vol. II that it is a work on Tarka by Murāri Miśra.[2] Similarly, Rev. William Taylor notices a work of Murāri Miśra, named *Śabdārthamañjūṣā-prakāśikā* which is a kind of lexicon of words dealing with *Svarga, Naraka* and *Pātāla.*[3] Nothing more can be said as regards these. Likewise, in Aufrecht's Cat. Cat. pp. 462, we find that there was a Murāri Miśra the son of Veda Miśra and grandson of Viśvarūpa Dīkṣita, who wrote a Bhāṣya on the *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra.* About him too we cannot say anything at present.

Coming to the *Tripādīnītinayanam*[4] we find that it is a work on *Mīmāṃsā*, being an independent treatise on the *Ādhikaraṇas* of the *Jaiminīya Sūtras, Adhyāya* I, *Pādas* 2 to 4. This work, which is associated with the name of Murāri Miśra, a Mahāmahopādhyāya, seems to be a very old work. The manuscript with me is dated Saṃvat 1644, that is 1587[5] A. D. Nearly all the references made

1. Catalogue of Books, Bharatibhavan, Allahabad, 1918, pp. 42, No. 47 under Purana.
2. Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. of Southern India by Oppert.
3. Catalogue Raisonne of Oriental Mss. Vol. II in Govt Library, Madras, by Rev. W. Taylor, pp. 129 No' 7.
4. *Vide* Colophon— 'इति महामहोपाध्यायमिश्रश्रीमुरारिकृतौ त्रिपादीनीतिनयनं समाप्तमिति'
5. सम्वत् १६४४ समये आषाढसुदि प्रतिपदि सोमे लिखितंषेति ।

in this book are old. It refers to *Vivaraṇa,*[1] *Viveka,*[2] *Pañjikā.*[3] *(Pañcikā)* and *Paribhaṣā* which are all old works. He refers, again to some of the old authors, *viz, Candra, Bhanga, Vindhyavāsin, Nandana,* and *Śrīkara.* Of these, Vindhyavāsin is the famous Sāṅkhya author who cannot be later than Vasubandhu, the Buddist philosopher of about the 5th century A. D., who might have written his *Paramārthasaptati* in opposition to Vindhyavāsin's revised work on Sāṅkhya.[4] Of Candra, we cannot say exactly when he lived and what he wrote, but we know that Varadarāja, who must be distinguished from the authors of *Tattvanirṇaya* and *Bodhanī,* refer to him in his *Dīpikā,* a commentary on *Nayaviveka,* of Bhavanātha Miśra.[5] Cālikanātha Miśra also in the beginning of his commentary named *Ṛjuvimalā Pañjikā* or *Pañcikā* refers to Candra.[6] Caṇḍeśvara Ṭhakkura, the great Maithila *Nibandhakāra,* also refers to this Candra, as *Gurumatāśā-*

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1. " According to Madhava's Sarvadarsanakaumudi, Prabhakara, the great Mimamsaka, was the author of two commentaries on Sabara-Bhasya: viz. (1) *Vivarana* in 6000 slokas, and (2) *Nibandhana,* in 12000 slokas. *Brhati* is another name of this Vivarana (proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference pages 477-478) Vide P. of Wales' Sarasvatibhavana studies Vol. VI pp. 167.

2. This *Viveka* might be the *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanatha Misra, who is not the same as the father of the great Naiyayika, Cankara Misra. Vide *Ibid.* p. 168.

3. *Panjika* is another name for ***Rjuvimala*** a com. on *Brhati* by Salikanatha Misra, *Vide* प्रभाकरगुरोर्भावंमतिगम्भीरभाषिणः । अञ्जसाव्यञ्जयिष्यन्ती पञ्चिका क्रियते मया ॥ Mangala—Verses of Rjuvimala being published from Madras. पञ्जिका for पञ्चिका is often used. It is only a different reading for the same, *Vide Ibid.*

4. Vide the Introduction of Jayamangala (Calcutta Oriental series No. 19,) by Gopinatha Kaviraja P. 6-7 and Dr. S. Vidyabhusana's Indian Logic pp. 266.

5. *Vide* the Princess of Wales' Saraswatibhavana studies Vol. VI, pp. 169.

6. 'प्रभाकरमयीं दृष्टिं दक्षिणां दधतं सदा । वामे दर्शनतापघ्नचन्द्रं वन्देऽपराजितम् ।

rya[1]. Jayarāma, in his *Nyāyāmlā*, says that there lived an author named Candra, who was the follower of Prabhākara[2]. There is a work of this Candra on Mīmāṃsā, in the Nepal Rāj Library. Nothing is known of Bhaṅga and Nandana as yet. About Crikara we know that Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmani* quotes his view[3]. His earliest reference is found in the *Mitākṣārā*[4], a commentary on *Yājñavlkyasmṛti*. The date of *Mitākṣarā* is about the 11th century A. D.[5]

There being no other reference in the book which can throw any more light on the subject, I think on the basis of these facts, we cannot place Murāri Miśra, the author of *Tripādīnīti-nayanam*, before the 11th century A. D. The lower limit must be at least 1587 A. D. which is the date of the transcription of the Ms. with us.

Then, I come to the *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa*[6], which is also attributed to Mahāmahopādhyāya Murāri Miśra. This is a small independent work dealing with the *Tantrāvāpa* definition, which forms part of the first *Adhyāya* of the *Jaiminīya-Sūtra*. It also refers to *Vivaraṇa* and *Pañjikā*. There is no other reference in the book except that of a commentator on Śabara's Bhāṣya who has been quoted there. The style and manner of writing quite independently on *Adhikaraṇas* on the

1. 'अयथार्थो गुरुमताचार्यचन्द्रादीनामप्यनुमत: Krtyaratnakara pp. 82. Bibl. Ed. 1832

2. Ms. Fal. 73a-73b. 'प्रभाकरैकदेशीयचन्द्रः

3. Tattvacintamani, Sabdakhanda, pp. 569. This Srikara should be distinguished from the author of *Vyakhyamrta*, a commentary on *Amarakośa*, who lived during the reign of the Maithila King Ramasimha, great grand-son of the famous Nanyadeva of the Karnata-dynasty. The date of Ramasimha is about 1390 A. D. *Vide* J. A. S. B. 1915 pp. 413-414. This Srikara was a Maithila.

4. Mitaksara, Vyavaharadhyaya pp. 209 and 229. Bombay Ed. 1882.

5. A history of Sanskrit literature by A. A. Macdonell p. 429.

6. This small treatise has been edited by the writer of this paper in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1929.

basis of the first Śūtra of the respective *Adhikaraṇas* and the references of the old writers on Mīmāṃsā very closely resemble those of the *Tripādīnīti-nayanam*. Hence, I am inclined to take these two works from the same pen. I think Murāri Miśra, the author of these two books, had written a complete treatise on all the Adhikaraṇas of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā of which these are the only two available fragments. On these grounds, I think it is better to take him as different from the above mentioned four Murāris with none of whom he can be identified.

Even after the detailed study of these works, the doubt still remains as to who is that Murāri Miśra who must have been scholar of considerable influence in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The following are the references of this Murāri :—

Vardhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa, quotes his views on his commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,[1] on Udayana's *Nyāya-Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa*,[2] and on Vallabha's *Nyāyalīlāvatī*.[3] Pakṣadhara alias Jayadeva Miśra refers to his views in his *Āloka*,[4] on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Mathurānātha quotes his views in his *Rahasya*,[5] on *Tatvacintāmaṇi*. Rucidatta Miśra mentions his views in his *Makaranda* on *Nyāyakusumāñjali-Prakaraṇa-Prakāśa* of Vardhmāna. Jayarāma-Nyāyapañcānana

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1. *Vide* Sabdakhanda, pp, 702-734 Bibl. Ed.

2. *Vide* pp. 114, 219 Bibl. Ed.

3. *Vide* Fas. 1. pp. 62-64 Choukhamaba, Benares, Ed.

4. *Vide* Pratyaksakhanda Ms. Fol. 13b- 17a, 25b 54a. Ms. belonging to Sanskrit College Library Benares, Jayadeva Misra is also of opinion that even Gangesa refers to his views in his Cintamani. *Vide* Ibid Fol. 25b.

5. *Vide* pp. 117, 126, 151, 152, 157, 167, 354, 372, and 420. Bibl. Ed.

speaks of his views in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*, a commentary on *Gautamasūtras*. Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, also, while commenting upon Vardhamāna's *Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakaraṇaprakāśa*, mentions his views in his *Vivṛti*.[1] Later subsequent writers also have not altogether forgotton his name.

His views are so independent that he may be called to be an exponent of the third school of Purvamimamsa.

As far as our present knowledge extends, on the basis of these references, it can, with some confidence, be said that Murāri Miśra had quite an independent view on various problems of Indian thought, specially, of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school. His views, as will be clear from the following pages, on certain vital points of the school, are so different from the views held by Kumārila and Prabhākara that one would like to call him as the founder of the third school of thought under Pūrvamīmāṃsā. This is not a new suggestion, for it was recognised as such long before, as is clear from an old saying: *Murārestṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ*, which means that the upholder of the third line of thought is Murāri; Kumārila and Prabhākara being the upholders of the first and the second line of thought respectively.

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1. *Vide* Fas. 1. pp. 62-64 chowk Ben. Ed.

It is a matter of great disappointment that we cannot assign the authorship of any complete work to this renowned scholar of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* with any certainty. But it can be with certain confidence said that *Tripādīnītinayanam* and *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇam*, the two fragments of a work, are probably from the pen of this Murāri Miśra. The reasons for this assumption may be adduced thus—

(*a*) These are Standard Works on *Mīmāṃsā* which must be attributed to some great Mīmāṃsā scholars. This Murāri is such a scholar as is clear from his title of *Mahāmahopādhyāya.*

(*b*) Paṇḍita Mahādeva Puṇatāmakara, in his *Nyāya-kaustubha* says that according to Murāri Miśra *jñāna* is an object of direct perception (*Pratyakṣa*),[1] which view is found in the *Tripādī*, while refuting the view of Prabhākara Miśra who holds that *Jñāna* is *Svaprakāśa.*[2]

(*c*) In the *Tripādī*, we find independent statements about several other problems of thought, such as, *Lakṣaṇā*[3] *Jātī*, *Ākṛti*, and *Vyakti*, and *Tarka*.

(*d*) It also appears that there is enough hint as to his well-known view on the validity of knowledge in the *Tripādī.*[4]

These are some of the points which may be put forward to support the view that the author of the *Tripādī* and *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa* is identical with the Mīmāṃsaka Murāri Miśra, who is associated with the proverb—*Murāre-*

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1. Nyayakaustubha, Pratyaksa Ms. Fol. 22a". The work is being edited by the writer of this paper for the Princess of Wales' Sarasvatibhavana Text Series, Benares.
2. Tripadinitinayanam Ms. Fol. 18.
3. *Ibid* Fol. 25.
4. *Ibid* Fol. 11 and 62.

sṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ and who is often referred to by Vardhamānopādhyāya.

If this assumption be taken to be valid, an approximate date of this scholar can be fixed. We have seen above that the upper limit of the date of the author of the *Tripādī*, should be about the 11th cen. A. D. Now having confidence in this identity, we can also fix the lower limit of the date of this scholar to be about the 13th cen. A. D.; for Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and his son Vardhamāna, who cannot be later than the 13th cen. A. D.[1] refer to his views in their works.[2] Thus our Mīmāṃsaka should have flourished at least in the 12th cen. A. D.

There is another proof to place him in the 12th cen. A. D. Sāyaṇa Mādhava, who died in 1387 A. D.[3] has referred to a Murāri Miśra, a Mīmāṃsaka, in his Saṅkṣepaśaṅkarajaya.[4] And this most likely is this very Murāri. Hence his date is about the 12th cen. A D.

Having thus arrived at certain conclusions about the dates of these several Murāris, we can put them now in choronological order. Thus the author of *Anargharāghava* is Murāri I; that of *Tripādī* and *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa* is Murāri II; that of *Śuddhinibandha, Śubhakarmanirṇaya* etc. is Murāri III; that of *Aṅgatvanirukti* is Murāri IV; and that of *Prāyaścittamanohara* is Murāri V. About others we cannot say anything at present.

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1. Vide the Princess of Wales' Sarasvatibhavana Studies Vol. III. pp. 133.
2. (*i*) "मिश्रमुद्दिश्याह-ज्ञानस्येति-" (Tattvacintamani, Pratyaksa, pp. 196 Bibl. Ed.)—Aloka on Ibid. Ms. belonging to the Sarasvatibhavana, Benares, Fol. 25b[5].

   (*ii*) "मुरारिमतमाशङ्क्य निषेधति-यत्त्विति" (Ibid pp. 268; ibid Fol. 54a[2].
3. Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, pp. 275.
4. Aufrecht's Cat-Cat. pp. 258b. Although this is a fanciful story book about Sankaracarya yet here I am not concerned with the truth of the story. My only aim is to show that Murari was a well-known scholar even in the 14th cen. A. D., when Madhava lived.

2. Categories.

He, like the Advaita-school of Vedantins believes in only one real entity i e. Brahman. For the sake of worldly usage he also believes in four more dharmi, dharma, Adhara and pradesa.

Of the above quoted references about Murāri Miśra, the reference of the views given by Jayarāma is very helpful and important. It gives us an enumeration of the categories of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, accepted by Murāri Miśra. According to Murāri, says Jayarāma, there is only *one* reality and that is *Brahman*. But like the Vedāntins of the Māyāvādin-school, he also believes, for the sake of worldly usage (*Vyavahāre tu*), in *Dharmiviśeṣa, Dharmaviśeṣa Ādhāraviśeṣa* and *Pradeśaviśeṣa.*[1] In order to explain these clearly we would like to take up each of these categories separately for explanation and illustration:

1. *Dharmiviśeṣa:* This may be explained as 'a definite substratum' (*niyata āśraya*) as a *ghaṭa* which is a definite substratum of *ghaṭatva.*
2. *Dharmaviśeṣa*: It means 'a definite *ādheya*' that is, an attribute; as for instance, *ghaṭatva*, which is a definite *ādheya* of *ghaṭa.*
3. *Ādhāraviśeṣa:* That is, an 'indefinite support' (*aniyata ādhāra*) in the form of moments of time, as for example 'इदानीं घट:', 'तदानीं घट:', etc., where the words—'इदानीं', 'तदानीं' etc.

1. 'अमेके, व्यवहारे तु धर्मिधर्माधारप्रदेशाविशेषाः पञ्चेति पदार्थाः वेदान्ता मुरारिमिश्राश्च' Nyayamala, Ms, (belonging to the Govt. Sanskrit College, Benares.) Fol. 73a 73b,

denotative of time, are an indefinite support of *ghaṭa*.

4. *Pradeśaviśeṣa:* Which means 'an indefinite support in the form of space' as 'गृहे घटः' 'भूतले घटः' etc., where the words—'गृह', 'भूतल' etc., stand as an indefinite spatial support of *ghaṭa*.

This makes it clear that according to Murāri Miśra, truly speaking, there is only *one real entity-Brahman,* who is beyond the limits of time and space. The other four categories, which represent substance and attribute, are accepted as far as this unreal (*aparamārtha*) world is concerned. This is exactly what the *Advaitavedānta* teaches. Hence it can be said that the two schools are identical in this respect.

This fact lends a support to a belief that the aim of the two schools was originally the same. This is supported by Kumarila, who says that the real nature of the Atman is to be realised from the study of Vedanta. Rucipati Thakkura also supports it.

Now this fact lends a support to a belief that the final aim of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* was also originally the same with the *Advaitavedānta*. It may be pointed out here that Kumārila also supports this view in his *Vārtika,* where it is said that the final aim, that is, the realisation of the nature of the *Ātman*, is to be found in the *Vedānta*;[1] and thereby Kumāril gives an advice to his readers indirectly that they should not think

1. 'इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्माऽस्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।
दृढत्वमेतद्विषयश्च बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥
Slokavarttika, pp. 727—728, chowk. Ben. Ed.

the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* is an independent system having nothing to do with *Brahman* This view further gets a support from Rucipati Ṭhakkura, who in his commentary on Murāri[1] Miśra's *Anargharāghava,* says,[2]

'ब्रह्ममीमांसा भाट्टमतम् । ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वात् तस्य'

Thus it is evident that even as late as the 15th century A. D. which is the probable date of Rucipati Ṭhakkurā[3], it was a recognised fact that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was a Vedāntin and had expounded the theory of Brahman.

3. The Theory of Prāmāṇya

Murari Misra is well known for his view on the Pramanyavada, where he, according to the general belief sides with the *svatah* theory of the mimamsaka against the *Paratah* of the Naiyayikas. There are three different views even amongst the Mimamsakas. Prabhakara, Kumarila and Murari Misra are the three exponents of the three views. Here is an explanation of the Naiyayikas *Paratah pramanya.*

The next more important point about Murāri Miśra is his independent view on the *Prāmāṇyavāda*. We know that about the validity of a *Pramāṇa* there are two most important recognised theories, one, as the *Svataḥprāmāṇya* held by the Mīmāṃsakas and the other as the *Parataḥprāmāṇya* accepted by the Naiyāyikas. Even amongst the Mīmāṃsakas themselves there are three different views, attributed to Prabhākara Kumārila and Murāri Miśra. To clear the point we would like to put the whole theory as follows:—

1. The Naiyāyikas hold that (*a*) due sense-organ-and-object-contact a simple cog-

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1. About the identity of Murari Misra the poet and Murari Misra the Mimamsaka we are still very doubtful. *Vide* Supra P. 2-3.
2. Anargaraghava, Kavyamala Ed. pp. 11̄.
3. *Vide*, Rucipati Thakkura and Maithili by Umesha Misra J. B. O. R. S. Vol. XIV—1927.

nition is produced in the form of 'अयं घटः' (*Vyavasāyātmakajñāna*) after the *Nirvikalpakajñāna* of the same; (*b*) then there is the recognition (*Anuvyavasāya*) of the same and is expressed in the form of a judgment 'I possess the knowledge of a ghaṭa'; (*c*) then follows the remembrance of the two possibilities *Prāmāṇya* and *Aprāmāṇya*, (*d*) then a doubt (*Saṃśaya*) as to whether the *jñāna* is valid or not, comes up; (*e*) and lastly, after the perception of the distinguishing feature (viśeṣa) the valid is recognised in the form of इदं ज्ञानं प्रमा, समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् ज्ञानान्तरवत् ॥ that is, this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to an effective effort, like another piece of cognition[1]. This is how a Naiyāyika proves the validity of a cognition.

The views of the Mimamsakas are classed under three heads:— Prabhrakara school, Kumarila school and Murari school; and these are here separately dealt with.

2. Coming to the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, we find they have got their independent views about this problem which may be classed under three different heads attributed to the three distinguished exponents of the theory:—

Prabhākara, Kumārila and Murāri.

(*a*) *Prabhākara school*: According to Prabhākara after the sense-organ-and-object-contact a *Savikalpakajñāna* is produced which is afterwards expressed in the form of a judgment which includes an object of *jñāna*

1. Vide Tarkamrta of Jagadisa, pp 16 Cal. Ed.

a. The Prabhakara school. According to this school the validity of a jnana is known through the means by which that particular jnana has been obtained. Here jnana is believed to be *svaprakasa.*

(ghaṭa), a subject of *jñāna* (the *ātman*),[1] and *jñāna* is, of course, there already. *Jñāna*, according to him being self-illumined (*svaprakaśa*) reveals itself along with its object and subject as well as the validity of its own self[2]. Thus it is through the first jñāna (*Vyavasāya*) itself (*svataḥ*) that the validity of that *jñāna* is cognised. In other words, the implements which led to the production of *jñāna* also proved the validity of that *jñāna* (*svajanakasāmagrītaḥ*).[3]

b. The Kumirala school. According to this school jnana is supersensuous and its presence and validity are inferred by *jnatata*, a dharma produced by the jnana itself Hence the validity is arrived at not through the same means which produced the jnana but through some other.

(*b*) Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that a *jñāna* is supersensuous (*atīndriya*) and its presence is inferred from a *dharma* called *jñātatā*, which is produced in that *jñāna* after the latter's production, and together with that *jñātatā* the validity of that *jñāna* is also inferred. In other words according to him, after the cognition expressed in the form of a judgment 'अयं घटः' a kind ef *dharma* called *jñātatā* is produced in the ghaṭa and then we get the *Pratyakṣa* of this *jñātatā*, which is then expressed in the form of a judgment 'ज्ञातो मया घटः' after which the presence of the *jñāna*, which was produced by the sense-organ-and-object-contact, is inferred and is ex-

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1. According to Prabhakara the Atman is essentially jada like that of the Nyaya-vaisesika, but the Atman becomes *cetana* when jnana is produced in it by the external sources, as an adventitious quality.

2. *Vide* Tarkamrta pp. 16.

3. *Vide* Rahasya on Tattvacintamani, Pratyaksa, pp. 126, Bibl. Ed.

pressed in the form 'अहं घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानवान्, घटत्व-प्रकारकज्ञाततावत्वात' and along with this inference the validity of that inferred *jñāna* is also arrived at.[1] Thus it is clear that Kumārila has not to depend upon the effectiveness of the effort to prove the validity of the *jñāna*. That is, the validity is not arrived at through some external element-parataḥ.

(c) *The Murari School*. According to this school jnana is an object of *Manasika pratyaksa*, and validity of a jnana is known through the *anuvyavasaya* of that jnana.

(c) Now coming to the last exponent of the theory, we find that the School of Murāri Miśra holds that after the sense-organ-and-object-contact a *jñāna* is produced, which is expressed in the form of a judgment अयं घटः' after which comes the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the same *jñāna*, in the form of a judgment 'I possess the knowlegde of the *ghaṭa*.' This very *anuvyavasāya* gives us the validity of the *jñāna* expressed in the form of a judgment— 'अयं घटः'[2] Here also for the validity of the first *jñāna* Murāri Miśra does not depend upon any other external source but upon the second *jñāna* itself. Thus it is also called a process of *svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*.

The difference between the School of Murari and that of Nyaya is explained.

Now we find that the line of thought adopted by Murāri Miśra closely resembles that of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. But there is a difference between their views. In the case of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika we have seen above that there is a *doubt* regarding the validity

1. Vide Tarkamrta pp. 16.
2. Jayadeva Misra's Aloka on Pratyaksa Ms. Fol. 14*a*.—15*a*. Tarkamrta. pp. 16; Bhaskarodaya on Nilakanthi on Tarkadipika of Annam Bhatta, pp 154, Bomb. Ed.; Janakinatha's Nyayasiddhantamanjari, pp. 345—348.

of the *jñāna*, which doubt is not possible in the present case. The reason is, that in the present case, the implement of arriving at the validity (*Prāmāṇyasāmagrī*) is the very presence of the *jñānendriya*, namely, the *Manas*,[1] which is ever present.[2] In other words, it is through the recognition—*anuvyavasāya*—that the validity is arrived at and hence in the unrepeated cases (*anabhyāsadaśāyām*) no doubt arises as to whether, for instance, the cognition of water is valid or not.[3] Thus it is clear that according to the school of Murāri Miśra, it is through the *sāmagrī* of the direct perception of the *jñāna* —*anuvyavasāya*—which is produced by a *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*) that the validity of the *vyavasāya* is cognised.[4]

Resume of the three views in brief.

Keeping aside the details of the three views we find, in simple words, that (*a*) Prabhākra holds that the *same thing* which produces *jñāna* also gives us the validity of that *jñāna*. (*b*) Kumārila holds that it is through the *jñātatā*, which is produced by *jñāna*, that the validity of that *jñāna*, which has produced the *jñātatā*, is inferred and ***not through the jñāna itself***. (*c*) Murāri Miśra,

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1. 'मनसैव ज्ञानस्वरूपवत् तत्प्रामाण्यग्रहः इति मुरारिमिश्राः'—
Vardhamana's Prakasa on Kusumanjali prakarana pp. 219.

2. 'मिश्रमुद्दिश्याह–ज्ञानस्येति–तन्मते ज्ञानेन्द्रियसन्निधेरेव प्रामाण्यग्रहसामग्रीत्वेन तत्प्रतिबन्धादेव संशयानुत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः'—Aloka, Pratyaksa, Ms. Fol 25b[5].

3. Bhaskarodaya on Nilakanthi, pp. 154. Nirnaya. Ed.

4. Rahasya by Mathuranatha on Cintamani, pp. 126 Bibl. Ed.

on the other hand, is of opinion that the validity is arrived at through the *jñāna* (*anuvyavasāya*)—the *Mānasika*—of the first *jñāna-vyavasāya.*[1]

A close study of the three views shows that it is the view of Prabhakara only which deserves to be called *svatahpramanyavada*, where the word *svatah* is used in its true sense.

The analysis of the views of the three schools given above shows that truly speaking it is the view of Prabhākara only which deserves the name of *Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*, according to whom the validity is known through the very instruments (*svataḥ*, that is, *svajñānajanakasāmagrītaḥ*) which produces the *jñāna*, in the true sense of the term.

According to Kumarila the instrument which produces jnana does not prove the validity of that jnana. Hence he does not deserve to be called an upholder of the theory of *svataḥpramanya* in the true sense of the term. Although the relative *svatastva* of this theory cannot be denied, yet it is more or less a *Parataḥ pramanyavada.*

According to Kumārila, it is not directly through the *jñāna* or the *jñāna* of the first *jñāna* that the validity is cognised. Hence, the true implication of the word '*svataḥ*' is not possible here. Here the *jñāna* is produced through the sense-organ-and object-contact, as usual, although we are not aware of the *jñāna* before the establishment of the validity of that *jñāna* through the *pratyakṣa* of the *jñātatā.* We should not forget here that according to Kumārila *jñāna* is supersensuous and it is through the *jñātatā* produced by the very *jñāna* and which is sensuous, that the existence of the cause of the *jñātatā*, namely, the *jñāna*, is inferred. In other words, the *jñāna* is produced by one kind of instrument while the validity is cognised by another kind of instrument of right knowledge. Hence

1. Ibid.

Kumārila cannot claim to be a true expounder of the theory of *Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda.* No doubt, thereby no one can deny the *relative svatastva* of the theory, but truly speaking Kumārila's view is more or less a *Parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda.*

The view of Murari, although approaches the *Svatastva* theory and is better than that of Kumarila, is truly a *Parataḥ* theory.

Similarly, the view of Murāri Miśra is far from being satisfactory. Murāri is only indirectly following the *svatastva* by holding that the validity is arrived at by the *jñāna* of a *jñāna* In this respect his position is better than that of Kumārila, but truly speaking his is also a *Parataḥprāmāṇyavāda,* as the means of right knowledge is not the same in both the cases

The above criticism depends upon the interpretation of the word 'svataḥ'. The interpretation followed in this paper is supported by Mathuranatha.

It is clear from the above that the entire criticism of these views depends upon the interpretation of the word *svataḥ.* If rightly explained and understood it means, as has been interpreted above, that the instrument of knowledge, through which a cognition is arrived at, should also give us the validity of that cognition. This condition is fulfilled only by Prabhākara's view. Hence it would not be improper to say frankly that Kumārila, Murāri and the Naiyāyikas are more or less the exponents of the *Parataḥprāmāṇyavāda,* while Prabhākara only. is the upholder of the *svatḥ prāmāṇyavāda.* This view has been supported by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, a

direct pupil of Raghunātha Siromaṇi, in his *Rahasya* on *Tattvacintāmṇi*[1]

4 The Theory of Error.

In the case of the Theory of Error Murari sides with Kumarila and holds that it is an *anyathakhyati*.

Next we pass on to the *Theory of Error* (*Bhrama*). Murāri Miśra, like Kumārila, holds that it is an *Anyathākhyāti*[2]. According to which, in the words of Pakṣadhara Miśra[3] – 'the knowledge of *ghaṭatva* as a *prakāra* is possible even when *ghaṭa* as a *viśeṣya* is not present, although घटविशेष्यकत्व' cannot be the अन्वयितावच्छेदक which is only possible when there is an अन्वय[4] which is not possible in the present case, as the घट is absent.'

5. Causality.

Prabhakara's view on causality.

As to the question of Causality also we find that Murāri Miśra differs from the usually recognised views of the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The view of the Mīmāṃsā school, as expounded by Prabhākara, is that the particular kind of *śakti*, inherent in the cause, produces the particular kind of effect[5]; as for instance the particular kind of *śakti*, favourable to *dāha* (burning), present in the fire, produces the burning sensation.

1. 'स्वतः—स्वाश्रयजनकसामग्रीतः । स्वं प्रमात्वम् । एतच्च गुरुमते । परतः—तदन्यसामग्रीतः । एतच्च मिश्रमत-भट्टमत न्यायमतेषु ।

—Rahasya of Mathuranatha on Tattvacintamani, PP. 177, Bibl. E.

2. Aloka Ms. Fol. 17a.
3. Ibid Fol. 16a.
4. 'अन्वयनियतं हि तद्' Vide Aloka Ms. Fol. 16a.
5. *Vide* Prabha a Com. on Nyayamuktavali, pp. 54, Mylapore Ed.

Naiyayika's view on causality.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, hold that as there is a *gaurava* in the above view, we should say that a cause is that which is qualified by the absence of obstacles. In other words, the fire, for example, is the cause of burning, only when that fire is qualified as possessing the absence of obstacles. (*Pratibandhakābhāvaviṣṭa*)[1].

Murari Misra's view on causality.

Murāri Miśra does not believe in either of the two above views. He holds, that 'neither the absence of *Pratibanadhaka* (*obstacles*), nor the presence of a *śaktiviśeṣa*, in the cause, can produce an effect, but a cause is that which is other than that which is obstacled, and which is characterised by the particular moments of time in which that cause exists; as for instance, the fire, which is other than that fire which is obstacled, and which is characterised by the particular moments of time of its existence, is the cause of the effect—*dāha* which is characterised by the moments of its production. *Pratibandhakābhāva*, he adds, is just like the *daṇḍatva* in the case of the effect *ghaṭa*, although that *Pratibandhakābhāva* is a *kāraṇatāvacchedaka*. In other words, he does not believe in the *Pratibandhakābhāva* to be a cause.

Now a question is raised against this view that *Ākāśa*, for instance, which is the cause of sound and which is only one

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1. Nyayamuktavali, pp. 34, Mylapore Ed,

(*ekavyaktika*), will no longer be the cause; for according to the view of Murāri, the cause of sound should be the *Akāśa* which is characterised by the moments of the time of its existence and which is other than the *Akāśa* which is *pratibaddha*, that is, along with the obstacle. But as there is only one *Ākāśa*, how can we have one *attributeless* Akāśa and another *partibaddha* Akāśa ? To this, Murāri gives an answer that we should take a particular drum, which is characterised by the absence of the *pratibandhaka*, to be the cause of the particular sound. As there are several drums, for instance, there will be no difficulty to find out a particular drum, which will be different from the *pratibaddha* drum. It is also clear from this that Murāri may not accept *Akāśa* to be the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* (material cause) of sound[1].

6.--Theory of Knowledge.

It is clear that Kumārila does not accept the *Pratyakṣatva* of *Jñāna*. According to him *Jñāna* is cognised through *Arthāpatti*. It is only a *dharma* of *Jñāna*—named, *Jñātatā* which is an object of direct perception.

1. 'मुरारिमिश्रास्तु न प्रतिबन्धकाभाव: कारणं न वा शक्तिः, किन्तु तत्तत्कालीनदाहविशेषं प्रति तत्तत्कालप्रतिबद्धेतरवह्नेः कारणत्वमिति प्रतिबन्धकाभावः कारणतावच्छेदको दण्डत्ववत्, न कारणम् । आकाशादौ त्वेकव्यक्तिके क्वचित् प्रतिबन्धेऽप्यन्यत्र शब्दोत्पत्तेरतथात्वेऽपि भेर्यादेरेव तथात्वेन कारणत्वमित्याहुः'—Vardhamana's Prakasa on Kusumanjali prakarana, pp. 114, Bibl. Ed., and on Nyayalilavati Fas. I. pp. 62 64. chowk. Ed; also *Vide* Bhagiratha Thakkura's Com. on the latter.

Prabhākara, likewise, has got his own independent view on this topic. He holds that *Jñāna* is *Svaprakāśa* (self-illumined). It is necessary according to him as the nature of his *Ātma* is essentially *Jaḍa.*

But Murāri, a follower of the third path, has got altogether a different view. He thinks that *Jñāna* is *Pratyakṣa*[1]. There seems to be enough influence of the Naiyāyikas on his view.

7.—Vaiśvadeva.

The last point about Murāri is his view on, 'वैश्वदेवेन यजेत'. The question is: whether the word 'वैश्वदेव' stands for the name of a particular kind of sacrifice, or for the name of a deity presiding over a particular sacrifice?

Mimamsakas' explanation of the word *Vaisvadeva* in the sentence—'*Vaisvadeven yajeta*'.

Murari's different explanation of the same.

The generally accepted view of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the word *Vaiśvadeva* stands in the particular context for the name of a particular kind of sacrifice and not a *guṇavidhi.*[2] Murāri Miśra differs here also from the usually recognised view. He holds that the word '*Vaiśvadeva*' stands here for the name of a deity presiding over a particular sacrifice.[3]

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1. *Vide* Nyayakaustubha, Pratyaksa, Ms. belonging to Sarasvati Bhavana, Benares, Fol. 22a.

2. Nyayamala vistara I. 4. 13-16; Dr. Ganganatha's Cm. on Mandana Misra's Mimamsanukramanika, Fas. I. pp. 34, chowk. Ed

3 Vardhamana's Prakasa on Cintamani, Sabdakhanda, pp. 702--704, Bibl. Ed. I am not quite sure about the authorship of this view, as in the reference we find only 'मिश्रमतम्' । But other Misras, namely, Parthasarathi, Bhavanatha, Vacaspati, Caliknatha etc. do not appear to hold this view. Hence being of a peculiar nature the view has been attributed to Murari Misra here.

All the Muraris examined with a view to find out the subject of the proverb.

These are some of the distinctive views attributed to Murāri Miśra. From the study of the work of Murāri I we cannot say anything regarding the identity of this Murāri with Murāri I. Of Murāri II we have seen above that he lived about 1499 A. D., hence there should not be any doubt that Murāri the *Mīmāṃsaka* must be a different personage; as Vardhamāna the son of Gaṅgeśa, who refers to the views of Murāri, the *Mīmāṃsaka*, has been quoted by Murāri II. Murāri III, who lived about the 18th century cannot claim to be the same as Murāri the Mīmāṃsaka. Murāri IV, like others, does not show any ground for identity. Of Murāri V, I am not quite sure. But as the author refers to old works and writers in his works and holds very strong views in Mimāmsā, I am inclined to assume that perhaps Murāri V had written, as already indicated above, a running commentary on Mimāmsā-Sūtras of which the two works, noticed above, are the available parts; and that he is perhaps the same as Murāri the Mimāṃsaka, of whom is said—'*Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ*'. At any rate we must give a separate independent position to this Murāri whose views have been given above. Hence, if in course of time we find some conclusive proofs to confirm this presupposition, we would call him same as Murāri V and if not, we would add one more Murāri to our list.

The origin of the proverb is due to the independent view of Murari V on the theory of *Pramanya*.

Now another important question remains to be decided. What is that for which Murāri came to hold the third independent view, and became the subject matter of a proverb? The study of the views given above shows that it was due to his independent view on *Prāmāṇyavāda*, on which there were already two views of the Schools of Prabhākara and Kumārila, that he obtained that fame and name which is associated with '*Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ*'.[1]

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1. There is another explanation of the origin of this proverb. Pandita Nrsimha Sastri, father of the late Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Sastri C. I. E., Benares, a great Scholar of Kavyasahitya, used to hold that the proverb refers to the author of Anargharaghava, Murari I. The reason is that poets generally while describing *Fame* (*yaṣa*) compare it with the *Waxing moon* of the *Suklapaksa*; but Murari I draws a comparison with the *Waning moon* of the *Krsnapaksa* which is quite unusual (*vide* Anargharaghava, Act. I. 35, pp. 36. Kavyamala Ed.).

This I have come to learn from a letter of the late Mahamaho-padhyaya Citradhara Misra, a great Mimamsa scholar of Mithila, who was a pupil of Nrsimha Sastri.

The view is not convincing as it does not explain the word '*trtiyah panthah*' which is the most important point.

THE DOCTRINE OF ĀTMAN AND ANĀTMAN.

Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya Principal, Vidyabhavana, Viśvabhāratī.

In the domain of Indian philosophical thought there are two diametrcially opposite views, one holding the existence and the other non-existence of *ātman* 'soul'. And here, I think, mainly lies the difference between the orthodox or Brahmanic and the Buddhist philosophers, the whole system of their philosophy being based on *ātman* and *non-ātman* respectively. It is not the object of the present paper to discuss the arguments advanced by them either in support or in refutation of *ātman*. It is a fact and let us take it as such that the centre of all thoughts in the philosophical systems of the Brahmins or the other *Ātmavādins* is avowedly *ātman*, while it is emphatically denied by the Buddhist philosophers. Now, the question before us is: why did they admit or deny *ātman*? It is quite clear that they started from different points in their march. But at what destination did they arrive? Did they ever meet together? Let us make here an attempt to find out an answer to this question.

It can be seen that philosophical thoughts began to grow on the fundamental conception of Self, *ātman*. The first seer or philosopher was preoccupied with consciousness of Self, *ātman*.

It is asserted by some of our Indian philosophers that he who knows the One knows all; he who knows all, knows the One. Knowledge is possible in two ways, knowing all by knowing the One, and knowing the One by knowing all. There is no doubt that it is more convenient to know the many by knowing the One. For the many are quantitively

innumerable, and how many things can man see in this life? Therefore a searcher after Truth sought for a knowing which includes all knowledge. And the seeking led him to his own self, the *ātman.* But the question remains, why this desire to know the Self. The answer is that such is the nature of man. He desires a thing in proportion to his joy in it, and we find that nothing is as dear to him as his Self. Because he is dear to himself, other things become dear to him through their relation to himself. One of the early seers explained it to his wife in the following way: " Verily it is not for the desire for the husband that a husband is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that a husband is dear. Verily it is not for the desire for the wife that a wife is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that a wife is dear. Verily it is not for the desire for the son that a son is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that a son is dear." And so on (*Br. Up.* II. 4. 5). So man desires the self naturally, because he holds it dearest, the highest source of joy.

He does not desire simply the *ātman,* he desires also *ānanda* ' joy ' to accompany it. He desires the union of *ātman* and *ānanda*. As the *ātman* and *ānanda* are the ultimate reality for man he cannot but hope for their permanence.

In this way from the doctrines of our first seers the three basic ideas of our later philosophy took rise, *ātman, ānanda* or *sukha,* and *nitya,* (eternal). If we change their order a little we may say *nitya, sukha* (*ānanda*), and *ātman.* Here we may recall the three fundmental principles of a later school of philosophers, the Buddhists, *anitya, duḥkha* and *anātman,* which is quite the reverse of the former

statement, but which, as we shall see, comes to the same termination.

For man the foremost of all desires is the desire for his eternal existence or immortality. His prayer heard in the words of a seer, " Lead me from death to immortality[1]. This desire for immortality has found expression among others in the following words uttered by Maitreyī to her husband, Yājñavalkya: " What should I do with that by which I cannot become immortal" ? In these was implied a question: How can a man who is evidently mortal become immortal? The answer naturally occurs to us that though our earthly existence cannot be prolonged for ever it may not be impossible for us to win immortality after our physical death. At first man imagined that in paradise he might retain some kind of body which would be everlasting. But this did not satisfy his reason and at last he came to realize that death could overcome only one's physical body, but it had nothing to do with one's Self. He said that it is the body that dies when it is deserted by the Self (Jīva), the Self does not die[3]. By every possible means he sought that Self, realized it, and then had complete satisfaction. It has been said that a man in this state of satisfaction has his sole desire for the Self, his activity in the Self, his union with the Self, and his enjoyment in it[4].

Some of the early thinkers (Buddhists) however, started from a different point of view. Naturally their

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1. *(Mrtyor mamrtam gamaya). Br. Up.* I. 3. 28. Similar expression of the conception of immortality abound in the Vedic literature, specially in the Upanisadic texts.

2. *Yenaham namrta syam kim aham tena kuryam.* Op cit. II. 4. 3.

3. *Jivapetam vava kiledam mriyate na jivo mriyate. Ch. Up.* VI. II. 3.

4. *Atmaratir atmakrd atmamithuna atmanandah. Ch. Up.* VII. 25.

attention was drawn to the essential facts of our daily life which are a series of sufferings. Birth causes suffering, various ills of life cause suffering, old age is continual suffering; and through suffering we reach death; contact with objects we dislike is suffering; separation from objects we love is suffering; unattainment of what we desire is suffering[1]. In fact there is no limit to suffering. And there can be no doubt that our wish is to avoid all these.

Like everything else suffering must also have its original cause. But there must also be a truth which points to us the path to the cessation of suffering. The most important question in this connection is: What is the root of the suffering? Metaphorically it is named by the Buddha, 'the Builder of the House[2]' (*gahakāraka*) and in plain language *kāma*=(*taṇhā*=*tṛṣṇā*)[3] 'desire' or 'lust'. Consequently cessation of sufferings entirely depends on the cessation of *kāma* 'desire'. This extinction of *kāma*, is called *naiṣkāmya* (*nekkhamma*) 'freedom from lust', *virāga* 'absence of desire' or *taṇhākkhaya* 'destruction of

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1. *Mahavagga* I. 6. 19.

2 It is stated in a very beautiful passage quoted below which is said to have been the first speech of the Buddha.

anekajatisamsaram sandhavissam anibbisam!
gahakarakam gavesanto, dukkha jati punappunam!
gahakaraka ditthosi puna gehamna kahasi!
sabba te phasukha bhagga gahakutam visamkhatam!
visamkharagatam cittam tanhanam Khayam ajihaga!
Dhammapada, 153-154

The following is the translation:
Through a round of countless existences
have I run to no purpose,
Seeking the Builder of the house.
Repeated birth is suffering
I see you, Builder of House, you shall not build the house again.
The mind at rest in Nibbana, has attained extinction of cravings.
Buddhist Legends, Part 2, P. 345

3. *Mahavagga* I. 6. 20.

lust,' all meaning *nirvāṇa* which is the same as *amṛta* 'immortality,' and as such is the sole object of life. And this is to be realised. But how? Evidently by rooting out the cause of *kāma* itself. And what this cause is we shall see presently as we proceed.

That *kāma* is in the beginning of all, that it produces evil, causing various sufferings, and that *naiṣkāmya* 'freedom from desire' leads to *nirvāṇa* or *āmṛta* 'immortality' is a view accepted also by the Brahmanic or orthodox teachers as their literature from the Vedas downwards deals with the different means of attaining *naiṣkāmya*. Let us here quote from the Ṛgveda the following passage (X. 129. 3) every word of which is full of significance: "In the beginning there was *kāma* 'desire' which was the first seed of mind. Sages seeking in (their) hearts with wisdom found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent[1]."

The seers say:

"When all desires which are in his heart cease completely, then does the mortal become immortal, then here[2] he realizes Brahman[3]".

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1. *kamas tad agre samavartatdhi*
manaso retah prathamam yad asit.
sato bandhum asati nir avindan
hrdi pratisya kavayo manisa
One may read with this the following from the Atharvaveda, III. 29. 7:
Ka idam kasma adat
kamah kamayadat
kamo data kamah pratigrahita
kamah samudram a vivesa
Who hath given this to whom?
Kama hath given unto Kama;
Kama is giver, Kama recipient.
Kama entered into the Ocean.

The last line means, according to Sayana, that *Kama* is just like an ocean, as it has no end. "Samudra iva hi kamah. naiva hi kama-yantosti". *Taittiriya Brahmana* II. I. 2. 5. 6.

2. In this very life.

3. *Yada sarve pramucyante*
Kama ye' sya hrdi sthitah
atha mariyo, mrto bhavaty
atra brdhma samasnute
Br. Up. IV4. 7 *Kath Up* 6. 14

In order to avoid prolixity one may be simply referred to the *Bhagavad-gītā* which is full of this idea and from which we quote the following lines:

" He only attains Peace within whom all desires merge as rivers merge in the ocean, which is ever full and ever unmoved, but it can never be attained by the one who cherishes desires".

" The man who having abandoned all desires goes onwards without attachment and free from the idea that 'it is I' and 'this is mine', attains (to) peace[1]".

As the root of all evils and suffering *kāma* is regarded as a great enemy[2] and described as the embodiment of death itself (*māra* or *mṛtyu*)[3], and the Buddha could not become a Buddha or attain to Buddhahood until he was able to conquer and kill that enemy, *kāma* or *māra* ('desire' or 'death') completely. As it is the fundamental principle in Buddhism this fact of conquering 'desire' or 'death' (*kāma* or *māra-vijaya*) by the Buddha has rightly been given a prominent place in the beautiful life-story of the Blessed One in Buddhist literature. In fact the same story in a different shape is told in the dialogue between

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1. *Apuryamanam acalapratistham*
samudram apah pravisanti yadvat
tadvat kamah yam pravisanti sarve
sa santim apnoti na kam kami
vihaya kaman yah sarvan pumamscarati nihsprhah
nirm mo nirahankarah sa santim adhigacchati
2 *kama esa krodha esa rajogunasamubdhavah*
mahasano mahapapma viddhy enam iha vairinam
avrtam jnanam etena jnanino nityavairina
kamarupena kauteya duspurenanalenaca
papmanam prajahi hyenam jnanavijnanasanam
jahi satrum mahabho kamarupam druasadam

Bhagavad-gita 111, 37, 39, 43.

3. Both the words are from the same root, *mr* 'to die'. On this point see Oldenberg's *Buddha*.

Yama and Naciketas in the beginning of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. The great poet Kālidāsa depicted the same thing in his *Kumārasambhava* showing that until *kāma* 'the embodiment of desire' had been burnt and reduced to ashes Pārvatī could not realise the joy of attaining Śiva, the personification of the highest bliss, the conquerer of death (*mṛtyuñjaya*). The real and happy union of Śakuntalā with Duṣyanta in the *Abhijñānaśakuntala* was in the last act of the work, in the hermitage of the sage Mārīca when the hearts of them were completely free from *kāma*.

Now, is there any possibility of getting rid of this desire in a world where our mind is overwhelmingly attracted by multifarious objects that are before us? Certainly there is a way and it is two-fold, subjective and objective. We shall deal with the former after we have discussed the latter. The objective way is various according to the variety of different schools of thought as we shall see presently. It is a truism to say that our mind turns back from an undesirable object or from all that leads to it. Man naturally desires a state of non-suffering or eternal bliss as well as its process of attainment which in itself may not be agreeable. That worldly things are not permanent is evident. Taking their stand on this point the Indian philosophers, Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, emphatically asserted that objects round us are of no worth to those persons who are desirous of having eternal happiness or complete cessation of sufferings. For nothing permanent comes out from what is not permanent.

Now, when man deeply meditates upon the nature of impermanency (*anityabhāvanā*) of the things, his attachment to them naturally weakens and his mind is gradually freed

from the desire for them. This is one way to cessation of desire.

Others hold a doctrine, which was more radical than this. According to them desire is roused only when an object is thought to be real but if it is clearly understood that it is non-existent then desire vanishes. According to the Māyāvādins the world is mere illusion. The Vijñānavādins would tell us that the external world has no reality at all, being the mere transformation of internal *vijñāna*. And the Mādhyamikas would advise us to believe that it is mere *śūnya* 'void' meaning thereby that in fact it is not what it appears to be. For, as it comes into being only owing to the cause and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) it has not its own independent (*svāyatta*) character or nature. Now when it has not its own independent character how can it borrow it from others? Therefore it follows that it has no essential nature of its own (*nirātmaka* or *niḥsvabhāva*).[1] And as such it cannot be in reality what it appears to us. Consequently to the wise who know the truth the external world cannot produce a feeling of attachment, but, on the contrary, it strengthens his realization of nirvāṇa (*saṅgakṣayaś ca nirvāṇāvāptikāraṇam*). The Bhaktimārgins teach us completely to dedicate all fruits of actions (karmaphalārpaṇa) to the Supreme Being and Srīkṛṣṇa's teaching in the *Bhagavad-gītā* emphasises upon doing one's own duties without any thought of ulterior gains thus overcoming man's greatest enemy, *kāma*, 'desire'. Mīmāṃsakas who are mainly concerned with various rites and ceremonies in the Vedic texts would warn us in unmistakable terms against performing *kāmya karmans* or the ceremonies done

1. This is what is called *dharmanairatmya*.

from interested motives advising us to stick only to indispensable and occasional (*nitya* and *naimittika*) ceremonies. Tantravādins would, however, suggest to us quite a different way saying that it is with desire (*rāga*) itself that the wise can remove desire. They tell us[1]:

"Just as one takes out water from the ear with the water itself, or a thorn with a thorn itself, so the wise remove desire with desire itself. Just as a washerman makes a cloth clean by removing its dirt with some dirty matter, so a wise man makes himself pure only with what is impure. Or as a looking glass becomes clean when rubbed with dust, just so things which are offensive are for the annihilation of offence when enjoyed by the wise. A lump of iron when thrown into the water surely goes down, but when it is turned into a vessel not only does it float on the water but enables others to do so. In the same way when the mind is

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1. This theory is propounded in a work called *Cittamsuddhiprakarana* the title being ascertained from a quotation in the *Subhasitasamgraha*. C. Bendall, 1905, p. 37. It is attributed to Aryadeva. The Sanskrit text is published by Pandit Harprasad Shastri, though not critically in JASB, 1898 No-2, pp. 175. There is a Tibetan translation of this book (Tanjur, Rg. XXXIII. 9) It is named here *Citt varanavisodhanam Prakaranam* (sems kyi sgri pa rnam par sbyon ba zes bya bahi rab tu byed pa). A critical edition of the work is undertaken in the Visvabharati. The folloing is culled from it:

karnaj jalam jalenaiva kantakenaiva kantakam l
ragenaiva tatha ragam uddharanti manisinah ll 37
yathaiva rajako vastram malenaiva tu nirmalam l
kuryad vidvamstathatmanam malenaiva tu nirmalam ll 38
yatha bhavati samsuddho rajonirghrsta-darpanah l
sevitas tu tatha vijnair doso dosavinasanah ll 39
lauhapindo jale ksipto majjaty eva tu kevalam l
patrikrtam tad evanyam tarayet tarati svayam ll 40
tadvat patrikrtam cittam prajnopayavidhanatah l
bhunjano mucyate kamam mocayaty aparan api 41
durvijnaih sevitah kamah kamo bhavati bandhanam l
sa eva sevito vijnaih kamo moksaprasadhakah ll 42
yathaiva vidhivad bhuktam visam apy amrtayate l
durbhutam ghrtapupadi balanam tu visayate ll 43
ghrtam ca madhusamyuktam samamsam visatam vrajet l
tad eva vidhivad bhuktam utkrstam tu rasayanam ll 50
rasasprstam yatha tamram nirdosam kancanam bhavet l
jnanavidas tatha samyak klesah kalyanakarakah ll 51

strengthened by wisdom it remains free even while enjoying the things that men desire and at the same time helps others to freedom. The object of desire when enjoyed by the unwise becomes a fetter to him, but to the wise the enjoyment does not work against liberation. Poison when taken in accordance with proper method acts like life giving ambrosia; but even good food, such as ghee, cake, etc., if taken improperly, acts like poison. Ghee mixed with honey in equal proportion becomes poison, but the same thing taken according to rules becomes an excellent tonic saving one from the ravage of senility and disease. As copper blended with quicksilver becomes faultless gold, just so the impurities or passions (*kleśas*) to those who know what true knowledge is, are efficient in causing good."

As regards the subjective way it is divided into two branches and this division depends upon the existence and non-existence of *ātman*. In the first division are the *Ātmavādins* or those who admit the existence of *ātman*. According to some of them with whom we are specially concerned here, the *ātman* is void of all qualities (*nirguṇa*). It is without actions (*niṣkriya*) and without stain (*nirañjana*). It is one and without a second (" *ekam eva advitīyam*"), and all-pervading (*vibhu*). In reality there is none in the world excepting the *ātman*. Now it is a fact that when there are two things, real or imaginative, there is possibility of fear. When there are both, a tiger and a man, the latter has the cause to be frightened. Thus runs an Upaniṣadic story (*Br. Up*. I. 4. 1-2): In the beginning there was Self, *ātman*, alone. Looking round him he saw but his self. He was afraid and therefore anyone who is lonely is afraid. But when he questioned himself, "As there is nothing but myself why should I fear?", his fear passed

away. What should he have feared? Verily fear arises from a second only ("*dvitīyad vai bhayaṃ bhavati*").

Just so when a man thoroughly realizes that there is nothing excepting his self (*ātman*), the nature of which has been described above, what can he desire? There is absolutely no object of his desire. So we are told (*Br. Up* IV. 4. 12): "If a man understands the self (*ātman*) saying, 'I am He' (*ayam asmi*) what could he wish or desire for the sake of which he should pursue the body?"[1] It is further said (*Iśa. Up*. 6. 7,): "When he beholds all things in the self and the self in all beings; and thus understands that all beings are nothing but the self, he is free not only from desire but also from all sorts of sorrows and troubles."

Let us now take up the subjective way suggested by the Anātmavādins. They say that the source of desire which is the root cause of miseries is one's notion of "I" and "mine" *ahaṅkāra* and *mamakāra* or in other words, 'self' (*ātman*) and 'that which belongs to the self' (*ātmīya*). This view of *ahaṅkāra* and *mamakāra*, or *ātman* and *ātmīya* is called *satkāyadṛṣṭi*[2] which in short means the be-

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1. *atmanam ced Vijaniyad ayam asmiti purusah* I
kim icchan kasya kam ya sariram anusancaret II

2. The term *satkayadrsti*, Pali *sakkayaaditthi*, is explained variously according to the different derivations of *satkaya*. Mainly the following two derivations are possible (I) *sat-kaya* and (2) *svak-aya*. With regard to the first (I) *sat-kaya*, *sat* may be derived from the roots, (*a*) √*as* 'to be', meaning 'existing', and (*b*) √*sad* 'to perish' meaning 'perishing'. The latter is supported by both Tibetan (*hjig*) and Chinese (*hoai*). The liberal meaning, in the first case, of the *satkayadrsti* is 'the view' (of atman and atmiya) on the existing body (or collections, *skandhas*); and in the second, 'the view' of (*atman* and *atmiya*) on the perishing body (or collections, *skandhas*). As regards the second derivation, (2) *sva-kaya*, it is suggested by Childers and others that Skt. *svakaya* becomes in Pali first *sakaya* and then *sakkaya* the *k* being reduplicated just as from *anudaya* we have *anuddaya* in Pali. According to Prof. Walleser the derivation is *svad-kaya* (from which Pali *sakkaya*) *svat* being for *sva*. Cf. *tvad*, *mad* (to which *yad*, *tad*, *anayad*, etc. may also be added). In support of this view, as pointed out by Prof. Walleser, cf. also *Kathavatthu*, PTS, p. 86. *anuppatta-sadattho* with *anupraptasvakarthah* in the *Astasahasrika-prajnaparamita* Bib. Ind. p 3: *Mahavyutpatti*, Bib Bud. 48-12; *Satasahasrika prajnaparamita*, Bib. Ind. p. 23 In favour of *svakaya* see Nagarjuna's *Madhyamakakarika* Bib. Bud. XXIII. 5, in which the word *svakayadrsti* is used and Candrakirti explains it thus; svakaye *drstih svakayadrstir atmatmiyadrstih*. Therefore the meaning is 'the belief of 'I' and 'mine' on one's own body or *skandhas*. For further details see ZDMG, vol. 64, p. 581ff, and Poussin's *Abhidharmakosa* with his notes on V. 7; "Belief in 'I' and 'mine' (*atmatmiyagraha*), this is the *satkayadrstih*; *sat* because it perishes, *kaya* accumulation, multiplicity. *Satkaya*, that is to say, accumulation of perishing things, that is to say, five *upadana-skandhas*."

lief in *ātman* and *ātmīya* with regard to the five *skandhas* or simply the belief in 'I' and 'mine', or what is known by the word *ātmavāda.* This *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is regarded as a great mountain with very high peaks, twenty in number, covering all the directions, which can be rent asunder only with the thunderbolt of the knowledge that there is no self ātman (*nairātmyabodha.*[1]) It then disappears just like darkness before a bright lamp[2].

The truth according to these teachers of *anātmavāda* in their system is the complete disappearance in every way of the notion of 'I' and 'mine', either inside or outside, owing to the non-perception of all things, external and internal[3]. And one can arrive at it only when one is free from this *satkāyadṛṣṭi.* For the root of the *saṃsāra* is the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* which rests only on the notion of *ātman.* Now, when one realizes that there is no *ātman*, one's *satkāyadṛṣṭi* disappears followed by the disappearance of all sorts of impurities or obstacles or passions (*saṃkleśas*). As to how the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* leads to various sufferings they tell us that the cause of suffering is *ahaṅkāra* the notion of 'I' and it increases owing to the delusion of ātman, or

1. *Madhyamakavrtti,* p. 294; vimsatisikhara-samunnatataratiprthu-satkayadrstimahasailaparivestitasarvadinmukha. These twenty peaks are as follows:—(*Mahavyutpatti* 208); 1 *rupa* is *atman* just like a master (*svamivat*); 2) *atman* is with *rupa* just like a man with an ornament (*rupavan atmalankaravat*); 3) just like a servant *rupa* belongs to *atman* (*atmiyam rupam bhrtyavat*); 4) *atman* is in *rupa* just as in a vessel (*rupa atma bhajanavat.* It is in tho same way also with regard to other four *skandhas; Vedana, samjna, samskara,* and *vijnana* the total number thus being (4 × 5) twenty.

Against this *satkayadrsti* is the following *bhavana;*

rupam natma rupavan naiva catma l
rupe natma rupam atmany asacca
Subhasitasamgraha, *p. 21.*

2. *Tattvasamgraha*, GOS, V. 3334;

Pratyaksikrtanairatye na doso labhate sthitim l
tadviruddhataya dipre pradipastimiram yatha ll.

3. *adhyatmika bahayesesavastvanupalambhenadhyatmam bahi ca yah sarvatha hankara pariksaya idam atra tattvam.*
madagamakhvrtti, p. 340.

believing what is not *ātman*' as *ātman* (*ātmamoha*)[1]. If one really knows that there is *ātman*, one's *ahaṅkāra* can in no way disappear and consequently suffering cannot cease. For when there is the cause there is the effect. When a man sees that there is an *ātman*, he indentifies his body with it saying 'it is I' and there arises his lasting love for it. From this love he feels thirst for comforts and the thirst prevents him from realizing their deficiency. And he imagines the thing that he desires to be good and loves to think that 'it is mine,' and adopts means for its attainment. When there is the notion of the self there arises also the notion of the other than the self and owing to the division of the self and the other than the self there spring the notions of attachment and hatred; and being firmly related to these two all evils arise[2]. It is this for which yogins deny the existence of self.[3]

According to these Anātmavādins, it is not a n(r surmise that there cannot be an *ātman* as accepted by the *Tīrthikas* or the non-Buddhist teachers, but it is a fact as there are strong grounds for it.[4]

Thus when the notion of *ātman* disappears necessarily that of *ātmīya* also disappears, as the parts of a chariot are

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1. *duhkhahetur ahankara atmamohat tu vardhate.*
Bodhicaryavatara IX 78.

2. *yah pasyaty atmanam tasyaham iti sasvata snehah* I
snehat sukhesu trsyati trsna dosamstiraskurute II
gunadarsi paritrsan mameti tatsadhanam upadatte I
tenatmabhiniveso yavat tavat tu samsarah I
atmani sati parasamjna svapara vibhagat parigrahadvesau I
anayoh sampratibaddhah sarve dosah prajayante II
Quoted as of Acaryapada (Nagarjuna) in the *Bodhicaryavatara panjika*, Bib. Ind. p. 492 as well as in the Commentary by Gunaratna on the *Saddarsanasamuccaya*, Bib. Ind. p. 192.

3. *Satkayadrstiprabhavan asesan*
klesams ca dosams ca dhiya vipasyan I
atmanam asya visayam ca buddhva
yogi karoty atmanisedhamasya II
Madhyamakavatara, VI. 120, quoted in the *Madhyamakavrtti*, p. 340.

4. As said before these grounds are not stated here on account of prolixity The reader may, however, be referred among others to the *Madhyamakavrtti*, XXVIII.

also burnt when the chariot itself is burnt. In this way when a yogin does not perceive *ātman* and *ātmīya*, his notion of these two cases he becomes free from both the ideas 'I' and 'mine' (*nirmama* and *nirahaṅkāra*).[1] And from the complete cessation of them there is no room for any attachment of 'holding on' (*upādāna*) of which *kāma* or desire is one and the first form.[2] And the extinction of *upādāna* is followed by that of birth which is full of sorrows.[3] Thus we see that though the ātmavādins and non-ātmavadins started oppositely they met together reaching the same goal by different ways.

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1. *atmany asati catmiyam kuta eva bhavisyati* l
nirmamo nirahankarah samad atmatmaninayoh ll
Madhyamakakarika, XVIII. 2.

2. There are four *upadanas*, the other three being (1) wrong view (*drsti*), (2) 'belief in rites' (*silvaratataparamarsa*), and (3) the 'soul theories' (*atmavada*).

3. *mamety aham iti ksine bahiradhyatmam eva ca* l
nirdhyata upadanam tatksayaj janmanah ksayah ll
Madhyamakakarika, XVIII. 4.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF BHĀVAPRADĪPIKĀ—AN OLD AND UNPUBLISHED PRĀCĪNA ṬĪKĀ ON ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA'S GĪTĀ BHĀṢYA.

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In the course of my search for "Prācīna Ṭīkā" in several places, especially in Udipi, Kumbhakonam and Mysore Province, I recently came across in the Mysore Oriental Library an old palm-leaf manuscript work which is styled "Bhāvapradīpikā". After a careful study of the work, I found it to be of very great service to students of Dvaita Vedānta. I therefore proceed to review this work before I speak of the other Prācīna Ṭīkā Works.

Description of the Manuscript :

This manuscript is written in Nāgarī characters of a very old and peculiar type. The manuscript contains many mistakes, perhaps due to the negligence or incapacity of the copyist. It is generally persons of a very little understanding that are employed to copy manuscripts and it seems to be particularly so in this case. Fortunately the letters are clear and the palm-leaves are well preserved. As the Nāgarī characters employed in this manuscript are of a very peculiar type, it can be deciphered only by persons of very great experience in reading Nāgarī characters. I therefore found very great difficulty in getting this manuscript read for copying it in Devanāgarī characters. The manuscript contains thirty-three long palm-leaves written on both sides.[1]. Each side of each leaf generally contains ten or eleven lines[2]. The characters in the first twenty-five leaves are very small

1. The first and the twenty-seventh leaves contain writing only on one side.
2. Leaves from 26 to 33 contain only 8 or 9 lines on each side.

while characters in the last eight leaves are somewhat big, but the characters of the unmarked page of the thirty-third leaf are extremely small and a magnifying glass is necessary to read these last few lines.

Each leaf of the manuscript is numbered on the front page and the work on the whole contains about one thousand nine hundered and eighty granthams. It is a complete work, being a very valuable ṭikā on the Gītā Bhāṣya of Śrī Madhvācārya and consists of eighteen chapters. The manuscript, however, contains many gaps or granthapātas Fortunately, this manuscript points out the gap directly stating it in the several places by the following words:—
"बहुग्रन्थः पतितः[1]"

(2) Name of the Work :

The manuscript work bears three names[2] "Bhāvadīpikā" "Bhāvaprakāśikā" and "Bhāvapradīpikā" which are synonyms. On the left hand margin on the marked page of the first leaf the work is called "प्राचीनगीताभाष्यटीका" and on the left hand margins of the remaining leaves we find only the following abbreviations: प्रा-गी-भा-टी

(3) Contents:

The work begins with a salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Śrī Vedavyāsa and Śrī Madhvācārya.

Both the first and the second chapters end in the first line of the marked page of the ninth leaf. Here the work is called "Bhāvadīpikā", and the last line of the chapter runs as follows:—

इति श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादार्यविरचितगीताभाष्यटीकायां भावदीपिकायां प्रथमोऽध्यायः—
द्वितीयोऽध्यायः—

1. Second leaf, front page, left hand margin.
2. These three names are found at the end of the second, fourth and the twelfth chapters respectively.

The author devotes about a fourth part of his work to the second chapter. It is in this chapter that the author clearly points out and ably maintains the difference between (*i*) the soul and the material sheaths, (*ii*) the universal soul and the individual soul, and establishes the tenets of Dvaita Vedānta refuting the views of the rival schools, chiefly the Advaita Schools.

At the end of the third chapter which ends in the sixth line on the unmarked page of the twelfth leaf the work bears the same name.

The work is styled "Bhāvaprakāśikā" at the end of the fourth chapter which ends in the fourteenth leaf.

The old name "Bhāvadīpikā" is found at the end of the fifth and the sixth chapters which end in the sixteenth and the seventeenth leaves respectively.

There is no difference in the nomenclature at the end of the seventh, the eighth and the ninth chapters which respectively end in the nineteenth, twenty-first and the twenty-second leaves.

No name is given to the work at the end of the tenth and the eleventh chapters which respectively end in the twenty-third and the twenty-forth leaves. Here the last lines run thus:—

इति श्रीमद्गीताभाष्यटीकायां दशमोध्यायः

इति श्रीमद्गीताभाष्यटीकायां एकादशोध्यायः

The name "Bhāvapradīpikā" is given to the work at the end of the twelfth, the thirteenth and the fourteenth chapters which respectively end in the twenty-sixth, the twenty-eighth and the twenty-ninth leaves.

At the end of the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the seventeenth chapters which respectively end in the thirtieth,

and the thirty-first leaves the old name "Bhāvapradīpikā" is given to the work.

The eighteenth or the last chapter ends in the thirty-third leaf. The work is styled here "Bhāvapradipikā" and the last line of the chapter runs thus:—

इति श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यविरचितश्रीमद्भगवद्गीताभावप्रदीपिकायामष्टादशोऽध्यायः

This last line is preceded by two verses which are the concluding stanzas of the author of the Ṭīkā, and is followed by one stanza in the anuṣṭubh metre and three full daṇḍakas and a fourth incomplete one. The two concluding verses of the author of the Ṭīkā are the following:—

नमोजलदनीलाय बल्लवीवल्लभाय ते ॥
रमाकरसमाराध्यचरणाय सुरद्विषे ॥१॥
श्रीमन्मध्वमहाचार्यपादपद्मैकसद्मनाम् ॥
अणूनां महतां चापि भवतात्करुणा मयि ॥२॥

It is difficult to say who the author of the following verse and the daṇḍakas is. The anuṣṭubh stanza and the daṇḍakas describe the exploits of Śrī Rāma in glowing terms. The stanza in the anuṣṭubh metre runs thus:—

भानुवंशाब्धिराकेन्दुधानुष्ककुलशेखरम् ॥
सानुमद्धीरता···नौनुमस्त्वां रघूद्वहं ॥१॥

The daṇḍakas are written in very small characters and some of the letters are not quite clear. The last daṇḍaka is incomplete. As this work is an annotation on the Gītā Bhāṣya which is a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā the first six chapters of this work detail the means of knowledge, second six the nature of knowledge and the last six amplify the contents of the first twelve chapters.

(4) Identification of the Author.

Sanskrit authors generally give their genealogy and mention their names at the beginning or at the end of the

work or at the end of every chapter or sarga or in the introductory portion of the work and this is seen in the following works:—

(*i*) *Kādambarī*:—

बभूव वात्स्यायनवंशसंभवो द्विजो.........सताम् ।

..................................कुबेरनामांश इव स्वयंभुवः ।

....

............ततस्सुतो बाण इति व्यजायत ॥[1]

The above verses give the genealogy of Bāṇa, the author of Kādambarī.

द्विजेन तेनाक्षतकण्ठकौण्ठ्यया............

..............निबद्धेयमतिद्वयी कथा ।[2]

The above verse states that Bāṇa wrote Kādambarī.

(*ii*) *Naiṣadha*:

Here the last verse of every sarga states the name of the author and his parents. The last stanza of the first sarga runs thus:—

श्रीहर्षं कविराजराजिमुकुटालंकारहीरस्सुतं

श्रीहीरस्सुषुवे जितेन्द्रियचयं मामल्लदेवी च यम् ॥

तच्चिन्तामणिमन्त्रचिन्तनफले शृङ्गारभङ्ग्या महा-

काव्ये चारुणि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गोऽयमादिर्गतः ॥१॥

(*iii*) *Pramāṇa Paddhati*:

The last verse here runs thus:—

जयतीर्थमुनीन्द्रेण बालबोधाय निर्मिता ।

प्रमाणपद्धतिर्भूयात् प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ॥१॥

Here the name of the author is mentioned as Jayatīrtha.

(*iv*) The *Ṭippaṇī* on Prameyadīpikā (fifth verse from the beginning):—

1. Kadambari from the tenth to the nineteenth verses at the beginning of the work.
2. Kadambari twentieth verse from the beginning.

अथैतत्कृपया श्रीनिवासाख्यायुतसूरिणा ।।
गीताभाष्यस्य टीकायाः क्रियते भावदीपिका ।।

The anthor's name is mentioned here as Śrīnivāsa.

(v) *Tantradīpikā:* (last verse of the work):

सुधीन्द्रगुरुपादानां शिष्येण श्रीशतुष्टये ।।
राघवेन्द्रेण यतिना कृतेयं तन्त्रदीपिका ।।

In the above verse, the author's name is mentioned as Rāghavendra.

The author of this manuscript, however, does not mention his name anywhere in the work. The evidence afforded by the work itself together with some indirect reference to certain views expressed in this work by Jayatīrtha in his Prameyadīpikā, his famous later Ṭīkā on the Gitā Bhāṣya of Śrī Madhvācārya, enables us to find out the name of the author. Since tradition also confirms our conclusion regarding the identification of our author we may safely take it also for our guidance in this matter. I now proceed to identify the author as follows:—

It is almost a rule or custom with Sanskrit authors in general and Vedānta writers in particular that they should offer salutations to their Iṣṭadevatās or favourite gods (deities of worship) first and then to their preceptors and great authors that preceded them. That this custom has been in vogue is seen from the following:—

(1) **Harśacarita:**

नमस्तुङ्गशिरश्चुम्बिचन्द्रचामरचारवे ।।
त्रैलोक्यनगरारम्भमूलस्तम्भाय शम्भवे
हरकण्ठ.......................नमाम्युमाम् ।।

....मिव ॥२॥

नमः.....व्यासाय ....॥

....भारतम् ॥३॥

कवीनां ——..................वासवदत्तया ॥[1]

——....— ——.............................गोचरम् ॥११॥

पद्..॥

भट्टारहरिचन्द्रस्य गद्यबन्धो नृपायते—॥१२॥

अविनाशिन............ ....सातवाहनः ॥

कीर्तिः प्रवरसेनस्य................. ....सेतुना ॥१४॥

सूत्र.....नाटकः...॥

.................................भासो.......... .....॥१५॥

निर्गतासु.....——...कालिदासस्य ॥

——...जायते ॥१६॥

हरिलीलेव——........................ ——— ....बृहत्कथा[2] ॥१७॥

आढ्यराज ....॥

....ते ॥१७॥

In the above verses, Bāṇa, the author, first offers salutation to Śambhu and Umā, the wife of Śambhu, and mentions the following famous authors that preceded him:

(1) The great Vyāsa, (2) Subandhu, the author of Vāsavadattā, (3) Bhaṭṭāraharicandra, (4) Sātavāhana, (5) Pravarasena, the author of Setubandha, (6) Bhāsa, the author of many dramas, (7) Kālidāsa, (8) Guṇāḍhya, the author of Bṛhatkathā, and (9) Āḍhyarāja.

(2) **Nyāyāmṛta:**

निखिलगुणनिकायं नित्यनिर्धूतहेयं,

शुभतममतिमेयं शुद्धसौख्याप्त्युपायम् ॥

सकल (निखिल) निगमगेयं सर्वशब्दाभिधेयं,

नवजलधरकायं नौमि लक्ष्मीसहायम् ॥१॥

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1. Here the author refers to Subandhu indirectly by mentioning his work Vasavadatta.

2. Here the author refers to Gunadhya indirectly by mentioning his work Brhatkatha.

विघ्नौघवारणं सत्याशेषविश्वस्य कारणम् ॥
[illegible]तीर्थवन्धुं हरिम्भजे ॥२॥
आश्रमं .... ॥
आनन्दतीर्थ .... ॥३॥
....भाति श्रीजयतीर्थवाक् ॥४॥
समुत्सार्य .... ॥
.... सेवे ब्रह्मण्यभास्करम् ॥४॥
ज्ञान..................... .... ॥
लक्ष्मीनारायणमुनीन्वन्दे विद्यागुरून्मम ॥६॥

Here Vyāsarāya, the author, offers salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Śrī Anandatīrtha, Jayatīrtha, Brahmaṇyatīrtha and Lakṣmīnārāyaṇamuni.

Following this rule or custom, the author of this palm leaf manuscript work in his first verse offers salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, his Iṣṭadevatā or favourite god, then to Śrī Vedavyāsa, the preceptor of his preceptor Śrī Madhvācārya and lastly to Śrī Madhvācārya, his direct preceptor. The first verse of the work runs thus:—

गुणगणनिलयं प्रणम्य कृष्णं
जगदघदहनं च वासवीसूनुम् ॥
गुरुकुलतिलकं सुपूर्णबोधं
गुरुमपि विवृणोमि गीतिकाभाष्यम् ॥

(Having offered my salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa who is the abode of the collection of virtues, to Śrī Vedavyāsa who is the destroyer of all the sins of the world, and to Pūrṇabodha, *i. e.*, Śrī Madhvācārya who is the best of all the preceptors, I proceed to explain "Gītā Bhāṣya)".

The above stanza contains one connective particle च in the first half and another अपि in the second.

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1. This Laksminarayanamuni is the famous Sripadaraja Svami of Mulabagal.

half. The first particle च connects Kṛṣṇa and Vāsavīsūnu. We have thus in this stanza only the following mentioned: (1) Iṣṭadevatā (favourite god), (2) Preceptor of his preceptor who is technically called Paramaguru and (3) the direct preceptor who is technically known as Sākṣādguru.

Archæological records[1], Tradition, and some Madhva[2] works tell us that Śrī Madhvācārya had four famous disciples, besides many others—Padmanābha Tīrtha, Narahari Tīrtha, Mādhava Tīrtha and Akṣobhaya Tīrtha. After the departure of Śrī Madhvācārya from Udīpi to Badarikāśrama on the Himalayas for the last time, these four disciples adorned his pontificial seat in regular succession: Padmanābha Tīrth first, then Narahari Tīrtha who was followed by Mādhava Tīrtha, lastly Akṣobhya Tīrtha.[3]

Tradition and later Madhva works are silent about the writings of Mādhava Tīrtha and Akṣobhaya Tīrtha. The following oft quoted stanza only refers to a fierce wordy

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1. Inscription No. 290 of the Madras Government Epigraphist's collection for the year 1896 states that Narahari Tirtha was a disciple of Sri Madhva Acarya. Refer to the sixth verse of this inscription.

2. (i) "Madhvavijaya"—the following verse and its sequel in Madhvavijaya state that Padmanabhtirtha, Naraharitirtha and many others became the desciples of Sri Madhvacarya.

आकृष्टोऽस्य गुणै व्यासै योगोदाया (?) उपाययौ ॥

स पद्मनाभतीर्थाख्यः शिष्योन्योभूत्सुचेतसः ॥

(Madhwa Vijaya, Sarga 15, verse 120.)

(ii) "Madhvacarya guruparampara"—this work contains a brief account of the life of Madhvacarya and gives the line of gurus of the Dvaita School of Vedanta.

(Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Library—No. 5414).

3. The work called "Purna Bodha Vamsa Katha Kalpataru" gives in the third, the fourth and the fifth chapters detailed information regarding the succession of Padmanabha Tirtha, Narahari Tirtha, Madhava Tirtha and Aksobya Tirtha.

warfare between Akṣobhaya Tīrtha and the famous Vidyāraṇya Svāmi of Śriṅgeri:—

असिनातत्त्वमसिना परजीवप्रभेदिना ॥
विद्यारण्यमहारण्यमक्षोभ्यमुनिरच्छिनत् ॥१॥

(By the sword "तत्त्वमसि" [THOU art (thoroughly and absolutely dependent on) that] WHICH differentiates the individual soul from the Highest God, Akṣobhaya Tīrtha vanquished Vidyāraṇya, the great warrior).

A Ṭīkā by Narahari Tīrtha[2] on the Gītābhāṣya of Śrī Madhvācārya is in existence. There is no reference in the later famous Madhva works to any Prācīna ṭīkās by Mādhava Tīrtha or Akṣobhya Tīrtha on the Gītābhāṣya of Śrī Madhvāchārya. Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya and his brother Śaṅkara Paṇḍita have written ṭīkās on Sūtrabhāṣya and Anuvyākhyāna respectively and there is no evidence to show that any of them wrote a ṭīkā on the Gītābhāṣya. The natural inference by Pariśeṣānumāna (proof of elimination) is therefore that the author of the palm-leaf manuscript work under review must be Padmanābha Tīrtha, the famous disciple of Śrī Madhvācārya, who succeeded him as the pontiff of the Madhva Maṭh.

The volume and the style of this work compared with those of Sannyāyaratnāvali or Harıtattvaprakaśikā by Padmanābha Tīrtha lend support to this identification of the author. This ṭīkā work is not very voluminous but it is suggestive like Sannyāyaratnāvali. The sentences are short but they are pregnant with meaning. Only very difficult passages of the text are explained and the ṭīkā is

1. This verse is found in the work called "Vedantadesika Vaibhava Prakasika."

2. A very old palm-leaf manuscript of this work was recently secured by me from His Holiness of Śripadaraja Svami Mutt of Mulbagal.

sometimes profuse in these cases. Avatārikā or introduction is given to each topic in simple and clear language. The work does not indulge in grammatical subtleties, and technical terms such as "avacchedaka" and "avacchinna" are generally not found in the work.

The above remarks regarding the style of this Prācīna Ṭīkā are supported by the following extract from the work under review:—

तत्रऊर्ध्वशब्दस्य विष्णुपरत्वं रूढियोगाभ्यां दर्शयति ऊर्ध्वेति ।।
अधश्शाखामित्येतद्व्याचष्टे अध इति ।।
भूतानि पञ्च देवादीनि च शाखा इत्यर्थः ।।
अश्वत्थशब्दं जगत् (भगवत्) परतया योजयतिश्वोपीति ।।
तर्हि उत्तरपदकोप इत्यत आह तथापीति ।।
मायाप्रलये सर्वथाप्युच्छेदो भवतीत्यत्यत आह पूर्वेति ।।
कयाविवक्षया छन्दसां पर्णत्वम् इत्यत आह फलेति ।।
पर्णानां फलकारणत्वं कथम् इत्यत आह नहीति ।।
अधश्चोर्ध्वंचेत्येतत् व्याचष्टे अव्यक्तं चेति ।।
शाखाः पञ्चमहाभूतान्यध इति ।।
स्वापेक्षया निकृष्टशरीरेषु ऊर्ध्वमुत्कृष्टप्रकृतौ प्रसृतानीत्यर्थः ।।
गुणशब्दस्यानेकार्थत्वात् विवक्षितार्थमाह गुणैरिति ।।
विषयाणां प्रवालत्वेन विवक्षामाह प्रतीतिमात्रेति ।
पूर्वं मूलस्यैकवचनेनोक्तत्वात् मूलानीत्यन्यानीतिप्र तीतिं पराकरोति मूलानीति ।।
आदिपदात् प्रकृत्यादीनि ।।
कर्मानुबन्धित्वश्रवणात् मूलानि जीवाः इत्यत आह भगवन्नपीति ।।
श्लोकस्थार्थप्रमाणमाह तथाचेति ।।

The following indirect reference may also be noted in this connection.

In the fifth line of the marked page of the third leaf of our work, we have the following sentence:

प्रकृतिपुरुषनित्यत्वेऽपि शब्दसमुचितप्रमाणमाहप्रकृतीति

This sentence suggests the connection or construction

of the word अपि in the following stanza of the Bhagavadgītā:

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः
उभयोरपि दृष्टोन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥ ॥

(There is no end or destruction of असत् or matter, nor is there the destruction of सत् or soul. The nature of both of them is seen by the seers of truth also).

The usefulness of the construction of the word अपि noted in the above quotation from the palm-leaf manuscript becomes clear by noting the following context:—

Arjuna having been overcome by ignorance fails to understand the nature of soul and matter and Śrī Kṛṣṇa expounds his teaching which takes the form of Bhagavadgītā to remove Arjuna's mistaken impression regarding the nature of soul and matter. At the beginning of his teaching Śrī Kṛṣṇa establishes the eternity of soul and matter by all the three pramāṇas or authorities of the Vedantin's Pratyakṣa or perception, Anumān or inference and Āgama or word. The above verse of the Bhagavadgītā gives all these pramāṇas or authorities. The stanza directly gives the pratyakṣa pramāṇa in its latter half by stating that the nature of both soul and matter is seen by the seers of truth. Our manuscript work points out that the word अपि in the stanza suggests or connects an additional pramāṇa or authority, namely 'Āgama' or the authority of 'Word' beginninig with श्रुति. Another Prācīna Ṭīkā by Narahari on Gītā Bhāṣya points out that the Bhāṣya on the stanza indirectly suggests the anumāna pramāṇa or inference.[2] Thus all the authorities required to establish the eternity of soul and matter are got from the stanza. Ṭīkācārya in his

1. Bhagavadgita: Second chapter, sixteenth stanza.

2. Lines twenty-one and twenty-two of the sixteenth leaf of Bhavaratna Kosa (T. R. Krsnacarya's Edition which is a very useful tippani by Sumatındra Svami on Prameyadipika contain the following quotation from Narahari Tirtha's Tıka on Gita Bhasya:—

तत्र तावज्जगत्कारणत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिरूपयुक्तिसिद्धत्वं किमात्मैव नित्यादिशङ्का भाष्येणैव यदुक्तम् ॥

Prameya-Dīpīkā, the famous ṭīkā on the Gītā Bhāṣya of Śrī Madhvaācārya, while commenting upon the Bhāṣya on the sixteenth verse of the second chapter of the Bhagavadgītā does not fail to refer in the following quotation to this construction of the word अपि of the Prācīnaṭikākāras: "केचिदपिशब्दस्य भिन्नक्रमत्वमङ्गीकृत्य तेन सूचितं प्रमाणं प्रागुदाहृतमिति" वर्णयन्ति[1]. The Tippaṇikāras, Kṛṣṇācārya[2] and Sumatīndrasvāmi,[3] state that the word क्वचित् in the above quotion refers to Narahari Tīrtha. As the construction of the word अपि referred to by Ṭīkācārya in his Prameyadīpikā is found in this Prācīnaṭīka work also we have every reason to think that Ṭīkācārya refers to this old work also. The additional "Āgama" pramāṇā suggested by the word अपि is obtained by connecting it with तत्त्वदर्शिभिः or दृष्टः Ṭīkācārya, however, connects it with उभयोः This reference conclusively establishes the priority of our palm-leaf manuscript work to Prameyadīpikā of Ṭīkācārya.

(5) DATE OF THE AUTHOR:

Archæological discoveries have established beyond all doubt the date of Narahari Tīrtha, the second disciple of Śrī Madhvācārya. Inscriptions relating to Naraharitīrtha ranging from 1186 Śaka to 1215 Śaka are found in the temple of Śrī Kūrma, in Chicacola and Simhachalam in Vizagapatam. Our author who was a contemporary of Narahari Tīrtha may therefore be safely placed between the first and the last quarters of the thirteenth century after Christ.

1. Prameyadipika (Belgaum Edition) Leaf No 41. 11. No. 3 (Prameyadipika .text).
2. Krisnacarya's Tippani on Prameyadipika (Belgaum Edition) first line of the forty-first leaf.
3. Bhavaratna Kosa of Sumatindra Svami (T. R. Krisnacarya's Edition)—Leaf No. 60, 11. No. 19.

(6) CRITICAL REMARKS:

If we now place the following first stanza of our palm-leaf manuscript work by the side of the following first verse of Prameyadīpikā, we can clearly see on which side the borrowing must have taken place.

The first stanza of our work.	*The first stanza of Prameya Dīpikā.*
गुणगणनिलयं प्रणम्य कृष्णां	**गुणगणनिलयं** पतिं रमायाः
जगदघदहनं च वासवीसूनुम् ॥	**जगदघदहनं च वासवीसूनुम्** ॥
गुरु**कुलतिलकं** सु**पूर्णबोधं**	मुनि**कुलतिलकं** च **पूर्णबोधं**
गुरुमपि वितृणोमि गीतिकाभाष्यम् ॥१॥	**गुरुमपि** परमं च मे वन्दे ॥१॥

The bold printed parts in the above two verses are common to both. Since the priority of our manuscript work is already established, we may unhesitatingly say that Ṭīkācārya is indebted to the author of the palm-leaf manuscript work for these common expressions.

It has already been indicated in the foregoing pages that Ṭīkācārya shows a very high regard for Padmanābha Tīrtha and in the first stanza of Prameyadīpikā also he offers his salutation to Padmanābha who is referred to here by the expression "परमगुरुं[1]" which means that Padmanābha Tīrtha is the guru of his own guru Akṣobhya. Though Akṣobya Tīrtha was a direct disciple of Śrī Madvācārya like Padmanābha Tīrtha he looked upon Padmanābha Tīrtha as his guru inasmuch as Śri Madhvācārya left Narahari Tīrtha, Mādhava Tīrtha and Akṣobhya Tīrtha to the care

1.—Srinivasa Tirtha's Tippani on Prameyadipika (Belgaum Edition.) Here the eighth line of the marked page of the sixth leaf and the first line of the unmarked page of the seventh leaf state as follows:—

परमगुरुं श्रीपद्मनाभतीर्थश्रीमच्चरणम् (Paramaguru, namely Padmanābhatīrtha).

of Padmanābha Tīrtha for instruction and guidance when he left Udīpi for Badarikāśrama for the last time. So, to all intents and puropses, Padmanābha Tīrtha may be regarded as the guru of Akṣobhya Tīrtha and the Paramaguru of Ṭīkācarya. Ṭīkācarya therefore offers his salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa first, then to Śrī Vedavyāsa, the author of all the Śāstras, then to the highest guru or the first guru Śrī Madhvācārya, then to his Paramaguru Padmanābha Tīrtha and lastly to his Sākṣādguru or direct preceptor Akṣobhyatīrtha.

In the course of his work Padmanābha Tīrtha very ably expounds and maintains the principal tenets of the Dvaita School summed up in the following verse:--

श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः सत्य जगत्तत्वतो
भेदो जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभावं गताः ॥
मुक्तिर्नैज (?) सुखानुभूतिरमलाभक्ति श्च तत्साधनं (?) ।
ह्यक्षादित्रितयं प्रमाणमखिलाम्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः[1] ॥१॥

(In the theology of Śrī Madvācārya Hari or Viṣṇu is the highest God, the universe is real, difference (between (i) God and the individual soul, (ii) soul and soul, (iii) God and matter, (iv) matter and matter, (v) matter and soul)[2] is real, the individual souls which entirely depend upon Viṣṇu (even for their existence) are graded as Superior and inferior,[3] emancipation is the experience of the natural bliss of the soul, pure devotion is the means to this end, perception, inference and word are proofs or sources of knowledge, Hari or Viṣṇu is the meaning of the Veda (and is knowable only by the Vedas).

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1. This verse is ascribed to Vyasaraya Svami by some and to Sripadaraja Svami by others
2. Mahabharatatatparyanirnaysa (T. R. Krishnacharya's Edition), first chapter, stanza No. 70.)
3. There are two classes of souls, viz. (i) Muktas (those who have gained liberation) (ii) Amuktas (those who have not gained it). These Amuktas are further sub divided into two classes: (i) those that are fit for emancipation ultimately, and (ii) those are not fit for it.

   Those that are not fit for release are classified as (i) नित्यसंसारिणः (those that are for ever bound in samsara, cycle of births and deaths) and ii) तमोयोग्याः those that are fit for eternal hell).

   Madhvaism states that something inherent in the soul accounts for its final destiny. This view of the Dvaita School relating to the classification of the souls has provoked a good deal of hostile criticism.

THE JAYAMAṄGALĀ AND OTHER COMMENTARIES ON THE SĀṂKHYA-SAPTATI OF ĪŚVARAKṚṢṆA.

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I

A number of commentaries under this name are available now. An attempt has been made in this paper to find out the author of Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṃkhyasaptati, and his approximate age, in the light of other Jayamaṅgalās, and other commentaries on Sāṃkhyasaptati.

The following works name their commentaries as Jayamaṅgalā.

(1) Sāṃkhyasaptati of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

(2) Kāmandaka's Nītisāra.

(3) Vātsyāyana's Kamasūtras.

(4) Bhaṭṭikāvya.

The Jayamaṅgalā is mentioned as the work of Śaṅkarācārya in its colophons. The colophons at the end of both the Mss. on which the edition of Jayamaṅgalā (Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 19) is based, read—

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीगोविन्दभगवत्पूज्यपादशिष्येण श्रीशङ्करभगवता कृता सांख्यसप्ततिटीका समाप्ता—क Ms. The ख Ms. differs from the above in reading परिव्राजाचार्य॰ instead of परिव्राजकाचार्य॰

The name of Śaṅkarācārya, along with that of his preceptor is, according to Paṇḍita Gopi Nāth Kavirāj,

1. Jayamangala without any other designation such as Kamandaka-Jayamangala or Vatsyayana-Jayamangala, will, throughout this paper, stand for the commentary on Samkhyasaptati.

the interpolation of a scribe, the commentary being perhaps from the pen of the great Buddhist commentator Śaṅkarācārya, who has commented upon Kāmandaka and Vātsyāyana The reason why Jayamaṅgalā is not from the pen of Śaṅkarācārya, is, according to P. Kavirāj, the careless slipshod style of Jayamaṅgalā which does not correspond to the depth, lucidity, terseness, learning and clarity which invariably characterise Śaṅkara's diction.

For assigning Jayamaṅgalā to Śaṅkarācārya, the learned Pandit bases his arguments on the similarity of the name to those of the commentaries on Kāmandaka and Vātsyāyana, and also on the fact that in the benedictory verse of Jayamaṅgalā, the two terms मुनिम् and लोकोत्तरवादिनम् prove the writer to be a Buddhist

The benedictory verses of the lifferent Jayamaṅgalās are as follows—

अधिगततत्त्वालोकं लोकोत्तरवादिनं प्रणम्य मुनिम् ।
क्रियते सप्ततिकायाष्टीका जयमङ्गला नाम ॥

(Sāṇkhyasaptati).

कामन्दकीये किल नीतिशास्त्रे प्रायेण नास्मिन् सुगमाः पदार्थाः ।
तस्माद् विधास्ये जयमङ्गलाख्यां टीकामहं सर्वविदं प्रणम्य ॥

(Kāmandaka).

वात्स्यायनीयं किल कामसूत्रं प्रस्तावितं कैश्चिदिहान्यथैव ।
तस्माद् विधास्ये जयमङ्गलाख्यां टीकामहं सर्वविदं प्रणम्य ॥

(Vātsyāyana).

प्रणिपत्य सकलवेदिनमतिदुस्तरभाट्टिकाव्यसलिलनिधेः ।
जयमङ्गलेति नाम्ना नौकेव विरच्यते टीका ॥

(Bhaṭṭikāvya).

Now the comparison of the second and third verse clearly shows them to be from one pen. Not only the metre, but the second half of the verses are identical. It has been suggested that the phrase सर्वविदं प्रणम्य is an obei-

sance to Buddha, for सर्वविद्-सर्वज्ञ-बुद्ध cf. सर्वज्ञः सुगतो बुद्धः (Amarakośa). But let us examine here the different senses in which this term is used in Kośas and literature.

The term सर्वज्ञ is used for Śiva also.

cf. कृशानुरेताः सर्वज्ञः Amarakośa.

सर्वज्ञनाट्यप्रियखण्डपर्शवो .... हरः

Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, 198.

सर्वज्ञस्तु जिनेन्द्रे स्यात् सुगते शङ्करेऽपि च ।

Anekārthasamgraha, III. 140.

Halāyudha also (I. 11.) gives सर्वज्ञ as a name of Śiva

शिवबुद्धौ तु सर्वज्ञौ दोषज्ञा वेद्यवित्खलाः

Maṅkhakośa, 155.

The supreme Brahman Brahmā, Īśvara, Svayambhū are also called सर्वविद् or सर्वज्ञ Compare—

य: सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ।
तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते ॥

Muṇḍaka Up I. 1. 19.)

स विश्वकृद् विश्वविदात्मयोनिर्ज्ञः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद् यः ।

(Śvet. Up. VI. 16.)

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता (Sāmkhya Sūtra, 3. 56.)

सर्वज्ञमनन्तमीडे (Bhāg. Pur. VI. 4. 25.) of Brahmā—सर्वज्ञ सकलेश्वर (ibid, II. 5. 8.) तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम् (Yoga Sūtra, I. 25).

The benedictory verse of Bhaṭṭi Jayamaṅgalā is in Āryā metre, and has also the term सकलवेदिनम्, which is equivalent to सर्वज्ञ and therefore, refers to बुद्ध, or शिव or जिन In the beginning of the commentary (Nirṇaya Sāgara Edn.) we find two formulas—

देवं नन्दनन्दनं वन्दे and ओं नमः सिद्धम् while the first is an obeisance to Kṛṣṇa, the second is the Sanskritised form of the Jaina formula: ओं णमो सिद्धाणम् ।

So, on the basis of the term सकलवेदिनम् shall we conclude

that the author is a Budhist or a Jaina ? But the evidence of the colophon at the end of the commentary on Bhaṭṭi goes quite against it. There, the author is described as a resident of Vallabhī, a high-born Brahmin, son of Śrī Svāmin, a great grammarian and known by three names— Jaṭīśvara, Jayadeva and Jayamaṅgala. Therefore, the term सर्ववेद (and also सकलवेदिनं) cannot indicate that the author is a Buddhist

The two terms which make us suspect the author of Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṃkhyasaptati as a Buddist, are मुनि and लोकोत्तरवादिन्. Well, मुनि is not an exclusive title of Buddha; for it has been applied to Kapila by Iśvarakṛṣṇa himself. cf. मुनिरासुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ । kār. 70.

In the Bhagavadgītā also we find—

सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः ॥ X. 26.

Therefore, this term does not help us much. As for the term लोकोत्तरवादी P. Kavirāj says that it is the name of a school of Hīnayāna Buddhism. But it is interesting to compare the following verses from the Mahābhārata in this connection. In the Śāntiparvan, chapter 320, we find Bhīṣma explaining 'what is Sāṃkhya' to Yudhiṣṭhira—

मोक्षे हि त्रिविधा निष्ठा दृष्टान्यैर्मोक्षवित्तमैः ।
ज्ञानं **लोकोत्तरं** यच्च सर्वत्यागश्च कर्मणाम् ॥३८॥
ज्ञाननिष्ठां वदन्त्यन्ये मोक्षशास्त्रविदो जनाः ।
कर्मनिष्ठां तथैवान्ये यतयः सूक्ष्मदर्शिनः ॥३९॥
प्रहायोभयमप्येवं ज्ञानं कर्म च केवलम् ।
तृतीयेयं समाख्याता निष्ठा तेन महात्मना ॥४०॥

In the light of these verses, we ought to explain the term लोकोत्तरवादिनम् as **लोकोत्तरं** यत् ज्ञानं तस्य वादिनम्. It, therefore, refers to Kapila मुनि who teaches the ज्ञानं लोकोत्तरम्. It is quite impossible that लोकोत्तरवादिनं मुनिम should refer to Buddha.

The Lokottaravādins are a school of the Hīnayāna. They are so called, because they believe that Buddha was

no human being, but "above the world" (लोकोत्तर), who for a time adapted himself to worldly life. In the Mahāvastu, which is a Hīnayāna work, it is said (I 159, 2) that the Buddhas have nothing in common with the world, but everything with them is above the world, *e. g.*, they wash their feet though they are not soiled by dust, they take food though they never feel hunger etc. It is clear that one cannot call Buddha himself लोकोत्तरवादिनं मुनिम्, that (if it did refer to Buddhism at all, which I believe is not the case) it could only mean *a Buddhist of the Lokottaravāda school af the Hīnayāna.*

Therefore it is quite evident that the author of Jayamaṅgalā is not a Buddhist.

In order to establish the identity and age of the author of Jayamaṅgalā it is essential to compare it with the other commentaries or Sāṃkhyakārikā.

II

The commentaries available on Sāṃkhya kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa are—

माठरवृत्ति, जयमङ्गला, तत्त्वकौमुदी, गौडपादभाष्य and चन्द्रिका

A perusal of these will show that there are many quotations, which are common to all. At first sight this might throw us in a confusion as to the priority or posterity of one to the other. But careful study throws some light on this question. As to माठर and गौडपाद the problem is practically settled. Not only the verbatim agreement between the two, but the fact (as shown below) that गौडपाद, at several places quotes wrongly from माठर, makes us entirely agree with the following remark of P. Viṣṇu Prasāda Śarmā, the editor of माठरवृत्ति [Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series].

'यत्तु सांख्यसप्तत्या गौडपादीयं भाष्यं ('बनारस-संस्कृतसीरीजाख्यग्रन्थमालायां मुद्रितम्) तत्तु माठरवृत्त्याः केनचित् कृतः संक्षेप इति भाति । नहि परकृतेः सक्षेपकृत्त्वं श्रीशङ्कराचार्यपरमगुरुषु गौडपादेषु सम्भवति । अस्य च उत्तरगीताव्याख्यायाश्च प्रणेता कश्चिदपरो गौडपादः संभाव्यते ।

(Introduction).

The following few instances will make clear what has been said before.

गौडपाद on kār 27, (Wilson's Edn., P. 130), says—

अथैतानीन्द्रियाणि भिन्नानि भिन्नार्थग्राहकाणि किमीश्वरेणोत स्वभावेन कृतानि यतः प्रधान-बुद्धयहंकारा अचेतनाः पुरुषोऽप्यकर्तेत्यत्राह—इह सांख्यानां स्वभावो नाम कश्चित् कारणमस्ति । and further अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण नाहङ्कारेण न प्रधानेन न पुरुषेण स्वभावात् कृतगुण-परिणामेनेति[1] ॥

माठर on this very point says—अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण न बुद्धया ना-हङ्कारेण न प्रधानेन न पुरुषेण न स्वभावेन कृतम्. गुणपरिणामेनेति ,……एवमिन्द्रियाणां निक्षेपः पुरुषेण वा कृत ईश्वरेण वा स्वभावेनेति अत्रोच्यते इह सांख्ये पुरुषेश्वरस्वभावा न कारणम् ।।[2].

Another instance is the following quotation in गौडपादभाष्य, on kār. 61. अजो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मा नः सुखदुःखयोः ।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं नरकमेव वा ॥

Mahābhārata III. 30-88.

The first line seems to be wrongly quoted from माठरवृत्ति, where it reads—अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।

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1. I think we ought to read कृतंगुणपरिणामेनेति ।

2. While as गौडपाद will have स्वभाव as the कारण to नानात्व, माठर will not accept स्वभाव as a cause. Wilson translates स्वभावात् कृतं गुणपरिणा मेनेति—'but from the modification of qualities produced by spontaneity'. But in order to have this meaning the phrase ought to have been—स्वभावकृतगुणपरिणामेनेति; for स्वभावात् being outside the compound cannot be grammatically joined to कृतगुणपरिणामेनेति । Therefore, the reading was perhaps न स्वभावात्, कृतं गुणपरिणामेनेति And the phrase इह सांख्यानां स्वभावो नाम कश्चित् कारणमस्ति, it seems to be an interpolation, as it disagrees with the remark of गौडपाद himself on kar. 61, where he says सर्वकर्तृत्वात् कालस्यापि प्रधानमेव कारणम् । स्वभावोऽप्यत्रैव लीनः । तस्मात् कालो न कारणम् नापि स्वभाव इति ॥

A third instance is the quotation कालः पचाति भूतानि in गौडपाद on kār. 61, the correct form of which in माठरवृत्ति is—कालः सृजति भूतानि। That Nārāyaṇatīrtha's चन्द्रिका also is but a summary of Vācaspatimiśra's तत्त्वकौमुदी, is a fact which needs no proof. Therefore, we are left face to face with माठरवृत्ति, जयमङ्गला and तत्त्वकौमुदी

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1. It will be interesting to say here something about the lost Karika of Isvarakrsna. B G. Tilak in his गीतारहस्य (p 163, Hindi Edn.), says that there must have been a Karika after the 61st, which refuted the views of other people. This is based on श्वेताश्वतर उपनिषद्,

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ।
देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम् ॥

Therefore, according to him the lost Karika would read.

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

When Tilak wrote this, माठरवृत्ति was not published. But now after its publication we have to revise this lost Karika. माठर says – इह सांख्ये पुरुषेश्वरस्वभावा न कारणम् जयमङ्गला also puts forth these very alternatives of पुरुष, ईश्वर or स्वभाव माठर however, adds काल as another possible alternative. To me it seems that this discussion is based not only on the verse of Svet. up, but also on the following verse from Naradaparivrajakopanisad (Minor Upanisads, Ed by Schrader, p 214.)

कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।
संयोग एषां न त्वात्मभावादात्मा ह्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ॥

[It will be seen that even the line of the Mahabh., *viz* –अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः, is based on the latter half of this verse] While Svet. Up. maintains स्वभाव and काल it ignores पुरुष, and the Naradapari. Up. mentions पुरुष but leaves out ईश्वर. If the lost Karika is to be supplied on the basis of गौडपादभाष्य (or now on the basis of माठरवृत्ति then it must mention पुरुष also. So the amended reading according to me will be—

कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च॥

i. e. I shall read पुरुष in place of ब्रुवते

As to the age of माठरवृत्ति. there is a very great anomaly. The editor of माठरवृत्ति opines that माठर is not a proper name, but a family name, as the न्यायभाष्य by पक्षिलस्वामिन् is commonly called as वात्स्यायनभाष्य. According to Mr. Rāmakṛṣṇa Kavi, माठर was according to Itsing a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa. The date of Aśvaghoṣa is also indefinite. If we take it to be, say, first century A. D., then माठर may be safely assigned to that period. This is further borne out by the fact that the अनुयोगद्वारसूत्र of the Jains, which preserves a list of the Brahmanical works, contains the names of कनगसत्तरि, कविलयं, and मट्ठितन्तं and माढरम्. Now, if the date of the अनुयोगद्वारसूत्र in its present form be 100 A. D., then माठर can be safely put in the first century A. D. The editor of माठरवृत्ति remarks that according to oriental scholars, eastern as well as western, this माठरवृत्ति, along with the text of the kārikā, was translated into Chinese by परमार्थ between 557-569 A. D. But Tilak differs from this (Sanskrit Research, p 108,. Therefore this वृत्ति cannot be later than 394 A. D.[1] He further remrks "In the वृत्ति on kārikā 39, we find 'यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ' a quotation from the हस्तामलकस्तोत्र, which is contemporaneous with the first Śaṅkara. Therefore, this and such others instances as 'अहङ्कारे ऽधयं ब्रते' etc., which favour the advaita philosophy, must be regarded as interpolations by the scholars who stand for the antiquity of the माठरवृत्ति"

So there are conflicting opinions as to the age of माठर— some placing him in the first century A. D., some in the

1. But Keith says—S. K. Belvalkar (Bhandarkar commemoration Volume pp. 171 ff.) argues that the original of Chinese version was the Mathara Vatt which he is editing, but this cannot be proved as derivation from a common source which is still equally probable. " The Saṅkhya system," p. 70. fn.

4th century A. D., and the others in the eighth century A. D. But more light is needed to solve this problem, before anything can be said definitely.

The agreement of जयमङ्गला with माठरवृत्ति at several places mean either जयमङ्गला borrowing from माठर or the latter from जयमङ्गला. The detailed study of जयमङ्गला shows that the author is quite expert in, and fond of quoting from Pāṇini's grammar. *e. g.* अन्योऽन्यजननाः। जनयन्तीति जननाः। 'कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्' इति कर्तरि ल्युट्। अनेकार्थत्वात धातूनां बोधनार्थाः द्रष्टव्याः। अन्योऽन्यस्य प्रबोधका इत्यर्थः (P. 17, ll. 5–7).

तस्य दुःखत्रयस्यावघातकस्तदवघातकः। तृजकाभ्यां षष्ठीसमासप्रतिषेधः. 'तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्च' इति न भवति। (P. 2, ll 4—5).

Although Vācaspatimiśra also indulges in grammatical explanations, but not so often.

Again the author of जयमङ्गला quotes from व्यासभाष्य on योगसूत्र of पतञ्जलि. He calls it सांख्यप्रवचन. The following quotation may be compared—

यथोक्तं सांख्यप्रवचने 'अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः' 'शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधाननियमाः' इति। तत्र सन्तोषः संनिहितसाधनाभ्याशादधिकस्यानुपादित्सा; तपो जिघत्सापिपासाशीतोष्णस्थानसाधनजपः काष्ठमौनाकारमौने, व्रतानि च कृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणादीनि। स्वाध्यायो मोक्षशास्त्राध्ययनं प्रणवजपो वा। ईश्वरप्रणिधानं विशिष्टदेवताराधनम्। (जय० P. 31, ll. 7 ff. with—

शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः। तत्र शौचं मृज्जलादिजनितं मेध्याभ्यवहरणादि च बाह्यम्। आभ्यन्तरं चित्तमलानामाक्षालनम्। संतोषः संनिहितसाधनादधिकस्यानुपादित्सा। तपो द्वन्द्वसहनम्। द्वन्द्वं च जिघत्सापिपासे शीतोष्णे स्थानासने काष्ठमौनाकारमौने च। व्रतानि चैषां यथायोगं कृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणसान्तापनादीनि। स्वाध्यायो मोक्षशास्त्राणामध्ययनं प्रणवजपो वा। ईश्वरप्रणिधानं तस्मिन् परमगुरौ सर्वकर्मार्पणम्। (व्यासभाष्य on योगसूत्र II. 32.)

Although माठर also quotes from the योगसूत्र of पतञ्जलि, but he never quotes from व्यासभाष्य.

Again 'पञ्च विपर्ययभेदाः' इत्यादि। अज्ञानाख्यस्य सर्गस्य भेदा पञ्च। तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रोऽन्धतामिस्रश्चेति। एत एव सांख्यप्रवचने क्लेशा उच्यन्ते। 'अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः' इति। तत्राविद्याक्षेत्र मुत्तरेषाम्—(जय० P. 50. ll. 9 ff.) may be compared with—

अथ के क्लेशाः कियन्तो वेति। अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः। क्लेशा इति पञ्च विपर्यया इत्यर्थः (व्यासभाष्य-यो. सू. II.3) and अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम्, the next Sūtra.

तम इत्यविद्योच्यते। सा चोत्तरेषां प्रसवभूमिः (जय० P. 51., L. I.)
अविद्याक्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसवभूमिः (व्या०, भा०, यो. सू. II., 4.)

सुखानुशयो रागो महामोह इत्युच्यते of जय० (P. 51, 48) and दुःखानुशयो द्वेषस्तामिस्र इत्युच्यते (ibid l. 12) seem to be incorrect reading for the योगसूत्र—

सुखानुशयी राग. and दुःखानुशयी द्वेष (II, 7 and 8). The quotation —गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति।

यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायावस्तु (तन्मायेव सु०) तुच्छकम् 'इति of जय० (P. 63, ll. 3 and 4) is found also in व्यासभाष्य, यो० सू० IV. 13[1]. This shows the fondness of our author of quoting from व्यासभाष्य. Moreover, he seems to have had some other commentary of Sāṃkhyakārikā before him. Compare—

अस्मिन् व्याख्याने 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैव
सिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते। यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम् etc.

०, P. 21 l. 21 ff.

and अन्यस्त्वाह—'अविभागे वैश्वरूप्यस्य' (ibid. P. 22, ll. 11 ff.)

Now these alternative explanations referred to by the word अन्य are not at all traceable. Not only these explanations are not found in माठर, or तत्त्वकौमुदी,, but even the reading

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1. In तत्त्ववैशारदी Vacaspati attributes this quotation to षष्टितन्त्र In भामती on ब्रह्मसूत्र, II, 13., Vacaspati quotes it and attributes it to वार्षगण्य

अविभागे for अविभागात् in the text of the kārikā is untraceable. But this alone does not prove anything as to the priority of जयमङ्गला to माठर. There is a very striking passage in माठरवृत्ति Viz.

यथा–कस्यचिद्वैराग्यमस्ति (जितेन्द्रियो विषयेभ्यो विरक्तो **न यमनियमपरः केवलम्**) Kār. 45[1]

Compare it with जयमङ्गला—

'वैराग्यात्' इत्यादि । यो विषयादिदर्शनाद्विरक्तो यमनियमपरिस्थितो, न ज्ञानं पर्यैषते etc.
[P. 48, ll. 21 and 22.]

Does it not look as if माठर were criticising the view of जयमङ्गला? While there is no passage or line which might show that the author of जयमङ्गला is cognisant of the माठरवृत्ति, the line quoted above is a striking proof of माठरवृत्ति having जयमङ्गला before it. Therefore, the verbal agreement between these commentaries rather tends to prove the priority of जयमङ्गला to माठरवृत्ति. than otherwise. There is another fact strengthening their conclusion. According to जयमङ्गला, the reading of the text of kār. 26, ought to be—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वग्रसनानासिकाख्यानि ।[2]

On this जयमङ्गला notes शब्दवशादत्राक्रमः कृत. । क्रमंस्तु श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुरिति । माठर reads in the text of the Kārikā—

श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुरसननासिकाख्यानि

Although it might be said here that the reading in the text need not necessarily be that of the commentator, for it is not quoted as प्रतीक in the Vṛtti, but still the explanation—श्रोत्रादीनि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणीति उच्यन्ते । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धान् बुध्यन्त इति बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि,

1. I do not understand why the editor has put this sentence in a parenthesis.
2. The reading in the text of the edition, viz.— चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि, is based upon the edition of Dr. Jha.

leaves no doubt as to the order of the text. Can we not say that in view of the fact that this reading is not found in any of the editions or Mss., it is adopted by माठर after reading शब्दवशादत्राक्रमः कृतः of जयमङ्गला ?

The next question of vital importance is—who is this Śaṅkara? Is he the same as the author of the Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtras? As has already been pointed out by Pandit Kavirāj in his introduction to जयमङ्गला, the identity of the two is very doubtful. Let us also examine the following quotations from जयमङ्गला on kār. 17.

तत्र सिद्धे पुंसि विवादाः । एक एवायं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषु स्थित इत्येके । सर्वे काया उपनताने-कात्मानः सात्मकत्वात् योगिशरीरवृन्दवत् प्रतिशरीरमनेकः पुरुष इत्यपरं ; एक एव पुराणः पुरुषः, तस्मादग्नेरिव विष्फुलिङ्गाः प्रतिशरीरं पुरुषा आविर्भूता इति वेदान्तवादिनः ।

Further on, in the concluding portion of जयमङ्गला on kār. 18, we read—

'पुराणपुरुषादग्नेरिव विष्फुलिङ्गाः प्रतिशरीरं पुरुषाः' इत्यस्मिन्नपि दर्शने पुरुषबहुत्वमस्त्येव । तेषां परस्परविलक्षणत्वात् ते पुराणपुरुषादभिन्ना भिन्ना वेति दर्शनद्वयम् । तदन्यत्र विचारितत्वादिह ग्रन्थ गौरवभयात् नोपन्यस्तमस्माभिरिति ।

As the word अन्यत्र denotes, there must have been some other work composed by our author.

But compare it with—

तदेतत सत्यम्—यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकात् विस्फुलिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः ।
तथाक्षरात् विविधाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापि यान्ति ॥

(Muṇḍ. Up. II. 1.)

On this शङ्करभाष्य—is ---

यथा सुदीप्तात् सुष्ठु दीप्तादग्नेर्विस्फुलिङ्गा अग्न्यवयवाः सहस्रशोऽनेकशः प्रभवन्ते निर्गच्छन्ति सरूपा अग्निसलक्षणा एव तथोक्तलक्षणादक्षराद्विविधा नानादेहोपाधिभेदं मनुविधीयमानत्वात् विविधाः, हे सोम्य भावा जीवो आकाशादिवत् विविधाः, हे सोम्य भावा जीवा आकाशादिवत् घटादिपरिच्छिन्नाः सुषिरभेदा घटाद्युपाधिप्रभेदमनुभवन्ति ।

The comparison shows that जयमङ्गला refers to this portion of शाङ्करभाष्य by the term वेदान्तवादिनः. Therefore, this शङ्कराचार्य of जयमङ्गला is not only different from the great Acārya, but is later than him.

Now, when we compare Vācaspati's तत्त्वकौमुदी with जयमङ्गला, we find many instances where both agree. A few of such instances are given here—

यथान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पाते कृष्णसर्पसन्दर्शने युगपदालोचनाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पनानि भवन्ति ।

(जय० P. 37 ll. 4, 5.)

यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पातमात्राद् व्याघ्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्यालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भवन्ति । (तत्त्व० on kār., 30.)

प्रसवो धर्मोऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि । (जय० P. 14, l. 20)

प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सोऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि—(तत्त्व० kār. 11.)

प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमुत्पादितत्वात् (जय० kār. 30)

प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकैकमुत्पादितम् (तत्त्व० *Ibid.*)

शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशमेकगुणम् । शब्दतन्मात्रप्रतिसंहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रात् द्विगुणो वायुः । ताभ्यां प्रतिसंहिताद्रूपतन्मात्रात् त्रिगुणं तेजः । तैः प्रतिसंहितात् चतुर्गुणा आपः । चतुर्भिः प्रतिसंहितात् गन्धतन्मात्रात् पञ्चगुणा पृथिवीति । (जय०—kār. 22.)

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम् । शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रात् वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहितात् रूपतन्मात्रात् तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रसहितात् रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहितात् गन्धतन्मात्रात् शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी जायत इत्यर्थः । (तत्त्व० kār. 22.)

एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वं पारार्थ्यं चेति प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वमकर्तृत्वं बहुत्वं चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य अस्तित्वं योगो वियोगश्चेत्युभयमधिकृत्य । स्थितिर्स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ जय०—kār. 51.

एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वं पारार्थ्यं च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वमकर्तृत्वं बहुत्वं चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अस्तित्वं योगो वियोगश्चेत्युभयमधिकृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ।

(तत्त्व० kār. 72.)

The agreement at several places is so very striking that we are obliged to conclude that one of the two authors has utilised or seen the commentary of the other. But who is

earlier and who is later? At first instance, one is disinclined to believe that the scholar of Vācaspati's cadre could utilise or borrow from जयमङ्गला. Several people are of opinion that जयमङ्गला must have used Vācaspati's तत्त्वकौमुदी. But the comparison made above is not sufficient or adequate enough to warrant this conclusion. Therefore, we have to find out some other deciding factor. The following instance is very interesting and useful to compare in this connection ——Vācaspati on kārikā 51, says –

अन्ये व्याचक्षते—'विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भवीयाभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं यत् सा सिद्धिरूहः **यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः शब्दः,** शब्दपाठादनन्तरं भावात्। **यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते साऽध्ययनहेतुका सिद्धि** रध्ययनम्। **सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति। यस्याधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ज्ञानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः। दानंच सिद्धिहेतुः, धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानं प्रयच्छति**'' अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतं परदोषोद्भावनेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति॥

Here, this criticism by Vācaspati presupposes some commentary. In माठर or गौडपाद, we do not find anything to correspond. But compare जयमङ्गला—

ऊह इति। जन्मान्तरसंस्कृतधियो यस्य बन्धमोक्षकारणमुत्प्रेक्षमाणस्य प्रधानपुरुषान्तरज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्य सिद्धिरूहहेतुका प्रथमा तारमित्युच्यते। **यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञान मुत्पद्यते, सा सिद्धिः शब्दहेतुका** द्वितीया सुतारमित्युच्यते। **यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन सांख्यशास्त्रं शब्दतोऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्याध्ययनहेतुका** .... **।सुहृत्प्राप्तिः इति। योऽधिगततत्त्वः सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमधिगच्छति तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिपूर्विका।** ...... **दानं च सिद्धिहेतुः। दानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानं प्रयच्छति।**

The comparison will show that while the phrases in bold type above are identical, the remaining portion also is the same in trend.

It is absolutely clear that Vācaspati is here criticising जयमङ्गला.

The fact, that the following quotation from विज्ञानभिक्षु also agrees in sense, proves nothing.

ऊहो यथा । उपदेशं विना प्राग्भवीयाभ्यासवशात् तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनमिति । शब्दस्तु यथा । अन्यदीयपाठमाकर्ण्य स्वयं वा शास्त्रमाकलय्य यज्ज्ञान जायते तदिति । अध्ययनं च यथा शिष्याचार्यभावेन शास्त्राध्ययनात् ज्ञानमिति । सुहृत्प्राप्तिर्यथा । स्वयमुपदेशार्थं गृहागतात् परमकारुणिकात् ज्ञानलाभ इति । दानं च यथा । धनादि दानेन परितोषितात् ज्ञानलाभ इति ॥

(विज्ञानभिक्षु on सांख्यसूत्र III. 44.)

It is quite clear that विज्ञानभिक्षु, who is much later than Vācaspati, and who flourished in the middle of the 16th century A. D. cannot be the target of Vācaspati's attack Moreover, the agreement between Vijñānabhikṣu and Vācaspati is not so striking as between Vācaspati and जयमङ्गला.

So that, it may be safely asserted that the author of जयमङ्गला is earlier than Vācaspatimiśra and later than the great Śaṅkarācārya. According to Macdonell (History of Sanskrit Literature, P. 393) Vācaspati's age is about 1100 A D.[1] And the great Śaṅkarācārya cannot be placed later than the 8th century A. D. Therefore, our जयमङ्गला's Śaṅkara must have flourished about 1,000 A. D., or earlier. In this conclusion I am fully supported by Mr. M. Rāmakṛṣṇa kavi, who writing on Jayamaṅgalās in the October 1927 issue of the Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, says:—

'All these Jayamaṅgalās are extensively read and found in Malabar. To relieve the anxiety of some critics that

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1. But according to Keith, the time of Vacaspati is 9th century A. D. See J. R. A. S., 1914, p 1098.

the great Acārya should not be associated with the authorship of these commentaries under the same name, we have to search for anothor Śaṅkarācārya in Malabar who, besides being an author, must be a pupil of Govindabhagavatpāda. We shall try to find one to answer our purpose.

'In the commentary on Vātsyāyana one of the quotations—

(रक्तजा: कृपयः सूक्ष्मा:············यथावलम्, II. I., कामसूत्र)

is traced to Ratirahasya of Kokkoka, who belongs to the tenth century and in my opinion later than Sāṃkhya-bhikṣu, the author of Nāgara-sarvasva. Jayamaṅgalā on Vātsyāyana may therefore be assigned to some period later than 1000 A. D.'

Further on, according to Mr. Kavi, two more works of Śaṅkarācārya, pupil of Govindabhagavatpāda are found. One is a commentary called Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa (a MS. in the Government Oriental library, Madras) on Vyāsabhāṣya and the other called Bhāṣyapradīpa, a commentary on Śābara Bhāṣya. In one of the colophons of the latter, the scribe has written;—

पय्युरभगवत्पादविरचितम्

The MS. once belonged to the well known Payyur-Patteri of Malabar who flourished between 1,300 and 1,400 A. D., or even later. To this Payyur family belonged a great scholar called Parameśvara (परमेश्वर) who wrote commentaries on several works and who is the son of ऋषि and a pupil of Śaṅkarācārya.

इति श्रीमदृषिगौरीनन्दनश्रीमद्भवदासपितृव्यश्रीमच्छङ्करपूज्यपादशिष्यपरमेश्वरकृतौ स्वादितंकरण्या तृतीय: श्लोक: ।

This shows that Śaṅkara must have been one of Parameśvara's relatives and his tutor. For, in a work called Śivodaya, the author Vāsudeva, one of the eight brothers' of Parameśvara, describes his family and mentions Śaṅkara as one of his uncles.

"Thus Bhāṣyapradipa and Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa are decidedly the compositions of one and the same Śaṅkarācārya, who, as said by Vāsudeva was the pupil of Govindabhagavatpāda. We are inclined to think that all the Jayamaṅgalās must have been the productions of this Śaṅkara."[1]

The जयमङ्गला on Sāṃkhyasaptati, therefore, is earlier than Vācaspati, and if the existing माठरवृत्ति is not the genuine work of माठर (as there are reasons to suspect) then जयमङ्गला may be safely placed earlier than even the माठरवृत्ति.

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1. In the January 1928 issue of the Journal of the Oriental Research Madras, p. 94, it is mentioned by the editor that, 'Mr. Kavi says that all these authors are identical and that this Sankara lived about 1,400 A. D.'

This is a mistake. Mr. kavi mentions that the "MS. belonged to the well-known Payyur-Patteri who flourished between 1,300 and 1,400 A. D." That is 1,400 A. D. is the date of possessor of the MS., and not that of the author. Therefore, this Sankaracarya cannot be placed later than 1,000 A. D., or near about.

SPIRITUAL IMPLICATIONS OF MĀYĀVĀDA.

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Truth and Value.

Truth and value are the fundamental concepts in philosophy. Philosophers are at variance in fixing their primariness and derivativeness. Rationalists are anxious to derive value from truth, pragmatists, truth from value. Truth is the soul of science and philosophy, value, of morality and religion. In the history of philosophy the allegiance has not been made equally to the both and ever since the time of Plato the one or the other has been accentuated in importance. Kant makes the distinction clear and definite and lays more stress upon value and the primacy of will and since Kant philosophy has been eloquent about value concept. In the vitalistic, romantic, and pragmatic movement a well defined start has been given to religion which seeks no longer confirmation from reason but from suprasensuous revelation of life.

Value concept has revised the test of truth, truth is no longer sought in correspondence of assertions and facts or coherence of assertions themselves. It is sought in intuition and effects of life. There are intuitions of practical reason whereupon theoretic reason is not competent enough to pronounce a judgment and their truth or falsity is necessarily outside the province of theoretic reason and the conditions of its judgment.

This divergence between truth and value has been minimised by Prof. Alexander in his conception of Tertiary qualities. He regards truth, beauty and value as fundamentally of a similar nature arising out in experience through appreciation or valuation—"from apprehending

through appreciation a corresponding character in the object of our appreciation".

Appreciation puts the thing in a peculiar relation to the subject, without this relation appreciation has no meaning. Whatever may be the form of appreciation, it always demands certain adjustment of the object to the subject. The object by itself has no meaning, unless it is presented to the subject. By itself it is an existence without meaning, its appreciation or meaning is acquired in relation to a subject or a community of subjects. Royce also hints at this when he maintains that knowledge is essentially finding meaning. Meaning or appreciation gives truth or falsity, ugliness or beauty of a thing; and truth or falsity, beauty or ugliness of a thing are not to be regarded according to Prof. Alexander as quality of things, for things are neither true nor false in themselves – their truth or falsity rises in relations.

Relations of Truth and Relations of Value.

A truth-judgment is different from the assertion of "Is." "Is" expresses a fact, an existence, but does not make a judgment. It is a sensation or an affection or pure existence without a definite content or meaning. A truth-judgment is an assertion of meaning. It 'dissects to unite.'

A value-judgment presupposes this meaning but implies some thing more. It puts a value upon meaning which draws in the subject more prominently in it.

This prominence of the subject distinguishes a truth-judgment from a value-judgment. The subject is implied in truth-judgment, but the balance between the subject and the object is evenly maintained. The truth-judgment is expressive of relation between subject and object

and truth is that the object is more prominent in the truth-judgment than in the value-judgment, for though the meaning always demands a reference to the subject, still in the judgment the subject does not feel the object in personal touch. This subjective or personal touch becomes more prominent in value-judgment. There the self is more prominent, for it is anxious to see not only the meaning of the object in an order of relations but its value in the order. The moment the meaning has acquired this reference to the self, it has a new light. A new aspect is presented. The meaning is no longer confined to the object and its objective relations, but becomes directly related to the subject itself. This impress of the subject itself puts the thing in a new colour, as that which is sought to be enjoyed or gratified. Meaning and value are therefore not identical. That which has value has necessarily a meaning. But that which has a meaning has not always a value. Their universes are not identical. A dream has a meaning, but no value, a false appearance has a meaning, but no value. Value is therefore a category different from meaning, though both imply a subject-object reference and relation. The pragmatic test of truth is, therefore, short sighted in so far as it cannot include many references which have no value but have an appearance or meaning. To seek therefore truth in value would amount to forcibly limiting its scope and exclude many objects that have no claim to value though they have every claim to truth.

Similarly the identification of truth with meaning is necessarily restricting the sense of truth, for meaning is always in reference to the self and gives therefore a subjective touch to truth. Meaning is no doubt implied in

judgment. A judgment puts the object in a certain relation to the self and cannot have the detached vision of the object. Therefore, when the object makes an impression the mind becomes restive to put it in a category. And understanding gives the meaning. But it is not possible to avoid the subjective reference of meaning. It may be well said that the subjective reference does not stand in the way of correct apprehension or estimate of the object, but still it cannot be doubted that the judgment introduces an element which is entirely subjective and its estimate must be subject to conditions which at least do not allow to make the presentation of the thing as it is.

This limitation of human judgment makes the sense of truth as meaning certainly restricted. The Advaita Vedānta sees this difficulty and therefore maintains that the uniformity of meaning may make a presentation truth in epistemological sense. but it certainly takes away the objective sense of truth.

It, therefore, lays more stress upon the realistic sense of truth than the idealistic or the pragmatic sense and defines it as something which exists in itself apart from all subjective relations. Truth is. Knowledge does not make any difference in it. It is, no matter whether it is known or not known, its meaning understood or not understood. And in a sense, it can be said to have no meaning, for meaning is relative to a subject but truth transcends all relations. It allows no judgment, either of truth or falsity. Truth, as judgment, implies also falsity, and a judgment is true or false in reference to a certain universe of the subject. Falsity or truth is therefore of the meaning and not of the object. The object is what it is. It is neither true or false. It is what it is.

Being is, therefore, truth in the transcendent sense without any reference to anything. This realistic sense of truth is what commands the greatest attention of the Vendantist, for the limitation of truth to meaning has been the fruitful resource of a confusion between the absolute and the relative. The difficulty of man has been that he cannot transcend the limitations of relativistic consciousness and naturally takes the values or the meaning of the relative order to be absolute truth.

Vedānta draws a distinction between the absolulte and relative orders of existence, and maintains that even in relative order the truth of meaning is not uniform everywhere. An apparent meaning of a presentation is contradicted by another and meaning changes with the universes of discourse. The same appearance has different meanings in different universes. The meaning changes by position and sublation of the different aspects of the appearance. No meaning can be absolute meaning and the relative order, therefore, is subject to changes in significance and value.

Advaitism, therefore, concludes that the order of meaning and value can never be an order of absolute existence and whatever satisfaction it can give in the form of meaning and value cannot offer absolute satisfaction which is the demand of religious consciousness. Religious impelling is an impelling to bliss consequent upon the expanse of being and the two can be hardly separated. Worth or value has an intimate relation with truth or existence, and Vedānta places truth before value, for value does not exactly prove the truth of a thing, on the other hand, value is consequent on truth.

Value in relative order is associated with meaning and personality and is intimate with the creativeness of the

subject, but in the absolute existence value is associated with being, for a non-being can have no value. But, in the absolute, value has a sense of security of being but does not indicate an agreeable feeling or a gratifying worth.

Even in the relative order value presupposes truth, a false concept or precept can have a seeming value, but when it is sublated its value vanishes. The pragmatic affirmation that value proves truth is a wide hit. It demands the prospect of value eslablishing the truth of false percept. Truth is, therfore, the fundamental concept and Māyāvāda points out that value or worth of moral and religious consciousness does not establish their absolute truth.

This should make clear that when Vedānta puts down Ānanda or Bliss as the quest of spiritual life it does not take it to man an agreeable consciousness or a fruition of an urge, but the supreme fact of an undivided being and an integral consciousness,

Vedānta draws a distinction between worth or value as an object of pursuit and fruition and worth and value of supreme existence. The former is the search of exoteric consciousness, the latter, of esoteric consciousness.

Value as Bliss.

Value in the latter sense has the import of blissful conscicusness. Religious consciousness is associated with bliss, for if the spiritual life has an attraction it chiefly lies in the promise of a continued blissful consciousness. Vedānta declares that spiritual-life is more a being than realisation, it is not necessarily a seeking. A seeking and an evolution, however high, are a move of life and con-

sciousness, but a move is consistent with finite urges but cannot be true of spiritual fulfilment. Spiritual fulfilment cannot be a constant growth, for it still smacks of limitation and cannot give us absolute security and peace.

Forms of Spiritual Consciousness.

Vedānta, therefore, recognises two forms of spiritual consciousness (1) absolute and
(2) concrete.

The absolute is true spiritual existence in the sense of an undivided bliss and being. Absoluteness is blissfulness. Any division is opposed to it and denies bliss in the sense of supreme existence. The concrete spiritual life is the seeking of bliss as value, as an agreeable consciousness, arising from the quickening of the divided life and being.

Religion in the ordinary sense of seeking an agreeable consciousness which is the value of religious life is an oscillation of the dynamic being in man, but even in this oscillaton and pursuit the end is not fellowship with a community of spirit, as theists claim, but the gradual assimilation of the dynamic divine in man.

The falsity of vision, the creation of Māyā, is sought to be got over not only in the transcendent consciousness but also in the immanent, for Māyā creates a division where there is none, and the religious life must be bent upon removing the sense of divison even in immanent consciousness for the divison is illusory, identity, truth.

In the relative consciousness the division is inherent and it sounds illogical to lay stress upon the removal of division in the sphere of relative existence.

But here lies the true significance of Vedānta as a system of spiritual discipline, for, even if the relative

order is full of divisions, erected by ignorance, the dawn of knowledge even in the rudimentary state will realise that this division is not absolute and the elasticity of life and consciousness can dispense with them. The distinctions of the relative order which realistic consciousness accepts as almost rigid, the more elastic dynamic being regards as temporary and creations of the crude ignorance.

Vedānta, therefore, even in the concrete spiritual life tries to get over the distinctions of rude ingorance by annuling the epistemological divisions of realistic consciousness and cultivating the sense of identity with the dynamic divine. This assimilation of the dynamic divine off puts the sense of division of the humanistic consciousness and relative order does no longer appear as fixed up in eternal divisions.

Concrete Spiritual Life.

In the concrete spiritual life Māyāvāda does not lay so much stress upon the reception of the spiritual felicities and their gratifications in theistic spirit, but seeks to transcend them in the assimilation of the dynamic divine in the finite itself. The value or worth here is sought not in the gratification or possession of possibilities, however high, but in the security of being in the assimilation of the infinite. Māyāvāda does not accept an absolute distinction between the infinite and the finite even in immanence, and therefore, its spiritual outlook in concrete life is not confined to the enjoyment of the divine life. Spiritual life is opposed to life of division and is directed to the removal and final destruction of ignorance.

But in the concrete spiritual life the final destruction of ignorance is neither possible nor aimed at, for Māyā is both creative and enfolding and this enfolding functions in

the primary and secondary way. Primarily it hides the absolute identity, secondarily it creates a division between Īśvara and Jīva, the finite and the infinite. The concrete spiritual life seeks to throw away this secondary division by gradually assimilating the infinite in the finite. As already said before the distinction is not absolutely fixed. Māyāvāda offers elasticity of being to Jīva. The finitude of Jīva in Māyāvāda is the finitude of Upādhi. It is the limitation of radiation but not the limitation of being. And since the distinction of being or of power is not absolute in Māyāvāda, the limitation can be set aside by spiritual culture. In fact Spiritual Culture in concrete life is the shuffling of this limitation and the growth and absorption of more power and being.

This attempt, therefore, is essentially to establish an identity between the dynamic divine and the finite self, for the more the identity is established by the removal of the impulsion of the finite consciousness, the more is there the access of powers, and expansive radiation of the dynamic divine.

Aham Graha Upāsanā.

Aham Graha Upāsanā is, therefore, an important state in the spiritual life, in so far as it helps to lay aside the sense of division between the worshipper and the worshipped. Worship is essentially an attempt to feel the divine presence. In Māyāvāda it is more. It is the assimilation of the infinite. And this becomes possible when the worshipper sacrifices the delights of fellowship to receive the greater delight of the expansive being. The more is the detachment to the joys of life, the more is the possibility of assimilating the dynamic divine. The immediate effect is the equilibrium of the dynamic being.

This equilibrium is the cause and the effect of greater penetration and assimilation. This identification, therefore, is a great achievement in so far as it destroyes the distinction between the finite and the infinite and allows the finite to realise that the finitude can be occasionally overcome, if not completely destroyed.

Spiritual assent, therefore, implies the tearing of the concentration of being and the progressive expression of diffusion. The finite centres then display uncommon power and energies, for they have now under control the dynamism of Māyā. This control puts the soul in the convenient position of a creative and productive centre. It attains Īśvarahood, or, more properly, the restricted consciousness of Jīva dies out and the more the elastic consciousness of Īśvara has its play. Īśvara becomes active, Jīva is overshadowed. The more the impelling proceeds from the dynamic divine, the more is the freedom.

Aham Graha Upāsanā has direct effect of establishing identity between the dynamic being of Jīva and Īśvara. It obliterates the difference between the two by silencing the native impelling of Jīva and by opening the cosmic impelling. It does not magnify the human existence. It drops from the veil between the finite and the infinite and makes the infinite more consciously active in man.

But the progressive spiritual ascent does not rest here, for the concentration is still assertive and the limitation of consciousness and power is still active. The concrete divine still suffers this limitation, though it is widely radiative. But radiation still bespeaks of a limitation even if it is all inclusive and all embracive. It means reference to a

centre and spreading out in all directions. Even when the radiation is all inclusive it cannot help presupposing a radiating centre and an influence. This mutual implication of accentralisation and radiation bespeaks of a limitation of the dynamic divine.

Māyāvāda, therefore, proceeds a step further and seeks to transcend all limitation. Here the search is no longer religious but becomes essentially philosophic. It requires a deeper penetration to see through the urges of dynamic and to transcend them in the quiet of being.

The spiritual ascent has therefore here the second and the final movement, not in the sense of further assimilation of divine but in the sense of breaking the initial ignorance which makes the absolute appear as the concrete infinite.

This removal of primary ignorance does not lie in the further expansion of being, for, rightly understood, the absolute being has neither expansion nor contraction, nor is it the absolute expanse. These terms can be, at best, an inadequate expression of absolute. The absolute cannot be categorically defined and spiritually speaking, it is reached when the human consciousness has the conviction that no difference ever exists in the basic being.

There is difference, then, between the final removal of ignorace and its partial tearing in Aham Graha Upāsanā. The latter removes the limitation of power, the former the limitation of being. No doubt, with the removal of the limitation of power, the being feels its expansiveness frequently, if not always, but still, this is not expanse of being in the absolute sense.

Tattvamasi.

Tattvamasi has, therefore, two implications, (1) it may

magnify the finite self and this magnification is a finer move of psychic consciousness and is a direct path to the wider vision and subtler move of being;

(2) or it may cultivate the transcendent consciousness by the complete detachment from the dynamic move of being, however fine, subtle and graceful. It always directs the attention to the truth of indentity and finally breaks the spell of Māyā.

The former energises the finite consciousness. The latter removes the veil and brings the history of life to a final close.

The former makes it possible to realise the ideality of space and time by removing the realistic division, and establishing the elasticity of being, the latter soars in transcendence by the complete realisation of their negation in the absolute and illusorines of the drama of cosmic existence. The former does not kill Māyā, it accepts it and energises it. The latter kills it. The former accepts it as the principle of becoming, the latter, as illusion.

Unless the ascent has been right upto the summit, spiritual life has not that challenge to the order of Māyā which can set aside the happiness and the miseries of divided existence.

Vedantism is eloquent, that a God cannot satisfy, far less can save man, unless man be spiritually bold enough to give up the clinging to the personal self, its delights and privileges for the truth of identity. The dance of life with its charms and delights, with all its fascinations cannot compare to the quiet of transcendence. Indentity gives the freedom of being.

Though the final consummation is reached in the direct knowledge of identity, yet the force and value of Aham Graha Upāsanā cannot be denied in spiritual life. The direct ascent to and the realisation of the identity is a possibility with the few, for the denial of the world order as illusory presupposes an idealistic sense of it, and this idealistic sense is actually realised in the soarings of consciousness in the dynamic divine. There alone a sense of an independent and a creative world disappears, and the truth of "esse is percipii" is fully realised.

Such an elasticity of the dynamic being is a greet asset and, naturally, the soul feels an attraction and a 'clinging to this possibility of divine self and would be unwilling to part with the ease and freedom of such an existence unless the Sākṣī-consciousness is there to help the final liberation.

Sākṣī.

Sākṣī is the consciousness indifferent to the functioning of the dynamic self and is equally present in each centre of consciousness, Jiva or Īśvara. The expansive dynamic life is to be crossed before the final consummation can be reached.

This expansive consiousness has this significance in it that it suffers from no crude impelling and in it the self enjoys the quiet af a fuller being which makes it convenient for it to reach the final distinction between the transcendent intuition and the conerete spiritual life. In fact it soon comes to feel that imminence is not so much real as the transcendence and in the transcendence all distinctions of radiation, influence and centre die out naturally. The idea and necessity of an all-inclusive absolute is relative to Māyā and before the absolute point of existence can be reached, it is necessary to break the charm of an all inclusive absolute.

It is necessary therefore to rise above the sense of distinction to get to the absolute intuition, and this helped by the clear perception of difference between the Sākṣī consciousness and the dynamic divine.

Should it be pointed out here that this expansion in dynamic being and consciousness is not an absolute necessity to the realisation of the transcendent intuition and the human consciousness without Aham Graha Upāsanā can, at once, go deeper and break the veil of the primary ignorance, for Sākṣī is equally manifest in Jiva as well as Īśavara. Nothing can cover it. If the dynamic being be free from the crude impelling of the lower self and calms down, Sākṣī becomes self-luminous. It is not necessary to develop the dynamic being by the heightening of consciousness by a meditative effort.

Be it noted that whatever be the method of approach Māyāvāda finally lays stress upon the clear analytic penetration into the degrees of existence, and unless the seeker is equipped with their knowledge, it has every chance of losing itself in the finer oscillation of being.

And, therefore, towards the final realisation the assimilation of a more expansive being is not so much a help as the clear sense of difference between the degrees of existences and intellectual boldness to leave the lower existences aside and seek identity.

The process of assimilation is not so much a help to liberation as the clear sense of difference between the transcendent and other phases of existence and the effort for a fixation in the former and a denial of the latter.

This, indeed, sounds strange and involves a strain of imagination, for delight is sought in the finer move of

life. But spiritual evolutiou has to be distingulished from final emancipation. Evolu ion is a fine display of divided existence but not of the absolute. In the absolute, life has neither play nor history, though it thereby suffers no disadvantage, no limitation. Māyāvāda denies, in the highest from of spiritual realisation, the delights of the finer possibilities of life, but, in so doing, it is anxious to confer on the seeker the deeper privilege of wisdom and freedom.

Fine Arts Section.

NOTES ON HINDU PAINTING.

By N. C. Mehta, M.A., I.C.S., Azamgarh, U. P.

It must be frankly acknowledged that Indian painting is ancillary even in its highest flights to architecture and in the matter of its achievements ranks after architecture and sculpture. The period of its greatest development may be said to have been over with the death of Harṣa. The frescoes of Ajanta, Bāgh and Sittānavāsalam illustrate the high watermark of Indian painting. The intervening centuries between the passing away of Anaṅga Harṣa (as the emperor appears to have been known a little later), and the accession of Jalaldin Akbar have left but little except a few Gujarati, Nepalese and Pāla MSS. and a good many literary references in works such as Bhavabhūti's Uttara Rāma Caritam, Somadevas' Kathā Sarit Sāgara, Dhaneśvara Muni's Surasundari Kathā and others. With the advent of the Moghuls the popular upheaval which was taking place throughout the country comes to a head and breaks out in that extraordinary resurgence which produced Tulsī, Sūr, Rahīm and the galaxy of other names known to all students of Indian history.

I do not, however, propose to go into the details of history. I want to confine myself to the consideration of some salient features of Hindu painting as exhibited in the centuries of its varied development. As one studies the growth of Hindu painting, one is especially struck by the extraordinary influence of and dependence on the theories enunciated by the rhetoricians from the time of Bharata onwards. Religion has been universally one of the principal sources of inspiration and subject-matter for arts; but nowhere has the maturity of the arts—sculp-

ture and painting in particular been so much dominated by the philosophers as with us. Coomarswamy is right when he says that 'the familiarity with gesture is a matter of scholarship rather than of happy inspiration; and this illustrates what the author of the Viṣṇudharmottaram has to say on the relationship of dancing (acting) and painting' (P. 90). What appears therefore to be the familiar features or unaccountable eccentricities of Hindu sculpture and painting are not fortuitous or the result of ignorance, stupidity or lack of accomplishment. They are the result of set pupose, age-long traditions and often of profound meaning. In fact, it is amazing the extent to which everything—every phase of development and even of novelty, is seen generally to conform to a Norm.

Hindu painting will be best understood if it is considered as only a different kind of medium for the expression of the various *Rasas*. The subject-matter of poetry and painting is the same. Love, legends and religion furnish the staple themes for both and consequently our poets and painters have to be judged—barring the inevitable differences due to their different media—according to the standards laid down by the writers of the Alaṅkāra-śāstras. The walls of Ajanta and Bāgh furnish a highly poetical version of the life of the Enlightened one and not infrequently the painted scenes tell the same tale as the Buddhacharitam of Aśva-ghoṣa with the same elaboration and colour, but only in a different medium. Naturalism or mere historical authenticity is obviously absent and in fact, quite alien to the very purpose and justification of such an art. When we look at the frescoes of

Ajanta and Bāgh, it is not the religion or the austerity of it which strikes us; it is the fulness of life with its varied tones and colours which the artists seem to have painted from the plenitude of their experience. They loved to tell the story, the various incidents of which no doubt lead up to the culmination--to the victory of the Blessed One over the forces of darkness. The moral is undoubtedly there, but it is served with an amazing richness of details and the very savour of life itself. The paintings are there, Taraṅgavatī, and Sura-Sundarī-Kathā written by Jain Sādhus, which but for the conclusion pointing to the creed of the Tīrthaṅkaras the only mode of salvation, are fascinating tales of adventures, love and romance. The Tamil classic Maṇimekhalai of about the 6th century is similar, though Buddhist in its inspiration.

The artists who have told the Jātakas by way of wall-painting, use a highly developed vocabulary of poses, gestures and colours, all of which have distinct meanings and unless these are studied and understood, the whole burden of these beautiful works is apt to be lost. It should perhaps be mentioned that this language of symbolism was not invented by the artists, but the rhetoricians and the writers of śilpa-śāstras. The love of analysis and classification is an inherent trait of our character and consequently every Rasa had its appropriate colour and deity as every melody had its proper time and season. Indian paintihg has not yet been studied from the point of view of the traditional significance of various colours and now for the chromatic restrictions have been actually observed in practice. There can be hewover no doubt that such a study is bound to yield interesting results, for nothing is more extraordinary than

the dominant influence that the alaṅkāra-śāstras and their theories have exercised for centuries on the development of poetry and painting. The classification of heroes and heroines is as old as the Nāṭya-śāstra of Bharata, but its greatest elaboration was reserved for the Hindi poets from the time of Keśavdāsa in the sixteenth century. Similarly the description of seasons is as old as the writing of the Mahākāvyas, but it was not until the end of the classical period and the beginning of the vernacular literatures in Northern India from the older Prakrits that the seasonal songs were enshrined in immortal ballads sung by men and women as *Mahinās* and *Bārāmāsā* songs. The renaissance which began at the end of the Hindu period and culminated during the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir was not primarily epic in character. It was chiefly lyrical and the only exception that one can think of is the immortal Rāmacarita-mānasa of Tulasīdāsa. Otherwise the character of the popular resurgence is well exemplified in the poems of Caṇḍīdāsa, Vidyāpati, Rahīm, Sūradāsa and countless others. The corresponding artistic phase is to be found in the architectural gems such as the tomb of Salim Chishti or the great Taj Mahal and the exquisite mosques of Agra and Delhi as in the paintings of the Gujarati school and the early Raginīs. The seasonal songs had taken root in Bengal and in Gujarat from as early as the 11th or the 12th century. Unlike the refined stanzas of the Sanskrit Kavyas these songs gave combined expression to the poetic and musical urge of the people. They represented in other words the fusion of poetry and music. With us, in fact there never has been such rigid separation between these two arts as in the west, but the relationship became closer with the advent of the vernacular literatures,—between poetry, painting and music.

This is a phase unique in the annals of painting. Seasonal pictures have been known in the West also, especially in the form of magnificent tapestries of the mediaeval period, but they are essentially statements of natural facts characteristic of the various seasons. They are poles apart from our lyrical Bārāmāsā pictures, which translate through the medium of lines and colours the life of love and poignant grief inevitable in that age of slow travel, which was recited in the beautiful verse of Kālidasa's Ṛtu-saṃhāra and in the haunting strains of popular songs of the mediæval period. This was a peculiar phase of the medieval period. Bārāmāsā songs were sung and painted. They probably gave impetus to the visualisation of Rāgas and Rāgiṇīs in terms of poetry and painting. The Rāga and Rāgiṇī pictures come into being about the commencement of the fifteenth century and in a way form a fascinating chapter in the history of Hindu painting. It should be noted that these melody pictures were painted and known only where the influence of Hindi poetry was especially powerful. Even there for instance in the courts of Kangra, Garhwal, Jammu and other hill states in the Punjab where Hindi literature and Hindu culture were patronised, Rāga and Rāgiṇī pictures never appear to have been in vogue. They were most cultivated at the Hindu courts of Bundelkhand and Rajputana. Moghal versions of these pictures with Persian inscriptions — generally translations of Hindi verses, as well as pictures painted in the Deccani style are also known. They are however utterly unknown to South India properly and there can be but little doubt that the whole conception of these musical pictures was an offshoot from the literature of Ṛitu-gīta and the Nāyaka-Nāyikā-bheda. While the prescriptions of time and season, for the singing of various tunes

are to be found in the earliest regular treatises on music, the growth of their literary corpus cannot be dated earlier than the fifteenth century; and it is worthy of notice that this was the creation primarily of the poets, who annexed the sphere of the musical art for the exercise of their ingenuity. Going carefully through a work such as the Rāga-Ratnākara by Deva one notices that one of the five wives (bhāryās) of all the six Rāgas is a Virahinī Nāyikā and leaving aside a couple of Rāgiṇīs of Rāga Bhairav the dominant note of all the literary elaborations of the various Rāgas is love described in detail by all Hindi poets who dealt with Ṛitu-gīta and Nāyaka-Nāyikā-bheda. The Hindi poets were not satisfied with the description of love as experienced in the six seasons, but some of them such as Deva essayed the task of spinning out situations for all the eight *praharas--aṣṭa-Yāma* of the day, as if life held nothing more important than the relationship of the sexes. Luckily the painters did not follow suit. They contented themselves with the translations of the verse into their own medium of significant lines and glowing colours. They took however good care to label their pictures by inscribing the appropriate literary compositions dealing with a particular Rāga at the top or sometimes on the reverse of the picture; for the painter did not always find it possible to conform to the detailed representation of literary prescriptions. It was not in fact possible, for notwithstanding the ingenuity and skill of the poets very few Rāgas acquired a new and distinct individuality from this extension of the old ideas. The delineations literary or graphic, of Rāga Megha were but the repetitions of the seasonal compositions dealing with the months of the monsoon. Raga Dīpaka was represented with lights all

round which it is said, are automatically lit if the Rāga is properly sung. The incongruity or the discomfort however of burning candles seems to have been hardly noticed, especially as Dīpaka is to be sung on a summer afternoon. While several of these melody pictures are generally beautiful *e.g.*, Ṭodī, Āsāvarī, Kakubha, Gaurī, Madhu-mādhavī and also more effective as a rule than the corresponding literary compositions, some of them are grotesque and inadequate. It is curious that the Jains who composed distinctive Bārāmāsā songs describing the love romance of Sthūlibhadra—a son of the chief minister of the ninth Nanda emperor with the courtezan Kośā or the tale of Nemināthа—the 22nd Tirthaṅkara and Rājimatī, though they do not seem to have become at all popular, did not cast the melody songs in a specifically Jain mould.

The Rāgamālā pictures were unfortunately evolved at a time when Indian music had already been cast into rigid forms and had ceased to progress. The court of Akbar rallied the finest musicians and painters in the country, but it was a period of brief though dazzling glory. The great popular upheaval had worked up to its nadir and the very brilliance of its achievements in the various fields was only a prelude to the decline which may be said to have been complete by the end of the 17th century. For once at any rate poetry, painting, music and dancing were so intimately interwoven that the intrinsic oneness of all art may be said to have been realised in visible form in a really good Rāgiṇī picture. The soul of the people was as it were keeping time with the rhythm of the universe. The splendour of the Imperial court of the Moghuls appears in harmony with the luxurious painting—

both Hindu and Moghul, and also the elaborate, highly artificial poetic compositions of the period The tone of this cultural efflorescence is unlike that of the Gupta renaissance, feminine and no wonder that the dominant note of the later Vaiṣṇavism was not the worship of the Bhāgavata—or the god Vāsudeva, but of Rādhā—the wife of Ayan Ghoṣa, as the mistress of Kṛṣṇa. It is therefore not surprising that post-Moghul painting—I am not at present considering the Moghul court art—the art of the chronicler and the portrait-painter, is especially lacking in the creation of great figures such as the Buddha, Sundara Mūrti or the Naṭarāja. Sculpture had already been dead in Northern India after the extinction of the Chandela dynasty in the 12th century. The noble but unequal monuments of Khajuraho were the last achievements of the Hindus in the north in the sphere of plastic art. In the south, however, the Hindu influence continued longer and good sculpture continued to be produced almost to the end of the 17th century. It is curious that with the exception of the Tanjore school—probably an imported off-shoot of the Maratha court at Poona, no school of painting has ever been known to have taken root in the Dakṣiṇāpatha—that land of great conceptions and monumental achievements.

The bulk of post-Moghul painting consists of miniatures, and as Coomarswamy has happily described the most popular and also pleasing phase of it: " But the great work of the (Kangra) school was to create a feminine type peculiar to itself and of infinite charm; not robust, like the Rajasthani types, but slender, and moving with an irresistible grace, intentionally accentuated by the long flowing lines of the drapery. Nothing indeed, is more

characteristic of the style than its use of flowing, unbroken lines, not ingeniously calligraphic like late Persian, nor boldly allusive like those of the early Rajasthani school, but creating a pure melody. The painter uses this flowing outline unwearyingly to define and repeat the forms to which he is attached; thus the aesthetic purity of the work is less than that of earlier schools, much less than that of the Gujarati manuscript illustrations, but the charm of the result is all compelling and almost personal like the grace of an individual woman The Kangra *qalm* is indeed a feminine art, contrasted with the masculine force of early Rāgamālās; intrinsically an art of sentiment, rather than of passion. The same quality appears in the colour, which is pure and cool; it is used in a quite different way, not to establish the planes but to fill in the areas defined by outline, so that we have to do now with coloured drawings rather than with paintings. And in fact many of the most charming work of the school are those unfinished pictures and sketches in which the figures are still represented in outline, only the colouring of background being partly completed". 'Thus in spirit Mughal painting is modern, Rajput still mediaeval'.

Poetry—lyrical poetry, is implicit in the productions of the Hindu school of painting, and the quality is so effectively and unconsciously fused with the subject-matter that it is unmistakeably even in the *genre* pictures dealing with the ordinary incidents of life.

The Hindu painter—the Pahārī artist in particular, is equally at home in telling the Purāṇic tales as in describing the homely scenes of daily life—bathing, dressing, talking, ending cattle, dancing, singing, cooking. He loved to

paint the scenes from his immediate life, sometimes directly and sometimes through the convenient symbolism of the Vaiṣṇavite worship.

The principal subject however which engaged him most, as also his fellow-worker—the poet, was love. According to the prescriptions of Sanskrit poetics the colour of Love is dark (*Nīla*) and its presiding deity is Viṣṇu. The dominance therefore of the themes of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā in poetry as well as painting is easily intelligible.

At best Hindu painting of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries is exquisite in its refinement almost feminine in its elegance and display of beautiful colours, supremely lyrical and wonderfully sensitive in its drawing. Mr. Laurence Binyon has rightly said that it " has all the charm of ballad-poetry—freshness, spontaneous sweetness, and an entire freedom from academic restrains and ambitions. It has also the corresponding weakness of a traditional art: it repeats itself a great deal; it grows thin with time and declines into pretttiness. It is of course limited in range, and lacks the grandeur and power of the earlier Buddhist schools, as seen in the frescoes of Bāgh and Ajanta. But it is always spontaneous and animated, and gives often a pleasure like that we have in hearing a clear vioce singing in the open air."

The miniature painting shows extraordinary resemblance to the style of singing which first came into being probably at the Moghul courts and subsequently became very popular among Musalmans in particular and in Northern India generally. ' This known as the *Ṭhumarī* style is of different from the older system of *Dhrupada* style—stately, serious and dignified, as the elegant minia-

tures with their slighter contents of Rāgas and Rāgiṇīs and the love episodes of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are from the epic style of the earlier fresco painting. The parallelism in the evolution of music, painting and poetry is extremely striking, and there can be but little doubt that it is not fortituitous but the result of a vital interdependence and innate relationship. It is curious to note that Samudragupta--the greatest of the Gupta emperors, is represented on his coins with a *vīṇā* in the hands; and *Vīṇā* is the earliest as well as the most complicated musical instrument. *Vīṇā* and *dhrupada* style of singing were as characteristic of the classical renaissance of the Gupta period as was the fresco painting of Ajanta and Bāgh. Everything in this case seems to have been pitched in the note of supreme self-confidence, grandeur and glory. Painting, poetry and sculpture—all struck the same note of perfect self-possession and the desire to express life as it was surveyed without reserve. An entire era of cultural evolution was rapidly reaching its climax and with the passing away of Harṣa we leave behind for ever an age of monumental conceptions and epic achievements. When the curtain is again raised after almost a millenium of discord and uncertainty, the scene is radically changed. *Vīṇā* is no longer the stately instrument which holds the place of honour in the royal orchestra; its place has been taken by *Sittār*, the pretty solo instrument invented by Amir Khushru and a host of beautiful but smaller substitutes. The exquisite *Sāraṅgī* supersedes the *Tambura* and becomes subsequently degraded to the level of an accompaniment only to the songs of courtezans. The *Dhrupada* style gives way to the prettier, emotional and theatrical displays of *ṭhumarī* and *khyāl*. In a sense the art of the court of Akbar

whether it be literature, architecture or painting, marks the high water-mark of a cultural resurgence which was gathering force during the preceding five centuries. The poetry of Tulasīdāsa, the architecture of Fatehpur Sikri and the vigour of early Moghul portraits represent the stage of highest perfection in their respective spheres and are profoundly different in character from the gorgeous, pretty, costly and feminine art of the reign of Shah Jahan.

It is but seldom that the emotional note is raised to the pitch of abstraction, of contemplation, as in the great picture of Rāsa-līlā probably by Sahibram whose signed and dated portrait of Maharaja Pratapsinha (Samvat 1851 = 1794 A. D.) had already been published in my Studies in Indian Painting and Mr. O. C. Gangoly's Masterpieces of Rajput painting. It may be said that the later Hindu painting in its lyrical and more sensuous form was cultivated at the courts of Kangra, Garhwal and other north Indian principalities; and if it had not the virility of the Kashmere School and the austerity, restraint and the severe rhythm of the Rajasthani painters, it had all the facility of the Bundela artists and a supreme grace and elegance of its own. Both its strength and weakness lay in its quality of feminine charm which rapidly degenerated in the absence of stricter discipline and discerning public into more prettiness in the second half of the 19th century.

MINIATURES OF A NEWLY-DISCOVERED BUDDHIST PALM-LEAF MANUSCRIPT FROM BENGAL.

By Ajit Ghose, M. A.

The illustrated palm-leaf Buddhist manuscripts are our earliest documents for the history of painting in India other than mural painting. They furnish a record of artistic activity spread over three centuries, from the ninth to the twelfth, of which scarcely any other materials, so far as graphic art is concerned, have survived. As Coomaraswamy[1] has remarked, "Their glowing colour and accomplished drawing lend to all these manuscripts a high aesthetic interest and their rarity a great historical value."

A systematic study of these precious documents is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the history of Indian art. The materials for such a study may be classified into:

(*a*) the manuscripts written in Bengal, and

(*b*) the manuscripts written in Nepal.

Except two manuscripts of minor aesthetic importance all these illustrated palm-leaf manuscripts are manuscripts of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā The manuscripts written in Bengal date from the ninth to the eleventh century; there are some manuscripts of even later date which were written in Nepal. The two best Nepal manuscripts, MS. 1643 of the Cambridge University and MS. A. 15 of the Asiatic Society of Bengal were, however, written in the beginning and towards the end of the 11th century respectively. From the known history of the more important of these illustrated plam-leaf manuscripts, it seems probable that those which were originally written in India

1. Coomaraswamy, A. K., Introduction to Indian Art, p. 110.

were carried away to Nepal when Buddhism spread into that country and all were thence brought to India during the last hundred years. One such manuscript of early, date and in which the miniatures on the palm-leaves are wonderfully well-preserved was secured in Nepal early in the present year and now forms one of the treasures of my collection. It is a manuscript of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā and is considered on palaeographical grounds to be of 9th—10th century date. It was written in Bengal, probably at Vikramsila, according to Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasad Shastri. The closest and parallel to it is a manuscript in the British Museum, Or. 6902, written at Vikramsila.

Writers on Indian art have so far either overlooked these most precious documents of art or have completely failed to do justice to them Foucher, in his iconographic study of Buddhism, was the first to make observations on their artistic qualities. He, however, was unable to approach the miniatures with that sympathy and reverence which is necessary to realise the pleasure which they inspire in lovers of art. With him it was a hopeless task to attempt to understand the spirit in which the miniatures were painted. His judgment is, in consequence, harsh and uncritical. He summarily disposes of their artistic claims thus: "En resume, nos miniatures, sans etre des chef-d'oeuvre, ne sont pas non plus de vulgaires bar-bouillages et ont ete desinees et peintes par des enlumineurs tres suffisamment maitres de leurs moyens. Dans toutes nous retrouvons les memes materiaux employes, les memes conventions acceptees, les memes procedes d'execution mis au service des memes sujets. Ni la difference d'age ni la diversite d'origine n'arrivent a modifier sensiblement leur

apparence generale. C'est assez dire que nous devans reconnaitre en elles les productions d'un art des longtemps stereotype."[1] Havell,[2] though he has referred to an early school of Nepalese painting, has made no mention even of either the Nepalese or the Bengal Palm-leaf manuscripts. Vincent Smith[3] refers to the miniatures in two Nepal manuscripts as "the only relics of an ancient school of Nepalese painting." He dismisses them as "not of much account" from "the purely aesthetic point of view," though "being plainly labelled, they are of high archaeological and historical importance," and he proceeds to deal with their technique, basing his observations entirely on Foucher's work. It is evident he had never taken the trouble to examine a single miniature. The importance of the palm-manuscripts in what he somewhat awkwardly called the continuity of pictorial tradition in India was emphasized for the first time by Vredenburg.[4] Recently Coomaraswamy[5] and Sawamura[6] have given references to some of the illustrated manuscripts but their lists are inadequate.

The outstanding manuscripts from the aesthetic point of view are (1) a manuscript, in the Boston Museum, (2) the manuscript in my collection, (3) a manuscript formerly in the possession of Vredenburg and (4) MS. A. 15 in the

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1. Foucher, A., Etude sur L'Iconographic Bouddhique de L'Inde 1900, I, pp. 36—37.

2. Havell, E.B., Indian Sculpture and Painting (1908), p. 79; 2nd edition, 1928, p. 77.

3. Smith, V. A,. History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, 1911, p. 324.

4. Vredenburg, E., The Continuity of Pictorial Tradition in Indian Art. Rupam, Nos. 1-2, 1920, pp. 7-11.

5. Coomaraswamy, A. K., Introduction to Indian Art 1923, p. 110, History of Indian and Indonesian Art, 1927, p. 141.

6. Sawamura, S., The miniature of a recently discovered Buddhistic Sanskrit Manuscript, Ostasiatische Zeitschrift, 1926 11, 119-123.

Asiatic Society of Bengal; of these the last is the only manuscript written in Nepal. Other palm-leaf manuscripts with miniatures are inferior in artistic interest to these four. It is true as Foucher has remarked that there are characteristics of technique and subject common to all these manuscripts but to say that, therefore, the miniatures are dull and monotonous is to exaggerate. The sameness in the subjects was to some extent inevitable in iconographical illustrations but the sameness in the general appearance points to, if anything, the high antiquity of this miniature art. In considering Foucher's opinion, it is well to bear in mind the observation of a very high authority on Byzantine art regarding 11th and 12th century (*i.e.*, contemporary to these palm-leaf manuscripts) Byzantine miniatures that in them: "Toutes les matrones ressemblent a Sainte Anne, les femmes jeunes a la vierge, les hommes a Saint Joseph".[1] We shall pass in silence over the poor technique of many of the contemporary miniaturists of Italy.[2]

I shall now briefly describe the general character of this miniature art basing my remarks mainly on my own manuscript. As Coomaraswamy[3] has stated with his usual clarity of expression, the miniatures are "not organically and decoratively associated with the script," they "occupy spaces left by the scribe to be filled by the painter." The size of the palm-leaves is 23″ × 2¾″ and each miniature measures about 2¾″ × 2½″. There are in all 20 miniatures. The painter expresses two widely differing ideals: on the one hand, he illustrates incidents in the life of Buddha; on

1. Diehl, C., L'Art Byzantin, I, pp 384–385.
2. Vide D'Ancona, P., La Miniature Italienne, 1925, p. 4.
3. Coomaraswamy, A.K., Introduction to Indian Art, pp. 110–11.

the other, he illustrates the numerous divinities of the later tāntric Buddhism which was then a living force.

The technique is calligraphic. The draughtsmanship is unusually strong and having regard to the material—fragile and soft palm-leaf—on which the drawing is made, the beauty of line and colour cannot but evoke our admiration. The forms are first drawn in outline and then filled in with washes of colour. The outline is then drawn in red for those figures which are coloured red, yellow or white, but in black for those the colour of which is green. In the drawing of the figures there is no disregard of scale. A very noticeable and general characteristic which has been pointed out by Vredenburg may be stated here. This is "the downward pointing angle in the middle of the upper eye-lid of several of the faces by means of which the downcast look is emphasized......... It is the form distinguished as "padmapalāśa".[1] Decorative settings taken from architecture such as the trefoil arch are made use of. The lotus rinceaux in such settings is worthy of mention. Geometric and animal motifs, such as the stag, is used as side decoration and at ends of chapters. The costumes and settings of the scenes give us an accurate and attractive picture of contemporary life and manners. The composition is in general excellent. The execution is as admirable as the draughtsmanship.

It is a moot question whether the colour has been laid on a prepared ground; it seems likely that it is so. Judging from the depth and purity and brilliance of the colours, they were not ordinarily mixed with white as in miniatures on paper of later times.

1. Vredenburg, E., Op. Cit., p. 10.

The colours used are mainly mineral. In my manuscript they are blue, red, yellow, black, white and green. Indigo does not appear to have been used by the painter of my manuscript; instead, he has used a delicate cobalt blue tint. In the Vredenburg manuscript an indigo blue is used. The pigments used by the miniaturists were orpiment for the yellow, cinnabar for the red and cobalt or indigo for the blue. Lapis lazuli appears to have been used in MS. A 15. According to Vredenburg, probably white lead was used for the white but this seems to be doubtful in as much as white lead would not lend itself to use in tempera work. Probably kaolin or chalk was used for the white. The black used is said to have been Indian ink. Indian red, ochres and ultramarine are not used Yellow is chiefly used for painting the faces of men though green and white are also used. These painters made wonderful pigments. They knew the secret of giving permanancy to fugitive colours, like orpiment and cinnabar, which are the despair of western artists. The freshness of the colours on the miniatures after the lapse of so many centuries is marvellous.

In the miniatures executed on the palm-leaves in my manuscript the drawing and colouring are alike exquisite. The faces have individuality and certainly are not lacking in expression while the poses are always gracious. The refined simplicity, dignity and restraint of the miniatures are beyond all praise. Such a scene as the death of Buddha marks the height which this unknown monk painter could achieve. The miniaturist's art could not go further without losing its proper outlook and aspiring to the dignity of mural painting as in some of the over-crowded scenes in MS. A 15. The qualities of strength in the drawing and the

calligraphic contour in such scenes as Buddha with his disciples are characteristics of the Bengal manuscripts only and of MS. A 15, which, though written in Nepal, is more akin to the Bengal than to the other Nepal manuscripts.

To conclude, these miniatures formed the artistic taste of their generation. From them we can form an idea of the greater art of mural painting which must have been in existence according to Taranath's statement. But while the comtemporary mural paintings have vanished, the miniatures of these precious manuscripts will always be treasured by every lover of art as imperishable things of beauty.

Appendix.

Bibliography of Illustrated Buddhist Palm-leaf Manuscripts.

The manuscripts may be classified into:

(1) those written in Bengal and

(2) those written in Nepal.

Only eight manuscripts are known definitely to have been written in Bengal. The two earliest are ninth-tenth century Mss.

Ninth-tenth century:

(1) A manuscript of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā in the Ghose collection ascribed to the ninth-tenth century on palaeographical grounds and probably written in the monastery of Vikramsila according to Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasad Shastri. It has twenty finely executed miniatures.

(II) Or. 6902. A manuscript of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā dated in the 15th year of the reign of

Gopala II of the Pala dynasty of Bengal written in the monastery of Vikramsila[1].

Four are eleventh century manuscripts:

(III) MS. Add. 1464 of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā in the University Library, Cambridge. It is "in excellent preservation, has several illustrations chiefly of Buddhas, showing various mudras, &c. both near the beginning and end of the MS."[2] and on the covers of wood. It is dated in the 5th year of Mahipala I[3], who reigned in the first part of the 11th century[4]. It has fifteen miniatures in the text and was probably written in Nalanda.

(IV) No. 4713. A manuscript of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā in the Government collection in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, copied in the 6th year of Mahipala I. It was acquired by Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasad Shastri. "It contains six illustrations in the first two and as many in the last two leaves."[5] This manuscript was written in Nalanda.

(V) MS. Add. 1688 of the Pañca rakṣa in the University Library, Cambridge, written in the 14th year of Nayapala, the son and successor of Mahipal I, and "copiously illustrated with figures of Buddhas, divinities and caityas".[6] It has 36 miniatures and there are elaborate patterns at the ends of chapters. The above three manuscripts Nos. III and V and No. 1 written in Nepal

1. J. R. A. S., 1910, pp 150–151; Ref., Banerjee, R.O., Palas of Bengal, p. 6.
2. Bendall, C., Cat., of the Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts in the University Library, Cambridge, 1883, p. 100.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Ramacarita by Sandhyakara Nandi, ed. M. H. P. Sastri, 1910.
5. Sastri, H. P., Descriptive Cat. of Sans. Mss., in the Government collection under the care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 1. pp. 1–2.
6. Bendall, C., Op., Cit., p. 100.

described below are the most valuable items in the collection made for the University Library, Cambridge, by Dr. Daniel Wright, formerly Surgeon to the British Residency at Khatmandu.

(VI) MS. of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, formerly in the collection of E. Vredenburg, written in the 39th year of Rāmapāla.[1]

Two are said to belong to the twefth century:—

(VII) No. 20. 589 MS. of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, copied probably in 1136 A. D., according to Dr. Coomaraswamy[2] but this is doubtful. The date in the colophon is the 4th year of Gopāladeva and this should be Gopāla II and not III. It has 18 miniatures in the text as well as miniatures on the covers.

(VIII) No. 9789 A. Damaged last leaf only of a MS. of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, copied in the 18th year of Govindapāladeva, also acquired by Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasad Shastri. It contains three illustrations of Tāntrika deities.[3]

Seven illustrated palm-leaf Buddhist manuscripts appear to have been written in Nepal, but none of a date earlier than the 11th century.

Of the eleventh century MSS.

(1) The earliest written in Nepal is MS. Add. 1643 of Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā in the University Library, Cambridge, dated in the Nepal year 135, corresponding to 1015 A. D., and secured in Nepal by Dr. Daniel Wright. It contains 85 miniatures.

1. Rupam. No. 1, 1920, p. 9.
2. Coomaraswamy, A. K., Introduction to Indian Art, p. 110, History of Indian and Indonesian Art. p. 141.
3. Shastri. Op. Cit., p. 6.

(2) The most important of the palm-leaf MSS., written in Nepal is MS. A. 15 of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā brought from Nepal by Brian Hodgson and now in the Asiatic Society of Bengal.[1] It was copied by the monk Kiraṇasiṃha in the convent of Kisa.................and completed in the year 191 in the reign of Śaṅkaradeva of the dynasty of the Nepal, corresponding to 1070-71 A. D. It has thirty-seven miniatures.

Twelfth century MSS:—

(3) Prof. Sawamura's manuscript of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā written according to him in Nepal and belonging to the 11th-12th century.[2]

(4) No. S. 268-1147-48 A. D., in the Government collection in the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The first two leaves contain four illustrations.[3]

(5) Or. 3345. A manuscript from Nepal of the end of the 12th century now in the British Museum of the same text.

(6-7). Two manuscripts of uncertain provenance. One formerly belonging to Sir. J. G. Woodroffe and now in the possession of G. N. Tagore is remarkable only for a painted cover. The manuscript is considered to be probably of 12th or 13 century.[4] The other manuscript belongs to Mr. Jackson Higgs of New York and like the preceding has later painted covers.[5] MS. Add. 1163 of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and a MS. of the Karaṇḍa Vyūha, both written in Nepal, are two other palm-leaf MSS. in Cambridge, the miniatures of which may be mentioned but they are of very minor importance.

1. Mitra, R. L., The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal, 188, p.
2. Ostasiatische Zeitschrift, 1926 pp.
3. Shastri, K. P., Op. Cit, p 3.
4. Coomaraswamy, A. K., History of Indian and Indonesian Art, p.
5. *Ibid.*

THE INDO-JAVANESE ART.

Gauranga Nath Banerjee.

The Colonisation of Java by the Hindus.

The Indian name of Java, known to the geographer Ptolemy as Iabadiu is a sufficient proof that the intercourse between India and the Indian Archipelago dates from at least 1st century A. D. The Rāmāyaṇa also mentions (iv. xi. 30) "Yava-dvīpa adorned by seven kingdoms, the gold and silver island, rich in silver mines." If we take the age of the Rāmāyaṇa at a modest computation at C. 1000 B. C. we find that the Indians of that age had an appreciable knowledge about the topography of the island. It is certain on definite historical knowledge that Indian civilisation had penetrated into the island long before the Chinese pilgrim Fa Hian visited the country in 412 A. D. Fa Hian stayed for five months in the country and recorded that "in Ye-po-ti (Java) various forms of error and Brahmanism are flourishing while Buddhism in it is not worth speaking of." Moreover the great majority of Buddhists who are mentioned in I-tsing's travels (A. D. 671) living in Java and the neighbouring islands belonged to the sect of Mūla-Sarvāstivādins. This sect belonged to the great division know under the name of Hīnayāna.

It is a matter of evidence that Buddhism must have been introduced into the Indian Archipelago long before the time of I-tsing and that the first propagandists belonged to one or more sects of the Northern Hīnayāna. Yet we find that in his days Mahāyānists were already making their appearance in Java and the adjacent islands. There is a notice in Tārānāth's History of Buddhism that the celebrated Māhāyānist Professor, Dharmapāla of the University of Nalanda went to Suvarṇa-dvīpa (Sumatra)

before the arrival of Hiuen Tsang. By the 8th century Mahāyāna gained a firm footing in Java. A Sanskrit inscription found between Kalasan and Prambanan, commemorates the erection of a statue and sanctuary of the goddess Aryā Tārā (the female counterpart of Avalokiteśvara) together with an abode for monks versed in the rules of discipline (Vinaya) of the Mahāyāna. The date of the inscription is C. 778 A. D.; the donor is a king of the Śailendra Dynasty. It is remarkable that the inscription shows a kind of writing usual in Northern India whereas most of the other Sankrit inscriptions in Java are in the common old Javanese characters which have their origin in Southern India. This inscription is therefore a sufficient proof that the Mahāyānists who enjoyed the king's favour came from Hindusthan proper. The remains of the sanctuary dedicated to Tārā have been recognised by Dr. Brandes as that of Chandi Kalasan.

All the splendid monuments of architecture and decorative art which arose in Java and the adjoining islands after the 8th century A. D. bear the unequivocal stamp of Mahāyānism. Though there are many masterpieces of Hindu art, devoted specially to Śaivism, the Dhyānibuddhas of Java exhibit Mahāyānistic character unmistakably as also their female counterpart, the Śaktis.

There are authentic records which show that Java was first colonised by the Hindus professing Brahmanical faiths and that the stream of colonisation flowed intermittently from the 1st century A. D. These Hindu colonists hailed from the different parts of India and about 78 A. D. one Aji Saka said to have led a batch of colonists from the Bombay Presidency. It should be noted, however, that by far the greatest number of colonists immigrated from

the South-Eastern coast of India from the Coromandel coast and from the banks of the Mahānadī and Godāvarī. It is tolerably certain, therefore, that the Javanese culture owes its origin to South-Indian Hinduism and there was a constant interchange of ideas and ideals between South India and Java from the 4th century onwards. Though we have evidence of Hindu culture as old as the first century B. C. in the island of Java itself, the actual remains there can be traced back only to the 5th century A. D. The rock-inscriptions near Batavia in western part of Java date from about 450 A. D. These inscriptions tell us of a king named Pūrṇavarman "the ruler of the town of Taruma." Perhaps this is the only inscription of an Indian king in the western portion of the Island, for all other records of Indian kings belong to the Eastern and Central Java.

The South-India Influence.

If we turn to the historical documents of Java, we find that the numerous inscriptions, though clearly testifying to the Indian influence by their language and script, hardly ever contain a faint allusion to the homeland from which that influence was derived. "Java possesses it is true" says Dr. Vogel in his Influences of Indian Art, "two ancient historical works written in the old Javanese or Kawi language, and of immense interest for local history and archæology." One of them, the "*Nagarakretāgama*" was discovered in 1894 by Dr. Brandes. This work gives an account of the dynasties which ruled Eastern Java in the 11th and 12th centuries. But it hardly contains any reference to India proper and is of no help whatever in elucidating the early relations between the Indian Continent and Java.

For our knowledge of these relations, we have to depend entirely on the evidence of the monumental remains of Java, supplemented to some extent by the information contained in the Imperial Records of China and in the itineraries of Chinese pilgrims. Earliest of these Chinese travellers, as we have already noticed, is Fa-Hian, who in the year 412 A. D. landed at this country on his voyage home from Ceylon. Though Fa-Hian's information regarding Java is exceedingly meagre, there is the historical fact that about 400 A.D., Indian civilisation was definitely established in the Archipelago and that this civilisation was Brahminical. The informations supplied by Fa-Hian and I-tsing are on the whole confirmed by native inscriptions. From these inscriptions it is evident that about the time of Fa-Hian's travels there existed in Eastern Borneo, a state ruled by a line of Hindu rājās, who bore the names ending in *Varman* such as Aśvavarman and Mūlavarman. These inscriptions, which are composed in plain but pure Sanskrit, record a Brahminical sacrifice offered up by the Brahminical priests [vide, J. Ph. Vogel.] [The Yupa Inscriptions of King Mūlavarman from Kotei (East Borneo)].

Now it is a point of special interest to note that all the early Sanskrit inscriptions of the Archipelago are written in a character which is unmistakably South Indian and which is practically identical with the early Grantha alphabet used in their inscriptions by the kings of the Pallava Dynasty. The Pallava kings held sway over the Coromandel coast for a period of nearly five centuries (300-800) A. D.) and have left us a lasting and brilliant memorial of their rule in the wonderful group of magnificent temples and sculptures in South India. These princes moreover have almost without exception, names ending in *Varman*—the same we meet

with in the royal names of Java and Borneo. It is also a noteworthy fact that the dated inscriptions of Java bear the Śaka era. Now this era, commencing from the year 78 A. D. is essentially the reckoning of Southern India, whereas the Vikrama era—which was in vogue in the North appears to have been unknown in the Archipelago. The Dinaya inscription for example, is dated in the Śaka year 682 (760 A. D.). It records the erection of an image of the Indian sage Agastya. Now, Agastya, is the Ṛṣi who is specially venerated in Southern India He is credited with having carried the torch of Brahminical civilisation across the Vindhya mountains into the Dakṣiṇāpatha. In all probability it was through the sea-faring population of the Tamil districts that the cult of Agastya was carried to Java. In this connection "it may also be remembered that in the Malay Archipelago, the immigrants from India proper are designated by the name of *Orang Keling* or *Kling* and this term is undoubtedly derived from Kalinga, the ancient name of the tribe inhabiting the east coast of India between the Mahānadī and the Godāvarī". The cumulative evidence which we have been able to adduce points to Southern India as the homeland of Indo-Javanese culture.

Hindu-Javanese Culture.

Among the islands of the Malay Archipelago it is in particular Java which in a large degree has been influenced by Indo-Aryan civilisation. Not content with holding sway over the whole of Indian Continent from the snowy Himalayas in the north to Cape Comorin in the extreme South, the mighty Indo-Aryans carried their culture across the sea to the shores of Farther India and the islands of the Malay Archipelago. We are gratified to see that in those distant lands races of entirely different ethnic stock assimilating thoroughly Indian

culture as it finds expression in its two great religions—Brahmanism and Buddhism, its two great epics the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, the Tripiṭakas and all that wealth of legendary lore which in the Indian homeland had been accumulating for many centuries.

Indo Javanese civilisation was by the 8th century A. D. a harmonised unity; but while the official cults were of Indian origin, the real basis of popular belief remained as it still remains animistic. The Brahamanism of the Javanese courts was throughout predominantly, though not exclusively Śaiva. No traces remain of an early Hīnayāna Budhism in Java. The Mahāyāna as a separate and integral cult belongs mainly to the period of Sumatran rule in Central Java; even at this time it is of a Tāntrika character, later it becomes increasingly so, and as in Nepal in Cambodia, and in Bali at the present day, Buddhism and Śaiva Hinduism are inseparably combined.

Although the inhabitants of Java were converted to Mohammedanism in the course of the fifteenth century A. D., Hinduism has left indelible traces on the social framework, on the language, manners and customs of the Javanese, which five centuries of Muslim ascendancy have not been able to destroy. There are a number of geographical names which retain the remembrance of that most brilliant period of Javanese history. The loftiest mountain-top of the island is known by the name of Semeru, in which we easily recognise the Indian Sumeru. Other Volcanoes bear the familiar names of Arjuna, Brahmā and so forth. The principal river of Central Java is the Serayū which takes its rise from the Southern slopes of Mount Prohu. Evidently the name Serayū is the Javanese form of Sanskrit Sarayū the ancient name of the Gogra, a tributary of the Ganges. Numerous other instances

could be quoted. Even at the present day the ruling chiefs, nobles and high functionaries of Java bear titles and proper names which have retained their ancient Sanskrit forms almost unchanged *e. g.*, rājā, prabu, bhupati, adipati, mantri &c. The Javanese language is as full of words of Sankrit origin as the English is of Roman words. Whatever literature there exists in that Kawi language is largely derived from Indian originals.

The Hindu influence which up to the present day it is possible to trace in many an aspect of Javanese life has found its grandest expression in those numerous monumental and sculptural remains with which the island of Java is studded. All those ancient sanctuaries of Brahmanism and Buddhism are now in more or less ruined condition, due not to vandalism or iconoclasm but to long centuries of indifference and neglect. Mr. Vincent Smith surmises that "the colonisation of Java was probably a sequence of the final collapse of the Saka power in India at the beginning of the fifth century A. D., when the Saka kingdom of Sourasthra or Kathiawar was conquered by Chandragupta II". After that Brahmanism supplanted Buddhism as the principal state religion of India. The Buddhist art traditions first went with the Śaka immigrants into Java, where they reached their highest expression in the magnificent sculptures of Borobudur.

The legendary Aji Saka from whom the Buddhist rulers of Java claimed descent was probably a Prince of the Śakas or Indo-Scythians who invaded the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom of Gāndhāra between 140 and 130 B. C. and founded a dynasty there. Being expelled from that country by fresh hordes of nomads, the Śakas entered India and founded a kingdom in the peninsula of Kathiawar which gradually extended over a great part of the adjacent country. "These facts explain the affinities of the art

of Borobudur and Prambanam with the art of India. The Śakas in their migration to India had passed through the Gāndhāra region and their empire in India embraced or was contiguous to the great art-centres of Elephanta, Ajanta and Ellora." (*Vide* Havell, *Indian Sculpture and Painting*, p. 112.)

Borobudur— "The Parthenon of Asia".

Candi Borobudur with the related and contemporary Candi Mendut and Candi Pawan in Kedu, is the greatest and by far the most celebrated of Javanese monuments. The grandeur of the Borobudur is something immense, sphinx-like, incomprehensible and yet so fascinating. It overpowers us with a sense of our incapacity to give an adequate description of it, its enigmas are too many and too great for us to solve, and yet it exercises such a powerful charm over us, lays such hold on the mind that we are irresistibly compelled to use all our powers to discover something of its mysterious being. "The temple here", writes Hoepermans in 1866, "this splendid work of art, the glory of old Java, stands in its grey antiquity loaded with images and festoons; built up in storeys and galleries, representing the whole life and acts of Buddha in carved reliefs; the magnificence, the great skill, the genius, the conception, all that was in and around this great Temple is far beyond imagination; no wonder it draws people from all parts of the world to see it. Lovers of art and antiquity will find all they want in the study of this old religion portrayed so vividly and in so many forms; those who know the arts must exclaim "O Javans of the ages, what mighty artists you were!".

Its Location.

It has often been remarked that the founders of the Hindu-Javan temples bestowed great care on the choice of a site for their erection and

generally succeeded in laying hands on most beautiful positions. This is particularly noticeable of the Borobudur. The whole architecture is wonderfully situated in the Kedu plain, surrounded by a decorative circle of mountains. It commands an extensive view of green rice fields and more distant towering conical volcanoes, comparable in grandeur with Fujison. A line of smoke shows that the Minoreh Mountains are still active, yet the peaks, with their brown, grey and green colouring, fading at evening to blue, lend a peaceful aspect to the panorama, softening the grandeur of the mighty Borobudur, throned on wide plain and guarded by the mountains. Architecturally it must have towered above all the mass of sacred buildings and temples on the plain. The fertile plain of Kedu with the surrounding country was one of the great centres of Hindu-Javan community. On the hill Wukir, east of Borobudur rose the old Śiva-temple, where king Sañjaya according to his inscription of 732 A. D., caused a *liṅga* to be established and in that year there already long existed the principal sanctuary of Java that was brought over from the fatherland Kūnjarakūnja in South India. Around this on all sides grouped themselves in numbers buildings dedicated to Brahmanism or Buddhism.

Borobudur—a unique monument of the Buddhist faith.

From an architectural point of view, Borobudur is unlike any other monument of the period. A rounded hill has been terraced and clothed with stone; the result is a truncated, terraced pyramid supporting a relatively small central stūpa surrounded by seventy-two much smaller perforated stūpas arranged in three concentric circles; a stairway in the middle of each side of the pyramid leads directly to the upper platforms with the stūpas.

Whether the Borobudur was originally built to enshrine holy relics or whether it was raised to commemorate some real or legendary event in the history of Buddhism we do not know. But manifestly the great monument of Java belongs to the most typical class of Buddhist buildings which originally served the purpose of relic-shrines and which are indicated by the Sanskrit terms, *stūpa, caitya* or *dhatūgarbha* (modern dagoba). As such Borobudur is undoubtedely a remote descendant of those early *stūpas* of Central India—the *stūpas* of Bhārūt or Sāñci. But no other edifice exactly of the same type is found on the Indian continent nor, we must add anywhere in the Malay Archipelago. The Borobudur may indeed be called unique. The whole of this great building from the basement to the seventh storey is adorned with a series of wonderful sculptures and bas-reliefs, extending in the aggregate over a length of three miles and expounding in ordered sequence the history, mythology and philosophy of the Buddhist faith. For the devout Buddhist pilgrims, who paced along these sculptured galleries they were illustrated scriptures, which even the most ignorant could read, telling in living words the life-story and message of the great Master. Because each of the lower terraces is a perambulation gallery, whose walls are occupied by a long series of reliefs, depicting the life of Buddha according to the Lalita Vistāra and stories from the Divyāvadāna. Jātakamālā of Sūra, and the Candavyūha and other sources Unique as the Borobudur may be called architecturally, its rich sculptural decoration, too, is unsurpassed by anything found in India proper. It is not only due to the wonderful vastness and excellence of those hundreds of panels which adorn the walls and balustrades of the four long passages, through which the faithful, ascending from terrace to terrace performed the solemn perambulation of

the sacred edifice in stone. It is above all the spirit of supreme repose, of serene calmness pervading them in which the Buddhist religious ideal finds so eloquent an expression.

Borobudur and the Parthenon—a comparison.

The Parthenon of Asia, Mr. Havell has called it, and as regards height of artistic inspiration and skilful execution, it may well be placed on a par with the famous shrine of the Akropolis. But what an enormous difference in religious conception separates these two masterpieces of art. In the friezes of Parthenon, all is activity, in the sculptures of Borobudur all is repose. "To compare them with Parthenaic frieze of the Parthenon", Mr. Havell wisely remarks, "would serve no useful purpose, though as artistic achievements of the highest class, the best Borobudur sculptures would not suffer by the comparison. There is little kinship between the academic refinement of the Parthenon sculptures and this supremely devout and spontaneous art as there is between Indian and Hellenic religious thought. They are much more closely allied in feeling and expression to the sculptures of Donatello and those of the best Italian masters of the 14th and 15th centuries. A very near parallel may be found in the celebrated bronze doors of the Baptistry of Florence by Lorenzo Ghiberti, one of the great masters of Italian art" (*vide* Indian sculpture and Painting, pp. 116—117). The Borobudur sculptors with much deeper reverence and less self-consciousness, show conclusively that art is greater than artifice. The very simplicity and unaffected naivete of their style are much more impressive and convincing than the elaborate efforts of an Italian master, who with all his wonderful technique is far behind in imagination and artistic feeling. The artists who conceived these sculptures were not aiming at

the applause of their fellow-men, but were trying to tell the story of the Great Master in the way they conceived. They had told it, offering their labour and skill as a devout gift to his shrine.

The date of its erection.

No record of the foundation of the Borobudur has yet been discovered, nor is mention made of it in any other inscription. We must specially note the last statement, as it appears that an unwarrantable conjecture based on a mistaken interpretation has existed until 1910 in Ferguson's History of Indian and Eastern Architecture. A Sumatra inscription discovered in 1856 by Friederich was supposed to bear the date 656 Śaka (A. D. 734) and to mention the construction of a Vihara, seven-storeys in height and this was taken to be Borobudur. In 1875, Prof. Heinrich Kern was able to prove conclusively that this statement was founded on a mistake and that the inscription mentioned, a stone from Bukit Combah is in reality dated, 1356. By that, any possibility that it can refer to Borobudur is lost, because of the fact that four centuries must have elapsed before that date and the Central-Java period of the Hindu-Javanese art had already come to an end. Besides one glance at the transcription (as interpreted by Dr. Brandes) is enough to convince us that the Vihara of seven storeys mentioned in the Sumatran inscription, referred to a Sumatran and not to a Javanese temple. Javanese traditions such as given in the native chronicles were aware of the building of Borobudur but they first mention the sanctuary in 1710 A. D. The Borobudur, however, was never hidden from view to the point of blotting out its existence from memory. The natives knew of the existence of the Chendi Borobudur long before

Cornelius' discoveries in 1814 or rather that they never lost sight of it and the place it occupies in the Javanese chronicles appears from the *Babad Tanah Java* (commented upon by Dr. Brandes in Het Tejdschrift Voor Indische Taal-Land-en Volken Kunde). Taking into account all the palæographic and epigraphic evidence, Prof. Krom comes to the conclusion that the great monument must have been completed by the 2nd half of the 8th century A. D.

So the date of the monument can only be inferred from the stylistic and palæographic evidence. The latter indicates a date certainly between 760 and 878 A. D., probably between 760 and 847 A. D. and most likely in the latter part of the eighth century. The style of the reliefs suggests rather the eighth century. "Its erection" says Prof. Krom, "may reasonably be brought into connection with the kingdom of the Śailendra's that flourished in Middle Java about 750—850, but for the rest both inscriptions and traditions have nothing to tell about it." This is not surprising for, though the sanctuary as the largest and most important of the Buddhist foundations and as the spiritual centre of the Mahāyāna Buddhism in Java, will have played the most important part in its religious life, it is not very likely that important events should have taken place within it or near it. During the later century and a half of the Middle-Java period, the stūpa must have stood in its place, undisturbed, the object of the pious adoration of thousands of devotees. Only in fancy can we picture in our mind how the mighty temple silently watched the generations come and go, receiving the homage of all those Java Kings of whom we know hardly anything but their names, from Śailendra probably till King Tulodong, the last monarch whom we may presume

to have reigned over Middle-Java. With the fall of the last Middle-Java kingdom, which we know from inscriptions as the kingdom of Mataram, the decline of Borobudur must have begun. If we know more of the causes which brought about the ruin of this monarchy, the fate of the many sanctuaries would be revealed to us. Now we can know nothing but the one fact that in a very short space of time the apparently flourishing Central-Java kingdom fell into decay and East-Java became the central seat of Hindu-Javanese culture. But the history of this transition is still obscure.

The etymology of the name Borobudur.

The word war waged around the etymology of the name Borobudur did not solve the mystery of its origin; all derivations thus far suggested are mere guess-work and unsatisfactory, whatever reasons be adduced for Roorda van Eysinga's explanation that it means an enclosed space or Raffles' surmise that it is a corruption of Bara (the great) Buddha or the late king of Siam's that it refers to the spiritual army of the Buddha, if not to the several Buddhas, as alleged by others. How the sanctuary was known in the old Javan period is entirely unrecorded, none of the inscriptions give us the least indication. The name appears for the first time in 1710 in the *Babad Tanah Java* in exactly the same form now used by the Javanese; the curious variations Borobodo, Borubudur and such, have all been invented by the Western scholars. Von Humboldt joins in the criticism of Raffles' conjectures; and though he considers the transition from Buddha to Budar not altogether improbable, nevertheless he thinks it very unlikely because in Java itself, the word Buddha as "old" is pronounced correctly (*vide*

uber die Kawi-Sprache auf der Insel Java). Altogether different is the explanation of the Javanese authority Winter. Borobudur would singnify, (according to Winter) may be with reference to the images of that temple, a gigantic statue, a colossus; as evidence is given in the expression "*dapurre kaya borobudur*", meaning a great heavy-limbed creature. Prof. Krom however thinks Winter's explanation as unconvincing. He says that Winter's surmise is merely an invention "hour le besain de la cause" and that in the expression quoted borobudur is nothing but the name of the temple which remains as vague and incomprehensible as ever. There is thus every reason to believe that Borobudur can have been the old name, both parts of it are old-Javanese and we need not assume it to be corrupted. To hunt after its etymology seems as hopeless a task as that of trying to identify any of the numberless other native names found on inscriptions.

Gunadharma the master-designer of Borobudur.

Seen from the Borobudur the profile of the Minoreh Mountains, just where they rise highest, somewhat resembles a human face (see Von Kinsbergen's Photo No. 11). The Javanese say that it is the image of the creator of Borobudur, the face of Guṇadharma. In other places too, admiration for a great work of art has led later generations to seek for some actual indication of the mighty creator, it is a common human tradition and of no further value to the monument itself than to show, if testimony were needed, the deep impression an edifice such as the Borobudur has continued to make on the people who lived within sight of it, even after the meaning of the Stupa was completely forgotten. Yet the name Guṇadharma is

notable, a pure Sanskrit name, especially when we compare with it the numberless native legends about the different, more or less saintly persons, who in all sorts of places are said to have made themselves conspicuous by penances or some other worthy occupation, and who are all named by native or naturalised native names. This makes us suspect that the tradition about Guṇadharma may be rather ancient and who can say whether some famous name of ancient times may have been kept alive and the celebrated designer of Borobudur was really a man called a Guṇadharma. However it may be, it is more than probable that the building of a work of such a compass must have lasted too long for the designer to have been able to see its completion (*vide* Krom, Archæological Description of Borobudur, Vol. I, p. 26.).

The Borobudur reliefs—a life history of Buddha and Bodhisattvas.

It has long been known that the top row of reliefs at Borobudur on the main wall of the first gallery represents the life-story of historic Buddha. It was in 1901 that a careful examination of the scenes depicted on the monument took place: this was done by C. M. Pleyte in his "Die Buddha Legende in den Skulturen des Temples von Boro-Budur". The text followed is that of Lalitavistara. The sculptors of Borobudur, however, have not had exactly the same version of the text before them that we now possess but at any rate, a sitra? that in all essentials agrees with it. Immediately below the life-history of Śakyamuni a series of edifying tales begins, Avadānas and Jātakas, stories of great deeds, specially deeds of faith in general and of the Buddha's former lives in particular; the same kind are also found on the balustrades of the first and second galleries. It is obvious that the ar-

rangement of all these tales was not left to the fancy of the sculptors, but followed some actual text, and this was confirmed when the Russian savant Sergius d'Oldenburg discovered the Jātakamālā in the first and third part of the balustrade of the first gallery, top series. We might have expected this to be quickly followed by similar discoveries, but that did not happen, though several of the tales have been identified by various experts with the collection of tales in Divyāvadāna or Avadānaśataka, both famous and authoritative holy scriptures. Systematic efforts have been made by eminent Dutch scholars for the identifications of the tales on these reliefs in such celebrated Buddhist works as Sūt-rālaṅkāra, Karmaśataka, Kalpadrumāvadānamālā, Ratnā-vadānamālā, Aśokāvadānamālā, Bodhisattvāvadāna-kalpa-latā, Bhadrakalpāvadānamālā and Mahāvastu, but without any tangible success. Nor do the tales in Buddhaghoṣa's works correspond to what is found on the Javan Monu-ment. With the exception of any possible finds among the Tibetan or Chinese writings, our only hope is in the great Jātakamālā of 565 tales that Hodgson met with in Nepal. But it appears that after detailed examination of the reliefs we must give up hope of explaining the reliefs that follow after the Jātakamālā series, by any known text. So we only can attempt to consider what is here represented as a whole and how far it can be identi-fied by the help of tales from all sorts of other sources. The total number of sculptured panels which decorate the walls and balustrades along the four galleries amounts to not less than 1300. The basement was embellished with 160 more reliefs, but these are no longer visible as this part of the building was encased even before the sculp-tural decoration had been completed.

We cannot close the description of Borobudur without quoting the beautiful words of Scheltema. "When high-born dawn," he says, "rouses the tillers of the soil to go forth to their work and the eye of day showers benediction, the solar word, spoken from the eternal throne and descending on wings of happiness, the living word is found emblazoned on the sea of light which floods the Kadu just as the fertilising water of the mountain-rills floods the *sawahs* (rice-fields); is found embodied in that superb temple, the Borobudur, whose soul, the soul of humanity in communion with the all-soul, is the soul of Java. Adorned with that priceless jewel of sanctity, the plain lifts its sensuous loveliness to heaven as the bride meets the caresses of her wedded spouse, trembling with love. They obey the divine law which bids them follow nature in drinking the *amrita*, gaining immortality like gods in creation of life, which may change, yet never dies, aging but receiving, the mystery of the Trimūrti. Clothed with the resplendent atmosphere, touched by the beams of the rising sun, its effulgent dagob, a mountain of gold, the Borobudur bursts out in the bloom of excellence, not the sepulchre of a discarded religion, or a fallen nation's dreams, but a token of the germinal truth of all religion, a prophetic expression of things to be.................. When knowledge shall cover the world at the advent of Viśvapāṇi, deceit and avarice will cease tormenting and glad content will dwell in the *negri jawa* for ever."

Monuments of the Dieng plateau Caṇḍi Bhima

We must now turn our attention to a highly interesting group of temples which lie scattered over the lonely and inhospitable plateau of Dieng (Dipyang) some 6500 feet above the sea. There are in reality five distinct group of temples, some well-preserved, others mere heaps of stone. Nothing

can better serve to demonstrate the popularity of the five Pāṇḍavas of the great epic Mahābhārata than the fact that among those ancient temples of the Dieng plateau the most prominent have been named after them. Thus we have Candi Puntadeva (Javanese name for Yudhiṣṭhira), Candi Bhīma, Candi Arjuna, Candi Srikandi and Candi Semabhadra. But it must be remembered that the present names of the Dieng temples, however interesting from a folklorist point of view, do not give any clue as to their origin and history. The Dieng plateau, represented not a civil capital, but a place of pilgrimage comparable with the Jaina temple cities of Palitana and Girnar in Western India; permanently inhabited only by priests and temple-servants and for the rest providing only temporary accommodation for pilgrims, amongst others for the king, who visited the plateau once a year. These temples are however "not remarkable for the beauty of the details when compared with Borobudur or Prambanan, but they are interesting to the Indian antiquary, because they are Indian temples pure and simple and dedicated to Indian gods." What strikes us most in these Brahminical temples is not only the classic harmony of their style but also the great simplicity in their decorations. The Dieng affords also many examples of sculpture. Of that applied to architectural surfaces the best instance is afforded by the Brahmā, Śiva and Viṣṇu panels and Candi Srikandi. The forms are in general slender, with the leading lines clearly developed. The largest remaining and the most beautiful temple on the Dieng is the Candi Weogodoro or Bhima. These Dieng structures belong to the oldest in the island; the *hanasima* inscription, transferred to Batavia, furnishing a record of the Dieng civilisation which goes back to 731 Śaka (A. D. 809).

Borobudur, the Highest Expression of Hindu-Javanese Art.

The most convincing proof that the art of Borobudur was not a foreign import but a product of Java itself, is its pure Hindu-Javanese type both as to form and character. This of course does not mean to deny that Hindu-Javanese art as a whole, including that of Borobudur, found its origin and being in India, but it stands in Java as a separate unit that combines the original Indian elements with Javanese characteristics in a masterly manner. Borobudur is without doubt an extraordinary monument, in its unusual form, its majestic conception the vast quantity of subjects represented on its reliefs; in fact in every respect it is unique. But when we consider the Borobudur sculptures by themselves, there is no reason to doubt that they agree entirely with the other Hindu-Javanese statues and reliefs of the Middle-Javanese period. We find everywhere the same method and the same rules. They are essentially Indian in so far placing the chief point not in the beauty of form, but in the spirit they endeavour to represent by means of these forms. Thus Hindu-Javanese art appeals more to feeling and imagination than to the intellect and to be properly appreciated, should be felt rather than understood. Its aim is to awaken some special state of mind and way of thought; discernment or comprehension is not demanded except as a means of helping towards its ulterior aim. The evident neglect of anatomical detail probably belongs to this old-Indian patrimony as well as several other technical peculiarities. Yet in what we must ascribe to the original Indian art and to its own Javanese quality, the Hindu-Javanese art of Middle Java everywhere retains its own character. This is true at the same time of all Hindu-Javanese art,

though more apparent here or there, and more convincing, the more skilled the sculptor may be, not only at Borobudur; from this point of view it is really absurd to consider the "Borobudur Art" something apart; a Borobudur art does not exist, there is only Hindu-Javanese art in general and in that Borobudur figures equally with Prambanan and so many other monuments. We shall always place Borobudur at the top of the list as the first exponent thereof, as we are aware that this great stūpa possesses a wonderful individual quality not to be found elsewhere.

It is however impossible at our present state of knowledge to say how much Hindu element is combined with the Javanese—how much remained individual and how much was lost of each, their influence on one another, their gradual transformation into what at first sight appears so curiously fantastic but on closer examination becomes the harmonious union of Hindu-Javanese culture. It is neither Javanese with a Hindu varnish nor Hindu merely transplanted into a foreign land, but exactly what the name indicates, a combination of two dissimilar powers, in value also unequal, and therefore the more remarkable it is that they created a perfect whole. With the help of East Java, whose Hindu culture has left us so much more data also with remnants of manners and customs, habits and institutions which are still alive in Bali, Cambodia and Champa where a similar combined culture was formed by the amalgamation of native with Hindu elements we can discern the real nature and being of that community whose spirit found expression in the sublime structure of Borobudur. But up till now this knowledge remains the aim and object of endless labour and research.

It has been conjectured that the migration of Hinduism to East Java was the effect of Buddhism gaining ground in the central part of the island; that the pronounced Śaivite tendencies of Mojopahit were a reaction against Buddhist innovations. A fusion of Śaivism and Buddhism has continuously controlled the construction of the larger temples of the later eastern Javanese period, says, Rouffær. The power and prosperity of East Java attained their Zenith under the kings of Mojapahit. Four great rulers including Kretanagara and Hyam Wuruk occupied the throne in succession from 1294 to 1389. Amongst the numerous monuments of this golden age of East Java, the finest and most important is the Śaiva temple of Panataran near Blitar. Here we are far removed from the unity of conception and organic relation of parts characteristic of middle Java; the temples of East Java, like those of Bali consist of buildings wholly unrelated and of various dates. Of the main temple at Panataran only the basement remains, but the lower terraces are adorned with medallions and reliefs illustrating the Rāmayāṇa, the upper with a continuous frieze depicting the life of Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇāyana).

The Saiva Temple of Panataran.

About two miles and a half from Borobudur is a small temple of a different class known as Chandi Mendut. It consisted probably of three storeys with a series of 24 miniature pagodas round the lower storey, 16 round the second storey, 8 round the third, half sunk in an octogonal wall, being crowned with a larger *stūpa*. The walls are decorated with bas-relief figures of Hindu deities, groups of three or five in the larger central panels and single figures in the

Candi Mendut.

side panels all under canopies of slight projection. The central figure is Buddha and the two other colossi, having only two arms each are certainly intended for Bodhisattvas. "These three," Dr. Fergusson conjectures, "may have been placed in the cells at a later date. But the colossal images themselves, wonderfully placed in their divine majesty, are to be reckoned among the great masterpieces of Buddhist art. They will stand comparison with the best work of the Gupta Period. The great interest however of this little temple arises from the fact that it almost certainly succeeded immediately to Borobudur. Candi Mendut shows too a progress in design at a time when Buddhist art in India was marked by decay; and it exhibits such progress in mythology that though there can be no doubt as to the purity of the Buddhism of Borobudur, any one might fairly argue that this temple belonged to Hinduism.

The Prambanan Group: The Ramayana Tableaux Reliefs.

Javanese excellence in plastic art is not only proved by the admirable reliefs of Borobudur, but also by another magnificent series of sculptured tableaux, which illustrate the story of Rāma, the hero of the Rāmāyaṇa. "Although on the Indian continent, there is no story more beloved and no poem more renowned than Vālmīki's epic, yet it is on the Javanese temple of Prambanan that Rāma's adventures have been carved in stone in a manner unequalled by anything found in the Indian homeland" (Vogel, The Relation between the Art of India and Java, p. 70). But whereas the Borobudur sculptures are supreme in rendering the Buddhist ideal of mental repose, those of Prambanan picture the heroic deeds of the divine Rāma with great vigour and perfect lucidity.

Not only in the fatherland of the great poet Vālmīki has the Rāmāyana remained one of the most loved and treasured works but outside the old Hindusthan, the narrative of Rāma's struggles with Rāvaṇa and Sīta's fidelity has a long list of admirers as is shown by the translations of Vālmīki's masterpiece more or less closely following the original. It lives forth as the Rāmakien in the Siamese language, as the Hikayat Seri Rāma in Malay literature and as the Serat Rāma is met with in various redactions in Java. In Bali it is highly prized and illustrations of Rāma's adventures on painted cloths have been found even in North Celebes. That the poem has long been known in Old Java is apparent not only from the 1200 old Javanese versions which have been found, but from the splendid reliefs seen in a temple of the Prambanan group which was probably erected in the 8th century and also, from the Candi Panataran close to Blitar built a few centuries later. Both these buildings show many of the principal episodes of the epos carved in stone. Neither of these series of reliefs however so far as they have been preserved gives the complete story. The Prambanan reliefs give representations of the narrative from the march of Rāma's army to Laṅkā. The Candi Panataran represents Hanumāna at Laṅkā and carries on the narrative till the fight with Rāvaṇa's brother, the terrible giant Kumbhakarṇa. These later reliefs go somewhat further than those of the Prambanan group but neither give the beginning of the narrative. It is remarkable to compare these two temples and to note the changes in the art of carving in stone which have taken place in Java in the course of a few centuries, At Prambana everything is truly Hindu-Javanese, but at Panataran the sculptures have attained the primitive and real Javanese character. The carvings of the Panataran reliefs are more similar to those of the present day as found ordinarily in Java and

Bali (*vide* J. Kats, Het Rāmāyaṇa op Javaansche Tempel Reliefs.)

The Suku—Temples: examples of Hybrid art.

Finally, let us consider the group of temples at Suku the last stronghold of Javanese culture. Near the centre of the Island, not far from mount Lowes, there is a line of temples which may be considered to be of great importance to the Javanese cultural history. They are among the most modern examples of style, having dates upon them of 1435 and 1440 A. D. or less than 40 years before the destruction of Mojapahit and the abolition of the Hindu religion in Java. So far as can be made out, they are coarser and more vulgar in execution than any of those hitherto described, and belonged to a degarded form of the Vaiṣṇava religion. Garuḍa is the most prominent figure among the sculptures; but there is also the tortoise, the boar and other figures that belong to Hinduism. The principal temple consists of a truncated pyramid raised on the top of three successive terraces. "The most interesting feature", observes Dr. Ferguson "with the remains at Suku is their extraordinary likeness to the contemporary edifices in Yucatan and Mexico". It may be only accidental but it is unmistakable. When we look at the vast expanse of ocean that stretches between Java and Central America, it seems impossible to conceive that any migration can have taken place eastward, say after the 10th century that could have influenced the arts of the Americans. It seems equally improbable that any colonists from America could have planted themselves in Java so as to influence the arts of the people. But there is a third supposition that may be possible and if so, may account for the observed facts. It is possible that the

building races of Central America were of the same family as the native inhabitants of Java. Many circumstances lead to the belief that the inhabitants of Easter Island belong to the same stock, and if this is so, it is evident that distance is no bar to the connection. If this hypothesis is admitted, the history of the Hindu-Javanese art may be summed up as follows: The Javanese were first taught to build monumental edifices in stone by immigrants from India, and we know that their first productions were their finest and to a large extent of pure Indian in conception and style. During the next five centuries we can watch the Indian gradually waning and during the period from 1150 to 1450 A. D., a native local style developing itself which blossomed at last into the hybrid style at Suku.

OM NAMO BUDDHAYA.

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INDIAN PICTORIAL ART AS DEVELOPED IN BOOK-ILLUSTRATIONS.

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General remarks on the antiquity of pictorial art in India based on Brahmanical, Jain and Buddhist works and early paintings on rocks as well as in caves.

Jātaka or birth stories of the Buddha represented in stone and other carvings as well as in frescoes, Jain and Brahmanical legends, depicted similarly, must have been the precursors of and led early *Citrakāras* to portray the subjects on paper.

Desire to see in some visible form incidents connected with life-sketches is quite natural and must have prompted writers of stories of sorts to have their works illustrated either by themselves or by professional painters. The same must have been the case with other writings, technical or others, on Rāgas, Nāyikās, etc., etc. There is no wonder, then, if we come across illustrated manuscripts of various kinds not only in Sanskrit or Prakrit but in Hindi, Urdu as well as Persian and other languages written in India in different ages.

Dr. Coomaraswamy's remarks in "Catalogue of the Indian Collections in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Pt. iv-(1) "Indian art has never developed book illustrations as such" and (2) "the illustrations take the form of square panels applied to the page without organic relation to the text" and (3) "illustrated manuscripts of any kind are very rare" are not substantiated by facts. Marvellously illustrated books written for Mughal princes are too well known to scholars interested in the subject. *Description*

of some illustrated books: Sanskrit—*Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa,* Tāntric works, *Gīta-Govindam, Citturasa-mañjarī* and other illustrated works found in *bhaṇḍāras.* Hindi—*Madhu-Mālatī* (one by Majhan (Circa 1509 A.C.) noticed in *Nāgarī Pracāriṇī Patrikā* (Vol. 6, No. 3) and in the *Rūpam* January-April 1928 number by Pandit Keshodas with a few illustrations, an incomplete copy of it in possession of the Bhārata Kalāpariṣad, the Society of Indian Art at Benares ; another, a different work altogether, in possession of a friend of mine. *Hammīra-haṭha, Rukmiṇī-maṅgala* and other illustrated manuscripts. Several erotic works written in Kashmir, Orissa, Rewah and other places etc.

Illustrated Jaina work *Kalpa-Sūtra* of Bhadrabāhu (who, according to all Jaina authors including Hemacandra, died after hundred and seventy years from the *mokṣa* of Mahāvīra had elapsed and is believed to have been the contemporary of Candragupta Maurya) which gives the legendary account of the life of Mahāvīra, the last Tīrthaṅkara and of some other Jainas though the latter portion is regarded as spurious. Its manuscripts ranging from Sam. 1100 onwards are known. The one written in Sam. 1100 is reported to exist in the Dharmavijaya Library at Agra. Prof. Jacobi of Germany owns a copy which is dated in Sam. 1484. One illustrated copy with me must be older. The last page of it is not yet found. The penultimate page I have, gives the year 1624 of the Vikrama era as the date when it was made over by one Bhāvadevasūri to somebody and shows that it belonged to Bhāvameru. It comes from Hissar. The other copy with me comes from Ahmedabad and is dated Vikrama Sam. 1505. I have got only a few pages of it with me. A third copy belonging to a friend is dated V. S. 1667 and

comes from Phalodi in Jodhpur Rajaputana. Several other copies of the kind are mentioned in various catalogues. These manuscripts, belonging to different parts of India, will show that illustrated books were not restricted to one part of India only and that books were illustrated with appropriate organic illustrations all over the country. The mere fact that several works on *Śilpa-śāstra* were written in the South would prove the existence of illustrated books there. *Some described.* Without illustrations, such works could not have been of much use. The *Kalpa-sūtra* mainly narrates the life of Mahāvirasvāmin and contains the legend regarding the transference of his embryo from the womb of the Brāhmaṇī mother to that of a Kṣatriyā and its earliest known representation in stone (Cir. 1st century after Christ) is given on a slab from Mathurā now preserved in the Lucknow Provincial Museum. This interesting sculpture supports the remark made above that stories carved in stone must have led to drawing pictures on paper. Other Jain works are also known, e.g. *Upadeśamālā. A manuscript from Aurangabad dated V. S. 1780 and some others described.* The illustrations are certainly organic in all cases excepting those which are merely decorative.



The only Image of Cundā.

(*Mr. Whitney's Collection*)

THE ONLY IMAGE OF CUNDĀ.[1]

B. Bhattachyaryya, M.A. Ph. D. Director,
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In the *Sādhanamālā* there are three Sādhanas describing a four-armed deity whose name is differently spelt in different manuscripts as Cundā, Cuṇḍā and Cundrā. Her Mantra however is uniformly given as Oṃ Cale Cule Cunde Svāhā which leads one to accept the spelling Cundā as correct. She is generally described as one-faced and four-armed carrying in the two principal hands a bowl on the lap and showing the Varada (gift-bestowing) Mudrā and a lotus with a book in the two other hands.[2] In one of the three Sādhanas it is further said that she bears on her crown the figure of the parental Dhyāni Buddha Vajrasattva; in the two other Sādhanas however there is no mention of the parental Dhyāni Buddha. In another Sādhana she is described as sitting in *Sattvaparyaṅka.* It cannot even now be definitely said what is meant by the word Sattvaparyaṅka. In the ***Indian Buddhist Iconography*** it has been suggested that the Āsana may mean the seat of an animal. But this has been objected to by Professor Foucher and others, though their own explanation also is no more convincing. So far it seems hopeless to find out the correct attitude which this Sattvaparyaṅka represents unless, of course, we can hit upon an image which actually represents this kind of seat. In one instance alone in an image of Khasarpaṇa Lokeśvara who is described in the Sādhana as "sitting in

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1. One of the earliest mention of Cunda occurs in Santideva's Siksasamuccaya which belongs to the beginning of the 8th century. The Guhyasamajatantra which is believed to be one of the earliest Buddhist tantra also mentions her name and Mantra.

2. An extraordinary form with Cunda of sixteen arms was installed at Cundavarabhavana at Pattikera in Bengal. This has been reproduced by Prof. Foucher from a miniature found in one of the A. S. B MSS in his L'Iconographie Bouddhique, Pt. I, Fig. 25.

the Lalita attitude on a Sattvaparyaṅka "[1] we find that the seat on which Khasarpaṇa is seated bears carvings of animals, men and some inanimate objects.[2] It seems, therefore, very probable that Sattvaparyaṅka represents a seat which is supported by some animals other than the lions as in that case it would no longer be a Sattvaparyaṅka but a Siṃhāsana. It cannot, however, be said that this is the true or final interpretation of the term but we cannot hope to meet with a correct explanation till further examples come to light.

Images of Cundā are extremely rare. As a matter of fact up till now no image has yet been discovered which corresponds exactly with the description of the Sādhana and that in important details. To say the least, it is extremely risky to identify an image when descriptions do not correspond in important details. Professor A. Foucher in his first part of *L'Iconographie Bouddhique de L'Inde*[3] identified an image in the British Museum as that of Cundā. But this image instead of showing the Varada Mudrā in the right hand shows the rosary instead, so that the hand instead of showing the downward direction is raised upwards. Besides this, there is a parasol raised over her head and below the parasol are two figures of the Dhyāni Buddha Amitābha. This identification is not in accordance with the Sādhana and therefore cannot be called correct.

Again Professor Foucher hit upon another figure (this time from Java) and indentified it as that of Cundā, in his *Beginnings of Buddhist Art* (pp. 265–6, PL. XLIV) and other essays. But this besides being wholly different

1. Sadhanamala, Vol I. p. 43. 44—ललिताक्षेप ·········सत्वपर्यङ्कासीनः ।
2. See *Indian Buddhist Iconography*, Plate XXI.
3. Fig. 24.

from the description given in the Sādhana appears to be a male figure. Therefore this identification also is to be discarded[1].

The only image of Cundā which accurately corresponds with the Dhyāna contained in the Sādhana comes from the collection of a wealthy American Solicitor, Mr. W. B. Whitney of New York. By the courtesy and generosity of this gentleman I could get a copy of the photograph of the image which is reproduced along with this paper. The image in Mr. Whitney's collection is 12½" in height and hails from a collection made by a Chinese in Peking and, as a matter of fact, was identified by Mr. Whitney himself[2]. This image of Cundā therefore is unique.

The image as can be seen from the photograph is extremely beautiful and artistic and is one-faced and four-armed as required by the Sādhana. Here the goddess sits in the meditative pose on a double conventional lotus and in the two principal hands which are arranged in the Samādhi Mudrā she carries the bowl on the lap. In the two other hands she shows the Varada Mudrā in the right and the book on lotus in the left. She is decked in all ornaments and wears richly garments.

The image corresponds with the Sādhana in every detail which describes Cundā in the following terms:—

शरच्चन्द्राभां चतुर्भुजां दक्षिणेन वरदां वामे पुस्तकाङ्कितपद्मधरां करद्वये पात्रधरां सर्वालंकार-भूषितां पद्मचन्द्रासनस्थां भावयेत् ।

1. In J R A. S. 1909, p. 291, Pl. III, 1, Dr. Coomara Swamy designates a four-armed bronze figure from Ceylon as Cunda. She shows in her four hands a book, rosary, a fruit and a bowl. The Sadhana and the image in this case differ so widely that it will be too rash to attempt such identifications.

2. His letter is as follows:

A few months ago I obtained from the Oxford Press of this City, a copy of your book on the *Indian Buddhist Iconograph* which I have found most interesting and useful in the identification of a number of the divinities represented in my collection of bronzes and painted banners (mostly Tibetan.)

In particular I was interested in the confirmation found therein of my bronzes as of Cunda, on identification of which I was somewhat doubtful because of the description and reproduction by Prof. Foucher in his book .....''

(Sd.) WILLIAM B. WHITNEY,
May 21, 1926.

3. The meditative pose of sitting (Vajraparyankasana) is quite in keeping with the hands which are arranged in the Samadhi Mudra and over which a bowl is placed. As out of the three Sadhanas only one advocates the placing of a miniature figure of Vajrasattva, this cannot be compulsory for all images of Cuṇḍa.

Arabic and Persian Section.

ED DAJJĀL, ANTICHRIST.

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A tradition says that once after prayers Muhammad told the congregation to keep their places and said that Tamim-ud-Dari had told him a legend about Antichrist which agreed with what he himself had told them. Considering the dates of Christianity and Islam this can only mean that the traditions about Ed Dajjāl were borrowed from the legend of Antichrist. The object of this paper is to point out the resemblances between the Muslim tradition and the Judaeo-christian legend. It is not possible to separate Jewish material from Christian.

The traditions about Ed Dajjāl are these.

Antichrist is a curly-haired youth with a dull eye; I should say he is like Abdul-ul-Uzza b. Qatan. Those of you who live till he comes will read on him the opening verses of the chapter of the Cave. He will come on a road between Damascus and Mesopotamia and lay waste on the right hand and the left. Servants of God be steadfast! They said; O prophet of God, how long will he stay on earth? He said; Forty days, one day like a year, one like a month, one like a week, and the rest of its days like your days.......We said; O prophet of God, what is his speed on earth? He said; Like rain which the wind drives. He will come to a people and call them, and they will believe in him and obey him. He gives orders to the heaven and it rains, and to the earth and it bears fruit. Their cattle will come home having the highest humps, the biggest udders, and the longest flanks. Then he will come to a people and call them, and they will not hear his call. He will leave them, and they will become poor nothing of their wealth will remain in their hands. He

will pass by a ruin and say to it; bring out your treasures. The treasures in it will follow him like queen bees. Then he will call a man in the bloom of youth and purposely cut him in pieces with a sword. Then he will call him and he will come forward and his face will shine and he will laugh. Just then God sends the Christ the son of Maryam, and he comes down by the white minaret to the east of Damascus, wearing two garments dyed saffron, laying his hands on the wings of two angels. If he bows his head they drop rain and if he raises it balls of silver like pearls drop down. If an infidel feels his breath he must die. His breath reaches as far as his sight. He seeks him (ed Dajjāl) till he overtakes him in the gate of Lydda and kills him. Then a people, whom God has helped, come to Jesus b. Maryam and he wipes their faces and tells them of their grades in paradise. Then God reveals to Jesus; I have chosen servants whom it is not permitted to anyone to kill. Make them take refuge in the mountain. God will send Gog and Magog hastening from every high land. Their van will pass the lake of Tiberias and drink up what is in it; their rear will pass by and say; Once water was here. Jesus the prophet of God and his companians will be besieged till the head of an ox will be of more value to one of them than one hundered dinars to you to-day. Jesus and his companions will pray to God and God will send worms into the necks of them (Gog and Magog) and they will die as one man. Then Jesus and his companions will fall to earth and not find on earth one span that is not filled with the stink and the stench of them. Then Jesus and his companions will pray to God and God will send birds like the necks of Bactrian camels which will carry them and put them where God wishes.

Then God will send rain, no house of hair or stone will stand against it, and God will wash the earth and leave it like a plate. Then shall be said to the earth; Bring forth your fruit, bring out your blessing. Then a band shall eat of a pomegranate and take shelter under its rind: milk shall be blessed till one milch camel satisfies a troop, a cow satisfies a tribe, and an ewe a clan. Then God will send a gentle wind; it will take them under the arms. The spirit of every believing Muslim will be taken away and evil men will remain fighting one another as asses fight; and then the hour will come upon them. (Muslim. vol. 2, 376).

Then for seven years men shall remain and there shall be no enmity between any two of them. Then God will send a cold wind from the north and there will not remain on the earth one in whose heart is the weight of a grain of good or faith but he will be cut off. So that if one of you entered into the heart of a mountain (the wind) would follow him and seize him. Evil men with the speed of birds and the bodies of beasts will abide, neither doing good nor hating evil. Then the devil will appear to them and say; Will you not obey? They will answer; What are your orders? He bids them worship idols wherein is their wealth and pleasant prosperity. Then will the trump be blown and none will hear it without bending his head and raising it. The first to hear it was a man plastering his camel trough; he cried and men cried. Then God will send rain like dew, from it will spring the bodies of men. Then a second blast and they will stand up and gaze...... ...(Muslim. vol. 2, 378). That they will make children whiteheaded; that day the leg shall be uncovered. (Muslim. Vol. 2, 379).

The story told by Tamim-ud-Dari, who had been a Christian, was this. They drew near to an island in the west.......... they landed on it and a beast met them, having much curly hair, so that they could not tell its head from its tail by reason of its hairiness. They said; What art thou? It said; I am the spy. Go to this man in the convent for he desires to talk with you. When it named a man we feared that it might be a devil. We went quickly, entered the convent, and there was the biggest, most strongly bound man we had ever seen; his hands were fastened to his neck and the part between his knees and ankles with iron.

He said; Tell me of the palms of Beisan. Do they bear fruit? We said; Yes. He said: They will soon bear no fruit. Tell me of the lake of Tiberias. Is there water in it? Yes. There will soon be no water in it.

I am Antichrist; I shall soon be allowed to come out and I shall walk through the earth, and I shall not leave a town without overthrowing it except Mecca and Tayyiba (Medina); they are both forbidden me. If I wish to enter one of them an angel meets me with a drawn sword in his hand and turns me from it. At every opening of it are angels guarding it. The prophet said; it is in the east. (Muslim. Vol. 2, 380).

The traditions have been shortened in translation to avoid repetition and to omit irrelevant passages.

The first thing that strikes one is that the centre of interest is Syria and, more narrowly, Palestine. Lydda, Beisan, and Tiberias are all in Palestine, while Damascus,

while outside Palestine, is in Syria. This is obviously a mark of its Christian origin.

A summary of the first tradition will show that it is not a coherent story. The sequence of events is this; the coming of Antichrist and his success; the coming of Jesus and the death of Antichrist; Gog and Magog and their destruction; the removal of Jesus and the saints; the golden age; the removal of the saints from the earth; the war of the wicked; the end.

In this tale the threefold destruction of evil is strange. One asks also who was left to enjoy the golden age when Jesus and the saints were taken away. It is possible to reply that they were not taken off the earth but only removed to another part of it. But one feels that this is not the meaning intended and that the argument is a quibble. The repetition in the tale reminds one of the Apocalypse where the forces of evil are destroyed several times over; first the great and evil city Babylon is destroyed; then the false prophet and the beast; then Gog and Magog; and finally all evil is consumed. Any one who has read the apocalyptic books must feel that there is no essential difference between them and this tradition; that it is in the direct line of descent from them.

To come to details.

The name ed Dajjāl recalls the false prophet of the Apocalypse who is the chief enemy of the saints. The devil is called 'the father of lies' (John. 5, 8) and also 'the deceiver of the world' (Rev. 12, 9. Didache. 16, 4).

With 'on it were the opening words of the chapter of the Cave' compare 'on its heads were the names of blasphemies' (Rev. 13, 1) and the many references in the same book to the 'mark of the beast'.

Forty days.

This method of counting time is quite in the manner of apocalypse. In Daniel 9, 24—27 time is counted by weeks when history shows that a week stands for a year. In ch. 12, 7 we find the mysterious 'a time, times and a half' and in Psalm 90, 4, 'a thousand years in thy sight are as yesterday'. The peculiar wording of this phrase of the tradition suggests the words of the Gospel 'except those days had been shortened no flesh had been saved' (Mat. 24, 22). The days of terror were shortened by the mercy of God in answer to the prayers of the saints and one feels that the same idea underlies this tradition; that the forty days had all originally been years.

The miracles of Antichrist.

"His appearance is through the energy of Satan, in all power and signs and false wonders. (2 Thess. 2, 9). There are many references in Revelation to the wonders wrought by the powers of evil. In the same book it is said; "He will make all, the small and the great, the rich and the poor, the free and the slaves, to take a sign on their right hands or their foreheads, without which no man may buy or sell (13, 16). This is only another way of saying that those who do not obey Antichrist will be made poor.

Antichrist always fails to raise the dead to life but this miracle is worked by Simon Magus—a representative of evil—though it is only an appearance and a vain show. (Acts of Simon with Peter. ch. 28). In another tradition (Muslim. 2, 378) it is said that ed Dajjāl cuts the man whom he kills in half with a saw; an idea that is familiar from the martyrdom of Isaiah.

" Placing his hands on the wings of two angels".

" The son of man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory, and he shall send his angels". (Mat. 24, 30).

" No unbeliever can feel his breath without dying".

" He sent out of his mouth as it were a fiery stream, and out of his lips a flaming breath............so that suddenly nothing more was to be seen of the innumerable multitude, save only dust of ashes and smell of smoke". (4 Ezra. 13,10).

" He will seek him till he finds him in the gate of Ludd and will kill him".

" He will be bound—and afterwards he will put him to death ". (2 Bar. 40).

" He will wipe their faces".

" God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes". (Rev. 7, 17.)

" Make my servants flee to the mountains".

" Then let them that are in Judaea flee into the mountains". (Mat. 24, 16). In Christian legend Gog and Magog are as many as the sands of the sea. (Rev. 20, 8) They come to war against the holy ones of God. " He will besiege Jesus the prophet of God and his companions". They surrounded the camp of the saints and the beloved city". (Rev. 20, 9). The statement that the head of an ox will be worth more to one of them than one hundred dinars might well be suggested by the account of the siege of Samaria when the head of an ass was sold for eighty pieces of silver. (2 Kings. 6, 25). The difference between the two is probably due to Muslim orthodoxy.

" Jesus the prophet of God and his companions will fall to the earth and will not find there one span which is not filled with their stench and stink".

This is the first hint that the war between Jesus and ed Dajjâl was not on earth. In Christian literature the spirit of evil is sometimes called the 'spirit of the air.' In the tradition it has been forgotten that the fight was above the earth and only this phrase remains to show the original conception. We may quote; "There was war in heaven, (or, in the sky) Michael and his angels fighting with the dragon. The dragon and his angels fought but could not prevail, and no place was found for them in heaven. The great dragon, the old serpent, who is called devil and Satan, who deceives the whole world, was cast down to the earth and his angels with him. (Rev. 12, 7.) It is curious to see how the same pharase occurs in different connections in the two stories, 'no place.'

The slaughter is described in other words; "I saw an angel standing in the sun and he cried with a great voice to all birds that fly in the sky; Come, gather to the great supper of God, that you may eat the flesh of kings, and princes, and heroes, the flesh of horses and their riders, the flesh of all free and bound, small and great. And all the birds were filled with the flesh of them. (Rev. 19, 17.) For the use of birds as the instrument of God's providence we may compare Elijah's ravens. (1 Kings 17, 4.)

Wind.

The idea that God takes men from danger by a wind is fairly common. (Enoch. 39) "The kings of the earth, the great ones, the princes, the rich, the strong, and every one bound and free shall hide themselves in caves and holes in the rocks and say to the hills and rocks; Fall on us and hide us from the face of him that sits on the throne." (Rev. 6, 15)

" Bad men will remain with the speed of birds and the bodies of wild beasts."

" All those who are polluted with iniquity will flee to it as evil beasts flee and creep into the forest." (2 Baruch. 39, 6)

Trumpet.

The trumpet is very common in apocalyptic books; one quotation is enough. " The seven angels who had the seven trumpets prepared to sound them." (Rev. 1, 6).

The domestic detail of the man mending his camel trough is imitated from " Two men shall be working in the field, one shall be taken and the other left. Two women shall be grinding at the mill, one shall be taken and the other left." (Mat. 24, 40.)

" ...... From it shall spring the bodies of men. Then a second blast and they shall stand up."

This reminds one irresistibly of the vision of the valley of dry bones, in which bones first become bodies and then by a separate act are filled with life. (Ezekiel 37.)

White headed children and the uncovered leg.

" And the heads of the children shall be white with grey hair." (Jubilees 23, 25.)

The uncovered leg is said by the dictionaries to be a metaphor for calamity. The phrase occurs in the Koran (68, 42) but it is much older than that. The Hebrew prophet sang; " Take the millstone, grind corn, take off the veil, strip off the skirt, bare the leg." (Isaiah. 47, 2). This may be a case of the same expression occurring independently in both Arabic and Hebrew.

The Beast.

From Daniel onwards beasts are plentiful; in

Revelation one is associated with the false prophet. (19, 20). Many of these beasts are not known to natural history.

"The biggest man I have seen—his hands tied to his neck—with iron."

"I saw an angel—having the key of the abyss and a great chain in his hand and he bound the dragon, the old serpent, who is the devil and Satan." (Rev. 20, 1).

The palms of Beisan and the lake of Tiberias.

The idea was familiar that at the coming of Antichrist the order of nature would be disturbed. "Suddenly shall the sown places appear unsown." "The springs of the fountains shall stand still so that for three hours they shall not run." (4 Ezra. 6, 22. 24).

Here we may find a place for two descriptions of the earth to illustrate that in the Muslim tradition. "All desirable trees shall be planted on it, and they shall plant vines on it; and the vines which they plant thereon shall yield vine in abundance, and as for all the seed which is sown thereon, each measure of it shall bear a thousand, and each measure of olives shall yield ten presses of oil." (Enoch. 10, 19.) "The earth also shall yield its fruit ten thousand fold and on each vine shall be a thousand branches, and each branch shall produce a thousand clusters, and each cluster produce a thousand grapes, and each grape produce a *cor* of wine." (2 Baruch. 29, 4.)

"I am ed Dajjāl, I shall soon be allowed to come out."

"Satan will be loosed from his prison and will come out to deceive the nations." (Rev. 20, 8.)

In another tradition occur the words; "The city (of Medina) will shake with three shakings" which recall "a great earthquake..... and the great city became three parts." (Rev. 16, 18).

Conclusion.

The tone of the traditions about ed Dajjāl is the same as that of the apocalyptic books. You have only to read few chapters of any one of them to be convinced of this.

The incidents are largely the same; so is the want of coherence. On the strength of the Muslim story that Antichrist was killed at Lydda, or as another tradition has it, at the church of Lydda, scholars are satisfied that this incident formed part of the Christian legend; though it is not mentioned in any book now extant.

In several places variations in details seem to be due to faulty memory of the actual wording of the earlier story.

Ed Dajjāl is one of the latest offshoots from the great mass of apocalyptic literature.

A STUDY OF THE KULLIYAT OF 'IMAD-I- FAQIH OF KIRMAN.

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The Persian *tadhkiras* of poets are notoriously lacking in biographical facts. In recent times this dearth of biographical details has to a considerable extent, been compensated by careful examinations of the poets own works. Thus for instance, the biographies of Sa'dī, of Mas'ud Sa'd Salmān, of Firdawsī, Nizāmī, Anwarī, Khāqānī and 'Attār have been reconstructed by modern critics by patiently scrutinising their poetical works. The result of such a research may not be very encouraging but the facts supplied by this method are surely more reliable than the legends generally given in the *tadhkiras.*

My reasons for taking up 'Imād for the purpose of a close study of his Kulliyāt are these: (1) Firstly, that 'Imād is one of the most noteworthy representatives of the classical period of Persian poetry, (especially *ghazal*); he is a contemporary, and according to the tradition a rival, of Hāfiz and Salmān, and as such should certainly claim our best attention. (2) Secondly, that no appreciation or criticism of his poetry has, so far as I know, been yet attempted and no portion of his Kulliyāt has been made accessible through publication, and MS. copies of it are extremely rare[1]. (3) Thirdly, that I was fortunate in coming across an exceedingly valuable MS. of the Kulliyāt of 'Imād belonging to my friend Professor S. D. Azar, who, with his habitual generosity, placed it at my service for an indefinite period of time. This MS. is very ancient

1. Only one other copy of the Kulliyat of Imad is known to exist in India, in the Bengal Asiatic Society. The Bankipur Library possesses a copy of the diwan (of ghazals) only.

(possibly written during the life-time of the poet, or at any rate not long after his death) and contains a very reliable text, (4) and fourthly, that notices of 'Imād given in the *tadhkiras* contain little about his life.

The MS. of the Kulliyāt is slightly defective at the end, undated, but, as I have said, belongs to the late 8th or early 9th century. It comprises 423 folios, and, according to my computation, 15000 lines, consisting of four Mathnawīs *viz.* (1) the Ṣafā Nāmā or Mūnis-ul-abrār, (2) the Ṣuḥbat Nāmā (3) the Muhabbat Nāmā and (4) the Ṭarīqat Nāmā; then a collection of ten versified letters addressed to various persons, called the Dah Nāmā; qasīdās, ghazals, and rubāiyāt.

Among these, the autobiographical details are to be found mainly in the introductory parts of the Mathnawīs. These, so far as I could notice and collect I now propose to present in this paper.

'Imād was born (probably at Kirmān where his father lived) before 700 A. H., for the passage in which he makes mention of the death of his father as well as of one Khwājā Maḥmūd, his father's spiritual teacher, both of whom died in Ṣafar 705, indicates that in that year he was already grown up. For in that passage he says that after their death he had to face many hardships, but by devoting himself to study and spiritual exercises he overcame his difficulties. The passage is in the Mūnis'ul-abrār:—

هفت صد و پنج ز هجرت چو رفت   وز صفر آن روز همانا که هفت

منزل او (1) روضهٔ فردوس گشت   نامهٔ شادی دلم در نوشت

محرم خاصش پدر این گدا   رفت همان هفته ز دار الفنا

بندهٔ بی توشه درین گوشه ماند   کشته درود ندهیی خوشه ماند
غم زدهٔ بی دل و دشمن هزار   گل شده از باغ و چمن پر ز خار
سیل جفا روی بدین خانه کرد   کلبهٔ درویش چو ویرانه کرد
کوشش و جهد از مدد فتح پیر   کرد درین بقعه بسی این فقیر
صحبت هر طائفه یافته   جز زپی فایده نشتافته
از علما و فضلای زمان   گشته دل غم زده ام شادمان
چاکر ارباب طریقت شده   وز پی اصحاب حقیقت شده

Another passage in the Mathnawī Ṭarīqat Nāmā supports this conjecture about ‘Imād’s date of birth. Ṭarīqat Nāmā was written in 750 and in the passage referred to the poet states that he is already a grey-haired old man—

خرد هر لحظه ام تعجیل می کرد   که مویت شد سپید و گونه ات زرد
گر آید مدت عمرت بپایان   بماند نام تو زین عقد مرجان

That he lived throughout his life at Kirmān is amply proved by his frequently referring to it as being the place of his residence, by his very often playing upon the word Kirmān as meaning worms (plural of کرم) and by his praising again and again its temperate climate and congenial society. The following passage from the Ṭarīqat Nāmā will serve as a good specimen:—

(1), Refers to Khwaja Mahmud,

خوشا ملک کریمان خانهٔ داد — که رحمت بر دیار و اهل او باد
کنی معلوم اگر صاحب کمالی — که کرمان از کریمان نیست خالی
هوائی معتدل آبی گوارا — مقیم خاک او اهل مدارا
زمینی دل نشان و تربتی خوش — مرا با ساکنانش صحبتی خوش
در و نعمت فراخ و در دل تنگ — بهشتی روضهٔ پر بوی و پر رنگ
رطب با یخ درین بازار باشد — مگس اندک شکر بسیار باشد
همه اهل کرم صوفی و اوباش — درم در کیسه نی و کاسه پر آش
چو فصلی نو شود در روز اول — هوای صافیش گردد مبدل
نه سرمائی که آرد لرزه در تن — نه گرمائی که سوزد پوست بر تن
چو نیر آید توان پوشید سنجاب — چو دی باشد توان غلطید در آب
مزار اولیا در مشهد او — مقام اصفیا هر معبد او

A little further the poet says that he has been living in Kirmān for forty years:—

من از غلمان آن فرخ بهشتم — وفای اهل دل بر دل نوشتم
چهل سالم بفضل ایزد چنان داشت — که از جان شد غلامم هر که جان داشت

After the death of his father in 705 and up to 741, the year in which the Muzaffarī prince Mubāriz'ud-din Muhammad took possession of Kirmān, ʻImād seems to have lived in poverty and hardship; for frequently and bitterly does he complain of his evil days. I have already quoted above the passage relating the death of his father and the consequent misfortunes. The following is another similar passage from the Ṣuhbat Nāmā written in 731;

ز بیداد دوران غمی داشتم   که امید شادی غمی داشتم
دلم پای بند کمند هوا   سر و پای من زیر بند بلا
تنم همچو موئی او در موی خم   فتاده چو کاهی پس کوه غم
بکردار ذره حقیر و نزار   گه از دیده پنهان و گه آشکار

The poet's abode in Kirmān was a Convent (خانقاه) the history of whose foundation he narrates in the Mūnis'ul-abrār. The founder of this convent was a certain Khwājā Maḥmūd (spoken of above as the spiritual guide of 'Imād's father) who, from his early childhood was given to study and devotion. At the age of 7 he knew the Qur'ān by heart and then studied law, ḥadīth, medicine, mysticism and exegesis of the Qurān:

سال ز هجرت چو رسیدش بهفت   در صدد زمرهٔ حفاظ رفت
فقه و حدیث و طب و تفسیر و نحو   هیچ نه کرد از ورق سینه محو
علم تصوف ز تعرف (1) گرفت   گوشه و ترک تکلف گرفت
کشور تقوالیش مسلم شده   نزد خداوند مکرم شده

Till the age of 40, he lived a retired life at Kirmān. The Prophet appeared to him in a dream and advised

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(1) تعرف المذهب التصوف is recorded by H. Kh. to have been written by Sh. Abu Bakr Muḥ. b. Ibrahim al Bukhari al Kalabadi 380 A. H.

him to go to Kāmuya (کامویه) in 'Iraq and become a disciple of Shaykh Zayn'ud-dīn Qutb-i-Zamān[1]:

رفته چهل سال که در راه دین — پهلوی او کرده وداع زمین
ناگهش آمد سحری در ضمیر — دادن دستی ز ارادت به پیر
خواجهٔ کونین علیه السلام — کرد بحالش نظری در منام
رفت اشارت که ازین تنگنامی — رخ بعراق آر و بکاموی درآی
حضرت با نصرت قطب الزمان — قدوهٔ صاحب نظران جهان
قبلهٔ ارباب صفا زین دین — هادی و سر حلقهٔ اهل یقین
رفت حوالت بوی ارشاد تو — حکم چنین رفت در ایجاد تو

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(1) Sh. Zain'ud-din, elsewhere called خواجه کاموی by 'Imad was, according to his statement, a disciple of Sh. Shihab'ud-din ' Umar (obviously Sh. Shihab 'ud-din 'Umar Suhrwardi d. 632 A. H.) of Baghdad on whose advice Sh Zain'ud-din devoted himself to learning and joined the Mustansiriya College at Baghdad where he received a high education in law and religion:—

چو آمد خواجهٔ کامو ببغداد — میان در خانقاه شیخ بگشاد
شهاب الدین عمر پیر طریقت — که بروی کشف شد سر حقیقت
امام مرشدست و شیخ کامل — که سالک را نمودی ره بمنزل
چو آمد شیخ در تکمیل و ارشاد — در اوقاتش موظف یافت اوراد
بتحصیل علومش کرد اشارت — که در دانش شود صاحب مهارت
بحکم شیخ سر بنهاد جانش — عزیمت کرد سوی اهل دانش
گروهی ساکن مستنصریه — چو احیای عرب در هر بریه
زد آنجا خیمهٔ انس و اقامت — چو صاحب رای در کوی سلامت
رسیدش پایهٔ دانش بجامی — که شد در کشور دین پادشاهی
بباغ سینه تخم علم کشتی — که در هر مذهبی فتوی نبشتی

Kh. Maḥmūd accordingly went there and became the diciple of the Shaykh. After some time the Khwājā, with the permission of his pīr, returned to his native town Kirmān. The Shaykh instructed him to found a convent at Kirmān, to reside there, and to devote himself to the spiritual guidance of the people. The convent at Kirmān was accordingly founded by the Khwājā in the year 666 A. H. to which was attached a refectory and it gradually became a popular resort of students, dervishes and all sorts of pious people. From that date until 705, Khwājā Maḥmūd continuously resided in that convent, to which endowments and financial grants were given:—

خواجه چو آورد بکرمان گذار   کرد مشرف بقدوم این دیار
شد ز پی کارِ گل خانقاه   رفت باتمام در آن چندگاه
صومعه و مسجد و محراب ساخت   مطبخ و سقایه و پایاب ساخت
جای مسافر بنوا شد در و   حاجت درویش روا شد در و
چون در این بقعهٔ میمون گشود   ششصد و شصت و ششمین سال بود
منزلِ حجاج شد و اهلِ علم   مسکنِ شایستهٔ اربابِ حلم
وقف پدید آمد و ادرار نیز   مجمع پاکان شد و ابرار نیز
سبحه و سجاده طاعت در و   فوت نشد وردِ جماعت در و

Kh. Maḥmūd died on the 7th of Ṣafar 705, and was succeeded by his nephew:—

تکیه بفرزند برادر گذاشت   آنکه چو فرزند گرامیش داشت

The father of ' Imād, a favourite disciple of the Khwājā, died within the same week after which our poet was left helpless and neglected:

محرم خاصش پدر این گدا   رفت همان هفته ز دار الفنا
بندهٔ بی توشه درین گوشه ماند   کشته درودند همین خوشه ماند

He then devoted himself, as already pointed out, to study and rigorous spiritual exercises, and after a time went to ' Irāq and acquired his mystic frock (خرقه) from the Shaykh of Kāmuya (evidently the above-mentioned Sh. Zayn'ud-dīn).

خرقه بکاموبه گرفتم ز پیر   آنکه در آن عهد نبودش نظیر

Elsewhere he mentions the شیخ کاموی or خواجهٔ کاموی as his master and liberator from adversity:

بحالم ناگهان دولت نظر کرد   ز اقلیم دلم محنت بدر کرد
نسیمی بودم از گل بو گرفتم   که کام از خواجهٔ کامو گرفتم
مرا تا پای بوسش دست داد است   فلک بر آستانم سر نهاد است

and again giving advice to his son he says:

رخ ز مشایخ نتوان تافتن   دولت ازین زمره توان یافتن
خدمت پیران طریقت گزین   پیش رو اهل حقیقت گزین
قبلهٔ ما خواجهٔ کامو بس است   در ره ما مشعلهٔ او بس است
دست بفرزند گرامیش ده   همچو پدر سر بغلامیش ده

'Imād once, in a dream, found himself in the agony of death from which he was relieved through the timely aid and blessing of خواجهٔ کاموی :—

قالب من در سکرات اوفتاد — برگذر سیل وفات اوفتاد
مرغ زبانم ز سخن باز ماند — جان من از یاری تن باز ماند
غرق عرق گشته سر و پای من — خون شده در بر دل شیدای من
در تن من جز رمقی هیچ نه — وز بدنم جز عرقی هیچ نه
دل بدر خواجهٔ کاموی شتافت — زانکه جز او هیچ وسیله نیافت
پیر چو از حال من آگاه شد — با من دل سوخته همراه شد
شربت توحید بجانم رساند — ذوق شهادت بزبانم رساند
عاقبة الامر بآهستگی — یافت شفا جانم از آن خستگی
حمد خدا گفتم و شکر و سپاس — در دل من هست هنوز آن هراس

In 741 Kirmān was taken, as already stated, by Sultān Mubāriz'-ud-Dīn or the Muzaffarī ruler of Fārs, and it appears that his attention was attracted both by the piety and poetry of 'Imād. He rose high in the royal favour and was granted by the king some monthly allowance:—

مرا ادرار داد و وقف فرمود — گرامی کرد و قدر افزود و بستود
بچشم شاعری در من ندیدست — که از صاحبدلانم برگزیدست

Mabāriz-ud-Dīn ordered the construction of many new buildings in Kirmān and to this 'Imād refers in his Ṭarīqat Nāmā.

ز سعی او شده برپای را باد — بکرمان آمده دجله ز بغداد
شده معمور از سور و قلاعش — مواضع گشته موقوف بقاعش
در و دار السیادت کرده ترتیب — از آثار النبی پر عنبر و طیب
در گنجینهٔ احسان گشاده — بنای مسجد جامع نهاده

Shāh Shūjā‘ the son and successor of Mubāriz-ud-Dīn was also favourably disposed towards ‘Imād. In his introduction to the Dah Nāma he says:—

مرا لطفش ز خاک راه برداشت　　که ز آب چشم گریانم خبر داشت
همان لطف از کرم با جان من کرد　　که باران بهاری با چمن کرد
مرفه خاطرم اکنون و خرم　　ندارد آشنائی با دلم غم
مرا تا جان بود در جسم بیمار　　دعای خسرو عالم بود کار

Many of his qasīdās are addressed to Shāh Shuja‘ and some of his Mathnawīs, as we shall see, are dedicated to him. ‘Imād had a brother named Majd’-ud-Dīn who accompanied him to Kāmuya and was his fellow-disciple.

با من بیچاره برادر رفیق　　بود و نبودم بجز او کس شفیق
یاری از دودیده ام و اتحاد　　قاعدهٔ خدمت و شرط وداد
ملجاء اخوان صفا مجد دین　　کامل و صاحبدل و عزلت گزین
همدم و همخرقهٔ من پیش پیر　　تیز صفت است رو و گوشه گیر
هر که برادر بودش یار غار　　زود بسامان شودش کار و بار

‘Imād looks upon the life of celibacy with approval.

سزد گر مبتدی باشد مجرد　　که دارد خاطر آسوده مفرد
خوشا دائم خفیف الحال بودن　　در شادی بروی دل گشودن
درین ره ورطهٔ از زن بتر نیست　　مرو در ورطهٔ کش ره بدر نیست

But that he himself did marry and had at least one son is indicated by the following passage in which he addresses his son and gives him advice:—

شمع دل افروز من ای نور چشم — چشم و چراغ دل و منظور چشم
مرغ دل اهل صفا صید تست — دل نشنیدم که نه در قید تست
از پدر طالب آموزگار — موعظهٔ بر ورق دل نگار
دین بکف آر و غم دنیا مخور — همدم پاکان شو و دولت ببر
بندگی حق کن و آزاد باش — جز غم عقبی مخور و شاد باش

The khānqāh in which 'Imād lived at Kirmān was a flourishing place and was visited by the rich and poor alike. That he visited Shirāz and possibly spent some time there, is shown by his celebrating the praise that city in the Mūnis'-ul-abrār, in the course of which he mentions some of its shrines.

There is nothing interesting about the religious views of 'Imād. He is a Sunni of the most orthodox type. Presistently he gives advice to live the life of a devout Muslim, to pray, fast, keep vigils and strictly observe all religious injunctions:—

هرچه از ارکان مسلمانی است — و آنچه درو نکتهٔ ایمانی است
جمله بجا آر مقصر مباش — تا بنکوئی شوی ای خواجه فاش
هر که رود در پی دین کاملست — و آنکه نه دیندار بود جاهل است
بندهٔ آزاد عبادت کند — در شب و در روز زیادت کند
بندگی حق بشب تار کن — رغبت مزدت چه بود کار کن
مذهب خود را لغلو رد مکن — دشمنی سنت احمد مکن

معتقد مردم دیندار باش — منکر بدکیش جفاکار باش
ماه بآخر مرسان بی صیام — شام میاور بسحر بی قیام
فرض بجا آر و بسنت گرای — بر سر سجاده زمانی بیای
صبحدم اوراد و وظائف بخوان — جزوی از احیاء و عوارف(1) بخوان

He lays great stress on the necessity of a pīr and his veneration, and unlike most persian poets, is a believer in dogma.

This is what I have been able to glean from the Kulliyāt. Now what the tadhkiras have to say about 'Imād is only this:—That he belonged to Kirmān where he was held in great veneration by the people on account of his learning and piety; that his poetry was very popular, that he lived in the reign of Mubāriz-'ud-Dīn and Shāh Shujā.' He died, according to Dawlatshāh in 773 and was buried at Kirmān where his shrine is much visited by pilgrims. The story related in the حبیب السیر that he had a cat whom he had taught to pray and that Hāfiz for that reason aimed at him in the verse

ای کبک خوش خرام کجا میروی بایست — غره مشو که گربهٔ عابد نماز کرد

is probably baseless and deserves no credit. There are no indications anywhere either in the کلیات عماد or the دیوان حافظ of any grudge borne by either of them against the other

(1) احیاء is of course the احیاء العلوم of Ghazali while by عوارف is meant the عوارف المعارف of شیخ شهاب الدین سهروردی.

and the above line of Hāfiz must be given its plain and natural interpretatation irrespective of any allusions implied in it.

'Imād, as his title الفقیه (the theologian) suggests, must of course have studied theology well, but he seems to have combined the study of mysticism with it, although his knowledge of the latter appears to be superficial. He has reffered to some of the mystical and philosophical works which he seems to have read. Two of these are احیاء العلوم and عوارف المعارف of which mention has already been made above, another is مصباح الدرایة[1] on which he has entirely based his mystical Mathnawī the ṭariqat Nāma of which I shall presently speak. Then there is the معارف to which also a reference has already been made. In ha lith he mentions a book called مصابیح which in all probability is the مصابیح السنة of امام محی الدین ابن الفراء البغوی الشافعی died 516. His command of the Arabic language seems to be perfect, for he has written several fragmentary poems and a whole qasīdā in Arabic. Among his ghazals frequently occur Arabic verses interwoven with Persian. In poetry, he is a great admirer of Nizāmī:—

چنین دارم روایت از نظامی — که او را می‌سزد میر الکلامی
خداوند سخن گویان عهد اوست — چو عیسی در جهان گویای مهد اوست
ز لفظش ذوق شکر می‌توان یافت — ز شعرش بوی عنبر می‌توان یافت

His مونس الابرار is certainly an imitation of the مخزن اسرار both in form (metre) and thought. Sa'di also is much

1. This مصباح الدرایة I have been unable to ascertain, unless it is identical with مصباح الهدایة و مفتاح الکفایة فی العلوم by کمال الدین کاشی recorded by H. Kh. without mentioning the date of the author.

appriciated by him, for he has more than once imitated him in his qasidas. To this point I shall return when speaking of the qasīdās of 'Imād.

The Kulliyāt of 'Imād.

The poetical career of 'Imād ranges roughly between 730-770 A. H., a period of forty years. The earliest of his dated poems is the Mathnawī صحبت نامه composed in 731, while the last one is the مونس الابرار written in 766. Brief remarks may now be made on these Mathnawis as well as on other portions of his diwān.

1. The مونس الابرار, otherwise called صفا نامه is the 1st in his كليات. Dedicated to شاه شجاع, it is an imitation of the مخزن اسرار.

چون بصفا روی بهنگامه کرد   نامش ازین روی صفا نامه کرد
نامه ز دیوان عدب یافته   مونس الابرار لقب یافته

It contains about 1,300 lines and the largest amount of autobiographical material of which I have made use in writing this paper. The date of its composition is given in the last verse:—

هفتصد و شصت و ششم سال بود   کاخر این نظم نکو فال بود

2. is the مثنوی صحبت نامه in بحر متقارب, written at the request of a friend and dedicated to the minister غياث الدين محمد son of رشيد الدين. It is divided into 10 discourses (مقالات) and contains didactic discussions about the moral duties (آداب) of various classes of society, *e.g.* آداب اهل طريقه - آداب مسافران - آداب طالبان علم—in all nearly 500 verses, the last of which gives the date of composition (731 A. H.)

باخر رسید این همایون مثال   بتوفیق باری بتاریخ ذال

3. is the محبت نامه whose fuller title محبت نامهٔ صاحبدلان form the chronogram giving the date 732 in which year it was written. A mathnawī in the *hazaj* metre, it was written (also at the request of a friend) to give a mystic explanation of love. The feeling of love, according to the poet is to be found in everything, organic or inorganic. The book is dedicated to خواجه تاج الدین عراقی who later became minister to سلطان مبارزالدین.

کتاب عشق را سر باز کردم   همایون نامهٔ آغاز کردم
بنام خواجه تاج الدین عراقی   که بادا جاه و دانش نام باقی

and was completed in a month's time.

کنی در مدت ماهی تمامش   زهی آنکه محبت نامه نامش

In the begining of it, a few verses are addressed to the reigning monarch the Mongol سلطان ابو سعید. The poet boasts that his صحبت نامه written in the previous year had already become popular and now he was therefore encouraged to produce another book:—

جهانگیر است صحبت نامهٔ من   که از وی گرم شد هنگامهٔ من
چو درویش سوی آن درگاه کردم   محبت نامه اش همراه کردم

The following lines give the date of composition:—

بود این مثنوی تاریخ ایام   که تاریخش موافق گشت با نام
محبت نامهٔ صاحبدلان است   که تاریخ کتاب مقبلان است

4. The طریقت نامه is the longest of 'Imād's Mathnawīs in about 3,000 lines composed in 750 and dedicated to سلطان مبارز الدین. The poet says that he has herein reproduced in verse, the mystical work called مصباح الهدایة.

بنظم آرم کتابی بی تکلف زمصباح الهدایة در تصوف
در و ده باب و در هر باب دو فصل که باشد جمله را هم فرع و هم اصل

and again at the end of the book he says.

مرا چون شد ز اهل دل حواله که سازم در تصوف این رساله
شمردم لازم این معنی که اقوال بود منقول ز اهل دل بهر حال
بود نظم ز مصباح الهدایة و یهدی نوره اهل البدایة (1)

The following is the chronogram of its composition:

چو دل در شهریار از مهر بستم فتاد از غیب تاریخی بدستم

i.e. the numerical value of دل added to that of شهریار gives the date 750.

5. The ده نامه is a collection of 10 versified letters in different metres addressed to different persons prefaced with a praise of شاه شجاع. The messenger of these letters is the باد صبا and they contain nothing but messages of love and good will. Of these, two are addressed to شاه شجاع, two to سلطان مبارز الدین, one to خواجه غیاث الدین وزیر and one to خواجه قوام الدین صاحب عیار prime minister of شاه شجاع

(1) Sprenger has erroneously given "مصباح الهدایة" as an alternative title of the طریقت نامه and Ivanow has copied this error in his catalogue of the Asiatic Society.

and sometime Viceroy of کرمان, so that

همیں دولتش کرمان بهشت است   که طومار مشقت در نوشتست

The rest of the lettrs are addressed to friends in عراق and خوارزم. None of these letters contains anything autobiographical.

The قصائد

The historical date yielded by the *qasīdās* of 'Imād is but little. In all these are 34 of which 5 are addressed to سلطان مبارز الدین, 3 to شاه شجاع, 2 to غیاث الدین وزیر prime minister of سلطان ابو سعید, 2 to خواجه تاج الدین عماد to whom, as already said, he dedicated his Mathnawī the محبت نامه; one to خواجه قوام الدین صاحب عیار Viceroy of کرمان from 755 onwards. One qasidā celebrates the praise of II شرف الدین مظفر brother of شاه شجاع while another is an elegy (مرثیه) on him[1]. Another elegy is written on شهاب الدین the son of خواجه مجد الدین الفقیه, the famous jurisconsul of Shirāz. Whom ابن بطوطه has noticed at some length in his travels.

A short fragment commemorates the birth of prince قطب الدین اویس son of شاه شجاع with the chronogram گهر بحر شهی giving 751 as the date of his birth. But of some special interest is a qasīdā addressed to رضیة الدین مخدوم شاه who, I find, was the mother of شاه شجاع and lived for a time at کرمان. This qasīdā beginning:—

ای مهد عصمت ابدی متکای تو   بر تخت ملک کس ننشیند بجای تو

is certainly an imitation of the famous قصیده of Sa'dī, which, curiously enough, is also addressed to a lady *viz.*

(1) His death took place in Jum. II, 754.

ترکان خاتون کرمانی wife of سعد بن ابوبکر زنگی and begins:—

ای پیش ازانکه در قلم آید ثنای تو — واجب بر اهل مشرق و مغرب دعای تو

Besides this, 'Imād has imitated Sa'dī in a few more qasīdās, *e.g.*, one beginning:—

ببرای پیک صبا نامهٔ از من بر یار
در جوابی بنویسد بمن دلشده آر

and another beginning:—

دوش در پردهٔ عزلت نفسی مسکین وار — ایمن از شعبده بازی سپهر غدار

correspond with Sa'dī's qasīda describing the spring season
فی صفت الربیع

بامدادان که تفاوت نکند لیل و نهار
خوش بود دامن صحرا و تماشای بهار

'Imād here has even appropriated one of Sa'dī's Misras: he says:

بست آنجا که دم از معجزهٔ عیسی زد
جائی آنست که کافر بگشاید زنار

The original line of Sa'dī is

آنکه باشد نه ببندد کمر طاعت او
جائی آنست که کافر بگشاید زنار

Another instance is 'Imād's qasīdā in praise of تاج الدین عراقی beginning:—

گر بشبی آن دلفروز همه غدار — مجلس ما برفروزد شمع وار

which agrees with that of Sa'di in praise of انکیا د beginning:—

بس بگردید و بگردد روزگار   دل بدنیا در نه بندد هوشیار

Again 'Imād:—

زهی بردی مرادت در سعادت باز   بر اہل عقل دعایت فریضہ ہمچو نماز

is comparable with Sa'dī:—

شبی چنین در ہفت آسمان برحمت باز   زخویشتن نفسی ای اسیر حق پرداز

and so on.

Ghazals of 'Imād

It is chiefly as a ghazal writer that 'Imād claims our attention. His ghazals, to my mind, can be compared very favourably with those of Hāfiz. Not only are they cast in the same mould of thought and style, but also many of them have a common metre and refrain. I have been able to pick out 22 such ghazals from the Diwān of 'Imād. (1)

A similar comparison between the ghazals of Salmān and Hāfiz has already been shown by Shiblī in the شعرالعجم I certinly share the popular opinion that Hāfiz as a writer of Ghazal defies comparison and 'Imād may not possibly quite come up to his mark, but it must be borne in mind that the poetical career of 'Imād was somewhat anterior to that of Hafiz and we must therefore be mindful of our well-known proverb الفضل للمتقدم.

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(1) These I have now published in full side by side with the ghazals of Hafiz in the Oriental College Magazine (May, August and November 1929.)

رباعیات خیّام

The quatrains of عماد are not many and have nothing in them to arrest our attention. At least one quatrain is particularly noticeable, for we find it included with slight variation among the larger and more modern collections of the رباعیات خیام. It is this:

با ما فلک ار جنگ ندارد عجب است   در برسر ما سنگ نبارد عجب است
قاضی که خرید باده و وقف فروخت   در مسجد اگر بنگ نکارد عجب است

Taking into consideration the age of our MS. we cannot doubt that the quatrain really belongs to عماد and not to خیام.

THE QURAN AND FREEDOM OF WILL.

Muhammad Sadruddin, M. A., D. Litt., Professor of Arabic, Government College, Lahore.

God, the Creator of the whole Universe has created so many kinds of creatures that it is impossible for us to know them wholly on account of a large number being in other worlds or on other planets. Even on our planet there may be many creatures like many laws which are not known to us but among those which are known animals take the first and most prominent place, and of these animals again, the rational animal called man occupies the highest position and is rightly taken to be the noblest of all creatures. Nobility of man, evidently, does not consist in his being an animal, but in his being a *rational* animal, or in other words, in his being endowed with 'Reason', that great gift of God to man, which distinguishes him among other animals, and the right use of which leads him on and on, and facilitates for him the further and further progress on his way to that highest goal which is destined for mankind and in attaining to which consists his greatest pleasure and highest bliss. No one, I hope, will doubt this and will dare question the helpfulness of reason in this respect, excepting only those who have a superficial view of human life. Now, if we think of the long life man has enjoyed on this earth and of the comparatively little progress he has made, especially on his way to his highest and destined goal, we begin to doubt the helpfulness of reason and feel inclined to become pessimistic in this respect. But before growing pessimistic it is necessary for us to find out the cause of this delay and to see what it is due to. A little careful consideration

of the various aspects of human life reveals to us clearly that this delay is not due to the fact that this rational animal is rational, but that this rational animal is animal. Though he believes theoretically that his rational side is higher and superior, but practically he devotes nearly the whole of his time to the service of his animal side. Instead of making his animal side sub-servient to his rational side, he makes his reason a mean and cringing slave to his animal side. Leaving aside illiterate and ignorant people, if we cast a glance at the lives of so many highly educated, erudite and enlightened people, even of the so-called civilised countries in the world, we see clearly the overwhelming majority devoting the greatest attention to the fulfilment of their animal passions and pleasures individually and nationally with utter disregard to the pleasures of other individuals and nations and using 'reason' only to strengthen this lower side of their nature. A further analysis of the human actions will make it clear to us that it is not the use of reason therefore which helps a man in making greater and greater progress, but only the right use of it. Now if we reflect deeply we will see that there are some hinderances in the way of using the reason rightly and unless these are removed from the way, man cannot make the real progress. These hinderances, are to be brief, ignorance, superstitions, prejudice, narrowmindedness, jealousy, fanatacism, bigotry and so on and so forth.

Unless a man removes these obstacles from his way, not only by higher education, but also by high living and high thinking, he cannot use his reason rightly and consequently cannot understand and appreciate the true meaning of the expression "Freedom of Will," what to

say of enjoying it. In other words, he cannot enjoy freedom unless he knows how to control his lower passions and prejudices, for, otherwise it is licence not liberty and abuse of freedom, not freedom.

Now let us take a step further and see how it goes with those men who by carefully controlling their passions and prejudices think highly and live highly, and are called by others great or good men. Are they enjoying perfect freedom of will? Are they quite free to do as they like? Are they possessed of absolute free will? Let a great scientist answer. C. Flammarion the great astronomer and well-known scientist of France says:—"Absolute free will? No, relative free will". "Our liberty is much more restricted than it appears to superficial minds. The cosmic progress of the Universe leads us on. We live under the astronomical conditions, of heat, of cold, of climate, of electricity, of light, of our surroundings, of our heredity, of our education, of our temperament, of our health, of our strength, of will and so on. Our liberty is comparable to that of a passenger on a ship which bears him from Europe to America. His voyage is traced in advance, his liberty stops short at the ship's railing. He can walk upon his floating edifice, talk, read, smoke, sleep, play cards, etc., but he cannot leave his moving home. The sketch of our existence is traced in advance like the movement of the portions of a machine and we have a roll to fill with a certain amount of personal actions. This conditional liberty is certainly very limited, but exists all the same.

After listening to these very clear words of the great scientist, nobody I think, will entertain any doubt about the fact that none can enjoy absolute free will in this

world. On the contrary, there are and have been great men who believed in the absolute negation of free will. The same authority mentions a few names with their ideas about free will which I cannot resist the temptation of quoting here, in some cases very briefly. He says:—

(1) " Laplace one of the greatest and most penetrating of the minds which are the pride of France wrote concerning free will in his "Essai philosophique sur les probabilites":—"The actual events have with what preceded them a relation that is founded upon the self-evident principle that a thing cannot begin to be without a cause which has produced it. This axiom known as the '*principle of sufficient reason*' extends even to the slightest events. The freest possible will cannot without a determining motive give them birth, for if, when all the circumstances of the two positions were exactly the same, it acted in one and refrained from acting in the other, its choice would, in fact, be without cause: it would then be, said Leibnitz, the blind chance of the Epicureans. The contrary opinion is an illusion of the mind, which losing sight of the fugitive reasons, for the choice of the will among indifferent things, persuades itself that it has determined itself and without any reasons. We ought therefore, to see the present state of the Universe as the result of its former state and the cause of that which will follow."

(2) In 1787, Immanuel Kant had written in his "Critique of Pure Reason":—

'From the point of view of time and its regular order, if we could penetrate in the soul of a man so that it will reveal itself by acts internal as well as external, if we could understand all its motives, even the slightest, and at the

same time all the external influences, we could calculate the future conduct of this man with all the certainty of an eclipse of the sun or of the moon.'

(3) Bouche Leclerq in "L'Histoire de la Divination dans l'antiquite" writes that an uncertain future depending upon free will, does not agree with the idea of the fixed laws inspired by the sight of the Universal order, and that the popular instinct anticipating the philosophical theories, has been insuperable in its inclination to consider the future as unavoidable (v. l. p. 15), that the future cannot be foreseen just because it is inevitable (ibid), that there is an unending conflict between prevision and liberty and that the one sets aside the other (ibid p. 16).

(4) Schopenhauer in his "Essay on free will" writes: "If we do not admit the rigorous necessity of all that happens by virtue of causality which compels all events, without exception, any prevision is impossible and inconceivable (p. 124).

(5) "In the conversations of Goethe with Eckermann we may read, under the date of October 13, 1825: 'As soon as we grant liberty to man, that is the end of the Omniscience of God; and if on the other hand, God knows what I shall do, I am not free to do anything but what He knows. I cite this dilemma only as an example of the little we know and to show that it is not good to touch upon divine secrets."

These are great men, far above the level of so many educated people of these days. They are the believers in the absolute negation of free will, they are the 'fatalists'. But our great authority, the well-known Flammarion does not agree with them and has his own way of thinking. In

order to bring home to you what he thinks in this respect and how he replies to their arguments, I cannot but quote his own words. He says:—"It is true that the freest will in the world cannot act without a determining motive. But among the causes concerned in the choice our own personality exists and that is not a negligible cause".

"That we decide in accordance with the predominant motive does not prove that we do not act according to our character."

"Events and happenings generally influence us more than we believe. Let each one analyse attentively the acts of his life and he will readily recognise this. Our free will finds play only in a very restricted compass of activity. 'Man proposes and God disposes', goes an old saying. This is not entirely exact. God or Destiny leaves a little liberty. The proverb that is the opposite of the preceding one, puts it this way, 'Heaven helps those who help themselves.' Yes, man proposes and events dispose: but at the same time we are the builders of our own destiny."

"To suppress liberty would be to suppress all responsibility, all moral valuation, to equalize the good and the evil, to which our inner certainty is opposed. In this case we should have to give up our clearest and most evident ideas".

"However much of a fatalist you may believe yourself, you run as quickly as possible after the doctor, you serve the country against invader, you call the fire department to put out a fire, you put out a fire which has started from a spark falling on your papers in your work-room, you have reason and you make use of it. This does not at all prove that you lack it and that you are an automaton".

Having thus refuted the arguments of both, the fatalists and libertarians, C. Flammarion, who is himself a determinist, puts down very clearly what he believes about the freedom of will and says: "Fatalism and determinism are two doctrines absolutely different from each other, and that it is necessary not to cofuse them, as is generally done. In the first, man is a passive being who awaits events which are inevitable. In the second, on the contrary, man is active and forms a contributing cause."

"Fatalism is the doctrine of the drowsy; fatalists await events which they suppose must come to pass nevertheless and in spite of everything. The contrary is the case, we work and co-operate in the march of events. Far from being passive we are active, we ourselves construct the edifice of the future. Determinism ought not to be confounded with fatalism. The latter represents inertia, the former represents action. Fatalism is Oriental, Turkish; determinism is European. There is an abyss between the two civilisations".

It is clear from the foregoing that no sane person believes in the Absolute liberty or Freedom of will, and that there are great men who believe in Fatalism or absolute negation of free will and that there are great men who believe in conditional liberty or determinism. You have also heard Flammarion say that Fatalism is Oriental, Turkish, probably because of the fact that the Turks as Mussulmans have been taken to be Fatalists by others or because of the decline of the Turkish power. I am sure if Flammarion had read the Quran carefully, he would have hesitated before making this remark, for, the Quran is more in favour of the determinists, those who like Flammarion believe in the well-known saying

"God helps those who help themselves," than in favour of those who like fatalists believe in the saying "Man proposes and God disposes."

It is now time for me to explain the attitude of the Quran towards freedom of will. For this purpose, I will give below the translations of some of its verses, and will leave it to you, gentlemen, to judge whether this holy book makes a man Fatalist or Determinist. But before doing this, let me put before you, the remarkably illuminating observation about the teachings of the Quran in this respect, of the ablest and the most renowned authority on Muslim Theology, the late lamented Professor I. Goldziher in his Vorlesungen (p. 92-94), its French translation (p. 72-74). He says:—"I should like to utilise the opportunity offered here to make an observation of some importance for the understanding of the problem of Free will in the Quran. A large part of the words of Muhammad (Blessings and peace be upon him) from which one ordinarily pretends to conclude that it is God Himself Who determines the sinfulness of a man, who leads him into error, would appear under another aspect, if we thoroughly examine the sense of the word which one generally renders by the term 'mislead.' If in a large number of passages of the Quran it is said: "Allah guides to the right path whom He wills, and guides to the wrong path whom He wills," such sentences do not mean to teach that God directly puts on the evil path people of the second category. The decisive word 'adalla' in such a connection, is not to be taken to mean 'make to err,' but 'leave to err,' not to care about some one, not to indicate to him the means of getting out. "We leave them (nad-aruhum) erring in their obstinacy" (6, v. 110.) One may picture to himself a solitary traveller in the desert—

it is from this idea that the Quranic expressions about 'leading' and 'misleading' are derived. The traveller errs in a space having no boundary waiting for the right lead to his goal. So is the case with man on the journey of life. But him who makes himself worthy of the favours of God by faith and good deeds, God rewards with His guidance; him who does evil deeds He leaves erring, withdraws from him His grace, does not extend to him the hand of guidance, but not that He puts him directly on the evil path. Hence the metaphors of blindness and of groping are readily used while speaking of sinners. They do not see, and must therefore err aimless and purposeless. As no guide helps them, they precipitate themselves irretrievably into ruin. "Illuminations are come from your God: whoever sees, sees to his own benefit; whoever is blind is so at his own cost." (6. v. 104). Why did he not utilise the light which was offered to him? "We have revealed the Book to thee for people, he who lets himself be guided by it, does so for his own self, but he who goes astray (dalla) does so at his own expense." (39, v. 42.)

The abandonment to one's self, the withdrawal of divine solicitude is a dominant idea in the Quran, with regard to the people who, by their previous conduct, render themselves unworthy of the Divine Grace. When God says that He forgets the impious because they forget Him (7, v. 49; 9, v. 68; 45, v. 33), He draws the consequence from this idea. God forgets sinners, that is to say, He does not care about them. The guidance is a reward which he accords to good. "Allah does not guide the impious people" (9, v. 110), He leaves them erring aimlessly: The infidelity is not the effect but the cause of going astray (47, v. 9, specially 61, v. 5). It is true that "he whom God leaves in the error does not find the right path (42,

v. 45), that "he whom He leaves in the error has no guide" (40, v. 35) and goes to meet his doom (7, v. 77). But everywhere it is the question of a punishment consisting in the withdrawal of directing grace and not of misleading, which would be the cause of impiety. It is this which the old Mussulmans, who were near the original conceptions very strongly felt and did. In a *hadith* it is said: he who misses heedlessly (tahâwunan), three reunions of Friday, has his heart sealed by God. Therefore by "sealing of heart" one understands a state into which the man falls only by the negligence of religious duties. And an old prayer which the Prophet teaches to the neophyte Husain converted to Islam, says: "O Allah, teach me my direction and guard me against the evil of myself," that is to say; abandon me not, to my own self, extend to me the hand of guidance. But there can be no question of misleading here. On the contrary the sentiment that the abandonment to one's self is the most rigorous divine punishment, impregnates an old Islamic formula of oath: 'If my assertion corresponds not to the reality (in the affirmative oath) God may exclude me from His power and His force (hawl-wa-quwwa) and may abandon me to my own power and my own force, that is to say: He may withdraw from me His hand so that I may have to see for my ownself in whatever way I may manage without His guidance and His help.' In this sense we must understand that God leaves the sinners to err but not that He misleads them".

Here ends the quotation from Vorlesungen. I do not think any doubt is left in the mind of any one as to the teachings of the Quran with regard to the freedom of will, so clearly explained by the learned scholar of

Hungary. It is clear that according to the Quran, God having pointed out the straight path, has left man free to choose and to work out his own weal or woe as he pleases. But to bring it home to you, I feel the need of saying something more, and to save your time, will confine myself to giving the translations of some of the verses of the Quran which will make the matter clear to every one who is not a prejudiced or sworn bigot.

The Quran says:—

1. "And if God had pleased, He would certainly have guided all of them, therefore, be not of the ignorant. Only those accept who listen". (S. 6, v. 35-36).

2. "And if God had pleased, they would not have associated others with Him and We have not appointed thee a keeper over them, and thou art not placed in charge of them". (S. 6, v. 108).

3. "And if thy lord had pleased they would not have done it, therefore leave them alone with that which they forge". (S. 6, v. 113 and 138).

4. "Say: then God's is the conclusive argument; so if He please, He would certainly guide you all". (S. 6, v. 150).

5. "And if thy Lord had pleased, surely all those who are on the earth would have believed all of them; wilt thou then force men till they become believers?" (S. 10, v. 99).

6. "And if He please, He would certainly guide you all aright". (S. 16, v. 9).

7. "Perhaps thou wilt kill thyself with grief because they do not believe. If We please, We should send down upon them a sign from the heaven, so that their necks should stoop to it". (S. 26, v. 3-4).

8. "And were God to punish people for what they earn, He would not leave on the surface of it (Earth) any creature, but He grants them respite till an appointed term". (S. 35, v. 45).

9. "And if God had pleased, He would surely have made them a single community, but He makes whom He pleases enter into His mercy, and for the unjust, there is neither any guardian nor any helper." (S. 2, v. 8).

10. "And if God had pleased they would not have fought one with another, but God does what He wills". (S. 2, v. 253).

These verses clearly tell us (1) that God commands the Prophet to deliver his message and not to force or compel any one, because he has not been appointed a keeper over them or placed in charge of them, (2) that God can punish people or destroy them wholly for their disbelief and evil deeds, but He has not done so and has left them free, and granted them respite till an appointed term, and (3) that God would certainly have put all persons on the right path if He had so willed, but then evidently life would have been quite different, free from so much struggle and strife. After hearing and understanding these translations of the verses of the Quran, no one can assert even for a single moment that God forces us to do things or compels our will in whatever way He pleases. Certainly not. How can it be so when He commands the prophet not to compel any one to become a believer like him and to have the disbelievers to do what they like after he has delivered to them the message, and persuaded them to worship God alone?

Let us proceed further. The Quran says (1) "Whoever desires this life We hasten to him therein what We please

for whomsoever We will, then We assign to him the hell; he shall enter it despised, driven away. And whoever desires the hereafter, and strives for it as he ought to strive and he is a believer, then these are they whose striving shall be recompensed. All do We aid—these as well as those—out of the bounty of thy Lord and the bounty of thy Lord is not confined". (S. 17, v. 18-20).

2. "Whoever desires the gain of the hereafter, We will give him more of that gain; and whoever desires the gain of this life, We will give him of it, and in the hereafter he has no share". (S. 42, v. 20).

3. "And whoever desires the reward of this life, We will give him of it, and whoever desires the reward of the hereafter, We will give him of it; and We will reward the grateful". (S. 3, V. 144).

These verses clearly show that a man is left quite free to choose this life or the next life or both. He will be given by God whatever he prefers for himself. But this freedom does not mean that he can in any way change the laws of God, for the law requires that the person who has totally disregarded the next life and has done nothing for the same, can justly have no share in that life and will naturally suffer just as it requires, that those who try to gain from this life as well as from the next, will be rewarded similarly but this desire for the double gain must be expressed in actions and not merely in words. Science has proved that there is not a single thing in this world which becomes nothing be that thing material or an action or an idea and thought. 'As you sow, so shall you reap' was true, is true and will remain true for ever. This takes us further to responsibility of man for his actions which is

the natural consequence of this freedom of will and this responsibility will become quite clear from the following verses of the Quran :

1. "And no person earns evil but against his own self, and no bearer of burden shall bear the burden of another". (S. 6, v. 165 cf. S. 35, v. 18).

2. "Whoever follows the right path he does so only for his own benefit, and whoever goes astray, he does so to his own detriment alone and no bearer of burden shall bear the burden of another." (S. 17, v. 15 cf. S. 39, v.7).

3. "So whoever follows the right path, he does so for his own benefit, and whoever goes astray, then say: I am only one of the warners." (S. 27, v. 62).

4. "Say: you will not be questioned as to what we are guilty of, nor shall we be questioned as to what you do". (S. 34, v. 25).

5. "Whoever does good, gains for his own self, and whoever does evil, suffers for his own self; and thy Lord is not in the least unjust to the servants." (S. 41, v. 46).

6. "Whoever does good, gains for his own self, and whoever does evil, suffers for his own self; then you shall be brought back to your Lord". (S. 45, v. 15).

7. "Every man is responsible (pledged) for what he (shall have) wrought". (S. 25, v. 21 cf. S. 74, v. 38).

8. "There have come to you clear proofs from your Lord; whoever will, therefore, see, does so for his own benefit, and whoever remains blind, it is against his own self; and I am not a keeper over you." (S. 6, v. 105).

Can anything be clearer than these verses? Can any one still assert that the Quran does not teach freedom of

will? No one I believe, provided he is not a bigoted and biased fanatic. This life is a struggle, a trial, gentlemen, in which we are to develop our faculties and to brighten our minds more and more that we may go on rising higher and higher to that splendid and glorious goal which is destined for man. It will not be out of place, therefore, if I quote a few verses from the Quran to show that this life is a trial for us.

The Quran says "Blessed is He in whose hand is the kingdom and He has power over all things, Who created death and life that He may try you—which of you is best in deeds". (S. 67 v. 1-2).

"And He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six periods—and His throne is on water, that He may try you which of you is best in actions". (S. 11 v. 7).

"And He it is Who has made you successors on the earth and raised some of you above others by various grades that He may try you in what He has given you". (S. 6, v. 166).

These verses clearly show that in this life we are to utilise all the faculties and powers given to us by God to the fullest extent because we are not to become nothing after death, but are to change this life for that life in which we will have to occupy a position which our actions here entitle us to.

We are responsible for what we do in this life, therefore we must use our will in a way which may help us in attaining to a high position in this life as well as in the next. The freedom of will is a great gift of God and we must appreciate it and utilise it in the best and the wisest way. Otherwise we alone are to suffer and not God. Mind this.

I think I have made the teachings of the Quran about freedom of will quite clear, but if still there be any one who is not fully convinced I may quote a verse or two more, which will surely convince him, provided he is not a biased person or a bigot.

The Quran says: "Say: the truth is from your Lord, so any one who likes may believe and any one who likes may disbelieve". (S. 18, v. 29).

"There is no compulsion in religion, truly the right way has become clearly distinct from the wrong way; therefore whoever disbelieves in the devil and believes in God, he indeed has laid hold on the firmest handle which shall not break off, and God is Hearing, Knowing". (S. 2, v. 256).

Listen! Gentlemen, here is the real freedom. Enjoy yourself in whatever way you like. Believe in God and His laws or disbelieve, maintain towards God and His creatures the right attitude or wrong, do whatever you like and live in any way you prefer but remember that you have no control over His laws, you cannot change any of His laws and you cannot shake off the responsibility for your deeds. Adieu.

A. MS. OF NAṢIR 'ALI'S MATHNAWĪ.

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I am indebted to my friend Mr. M. H. Syed of the Urdu Department, University of Allahabad, for his generosity of placing at my disposal his valuable MS. of Nāṣir 'Alī Sarhindī's most important Mathnawī*, which I intend to study in the following pages. Acquired at Bijapur in 1927, the Mathnawī forms a part of the collection of numerous poems in Persian and Dakkhini. The collection opens with the well-known Persian poem, the Mathnawī "Nān-o-ḥalwā" of Bahā'ud-dīn-i-'Amilī[1]. It begins with.

ایها اللاهی عن العهد القدیم   ایها الساهی عن النهج القویم
استمع ماذا یقول العندلیب   حیث یروی من احادیث العجیب

and is preceded by the brief khutba:—

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم. اما بعد حمداً لله علی افضاله و الصلوة و السلام علی اشرف الخلائق محمد و (علی) آله: فیقول افقر العباد الی رحمة الله الغنی محمد المشتهر بهاء الدین العاملی وفقه الله العمل فی یوم بعده قبل ان یخرج الامر من یده. هذه نبذة من السوانح وجملة من الموانح، قد سنح اکثرها فی طریق حج بیت الله الحرام وزیارة سید الانام علیه و (علی) آله افضل الصلوة (sic) والسلام اثبتها فی هذه الاوراق تذکرة منی (الی) الاحباء الراغبین للاخلاء البین (sic) وعلی الله التوکل ومنه استمد (د) به استعین.

It consists of about three hundred couplets, ending with :—

کم انادی وهولا یصغی التناد   وافؤادی وافؤادی وافؤاد

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* Generally designated as the "Religious" Mathnawi.

1. Died in Shawwal, 1033 A. H. (1621 A. D.).

Next comes (2) the Mathnawī of Nāṣir ʿAlī Sarhindi, which is followed by

(3) the Mathnawī entitled Miʿrājul-Khayāl of ʿAlī Riḍā Tajallī[1], which in the end bears the date 1354 A. H.

(4) A Persian Mathnawī of Mirzā Bedil[2] with the heading (قصه تصنیف میرزا بیدل) comprising 141 couplets, beginning with:—

مرا پیری که راسخ کیش بود او   همانا خضر وقت خویش بود او

(5) A short Persian poem of twenty five couplets, by Niʿmat Khān ʿĀlī, bearing the head line[3] :—

در تعریف کتخدائی کامگار خان، من تصنیف نعمت خان عالی

(6) A Persian *Mathnawī* described in the head line as a selection (انتخاب) from the Mathnawi of Muhammad Rāsikh[4] and beginning with:—

جنون آموز قانون حکایت   خراش زخمه تار روایت

(7) A Persian *Mathnawī* by Ḥashmat,[5] beginning with:—

درین چنبرین قصر سرپوش دار   به قلیان مرا صحبت اندر برآر

1. One of the court poets of ʿAbbas II and Sulayman, the Safawis; died 1088 A. H. (1677 A. D.).

2. Died in Safar, 1133 A. H. (November, 1720 A. D.)

3. Kamgar Khan was the second son of ʿUmdatul-Mulk Jaʿfar Khan, the Prime Minister of Aurangzeb. After the conquest of Golkunda (1098 A. H.) he was wedded to the daughter of Sayyid Muzaffar, the Vizier of Sultan Abul-Hasan, the deposed king of Golkunda. This marriage came off in 1099, about a year after the conquest of Golkunda. It was to celebrate this marriage that Niʿmat Khan ʿAli composed this satirical poem. ʿAzad Bilgrami's commentary on this poem forms a part of the account of ʿAli's life in the Khizana-i-ʿAmira.

4. An eminent poet of Sarhind and a friend and contemporary of Nasir ʿAli, died 1107 A. H. only a year before the latter's death. He held a respectable office in the service of Prince ʿAʿzam Shah (the son of Aurangzeb) and enjoyed the lofty mansab of 7,000.

5. Bakhshi ʿAli Khan Hashmat, who flourished in the time of Nawwab Salabat Jang of Haydarabad about the year 1164 A. H. (1751 A. D.).

and bearing the heading (مثنوی فلدان از حشمه)

(8) A *Mathnawī* in Dakkhanī, said to be the (عمل نامه) of one 'Abrām Khān Afghān of Bāngar-Mau[1].

(9) Another Dakkhinī *Mathnawī*[2], covering eight pages and beginning with:—

الہی تری حمد مقدور نین　　اگرچہ سخی کا یہ دستور نین

(10) Another long Dakkhinī *Mathnawī*, which runs into forty-one pages and bears the date 11th of Rabi I of the 20th year of the reign of Muhammad Shāh, corresponding to 1151 A. H.

(11) A Persian *Mathnawī* described as the work of Mirzā 'Abdul-Qādir Bedil and headed (قصه مبتدی). It opens with the couplet

ذکر آن دختر مردانه قدم　　که شد بخیال مبهم

and consists of 113 couplets closing with

گرچه پیرم بعد کتاب افتاد　　لیک آن داغم انتخاب افتاد

(12) A Persian *Mathnawī* written in celebration of the Holī festival by one Gulāb Rāi surnamed Bekhud, who seems to have been some Kāyastha poet of the South. He opens his poem with:

بیا ای تیز رو پیک کبوتر　　که بر بندم بیالت نامهٔ تر

and is not satisfied till he completes the number 80. This *Mathnawī* is followed by

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1. Bangar-Mau, District Unnao, U. P. of Agra and Oudh.

2. In the فہرست given after the MS. of the "Nan-o-Halwa" this poem is styled as مثنوی درد امند and No. (10) is entitled as مثنوی حسن و عشق of Mir Sayyid Muhammad Walih of Haydarabad.

(13) another Persian *Mathanwī* written in the same metre and strain, and as a retort to the last one, by one Rāi Muntakhab (?) Rai surnamed Himmat (?), who opens his حمد مثنوی with:—

بدیہ آورد مکتوب کبوتر　　　که از منقراض لا افشانده شہپر

and carries on up to 154 couplets, almost double the number of that of Bekhud. And with this the collection ends.

The collection seems, till quite as recently as 1329 A. H., to have been in possession of Nawwab ʻĀbid-Yār Jang[1] of Haydarābād Deccan, as appears from p. 2 of the fly-leaf, which bears the words:

گزرانیدهٔ عابد یار جنگ
مختلف مثنویہا . . . . . . ماہ ربیع الثانی شریف سنہ ۱۳۲۹ ھ
حیدر آباد دکن

But the black-and-white stamp of some former (apparently the first) owner, Rāi Dūlah (or Dawlat) Singh, appears in seven places in the Collection, in spite of the attempts of some later possessor at erasing it out of recognition and decipherment. There is, however, another smaller stamp in the beginning of No. (4) which is quite clearly inscribed with the name of Rāi Dūlah (Dawlat ?).

To come to the Mathnawī of Nāsir ʻAlī. The MS. occupies seventy-five pages, covering 1131 couplets, and is written in a fairly good Nastaʻlīq hand, which suffers from looseness here and there. Though worm-eaten, the

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1. For many years in charge of the administration of Niyazat and Dargahs, as also of the Makka Masjid in Haydarabad (Deccan). Died recently.

MS. is easily legible. Some of the last pages seem to have suffered more than the first ones from the effect of damp, but the copy is on the whole quite clear. Fol. 1 a and the last page bear the stamp of Rāi Dūlah Singh, and the following sentence appears at the end:—

تمت تمام شد مثنوی مرزا (sic) ناصر علی بتاریخ بیست و یکم شهر محرم الحرام سنه ۳۰ جلوس
عالمگیری و هجری سنه یکهزار و نود و نه والسلام علی من اتبع الهدی

Besides the present MS. sixteen other copies of the Mathnawī are traceable in different libraries. The British Museum (Reiu, Vol. II, p. 699, No. 315) has a copy of the Dīwān of Nāṣir 'Ali beginning with the first couplet of the Mathnawī:

الهی ذرهٔ دردی بجان ریز شرر در پنبه زار استخوان ریز

It is described as consisting of "two Daftars and is followed by other short *mathanwīs*. No date is mentioned. The Bodleian Library, No. 1151, is dated the 9th, of Safar 1135 A. H. (= Nov. 19, 1722 A. D.), while No. 1152 bears no date. The India Office possesses three copies. Of these No. 1646 comprises it along with some other *mathnawīs* by the same poet. No. 1647, styled as " the longest Mathnawī" is distinguished by having various readings on the margin. Neither of the two is dated, nor is No. 1648, which is only an incomplete copy. No. 1646, however, mentions a " special copy of this Mathnawī" as noticed by W. Pertsch, Berlin, Catalogue, p. 697, No. 15. Gotha (W. Pertsch, p. 80), has a copy comprising 1,000 couplets. The Asiatic Society of Bengal boasts of the largest number of the copies of this Mathnawi, Nos. 813—816. The first, No. 813, is mentioned as a *mathnawī*-poem in Sufic strain and is said to be " a bad copy." No. 814 is included in a large collection of

treatises on different subjects; No. 815 is only a fragment of the poem; and No. 816 is "incomplete at the end". The dates of these four MSS. range from the beginning to the middle of the twelfth century A. H., the only precise date being that of 816, the other parts of the collection of which are dated 1134 A. H.

It will thus be clear that the only certain date of the MSS. of this Mathnawi is 1135 A. H.—1722 A. D. (Bodl., 1151.) Even if we take into consideration the MS. copies of the Dīwān (containing *ghazals, fards, qasīdās* and *raba'is*) of Nāṣir 'Alī, we find the dates ranging between 1132 A. H. (India Office No. 1640) and 1164 A. H. (Bankipore, No. 363, Vol. III, p. 171), after which nearly a century elapsed before the first lithographed copy of the Dīwān was published at Lucknow in 1844 A. D., 1260 A. H., subsequent editions of the Dīwān appearing in 1263 and 1281 (A. H.) All the three editions of the Dīwān, however, contain only *ghazals* (arranged alphabetically), some *fards* and *ruba'is, the mathnawīs finding no place among them.*

The Punjab University Library at Lahore has a MS. copy which bears no date and comprises about one thousand couplets.[1] The Rampur State MSS. Library has two copies, both of which are dateless, besides a printed copy, which was printed at Hyderabad Deccan in 1312 A. H.[2] Another incomplete and dateless MS. is in possession of Professor Fazl-i-Haq of Lahore.

The fact is, therefore, indisputable that the present

1. The Oriental College Magazine (Lahore, Nov. 1928), p. 70.
2. For this information I am indebted to Hafiz Ahmad Ali Khan, the learned Curator of the Rampur Library.

MS., dating from 1099 A. H., is the oldest copy of the Mathnawī, having been written a year (may be only a few months) before the poet left his home[1] at Sarhind for the Imperial Camp at Bijapur, and nine years before his death, which occurred in 1108 A. H. 1697 A. D.

The author, Nāṣir 'Alī[2], with the pen-name of 'Alī was a well known and eminent poet of India in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and thrived during the reign of emperor Awrangzīb. It is indeed regrettable that no direct clue can be found to the date of the poet's birth. But since he is said to have died when he was about sixty his birth may be dated in 1640 or so. This much however, is certain in that he was born and bred at Sarhind[3], whence he derives his appellation of Sarhindi. The author of Farhatun-Nāẓirīn, writing in 1184 A. H. (1770 A. D.), more than seventy years after the poet's death[4], seem doubtlessly to be labouring under a misconception when he puts down Lahore as the poet's home (موطن) and the improbability of the fact becomes patent when he makes Sarhind the poet's permanent residence (نقد عمر وارستگی در سرهند می گزرانید). Sarhind is situated near Ambala in the Panjab, being at a distance of about six miles from the railway station Sarhind on the North Western Railway. After the Muslim conquest it had become a fief of Dihli, and long continued to be an important stronghold of the Dihli empire. Under the Moghul

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1. In 1100 A. H. (A. D 1688). See Khizana-i-'Amira (Cawnpore, 1871), p. 329.
2. Wrongly styled in the colophon of this MS. (q. v. *supra*) as Mirza.
3. Originally Sahrind. See Sarw-i-Azad of Azad Bilgrami, Lahore, 1913, p. 126. The Sarw was written in A. H. 1166 (1762 A. D.).
4. The Oriental College Magazine, Lahore, May 1928, p. 92.
5. Ibid., August 1928, p. 98.

sovereigns it was one of the most flourishing towns, with hundreds of mosques, schools, *sarāis* and wells; but nowadays a greater part of it lies in ruins, extending for several miles. The place has consequently dwindled into a small town with a population of about seven thousand souls, and owes its chief importance to the two great Muslim saints, Shaykh Ahmad (the *Mujaddid*) and his son the Khwāja Ma'ṣūm, whose mausoleums attract a very large number of pious visitors every year in the lunar months of Ṣafar and Rabī I.

The poetical works of Alī Sarhindī are all in Persian. Ghulām 'Alī Āzād, the author of Khiza-i-Āmira, skilfully compares him with the Fourth Caliph, 'Ali. He calls him the chief of the family of Eloquence (سرحلقهٔ ارباب فصاحت) and completes the figure by placing him in charge of the Fountain of Poetry (کوثر سخن) like unto his great namesake, whom popular fancy holds as the supervisor and distributor of the plentious waters of the *Kawthar* fountain in the paradise. While duly recognising the worth and merit of Nāsir 'Ali's *ghazals*[1], Āzād regards him as matchless in the field of *mathnawī*[2], and after quoting two couplets from this Mathnawī, he goes on to

1. Note Nasir 'Ali's utterance:—

با این شوخی غزل گفتن علی از کس نمی آید　　بایران میفرستم تا که میگوید جوابش را!

It was this couplet that called (from his contemporary, the poet Sa'ib the retort:—

بایران کی خرامد فکر بکر ناصر هندی　　که طفل مکتب صاحب بدر اند نقابش را

and the rejoinder of 'Ali:—

علی شعرم بایران مے برد شهرت ازان ترسم　　که صائب خون بگرید آب در دفتر شود پیدا

say, "Although some *mathnawī*-writers have adopted his way, but every one of them has failed to attain to his standard .... The people of Baghdad are conversant with Arabic, as well as with Persian. In their assemblies of esoteric fervour and ecstasy (مجلس ذوق و سماع) they recite mostly the Arabic poems of Iban al-Fāriḍ al-Miṣrī and very often (اکثر) the Persian Mathnawī of Nāṣir 'Alī". Sarkhush, himself a poet of no mean repute, and author of the celebrated biography of poets entitled the Kalimātush Shu'arā', speaks of him thus:—

در ملک سخن بود جهانگیر علی — در مشرب دل ولی علی پیر ولی
با شعر علی نمی رسد شعر کسی — ز انسان که خط کس بخط میر علی

In the domain of poetry 'Alī was the overlord. In Assembly of the Heart 'Alī was the saint, 'Alī was the leader. None can vie in excellence with the poetical utterances of 'Alī, just as none can vie with Mīr 'Alī.[2] In the excellence of calligraphy.

He enjoyed the patronage of Awrangzīb's two noblemen Sayf Khān Badakhshī[3] and Dhul-Fiqār Khan[4]. On the

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1. Sarw-i-'Azad, p 121. اگر چه غزل را باسلوب تازه جلوه داد، اما در مثنوی ید بیضای نماید
2. Khawaja Mir 'Ali Tabrizi was the originator of the eighth mode of writing evolved from the Naskh and the Taliq modes, and a peerless calligraphist of his day. He thrived during the ascendency of Tamerlane, and was a contemporary of the poet Kamal-i-Khujandi)d. 803 A. H.-1400 A. D). See Tadh-Kira-i-Khushnawisan of Ghulam Muhammad (Ed. Hidayat Husayn, Calcutta, 1910); and Ain-i-Akbari, I, 114.
3. Sayf-ud-Din Mahmud, known as Mirza Faqirullah and entitled as Sayf Khan (son of Tarbiyat Khan, a Bakhshi at the court of Emperor Shah-Jahan) held governorships of Agra, Kashmir, Bihar and Allahabad, and died in A. H. 1095. He is the author of a valuable treatise on Indian Music and Dancing. entitled Rag-Darpan. See Ma'athirul-'Umara', II, 479-485.
4. Muhammad 'Isma'il, entitled Dhul-Fiqar Khan (formerly I'tiqad Khan), son of 'Asad Khan'Asafud-Dawla and son-in-law of the great 'Amirul-'Umra' Shayista Khan, was one of the esteemed noblemen of Awrangzib. Born in 1067 A. H. (1657 A. D.) he held several appointments under the Emperor. Bahadur Shah gave him the title of Samsamud-Dawla 'Amirul-'Umra' Bahadur Nusrat Jang, together with the governorship of the Deccan. He suffered disgrace at the hands of Emperor Farrukh-Siyar, by whose orders he was strangled to death in 1124 A. H. (1713 A. D.) See Ma'athirul-'Umara', II, 93-106.

former's appointment as the Subedār of Allahabad the poet accompanied him thither and enjoyed a happy life at that sacred city, and returned to his home in Sarhind after the death of his patron. The inspiration that the poet drew from him is very well evidenced by his utterance:—

گفت وگوی طوطی از آئینه می خیزد علی
گر نباشد سیف خان ما را نفس درکار نیست (1)

O 'Alī, only a mirror inspires a parrot to twitter. If there be no Sayf Khan we do not require the breath (to enable us to speak).

His great love for drinking did not fail to attract severe bans from the puritan-spirited *ulema* of the day and would have cost him his life, if his friend Mīr Muhammad Zamān Rāsikh, who was then at Sarhind, had not sent him on to Dihli. Later on, however, he fell under the influence of Shaykh Muhammad Ma'sūm of Sarhind, whom he accepted as his spiritual guide, and not only gave up all follies of youth, but became a staunch *sūfī*.

Shaykh Muhammad Ma'sūm, known as عروة الوسقی (The firm handle) and قیوم ثانی was the son of the great Indian saint Shaykh Ahmad of Sarhind, styled as مجدد الف ثانی (The Renewer of the Second Millennium) and قیوم اول. He is said to have been a descendant of the Second Orthodox Caliph, 'Umar, and in the twenty-ninth generation from him. He was born in 1009 A. H. 1600 A. D., the year which was always regarded by his father as

1. Ma'athirat-'Umara', II. 484.

an auspicious date, for it was in that year that he (the Mujaddid) met his spiritual guide, the Khwājā Bāqī Billāh for the first time. Shaykh Ma'ṣūm completd the course of his education when he was only sixteen. After that he attended to the development of his spiritual self. The aspirant soon became a perfect *ṣūfī*. His father regarded him as the best and almost perfect of his children, and adopted him as one of his *khalīfas*. The Emperor Shāh Jahān is said to have always courted the ambition of meeting him, but the pleasure was not vouchsafed to him. The Emperor Awrangzīb did, however, enjoy the privilege of being a devotee of his. The Shaykh was indeed one of the eminent saints of the Naqsh-bandī school, among the adherents of which he commands great esteem. His mausoleum at Sarhind is the scene of a large assemblage on the 9th. of Rabi' I, the date of his death in the year 1079 A. H. 1668 A.D.

In 1100 A. H. the poet left his home for the Imperial camp at Bijapur, where he met and enjoyed the patronage of Dhul-Fiqār Khān. It was in praise of this patron of his that 'Ali composed his famous *qasīdā* beginning with:

ای نشان حیدری ز جبین تو آشکار   نام تو در نبرد کند کار ذو الفقار

And it is on record that this *matla'* alone brought him from the Khan a reward of an elephant with an enormous amount of money.[1] The poet was with Dhul-Fiqār Khān, when in 1103 (A. D. 1691) he marched on Karnatak with intentions to effect a conquest of that territory. In fact he was constantly in company of the Khan till he returned to Shāhjahānābād, where he passed his

1. Ma'athirul-'Umnra', II, 101.

last days living as a *qalandar*, and passed away on the 20th of Ramaḍān, 1108 A. H. 1697 A. D. at an age of nearly sixty years, and was buried in the vicinity of the mausoleum of the great saint, the Sulṭānul-Mashā' ikh Niẓāmuddīn of Dihli.[1] Besides the two illustrious patrons named above, the poet was patronised by (*i*) Shāh 'Adil, son of Khwājā Shāh entitled Sharīf Khān, whom the poet praised in a *qasīdā* beginning with:

منم آن طفل نظر کردهٔ استاد قدیم   که بود نقطهٔ سهوالقلم فکر حکیم

and (*ii*) Ghazanfar Khān, who was for some time Governor of Coujeevaram and in whose praise Nāṣir 'Alī has:[2]

هیچو پیل بی جگر بگریزد از میدان ما   بشنود گر گوره آواز غضنفر خان ما

Of all the MSS. mentioned above only Pertsch (Gotha, p. 80) records that the Mathnawī contains 1,000 *baits*. But the present MS. has 1116 *baits*, adding to which the 15 couplets suggested on the margin (on pp. 8, 11, 20, 21, 27, 46, 49, 53, 59, 62 and 65) for insertion in the body of the poem, we get the total number 1131, which exceeds the Gotha MS. by as many as 131. The whole poem is couched in the hexametrical form[3] of the metre Hazaj, each hemistich having three feet. But there are certain pieces interspersed here and there that do not follow this metre. The first five of those pieces (on pp. 3, 5, 9, 9-10, 14) have been written in red ink, which seems to have been employed only to show out the difference in metre. But the latter six pieces (on pp. 35, 44-45, 49, 52, 63, 73)

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1. Khizana-i-'Amira (p. 330), on the authority of Sarkhush (Kalimatush-Shu'ara') who was and intimate friend of Nasir 'Ali.

2. Sarw-i-'Azad, p. 131.

3. The Maqsur form of Hazaj, scannable as مفاعیلن مفاعیلن مفاعیل —

do not offer any such distinction in ink.[1] Among the former group is also included a couplet of ' Irāqī (p. 9), which is perhaps the solitary example of quotation throughout the poem.

The absence of dots from the dotted letters, and the neglect of any discrimination between the script of *Kāf* and *Gāf*, can hardly be described as a defect of the MS., for the classical writers and scribes hardly recognised their responsibility in this matter. But one cannot help noting, while reading the MS., the misrepresenation of an *'iḍāfat* by a *Yā*, or on the contrary the mistaking of a *Yā* for an *'iḍāfat* and the consequent omission of the former from places where it must have been added. This tempts me to think that the MS. (a greater part of it, if not the whole) was written to dictation, and that the scribe was not able or careful to distinguish, while writing, the long *'iḍāfat* (as necessitated by the metre) from a *Yā*. In many places different readings have been suggested on the margin. These are either (*i*) only corrections of miswritten words,[2] or (*ii*) they offer better readings than the ones adopted in the ***matn***. Such suggestions, together with the couplets noted on the margin (and meant for insertion in the ***matn***), that have been already mentioned, may have been added after a comparison with some other existing MS. of the poem. If this conjecture be not incorrect, one cannot doubt that the Mathnawī had already become popular before 1099 A. H.

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1. In Bodl., No. 1151, however, it seems red ink has been used for all these.

2. This happens in a majority of such cases, and lends further support to the conjecture that the MS. was written to dictation.

In the absence, however, of any external evidence regarding the date of the composition of this Mathnawī, we have to rely on the internal evidence afforded by the author's sweet and pithy eulogy of his spiritual guide, the Khwāja Ma'ṣūm (on p. 48), where he speaks of the saint in the present tense, closing with the fervent wish:

نبازد تا چراغ آسمان رنگ   نبارد تا بمینای فلک سنگ

جهان در سایهٔ احسان او باد   فلک قائم بفرزندان او باد

As long as the Sun shines so
proudly, as long as the blue crystal
goblet of the heavens does not
suffer from any stone-storm,
may the whole world remain
under the shadow of his good,
and may the heavens continue to
favour his children!

This shows that the Khwāja was still alive when the poet composed this poem. And since the Khwājā died in 1079 A. H. (1668 A. D.), it will not be wrong to conclude that the Mathnawī was written some good time before that date. The present Mathnawī is one of the many *mathnawī*-poems[1] written by Nāṣir 'Alī, and is the longest of them all. It bears no title. Ethe and Rieu style it as the "religious poem" and "religious mathwnawī" of Nāṣir 'Alī, while the Asiatic Society of Bengal call it "a *mathnawī* poem in sufic strain,"[2] which is perhaps the fittest possible description of the poem. Like the

1. See Ethe, Ind. Off. Cat., No. 1646.
2. Cat. As. Soc. Bengal, No. 813.

immortal Mathnawī of Mawlānā Rūmī, it begins rather abruptly with a *munājāt*, without the usual doxologies characteristic of such poems. It discusses sufic topics, which are first discussed in abstract form (couched in other metres) and are then illustrated by apologues and stories. In this the poet is following the model of Nizāmī Ganjawī and Rūmī. After the cherished style of *mathnawī*-writers the poet calls upon the cup-bearer (ساقی) now and then, and starts a sort of soliloquy (addressing himself with his nom-de-plume 'Alī) when carried away by rapture and fervour.

The Mathnawī begins with:

الهی ذرهٔ دردی بجان ریز   شرر در پنبه زار استخوان ریز

which opens a Munājāt. The theme of دردی بجان ریز and شرر در پنبه زار استخوان ریز have been very well sustained throughout this fervent and glowing outpouring of this heart to God. He desires to be consumed with the fire of His love.

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1. Sarkhush, the author of Kalimatush-Shu'ara' notes (under the account of Nasir 'Ali) the objection to and correction of this couplet by an old friend of the poet. His correction runs thus:

الهی ذرهٔ دردی به تن ریز   شرر در پنبه زار موی من ریز

Sarkhush, however, meets this correction resentingly, and retorts:—

من این حرف از زبانش چون شنفتم   چو گل خندیده بر رویش بگفتم
چرا این حاجت از حق خواهی ای یار   توانم کرد من هم این قدر کار
که مشتی خس بآتش بر فروزم   همه موی سر و پشتت بسوزم
سزای این که در شعر بلندی   کند زینگونه دخل ناپسندی
سبک سر تر درین هنگامه افتاد   بر اهل سخن این بیت استاد
چراغی را که ایزد بر فروزد   هر آن کو پف زند ریشش بسوزد

I owe this information to the kind courtesy of Professor Fażl-i-Haq.

بسوزان از محبت پیکرم را   بآتش رنگ ده خاکسترم را
کبابم را بنه بر اخگر خویش   نمک سودش کن از خاکستر خویش

He wants a heart as delicate as the dew-drop دلی نازک چو شبنم a heart full of tumult, a heart glowing with the very life-forces of Manṡūr

دلی آئینه داریک جهان شور   چراغ روشنش از خون منصور

He craves for that wine of Divine Love, the brilliance of which puts to shame even the glory of the Sun, one which does not mix with water or dust, one which even if it drops on dust can yet be put into the cup and quaffed off!

اگر بر خاک ریزد در بر آذر   توان بر چیدن و کردن بساغر

This naturally leads him into the tavern of Divine Unity, where he enjoys the vision of God to the exclusion of everything else:

بیا ای ساقی میخانهٔ دید   هلال جام کن لبریز خورشید
که در خمخانهٔ توحید جوشم   نظر از غیر یار خود بپوشم

He is face to face with the One Himself, and enjoys His beatitude from morn till eve; for in that august assembly where His own beauty is the cup-bearer, nothing survives except His Essence.

از و چشم تماشا صبح تا شام   ز حیرت پر کند چون آئینه جام
در آن محفل که حسن اوست ساقی   بغیر از هستیش هیچ است باقی

A lover of self-annihilation and worshipper of the deadly dagger of Love (شهادت عاشق و خنجر پرست) that he is, he

gives himself up wholly and loses himself completely. But he is not satisfied with this much of enjoyment. He wants another cup of (the wine of) Unity, and calls upon the Sāqī to drench him with a torrent of fire once again:

بیا ای آتش می را سمندر بهر کش ساغر توحید دیگر
بیا ساقی ز خواب ناز برخیز بده جامی و بر مغزم شرر ریز

So that he may be able to cast off the shackles of these earthly habiliments. He is enraptured and chimes in tune with the great Rūmi:

عشق نی اول حکایت می کند درد بی پایان روایت می کند
رفت موسی بر فراز طور مست زد نوای بیخودی سنگی شکست
باد رعنائی شراری باز کرد پنبه زاری دید و ناز آغاز کرد
گرد هستی سوخت خاکستر گداخت از برای حسن آئینه ساخت
بر شکوه خویشتن دیوانه شد شعله شد بالید و آتشخانه شد

Naturally enough he sees the same Beauty manifested in every particle of dust. Be it a denizen of the mosque or of the temple, both are alike enamoured of it, both are intoxicated with the same wine. The same beauty manifests itself in so many forms. The fire that burned down the Sinai to ashes got transmuted into the blood of Manṣūr. Majnūn and Laylā, Farhād and Shīrīn, Yūsuf and Zulaykhā are all alike afflicted with the love of the same. For that beauty is the real source of Love. It is that self-same music that has filled every nook and corner with its sweet tunes.

صدائی خاست زان گنج نهفته | که جست از خواب عشق نیم خفته
همان یک نغمه جست از پردهٔ ساز | بهر گوشی برنگی ریخت آواز

It is this wine that gives life to the spirits and the bodies (ارواح و اجسام) and enlivens the plants into a whirling dance. It is this love that inspires the animate objects, that teaches the nightingale to lament and makes the rose alive to the rift in its heart.

به بلبل گفت راه ناله برگیر | به گل گفت از شگاف دل نمه گیر

Love is omnipotent, omnipresent. It reigns supreme over the spiritual as well as temporal regions (افواج ملک تا لشکر صور). But, man, of all, possesses the light of Gnosis (نور معرفت). It is latent in his very being.

This is how the poet introduces Adam to the readers. All angels made their obeissance to him, save one Disbeliever in Love (منکر عشق), who could not appreciate the Fire in Adam. He saw only desolation all round, and failed to descry the Treasure hidden in it. It is a beautiful painting indeed!

در آن میخانه شد پیر خرابات | ملایک نیز سرجوش مناجات
زهر جانب خریداران جستند | چراغ دیده چون پروانه خستند
همه در عجب کرده گرم بازار | چو ماه نو متاع سجده در بار
که ناگه منکر عشق از میان جست | شراری ز آتش آن کاروان جست
بغفلت دیدهٔ مالیده بر هم | نظر پوشیده رخت از خاک آدم
نشد آگه ازان حسن قدیمی | گهر نشناخت در گرد یتیمی
ز صاحب خانه خالی خانه مویه | ندید آن گنج بل ویرانه دید

This light, this fire finds its culmination in Muhammad, who is veritably the چراغ هفت فانوس زبرجد and فروغ شش جهت. This approach to the climax of beauty throws him once more into a *munājāt*. Once again he expresses his desire to be lost irretrievably into Him, after perfect freedom from this temple of the body.

در آتشخانه ام دودی نماند   تو باقی و ز من بودی نماند
الهی از خودم بستان و گم کن   بنور پاک بر من اشتلم کن

. . . .

گرفتار طلسم سومناتم   نجاتم ده نجاتم ده نجاتم

This Munājāt is a long one, taking us well through sixty couplets and ending in his cry.

بر آ از طور دل با حسن سرمد   تجلی کن برنگ و بوی احمد

Here again he calls upon the *Sāqī*, and once more bursts into the great Master Rūmī's tune:

بطرز مولوی آهنگ بردار   حدیث دیگران کن پردهٔ تار
اثر بردار و از آواز بگذر   بدل ناخن زن و از تار بگذر

and then:

بود نقاشی قلم نیرنگ عشق   نقش کلکش پردهٔ آهنگ عشق
برلب عاشق رقم می کرد آه   نور می انگیخت از تصویر ماه
ریخت نقشی ناگهان از دست خویش   خورد تیری بر جگر از شصت خویش
عشق بر مغزش قیامت ریز شد   شعلهٔ در پنبه خوش مهمیز شد
خانمان آوارگی دامن گرفت   رفت و در ویرانهٔ مسکن گرفت
تا دوچارش شد ز خود رم کردهٔ   داغ صد وحشی فراهم کردهٔ

اصل آن صوتی که گفتم وانمود   سیل بی پروائیی را در ربود
جذبهٔ کامل بمعشوقش رساند   تشنه را کوثر بسوی خویش خواند
عاقبت اجزای همدیگر شدند   غرق گردیدند و یک گوهر شدند

This beautifully summarises the story of a Chinese painter whose paintings were so exquisitely delicate and life-like that

بنوعی می کشیدی چشمهٔ آب   که مستسقی از دمی گشت سیراب

It so happened that this painter became a victim to Love. As is wont with lovers, he left the comforts of his home and became a wanderer in the deserts. During his wanderings he descried one day from a distance another equally distracted lover. The stranger advanced, and recognising the painter as a brother lover, he questioned him as to whose love was the cause of his affliction and misery. He entreated the painter not to conceal the secret from him, and offered to help him in his troubles. This touched the heart of the painter, who burst into tears while trying to describe his troubles and hardships. He told his kind enquirer how he had fallen in love with the form of one of his own paintings:

چکید از خامه‌ام نقشی به نیرنگ   که زد راه دل و دینم بصد رنگ
خدنگی خوردم از وی جان برشته   که باشم تا بمحشر نیم کشته

etc. And as he said so he took out the portrait from under his collar and showed it to his sympathiser. Taking an active and lively interest in the affairs of the painter's love, he apprised him of the condition of his sweetheart,

and then surmonised him on Love. During this lively and entertaining talk of his own Love and its all-embracing effect, weight and gravity, he strikes the significant note that a guide (رهبر) is necessary to lead the aspirant to the object of love. He then related his personal experience in love, and told him how during his wild ramblings he stumbled into a lovely and charming town where he happened to see the very person whom the painter had portrayed and whose love he was cherishing. The sweet-heart is thus described:

هنوزش عمر نگذشته زده سال   ز شور حسن عالم کرده پامال
هنوز آن شوخ طفل نی سوار است   هنوز آن برق بی پروا شرار است
هنوز آن غنچه خندیدن نداند   نظر وزدیدن و دیدن نداند
نگاهش لذت کشتن نبرده ست   خدنگش خون دلها را نخورده است
هنوز آن تاجر از جوشش خریدار   متاع حسن دار دلبسته در بار
دلی از گرد غم بالیده خواهد   چو یوسف عاشقی نادیده خواهد

On the stranger's offer of leading him to the place of the sweetheart the two started on their journey there. And though, through his extreme madness, the painter strayed away from his guide, the sweetheart's magnetic force drew him to the town of his beloved. Here follows a picture of the sweetheart's state of mind, and is beautifully introduced with:

بهم حسن و محبت تو اماند   ز نیک زخم جدائی در فغانند
اگر عاشق ننالد یار نالد   محال است این که رسوائی ننالد

. . . .

اثر شد آشکارا و فغان گم   خلش پیدا و نشتر از میان گم

so much so that

قبا بر جلوهٔ محبوب شد تنگ　　　خیالش باخت در جیب نفس رنگ
محبت آن قدر برق اثر ریخت　　　که دود از رنگ و بوی او بر انگیخت

In othe1 words, the P1ince (the sweetheart) also began to feel the pangs of love, and he yea1ned to go out to the desert:

غرض شهزاده هم خود را طپان دید　　　بدام ذرهٔ افتاد خورشید
بنای طاقتش زیر و زبر شد　　　دل سنگین بتاراج اثر شد
ببزمش جام می گرداب خون گشت　　　بگلشن رفته بیتابی فزون گشت

. . . .　　　. . . . .

دلش داد از درون سینه آواز　　　که در صحرا در افگن پردهٔ راز

He complained to his father of his ennui, and asked his permission to go out fo1 a change. The king permitted him accordingly and orde1ed his attendants to afford him eve1y pleasure, little knowing what was in store fo1 his dear child.

ولی نشناخت سلطان عنان سست　　　که گرگ فتنه با مهر یوسفی هست

Nor had the prince any idea of what was going to happen to him.

تذرو باغ شاهی کرد پرواز　　　ولیکن غافل از سرپنجهٔ باز

He got on a fleet horse and gliding off into the jungle set himself busy with hunting. While thus knocking about in pursuit of game, he chanced to reach just the place where his lover, the painter, was brooding over his agonies

of love. The lover raised his eyes and found himself face to face with the very object of his thoughts, the original of his picture. He fell into a trance and could not utter a word. The prince approached him and talked to him softly, and offered to help him out of difficulties if he would only let him know what they were. This encouraged the painter to speak, and he related to his enquirer all about his home, his occupation, his distraction and madness, and at last handed over the portrait to him

بشرح آورد هر معنی که رو داد   بدستش عاقبت تمثال او داد

The prince was deeply moved and being unable to control his feelings, he proposed to the painter that he should like to take to the river as he was tired of the desert. He accordingly went to the river and took his seat in a light skiff. But he could hardly find rest without the painter, who was, therefore, invited and given a seat by his side and the two began to enjoy each other's company.

نیاز و ناز را بازار شد گرم   دلی پوشیده در صد پردهٔ شرم
تغافل بسته راه جلوه بر غیر   نگاهش کرده در نبض گلو سیر
نگاه گرم دل را تاب می داد   خیال تشنگی را آب می داد

The clmax was reached in conversation when mere nods and becks usurped the place of words and expressions.

اشارت با اشارت همزبان شد   تکلم این قدر ها در میان شد
نفس معزول جوش سینه سرشار   زبان در خواب و مژگان نیم بیدار

As the prince did not wish to betray his feelings to the

onlookers he spoke very cautiously while he related to the painter the story of a musician (مطرب) who was a long time away from his home and longed to get back again. He told him how the musician fell in with a sūfī, who endowed him with some precious rubies, which the musician took home and made a present of them to the king of his town. The king set the rubies in his crown. One day, however, the heart-rending cries of one smitten with Divine Love caused the rubies to melt down and trickle on the face of the king, who was surprised at this strange phenomenon and invited some jewellers to make investigations regarding the queer nature of the rubies. The experts told him that the rubies really consisted of blood-drops—the blood of the sūfī's heart !

The poet interweaves this narrative here by way of an example of the influence and effect of Love, and to give vent to his ideas on Faqr, which are cleverly introduced in the prince's address to the painter :

که ای غم پرور محنت سرانجام　　زیارتگاه آفتهاے ایام
ز نیل فقر بر رخ خال داری　　خوشا حالت اگر این حال داری

For *faqr* is the quality possessed by the Prophets alone, and manifests itself in two distinct ways:

نشد جز انبیا کس محرم فقر　　دو راه دارد سواد اعظم فقر
یکی از هر چه پیش آید رمیدن　　یکی در راه مردم دام چیدن
یکی پشت نظر بر غیر کردن　　یکی در خود چو گردون سیر کردن
یکی از کافری و بدقماشی　　ز سنگ کعبه دارد بُت تراشی

These ways are further qualified thus :

رهی دارد که مقصد پیش راه است　　بهر جا پا گذاری قبله گاه است
ز جام بی نیازی ها شوی مست　　نهی پا بر زمین گردون شود پست
رهی دارد که چون بر وی نهی گام　　شود گمراه و دشمن گیرد آرام

It is at this juncture in the neophyte's path that Satan lays his trap and beguiles and misleads the traveller away. But he only is perfect who is strong enough to disregard these temptations of Satan, and brave enough to merge into the Eternal.

همه کامل روان رفتند از خویش　　چو تن خالی کنان پیراهن از خویش
همه سرچشمهٔ عهد الست اند　　پل بحر فنا از خویش بستند
که این ره طی نمودن بود مشکل　　نمی شد قطع بی پرواز بسمل

. . . .

تا خرمن هستی بسوزند　　رخ چون لعل تابان بر فروزند

[This mention of لعل تابان is nicely employod by the poet to introduce the story of the musician and the rubies. This last couplet is followed by another introductory couplet in a foreign metre :

خوش سخنان چون بدامی زنند　　اندر ره تمثیل نوا می زنند

and then begins the story of the musician with :

شنیدم مطربی از خانمان دور　　نمکسائی دل ناسورها سور

The experts' discovery of the true nature of the royal rubies affords the poet another occasion to expatiate on the subject, and the moral of the story is summed up in these words:

نهان در خاک مردان گوهری هست　　جدا در آسمانها اختری هست
که مه از پرتو او می رود راه　　تجلی می کند از شعله آه

درین ویرانه‌ها شمعیست روشن — که نورش خیره دارد چشم روزن
بچشم ره نوردان شب تار — نگه در خواب و آن نور است بیدار
ولی پنهان بود آن گوهر پاک — نه بندی تا سر خود را بفتراک

The gist of the whole talk is that Self-annihilation is the aim, the object of man's life; for such is the demand of Love, which consists only in selflessness. Catching the hint contained in this pointed mention of self-annihilation the painter could not control himself : a fountain of blood gushed out form his heart, and he jumped from the boat into the waters! This practical step of the lover could not have failed to react on the sweetheart. The prince followed the example set before him. He dashed into the river, and the waves instantly carried him far away! It created a tumult in the midst of all those who were present, and the eyes of the onlookers poured down a heavy shower of tears. Some divers were sent into the waters to rescue the prince. But after hopeless efforts they succeeded in bringing out the two corpses of the lover and the beloved, both the painter and the painting.

شبیه عاشق و معشوق زد فاش — تراوش کرد از وهم نقش و نقاش
ز یک سو بدر کامل رخ نموده — ز یک سو ماه نو برقع کشوده
ز یک سو گل ز یک سو بلبل مست — به این خوبی محبت نقش کم بست

For indeed Love works wonders at all times!

عجائب می طرازد گاه بیگاه — کتان می سازد از مه از کتان ماه
بیکجا آب و آتش می کند جمع — ز اعجاز محبت سوزد این شمع
کند چون اختراعش مثل بیداد — تو اندر ریخت خون آتش از باد
ز نخل سبز آتش می نماید — خودش انی انا الله می سراید

This narrative produces on the poet an intoxicatnig effect as it were, and he begins to soliloquise on Love and Unity, closing with the lines:

حساب عشق از این افسانه برگیر — مکن گردش کر در کاسهٔ شیر
وقوعی دارد این معنی که گفتم — زکانی بود این گوهر که سفتم

The thought of Divine Unity once more reminds him of the Prophet Muhammad.

دلی دارم نگین نام خاتم — تهی از خویش و پُر از اسم اعظم
ز شوقش برگ جان خورده ام نیش — شرر دارم سوار نالهٔ خویش
بمهرش از دو عالم پیش رفتم — محمّد گفتم و از خویش رفتم

This introduces us to a short eulogy of the Prophet, ending in terms of Unity:

دلش از نقش کثرت شد مجرّد — برون آمد ز احمدّ میم احمدّ
همان یک نقش الله الصمد ماند — عددها محو شد باقی احد ماند!

This is followed by eleven couplets in a new metre, purporting to introduce the subject of Freedom and Liberation آزادي and آزادگی Says he:

دام و کمین شیوهٔ صیادی است — جلوهٔ اهل نظر آزادی است
نیست دگر معنی آزادگی — جز دل بی نقش پُر افتادگی

He is indeed a vehement preacher of independence. To quote some of his utterances in this connection:

ز دنیا برفشان یک بار دامن — به از جمعیت دل نیست خرمن
چه گردی چون مگس بر خوان شاهان — که آب اوست خون بی گناهان
چه جوئی بخت را از چرخ خونخوار — زمرد نیست در گنجینهٔ مار
مکش از منت دریا ملالی — عرق کن گر دلت خواهد زلالی
بدام خرقهٔ صد پارهٔ بند — غلامی لاف آزادی زنی چند
سری از جیب پندارت برون آر — مثالی گویمت گوشی بمن آر

The مثال mentioned in the last couplet is that of a man who felt much distressed and confounded at the falling of a dog into his well, and had recourse to a *faqīr* to ask him as to how he should get rid of the impurity thus caused. The *faqīr*, after consulting the books relative to the subject, advised him to draw out some water from the well. The foolhardy enquirer ran back home, drew out some water, but left the corpse of the dog in the well. The poet enlarges upon this to say:

توئی صحرا نشین و بحر دو نیز — ز دنیا می کنی بسیار پرهیز
ز سیم پاک دل را چیده دامن — سگ ناپاک را کرده نشیمن
گناهت نفس و طاعت نفس و دین نفس — ترا تا کی فریبد این چنین نفس

He avails himself of this opportune moment to advise the hearer:

ازینها بگذر و قصد سفر کن — به ملک شاه مایکره گذر کن
بیا تا بر در جودش شتابیم — که گر خواهیم دنیا دین بیابیم

This "king" (پادشاه) towards whose door of bounty he is hastening, is no other person than his spiritual guide, the Khwājā Ma'ṣūm, whose praise so naturally follows after another six couplets. This eulogy of the Khwājā takes up fifteen couplets, which I can not resist the temptation of quoting below:—

چراغ هفت محفل خواجه معصوم   منوّر از فروغش هند تا روم
روا از ماهتاب شرع بر دوش   چو صبح از پاکیٔ باطن قصب پوش
ببزمش جز صفائی دل نگنجد   فروغ شمع در محفل نگنجد
گداز چشم نور دل فزاید   محیط از ریزش ساحل فزاید
دل اندر سینه اش در چشمهٔ مهتاب   تنش در پیرهن در برگ گل آب
دو عالم کرد خود را فرش راهش   که شاید زیر پا افتد نگاهش
ولی آن شمع بزم پادشاهی   نه پردازد باین مشت سیاهی
دران ساعت که ماند دیده برهم   فشاند برق بر کشت دو عالم
کشد هوی نهان در جوش مستی   پرد چون رنگ از رخسار هستی
رود جائی که آنجا جا نگنجد   نظر بیکار ماند پا نگنجد
نباشد بیش ازین تاب بیانم   چه گویم چون حقیقت را ندانم
ولی زین خوشتر آهنگی نباشد   که رنگ جسته را رنگی نباشد
علی ای بی ادب زین حرف بس کن.   دعا را با اجابت هم نفس کن.
نبازد تا چراغ آسمان رنگ   نبارد تا بمینائی فلک سنگ
جهان در سایهٔ احسان او باد   فلک قائم بفرزندان او باد

Resignation to the Will of God توكل forms the subject of the next part of the Mathnawī, which is again introduced with twelve couplets in a foreign metre, beginning with:

اي بتوكل شده رعنا خرام بادل پر حرص بتقليد عام

which is followed by:

اي كر توكل لقبش كرده حسرت چندي بهم آورده
زور تن و قوت دل از خدا است منتظر لقمه نشستن خطا است
درد بدست آور و مرهم بسوز عشق فراهم كن و عالم بسوز

He goes on in the same strain, emphasising the idea that Man is a microcosm of the whole cosmos and that he is the only object of his search. And hence his advice of self-study, self-concentration, which helps one to solve all problems and unravel all mystery:

ز خود بگريز و خود در راه بيرون آي درون جان درآ از تن برون آي
فراهم كن نگه جام جم اينجا است طلسم رازهاي عالم اينجا است

. . . .

قدم بردار و رنگ آن جهان گير زمين تنگ است راه آسمان گير

This has been illustrated by the story of an alchemist, who had wasted many a long year of his life in attempting to change a base metal into gold, till after all he met a saintly person, who demonstrated to him the real successful way of alchemy. And the moral of it is that Resignation توكل must always be attended with Search طلب without which it is of no use. Having both together, one can achieve any thing one longs for—the part, in fact, finds its union with the whole.

طلب چون جمع گردد با توكل تواند جزو گشتن واصل كل

Tawakkul is defined as a complete detachment of one's relation from Not-Self, it is likened to a benumbed foot that trudges along but is unaffected by fatigue. Its very essence is the destruction of all earthly desire and a persistent refusal to yield to the cravings of one's lower nature:

توکل بستن چشم است از غیر — بپائی خفته کردن در جهان سیر
گلوی آرزوها را فشردن — فریب نفس غیرت کش نخوردن

The idea is further illustrated by the story of a saint who prayed to God for sending down rain on Lahore, which was once upon a time afflicted with a terrible drought, which is finely painted in these words:

به دردی مبتلا شد خاک لاهور — که انجم گرد در مغز فلک شور
ره شبنم هوا در اوج می زد — محیط از خار ماهی موج می زد
چمن را جوش سرسبزی فراموش — بهار خشک چون طوطی در آغوش
ز موج باده خالی شیشهٔ تاک — چو دندان شهیدان دانه در خاک
بقتل عام شد برق غضب تیز — نظر وز دیده ابر رحمت انگیز
زراعت آفتی از آسمان دید — که دهقان دانه را از خاک برچید
گهی سامان مردم شد بتاراج — چو ماه نو بتان گشتند محتاج
گذشت از آسمانها زاری خلق — که شد ناسور زخم کاری خلق

When the climax was reached, the saint prayed to God to be merciful to His creatures. And a voice from the unseen responded saying that the saint was still an imperfect novice and was deficient enough not to be able to understand and realise that every particle of the universe..........be it a stone, or an animal, or a tree.......... has

been endowed with a knowledge of the mystery, into which even an ant could initiate him only if he were intelligent enough to understand.

[To illustrate this idea of imperfection a story has been related here, of an idol of Somnāt speaking to a Brahman, whom it styled as its own god, and then put him the searching questions. You have created me after your own image", said it, "Have you, then, found anything apart from your own self?" Then the idol admonished the Brahman for his imperfection and fickleness of nature:

چو ربّم خوانده‌ای بد سرانجام   براه ناتمامیها مزن گام
ولی دانم که پا بر جانه باشی   که خامی خام در مولا تراشی

To continue the story, the voice from the unseen went on to say: There is an old matron in this calamity-stricken spot. Love has pierced her heart in hundreds of places for she is Our Lover, she is suffering from our imperishable love. Her heart does not care to build up a home, for she is Our martyr and does not want a shroud. Her bed consists of only a handful of dust, and she owns no shed save the heavens. Her home is homelessness itself. Lightning will not smile, and clouds will not pour down rain till she does not will it. For the heart of the gnostic is the mainspring (وكيل)of the well-being of the world, and it is from there that the people of the world get their daily provisions, though the faces of the devotees of God be dust-covered, yet it is they who really bear the brunt of the evils of the world!

The saint caught the hint. He girded his loins and went out in search of the old matron. And when he succeeded in meeting her, he complained to her of the afflictions of the

people and beseeched her to pray to God for His grace and mercy. On hearing the request the matron-saint sermonised him on love and its essence, and told him that since she did not see any space devoid of the friend (God), and whereas her very being was seething with a burning desire to steal a glance of Him she had mustered up her courage to serve Him and had taken oaths[1] that to His door only she would take all her supplications for the grant of her longings and wants, and from Him alone would she seek help, for, indeed, said she, His acceptance makes every hair of my body smile. It is his reins only that turn the trend of my being. I am indeed something beyond imagination. Even fancy failed to paint a correct picture of my state of mind. My thought (خیالم) simply entrances the hearts, my reflection melts the mirrors. My very colourlessness is full of all colours. In my heart I store up all the universe, but the whole painting is lost in the mirror (of my heart). She wound up her discourse by saying that words were too delicate and insufficient to express the very extensive meaning:

عبارت نازک و معنی بسیط است   که جوش قطره و دریای محیط است

And her parting words followed immediately :

سخن بسیار و فرصت برق مهمیز   صباحت شام شد برخیز برخیز

The saint was compelled to leave her to her solitude, without having realised the essence of love. Once more he prayed to God, and again a third time. But all was in vain. He could hot move the providence to send down a single drop of rain. The matron was after all moved with the

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1. Here follow (pp. 58, 59) twenty-four couplets containing as many as forty-two oaths.

misery of the people, and as the night came on, she went outside the town, and shedding tears, she called upon the morning to come on and give her shelter to provide her with full comforts of life.

بیا صبحی و فکر سایه ام کن　　همه آرام جان سرمایه ام کن

The saint saw the scene, and hied back to his solitude. But the old lady had not yet found a comfortable bed for herself when the clouds began to pour down rain in torrents, and the land presentnd the scene of a wide expanse of watei. The saint once again opened his communion with God and expressed his surprise at the fact that though the old saintess had not yet got a shelter, still rain did pour down. And the voice from the Unseen informed him that the saintess had joined the majority and had-found her shelter on high. The drop had become one with the ocean of Reality; the ocean of Divine Mercy had received it back to itself. The sacred soul had gone on high and only the body had remained.

ندا آمد که آشوب از جهان رفت　　همای قدس سوئی آسمان رفت
به اصل آن قطره دیگر بار رو کرد　　محیط رحمت استقبال او کرد
به بالا جان قدسی رفت و تن ماند　　لباس کهنهٔ در جامه کن ماند

For the beggars of love are really kings. Whatever exists is for them alone. Their city is quite a unique one, perfectly distinguishable from both the worlds.

وجود هر چه هست از بهر ایشان　　جدا از هر دو عالم شهر ایشان

The poet desires to learn a lesson from this saintess. The I and the We seem to him to be a mere forgotton dream, and

nothing more; for in his very self he perceives the onrush of a shoreless ocean.

بجان دریای بی ساحل نهد جوش　　　من و ما چیست یک خم آب فراموش

The next section of the Mathnawi is again introduced as usual with nine couplets in a foreign metre. It proposes to deal with the high quality of his own lofty poetry and sublime diction. He becomes expressly self-laudatory when he says:

سخن را آفریدم جان دمیدم　　　باقرار خدائے برگزیدم
الستی سر زد از من و بلی گفت　　　منش یا عبد او یا ربنا گفت

. . . .　　　. . . . . . .

بجائے مایۂ معنی رساندم　　　که من هم از خیالش باز ماندم

. . . .　　　. . . . . . .

برنگے جلوه دادم این چمن را　　　که بلبل سوخت با گل پیرهن را
شکست رنگ هوش از دل خریدم　　　که این بی رنگ ها صورت کشیدم
نوائی بیخودیهای من است این　　　صدائی پای از خود رفتن است این
جراحت از عشق است این رقم نیست　　　صدائی تیغ می آید قلم نیست

. . . .　　　. . . . . . .

زبانی نیست آهنگ دل است این　　　ورق گردانی رنگ دل است این
سماع از وجد بسمل می تراشم　　　دل از کیفیت دل می تراشم

He believes that as long as the angels do not read and patronise poetry, people do not regared it as praiseworthy. According to him a poetical utterance, truly deserving the name is one which so effects the heart that it becomes a part of the heart itself, one which gives birth to a mania in the heart, one which effervesces like wine in the butt of Thought, and goes right into the very marrow of

the soul even before it reaches the ear of the hearers. He means thereby to suggest that his own diction and poetry stand the test of these criteria. He goes on in the same self-laudatory tone to assert his uniqueness. All the forces at Nature's command were exhausted before the world could get a man like him. Let us hear him in detail:

کله داران هفت اورنگ افلاک   بتاثیر نظر گوهر کن خاک
ز هفت اقلیم عالم دیده بستند   نظر بر خاک هندوستان شکستند
اثرهای مخالف جمع کردند   چراغان فلک یک شمع کردند
بدخشان را خرابی کرد تاراج   صفاهان شد بمیل سرمه محتاج
تبسم کرد از کشمیریان رم   که رنگ از زعفرانش رفت و بو هم
چنین هر ذره آه نیمکش زد   ببوی نافه آهو العطش زد
یمن را بی نگین کردند خاتم   بر اینها کن قیاس کار عالم
ز ویرانی جهان آمد بفریاد   که چون من عالمی کردند ایجاد
بهر عضو آسمانی دیگرم من   نگین را نقش یکتائی منم من
سخن را علت غائی منم من   نظر پرورده هفت اخترم من
درین فن پارسی با من مزن لاف   که ریزد از زبانش خون انصاف

. . . .

مرا نشناسد و خود را نداند   بآن رسوائی دور از کار ماند

This wakes him up to the necessity of saying a word about such poetesters as may have the courage to vie with him in excellence or try to challenge his mastery of the art. To bring home to the reader's mind the existence and futility of such audacious and mean souls and their criticism he brings here the story of a wretch who urinated in the

sacred well of Zamzam and when he was asked as to the reason of this atrocious deed of his, he said he committed the heinous act simply to attract the peoples' attention to himself. Such an anecdote so skilfully woven together can hardly fail to secure its purpose with the reader of Nāṣir 'Alī. Couplets then follow, which criticise such mean and meaningless actions and intentions of his adversaries and malignant opponents, till at last he closes the topic with:

دگر ای مدعی کوتاه کن لاف　　سخن عیسی است در احیای انصاف

feeling certain of the fact that full justice will be done to him by his own utterances سخن عیسی است در احیای انصاف and goes on to strike a note of warning thus:

بترس از من که مقبول الهم　　نیم شاعر گدای پادشاهم
مرا از جنس این مردم مپندار　　بسا ماهی که همشکل است با مار
ز تیغ حیدرم جان را نگه دار　　سپر کن شرم و ایمان را نگه دار

And then:

دلی دارم چو جام حضرت جم　　تهی از خویش پر از راز عالم
به تسخیر جهان نقشی تمام است　　دو عالم صید این یک حلقه دام است
ز من اسرار رمزی نهان نیست　　ولیکن پای رخصت در میان نیست

. . . .　　. . . . . . .

توکل زادهٔ اقلیم فقرم　　هما پروردهٔ دیهیم فقرم
به هر محفل غبارم آشنا نیست　　بخود بالیده ام چندانکه جا نیست
نیم جوشان چو بحر از آتش کس　　درین عالم بخود می جوشم و بس

But there is an end to this. He is once more aroused from his self-intoxication, and finds fault with himself:

علی ای سلسبیل خود فروشی　　بزهر آلوده نوش عیب پوشی
بعیب خلق دیدن مذهب کیست　　هنر در خود فزودن مشرب کیست

and awakes to the realisation of a heart full of love—Love that knows no distinction between I and Thou, Love which is the fountain-head of all Existence, is the source equally well of Non-Existence:

چه باشد عشق اصل الاصل هر چیز　　تبسمهای برق نیستی نیز

Reason (خرد) is only a servant of Love, and Madness (جنون) only an attendant in its solitude. Love is itself the hunter and the victim; it is at once Justice and Injustice. All is Love, and nothing else. What really matters is the happy occasion (of a ceremony), and those who take part in it are of no account.

همه عشق است باقی این و آن هیچ　　همه سور است محفل در میان هیچ

This ecstasy once more throws him into a *munājāt* "Light up the fire of Love in me, O God!", he says, "If Thou hast shown Thyself to me, teach me as well how to enjoy Thy Beatitude"............"Burn this torch once more", he cries, and "let not my candle be extinguished. Endow it with the constant glow of a pearl. Grant me an everlasting life (حیات جاودان). Transmute me into an eternal Love (عشق جاودان)"..............and so on.

This is followed by a fresh (and the last) section of the Manthnawī, which is introduced as usual with four couplets in a new metre......in this case that of Rūmī's Mathnawī. This is the story of saint Ibrāhīm son of Adham, who is characterised as:

چمن پیرای زخم و داغ و مرهم — بهار عشق ابراهیم ادهم
خروش آباد طوفان جوشی عشق — خرابات بلا اهل نوشی عشق

Ibrāhīm, it is related, once felt a burning desire to resort to the side of river and jungle. After roaming about in the forest for some time, he repaired to the river. In the boat he was joined by a lovely youth. It so happened that the lance of Ibrāhīm struck and pierced the foot of the handsome stranger, who, however, uttered not a word of complaint, and his journey terminating, he extracted the spear-point from his bleeding foot, mounted a steed and trotted off. Ibrāhīm could not bear the scene. He felt tormented at heart, and a voice from within admonished him for his gross carelessness in having hurt the stranger,

بگوشش از درون دادند آواز — که ای خلوت سرا نا محرم راز
شهید ضرب بی پروائی تست این — هلاک تیغ استغنائی تست این
کشد خونش بحشر چون شفق اوج — بدامانش زند هر قطره اش موج

and bade him pray, saying (in the words of the Korān):
رَبَّنَا ظَلَمْنَا اَنْفُسَنَا وَ اِنْ لَّمْ تَغْفِرْ لَنَا وَ تَرْحَمْنَا لَنَكُوْنَنَّ مِنَ الْخَاسِرِيْنَ !

Thus closes the Mathnawī, sounding a note of self-denunciation.

ظلمنا ربنا بر خوان و برخیز — عمل بر خود مکن از خویش پرهیز

The main theme of the whole poem, as has been rendered abundantly clear by the detailed argument above, is Divine Unity and Love. Unity encompasses everything. All that is covered by Time and Space. all that is conceivable and imaginable resides in Him, who is unchangeable and absolute. There is nothing else, but God. All that has been, that is,

and that will ever be, is ever there in the unchangeable Reality. He is the light and life of the Universe. Everything merges into him, for He is all, and there is none other. God is Love. Love found its first expression in the person and being of Adam, the first Man, and was consummated in the august personality of Muhammad, the Messenger of God, the centre of all light and glory, the pivot of all love. God is the very heart and soul of the Universe, and must be searched for in Man's own self. Hence it is only in the oneness with the heart and soul of the Universe that one can find the true ideal, the true self. This search must needs be helped by a total resignation to the Will of the Supreme, and cannot bring forth the desired end without the aid of a (spiritual) guide who only can lead the aspirant direct to the realisation of that Love, which draws all things together into the huge oneness of cosmic life, and wherein lies the secret of the Absolute Unity and Reality. And it is to Man, and Man alone, that the realisation of this great and grim truth is vouchsafed!

THE HISTORICAL CONTENTS OF THE DIWAN OF ABU TAMMAM.

A. Haq; M. A; Ph. D.

The poems of Abu Tammam are full of historical facts which shed a new light on our knowledge of the events of the period in which he lived. Although Tabari and other Arab historians have dealt fully with the important events, yet still in the description of various happenings there is a gap which can only be filled by the contemporary poets. It would be idle, indeed, to search for historical facts in a chronological order in the poems, as their chief aim is the praise of patrons in order to gain reward and not the accurate recording of historical facts. As Dr. Margoliouth in his article[1] on the historical contents of the Diwan of al-Buhturi remarks, the poet of Abbasid times had to discharge some of the functions of the modern journalist. He had to defend the policy of the court before the public, test public opinion regarding any important step to be taken by the sovereign or minister, and not infrequently to persuade him to adopt certain measures for the public welfare.

In the poems of Abu Tammam, the chief events described are, the battles and skirmishes against Babak, the powerful leader of the Khurramites, his capture and execution, the defeat of the Emperor Theophilus and the fall of Ancyra and Amorium; and also the raids on Roman territory. In addition to these, many other events are also mentioned, *viz.*, the crucifixion of Mazayar[2], the chief of Tabaristan, and Aetius, the de-

1. See the Journal of Indian History, October 1923, pub. at Allahabad.
2. Diwan 154 (8) he was captured and beaten to death in 225 A. H. Tabari iii, 1303.

fender of Amorium,[1] the capture of Hurjam by Abu Said,[2] the execution[3] of the famous Afshin and the burning of his body, the overthrow[4] of Ibn-al-Sari by Abdul-lah-Ibn Tahir, the establishment of order in Egypt by Mamum[5] and other events of minor importance. He alludes to the insurrection of the Zutts (Jats) which was suppressed ruthlessly in the year 220[6] A. H., in poems[7] which are not mentioned in the Diwan and the authenticity of which is disputed. He mentions the city of Surra-Man Raa (Samarra) which was built by the Caliph-al-Mutasim in 221 A. H., as being the place where Babak was executed.[8] His reference to the year 219 A. H. as that in which al-Mutasim acceded to the Caliphate is very significant,[9] as most of the Arab historians assign that event to the year 218 A. H. Masudi,[10] however, says, "Some say that the people paid allegiance to Mutasim as a Caliph in the year 219 A. H."

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1. Diwan 154 (10) he was captured on the fall of the fortress and brought to Baghdad where he died in A. H. 224 and his body was gibbeted beside that of Babak. Tabari iii, 1302.

2. Diwan 107 (5) Tibrizi says he was the king of Sanariah in Armenia, cf. Masudi ii, 67.

3. Diwan 151—155.

4. See al-Ziyadat MS. 53-54. This event took place in 211 A. H., Kindi 180-183.

5. In 217 A. H. Tabari iii, 1107 Diwan 111-114.

6. Tabari iii, 1168. The marshes between Basra and Wasit were occupied by a large population of Indians called Jats.

7. See al-Ziyadat 45 (14), 49 (9-12).

8. Diwan 264 (22). See also the poem (MS. 510) in which he praises Samarra and hurls ridicule at Baghdad.

9. Diwan 157 (6).

10. vii, 103. If the date 218 A. H. given by Tabari and others is correct, it is quite possible that Mutasim after becoming Caliph held a royal reception in 219, in which the poet presented to him this encomium.

His poems are full of allusions to the Days (*i.e.*, battles) of the pagan and Islamic[1] age which are described in the Aghani and other historical works. He mentions also the massacre of the followers of Mazdak[2] (528 A. D.) by Anushirwan, the King of Persia.

A few references of historical importance are also given in his poems. He relates that Umar, the second of the Orthodox Caliphs, had once, when gold became scarce, suggested that coins should be made of camel's[3] hide. In another place he informs us of the strange method adopted for spreading abroad the news of victories and defeats of the Caliph's armies. In the time of Mutasim when the army of the Caliph was engaged in almost incessant battles against Babak, the messenger bedecked himself with black feathers when the Caliph's army gained a victory, and with red feathers when it was defeated.[4]

He also makes mention of the famous Halley comet which made its periodical appearance in 222 A.H. (738 A. D.) from which the astrologers predicted that a great calamity would fall[5] upon the people.

The laudatory poems addressed by the poet to the high dignitaries and officials of his time are not confined

1. Diwan (322-23) See also the indices to the Diwan in which the names of battles mentioned by Abu Tamman are given.

2. Diwan 322-23 (1-3) Tabari (i, 894 seqq) In most MSS. of the Diwan the name is written as المصدقية whereas in some MSS. it is given as المزدكية cf. MS. of the Diwan 306 (8).

3. Diwan 50 (2).

4. Diwan 107 (4).

5. The poet calls it by the name of al-Kawkab-al-Gharbi. See Diwan 7 (fourth line from the bottom) Cf. Kamil of Ibn-al-Athir vi, 337, pub. Leiden, Michael Syr. iii, 97. See also Chamber's Book of Astronomy, i. 444.

to ordinary complimentary platitudes, but contain much that is of historical importance, as they were addressed to those who controlled the helm of State. The panegyries composed in praise of his patron Abu Sa'id are full of allusions to and description of the battles fought against Babak, of raids carried into the Roman territory.[1] In his panegyric on Khalid b. Yazid he recalls his raid on Roman soil.[2] Abu Dulaf, who fought Babak under the command of Afshin, rescued the latter from a difficult situation by his strategy,[3] and though he was disliked by Afshin who tried to poison the mind of the Caliph against him yet the Caliph cherished his memory[4]. Muhammad b. Abd-al-Malik-al-Zayyat was not only a vizier but the Prefect of Police, Head of the Council of State and Censor.[5] Abu Said was one of those who favoured the nomination of Wathiq as a successor to Mutasim while the latter was still alive.[6]

Coming to the part he played as a journalist of his day; though he often voiced the opinion of the court, he was conspicuous for his reiterated demands from the Caliph or other nobles, of what he thought was for the public good. In an encomium he urges the Caliph al-Mutasim to nominate Harun (al-Wathiq) as successor to the great empire, which on one side extended from China to Yaman and on the other from Spain to the walls of Rome, and crush all who dared to oppose it[7] Again, when Afshin fell on evil days and was imprisoned and afterwards

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1. Diwan 96-110, 215-220.
2. Diwan 32-33.
3. Diwan 42 (13 seqq).
4. Diwan 43 (1-6), 210 Cf Ibn. Khallikan i, 27
5. 48 (11).
6. 338 (3-4).
7. Diwan 155 (1—8).

executed and burnt[1], he requests the Caliph to exterminate the whole family of Kaus, the father of Afshin, and hurl them into the pits which they had dug for the Kingdom[2].' He pleaded before Malik b. Tawq for Banu Taghlib, who had incurred the displeasure of Malik on account of their insubordination[3], and so appeased the anger of Malik, who then treated his flock with the dignity to which they had been accustomed[4]. Many other verses of a similar kind may be found in this Diwan.

Abu Tammam makes no mention of the foreign troops, *i. e.* al-Mawali, organised first by al Mutasim, which in a comparative short period assumed the importance of the Roman Praetorian Guards, seating and unseating Caliphs who were practically in their power. Even in celebrating the victory of Amorium, in which these troops played a very important part, he passes over their exploits without mention and speaks only of the achievements of the Arabs[5]. This is probably due to the fact that in the poet's life time these troops did not become so important as they did later on, in the time of the poet Buhturi, who in his poems constantly refers to them[6].

The chief themes on which Abu Tammam harps are the victories won by the Caliph al-Mutasim against the heretic Babak, and the Emperor Theophilus Many raids on the Roman land carried out by al-Mamun, and other Generals of al Mutasim are also alluded to in his poems. Here

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1. For a detailed account of Afshin's execution see Tabari iii, 1308—1318.
2. Diwan 154 (3—5).
3. 19 (8 seqq.)
4. Cf. Ibn Rashiq (Umda) 32—33.
5. Diwan 12 (2.
6. See Dr. Margoliouth's article in the Journal of Indian History, on the historical contents of the Diwan of Buhturi.

I propose to deal only with the battles fought by the Caliph's army against Babak, his capture and execution. In order to appreciate the significance of victories over Babak it is necessary to give a short account of each, pointing out wherever necessary the contribution that Abu Tammam has made to the accounts given in historical works.

BABAK, HIS DEFEAT, CAPTURE AND EXECUTION.

Babak the great heresiarch made his first appearance in the city of Badhdh during the reign of al-Mamun in the year 201[1] A. H. He succeeded his master Jawidan b. Sahl as the leader of the Khurramites, who are often called al-Muhammira and al-Babakiyya[2]. From this time until his capture in 222 A.H. he was constantly at war with the forces of the two Caliphs, al-Mamun and al-Mutasim, and defeated and routed many generals who were sent to conquer him. He was the terror[3] of western and north-western Persia for more than twenty years, but was at last sought out in his inaccessible haunts by the famous Afshin, was subdued and captured after two years of fierce and persistent struggle. Mamun, while on his death-bed, had enjoined on his brother Mutasim not to

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1. Tabari iii, 1015. According to another version he appeared in 200 A.H. Cf al-Tanbih by Masudi p. 353; again Masudi (Muruj vii 62) gives the year 204 A.H. as that in which Babak made his first appearance

2. Cf. Fihrist 342—344. Diwan 248 (12—14) Masudi vi, 186 identifies al-Khurramiyya with al-Muslimiyya, the followers of Abu Mustim who was slain by Mansur in 136 A.H. and Abu Tammam (303) 12 identifies them also with the followers of Mazdak.

3. According to Tabari (iii, 1233) the number of all those who were killed by Babak during the twenty years of his reign was 255,500. Masudi (Tanbih 353) mentions 500.000 as a moderate number.

4. Cf. Diwan 260.

spare any efforts to root out Babak and his followers[1], and the chief thought which occupied Mutasim's mind after his accession was to remove this great danger to the Kingdom. Babak was countenanced and helped by the Romans. Indeed the raid on Zepetra was carried out by the Emperor Theophilus at the request of Babak in order to divert the attack of the Caliph's forces, and alleviate the pressure on Babak.[2] To establish peace with the empire and to produce an impression of the strength of the state it was essential that Babak and his followers should be suppressed. With this purpose in view Mutasim, within a very short period of becoming Caliph, set on foot preparations for a great expedition, and when they were completed he, in the month of Dhul-Qada 220 A.H., sent Afshin at the head of a great army to conquer Babak.

The chief battles mentioned by Abu Tammam are fully described by Tabari in his well-known Annals.[3] Here it will be sufficient to give a short account of those events and mention a few details and small incidents that are alluded to by the poet.

1. Before the expedition of Afshin set out Ishaq b. Ibrahim was sent by the Caliph Mutasim to the province of al-Jabal to suppress the rising of the followers of Babak, where in many engagements he defeated and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Tabari does not state the name of a single place where the fighting took place. He simply records the fact[4] that in the month of Shawwal 218 A.H.

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1. Tabari iii, 1138. It is said that the horsemen of Babak alone numbered twenty thousand. Abul Farj (Mukhtasar) 241.
2. Tabari iii, 1234
3. See Tabari iii, 1171 Seqq and 1186 seqq.
4. iii, 1165.

Ibrahim was sent to the province of al-Jabal to subdue the Khurramites, who had gathered in Hamadan, and slew sixty thousand of them, while the remainder fled away to the Roman border. In another place he informs[1] us that Ibrahim returned to Baghdad from al-Jabal on the 11th of Jamadi-ul-avval 219 A.H. with many captives, after slaying one hundred thousand followers of Babak. Abu Tammam in the poems composed in praise of Ibrahim mentions the names of Qurran[2] the two Ashtars, Dadhwayh, Khayzaj[3] as the places where fighting took place, and adds that many battles were fought under cover of darkness which was a favourite method of Babak's attack.[4]

2. Before Afshin left for Barzand[5], his headquarters, Abu Sa'id, a general who distinguished himself in this expedition, was ordered by the Caliph to repair the forts between Zanjan and Ardabil, [6] which had been destroyed by Babak and to establish military guards on the roads for the safe transport of the provisions that were sent to Ardabil. Having heard that a party of the enemy headed by Muawiya, the brother of Babak, was returning after a raid, he intercepted and attacked them killing many and taking a great number of prisoners, though

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1. iii, 1166.

2. Diwan 302 (10) Qurran was a town in Adharbayjan. Yaqut iv, 51. Ashtar was a district town between Nahawand and and Hamadan. Yaqut i, 276.

3. Diwan 307 (1)

4. Diwan 306 (last line) "In the East thou hast met them in a battle the bolts of which have caused the mountains of the Roman land to cleave" 307 (10).

5. The distance from Barzand to Sadarasp, where the first ditch of Afshin was, is two *parasangs* and then to Zahrkush (Kalan Rud) where was the second ditch, is two *parasangs* and thence to Rud-al-Rud, where the third ditch was, is two *parasangs* and from there to Badhdh one parasang Ibn Khurdadbih, 121.

6. See Ibn Khurdadbih 119.

the leader himself escaped[1]. Here again Tabari is silent as to where this battle was fought but Abu Tammam describes it as having taken place behind Sindbaya[2], adding that Muawiya escaped under cover of darkness[3] thereby showing that it was a night raid.

3. After rebuilding the forts between Barzand and Ardabil Afshin divided his forces and quartered his generals in different fortified towns. Thus Abu Sa'id was posted at Khush[4], Haytham al-Ghanawi at the fort of Arshaq, and Alawaya-al-Anwar at the fort of al-Nahr. Provisions were conveyed from one stronghold to another by armed guards. Afshin a very able general, knowing well that an effort to force an issue by a direct attack would result in disaster, adopted the method of slow and steady progress. Meanwhile, he tried many ruses and laid traps to ensnare the enemy who often fell a victim to them. The way in which he enticed Babak to attack Arshaq[5] was an exceedingly clever ruse. While Babak was attacking the fort of Arshaq, Afshin and Abu Sa'id fell upon him with their horsemen and slew nearly all his cavalry, though Babak himself escaped to Muqan[6] with a few of his followers. Describing this event Tabari says[7] that Babak, after a few days' stay at Mupan, left by night for Badhdh escorted by a military guard. Abu Tammam adds several details informing us that Muqan was attacked by

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1 Tabari iii, 1171, According to Tabari this was the first defeat sustained by Babak's followers, See ibid.
2. A market town in Adharbayjan *Yaqut* iii, 166.
3. Diwan 101 (7-9).
4. Diwan 68 (5)
5. For details see Tabari iii, 1174 seqq. Arshaq is a mountain in the district of Muqan. Yaqut, i. 208.
6. Cf. Ibn Khurdabih 119.
7. Tabari iii, 1178.

Abu Sa'id on a Friday, and that Babak compelled to flee[1].

4. Abu Tammam mentions a night raid which was repulsed by Abu Sa'id[2]. The attack was directed against Bishr[3], one of his officers, who was staggered and whose ranks were broken[4]. Muhammad b. Maadh came to his help[5], but the enemy was too strong for them both. Seeing this Abu Sa'id came to their help just in time to save the situation. Referring to this incident, Abu Tammam says[6].

"Hadst thou delayed one hour in reaching them, Islam would have stirred to flight a bird of ill omen."

Tabari[7] records a night raid in which Babak forced Afshin to retire, but whether this refers to the raid mentioned by Abu Tammam is doubtful. More probably the reference is to another raid made by Babak in whose plan of campaign night[8] attacks took a prominent place.

5. The capture of Tall, a fortified high mountain near Badhdh, occupied by an officer of Babak named Adhin[9], led to the fall of Babak's last stronghold, Badhdh. Tall was captured just before sunset[10] after a hard struggle,

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1. Diwan 102 (3-7) 261 (11-12)
2. Diwan 262 (11-12) 28 (2-7)
3. Diwan 295 (last line) 296
4. Diwan 296 (1-6)
5. Diwan 296 (7) 28 (6-7)
6. Diwan 297 (2).
7. iii, 1190.
8. Cf. Tabari iii, 1192 (2)
9. Tabari iii, 1214.
10. Diwan 262 (last line)

while Badhdh fell easily on Thursday[1] the 9th of Ramazan 222 A. H.

Many smaller battles which took place during the two years' struggle, but are not mentioned by Tabari, are alluded to by Abu Tammam in his poems, among them being the following:—

1. A battle fought in the highlands of Abrashtawim and Darwadh[2] in which the enemy was repulsed in a night raid, and only escaped destruction by fleeing under the cover of darkness to a hill in Darwadh. "It was a victory by which time became resplendent and lances opened the buds of hopes."
2. The night raid mentioned above in No. 4.
3. From the description given by Abu Tamman it appears[3] that another battle in addition to that already mentioned, took place in the neighbourhood of Arshaq, in which Abu Dulaf rescued Afshin from a perilous situation.
4. The poet constantly refers to the fortifications of Babak as Kadhaj[4] and Kadhajat, which were built on the hills, and were surrounded by dense forests.

Babak after the fall of Badhdh effected his escape to Armenia with the intention of crossing over the Roman

1. Diwan 263 (6) Yaquti ii 578. Tabari (iii 497) says that it was taken on Friday the 20th of Ramadan.
2. Diwan 262 (7—10) 327 (6) Cf. Yaquti. 80. Ibn Khurdadbih 22.
3. Diwan 42 (13 seqq) 202 (3—6). See also 326 (last line).
4. Diwan 102 (11) 262 (4) it is Persian word Kada which means shelter. Cf. Yaqut iv, 244.

border, but was captured by an Armenian prince called Sahl b. Sanbat[1], with whom he had taken refuge, and made over in the month of Ramadan[2] to Afshin, who brought him together with his brother Abdul-Lah, to Samarra. On reaching the city he was carried on a caparisoned elephant[3], paraded about the city, and then executed, the Caliph, ordering Babak's executioner to plunge the knife into his trunk after severing his limbs. His head was sent to the cities of Khurasan and his body impaled before the palace. His brother met the same fate at the hand of Ishaq b. Ibrahim, the Governor of Baghdad[4].

After the capture of Babak, thousands of Muslim captives, women and children who had fallen victim to his tyranny, were restored to their families[5].

The date of Afshin's return with Babak to Samarra is given by Tabari[6] as the third of Safar 223 A.H. From Abu Tammam's description[7], one might have inferred that the execution of Babak took place in the month of Shawwal 222 A.H. instead of Safar 223 A.H. as stated by Tabari.

Describing the impalement of the bodies of Mazyar and of Aetius at a later period beside that of Babak the poet says[8], "The fever of the hearts was cooled when Babak became the neighbour of Mazyar.

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1. Diwan 107 (2) 328 (2).
2 Diwan 264 (7).
3. Tabari iii, 1230 seqq Diwan 264 (13).
4. Tabari iii, 1292 seqq.
5. Diwan 260. Tabari iii, 1227.
6. Tabari iii, 1229.
7. Diwan 264 (7).
8. Diwan 164 (8—13).

He is the second with him under the dome of heaven and not the second of the two when they were in the Cave[1].

They seem to have hastened away that they might conceal some news from Aetius.

Black are their vests as if the hands of Simoom have woven for them garments of pitch.

Day and night they ride on slender steels brought to them from the carpenter's stable.

They stir not from their places and yet whosoever sees them thinks they are ever on a journey".

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1. i. e. the Prophet and Abu Bakr. Quran ix 40.

اسواق العرب

Or

FAIRS IN EARLY ARABIA.

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Annual and periodical fairs are as old institutions as human society itself. The writers on the history of commerce like Richard Lasch[1], Walford[2], Clive Day[3] and others have already traced their existence in ancient China, Greece and India. Some of these as well as certain other writers on the subject have referred to, and made some passing remarks on fairs in pre-Islamic Arabia also.

Several European Orientalists, also, while writing on history and religion of the Arabs before Islam, have dealt at some length with some of the fairs that were held in central Arabia, before Islam. Snouk Hurdronje[4], Dozy[5] and Wellhausen[6] among them have also thrown some light on the type and nature of these fairs. But all these eminent Orientalists, on account of the nature of their themes, had to limit their investigations to the fairs held in central Arabia only.

Among the Muslim writers, Al-Bírúní, in Al-Athárul-Báqiya[7], Al-Qalqashandí in the Ṣubhu'l-A'sha[8] and al-Marzúqí in his Kitábe'l Azminati Wa'l-Amkina[9] have given long lists of fairs that were held in Arabia annually and have also mentioned some particulars with regard to them.

1. " Primitive Karkets "
2. " Fairs past and present."
3. " History of commerce "
4. Het Mekkanische Fest. Leiden 1880.
5. Die Israeleiten zu Mekka.
6. Reste Arabichen Heidentum pp. 84-100.
7. Arabic text P. 321 Eng. Translation Sachau P. 324.
8. Vol. 1 Pp 410-411.
9. Vol. 2 Pp. 161—169.

As for the Geographical works of the Arabic writers, the Mujam[1] of Yáqút and in the works on "Traditions" the Ṣaḥíḥ of al-Bukhárí[2] and the commentary of Fatḥú'l-Bárí[3] on it contain some important details with regard to our subject. The Kitábu'l-Aghání of Abu'l-Farj also contains a long notice on the fair of 'Okáz[4].'

A complete list of places in Arabia where according to the above-mentioned authorities, fairs were held annually is given below[5].

Places where fairs were held[6].		Months and dates in which fairs were held.
(1) Mumatu'l-Jandal*		Rabiu'l-awwal, 1st-5th.
(2) al-Jisr		
(3) al-Hijr*	in Bahrayn	Qabiu'l-akhir. (under the patronage of Mundhir B. Sawa.)
(4) al-'Omán[1]	in Bahrayn	Juma'l-ula till the end of the month.
(5) al-Mushqqar	in Yemen	Jumada'l-Akhira from the beginning of the month.

1. Cairo. Vol 6, P. 203. Vol. 7 P. 390.
2. Kitabul-Hajj and Kitabul Buyu.
3. Cairo Vol. 8. P 385.
4. See P 5 etc. seqq 6 of this article.
5. This list is based on al-Biruni al-Atharu'l-Baqiya P. 328. al-Marzuqi's Kitabu'l-Amkina Vol. 2 pp. 161—169 and on al-Qaalashandi, Subhu'l-Asha Vol. 1. pp. 410-411.

(6)	Ṣuh'ár*	in Yemen	Rajab-10th-15th.
(7)	Dabá	,,	Last days of Rajab.
(8)	Shihr*	,,	Middle of Shaban.
(9)	'Idn or 'Idn Abyan	,,	Ramadan 1st-10th or 15th.
(10)	Ṣan'a'*	,,	Ramadan 15th the end of the month.
(11)	Rábiya	in Hadramaut	Middle of Dhul-qada
(12)	'Okáz	in Hejaz	Dhul-qada 1st-20th.
(13)	Dhu'l-Majaz	,,	,, 20th-29th.
(14)	Dhu'l-Majaz	,,	Dhuld Hijja 1st-8th, 11th-13th.
(15)	Mina	,,	The 9th and 10th of this month being the Hajj days.
(16)	Niṭát	,,	Probably during the end of Dhul Hajj.
(17)	Hajar*	in Yammama	Muharram 1st-10th.
(18)	Majaza[1]	,,	
(19)	al-Abla		
(20)	al-Badr.		
(21)	al-Hubasha.	Near Medina	In the month of Rajab.

It is apparent from the above list that the season of fairs in Arabia began with the month of Rab'iul-Awwal when the first fair was held at Dumatu'l-Jandal, and ended with the fair of 'Mina' which was held just after the Hajj. The intervening period of seven months was filled in, by successive fairs which are held at different places and followed one another on well arranged consecutive dates.

1. It is doubtful whether it is the same place as Dhul-Majaz or a different one. See Mujam Cairo Vol. VII P. 385.

A detail information about the places marked with an asterisk, is found in the Encyc. of Islam.

The fair of Dumal-ul-Jandal, began on the 1st of the month Rab'iul-awwal under the patronage of the Christian prince Ukaidir the Abadite*, or that of Abu Quáfa the Kalbile. These two Arab chiefs vied with each other for the patronage of the fair. The contest was decided yearly by a competition in wit between them. He who won the contest secured the supreme authority over the affairs relating to the fair. The patron thus elected had the sole responsibility of the fair and the right of buying all that he wanted before any of the visitors could do any business. The Syrians and the Mesopotamians were not allowed even to visit this fair without special permission. The shops in the fair however consisted of woollen tents, in which there were a good number of professional girls[1].

The fair of Dumat-ul-Jandal was followed by the fair of Hajar in Bahrayn which was held in the month of Rabi ul-Akhir. It was patronised by Mundhir B. Sáwá for sometime and must have been visited by most of the people who went to Dumat-ul-Jandal[2].

This was followed by the fairs of (المشقر) and of (صحار) a place well-known for its textile industry (لسان Vol. 6, P. 114) and of 'Omán' one after another. Omán was a great business centre of the Arabs. The merchants of China, India and Africa went there, sold the goods of their own countries and bought those of the other countries.

After the fair of 'Omán another fair was held at Shihr on the coast of Yemen (Lisan Vol 6, p 65) in the

1 Al-Marzuqi Kitabul-Azminati-wal-Amkina Vol. 2 P 161-162
2. Subhul-Asha Vol. 1, P. 110.
*A long notice on Ukaidir is found under the word Dumatul-Jandal in the Mujam.

middle of the month of Sha'ban. Here business was done mainly in cloths, in Myrrh, in aloe and in Frankincen. This was followed by the fair of Eden which lasted till the 10th of Ramaḍán.[1] It was patronised at first by the Hymyarite kings and later on by the Persian Governors of Yemen and was attended only by such of the over-sea merchants as were not able to sell off all their goods in the fairs that were held earlier.

After the fair of Eden was held the fair of Ṣan'á, which began in the middle of Ramaḍán and lasted till the the end of the month. The articles sold in the fairs in Yemen consisted mainly in cotton, in dye stuffs in saffron, in seeds, in weapons of wars and in mantles[2].

With the end of fair of Ṣan'á, the merchants as well as the other visitors of these fairs were divided into two parties:—One party went to Ḥaḍramaut and attended the fair of Rabiya, after which they dispersed and the other party proceeded to Central Arabia to visit the fair of 'Okáz[3].

The fair of 'Okáz was held in a valley between Ṭá'if and Nakhla at a distance of a few miles from Mecca. It began on the 1st of Shul-qa'da and lasted till the 20th of the same month[4].

Being held about the time of annual pilgrimage to Mecca in one of holy months when clash of arms and inter-tribal wars, were suspended, it could be visited by all the tribes. Being sure of their safety they all visited 'Okáz in a

1. Subhul-Asha Vol. P. 110.
2. Al-Marzuqi Vol. 2, P. 164.
3. Do. Do.
4. Mu'jam, Egypt. Vol. 6, P. 208 Fathu'l-Bari Vol. 8, P. 385.

large number. The chiefs of the tribes came to 'Okáz with masks on their faces which was later on given up. In order to prevent any clash of arms it was adopted that all the visitors of this fair should deposit their arms with a chief appointed for the purpose. These arms were returned to their owners at the time of their departure from the fair. Those who infringed any of these laws were declared as traitors from the pulpit and were socially boycotted.,

'Okáz thus became a great centre where all Tribes of Arabia met in perfect peace, and competed with one another to make a name in the whole country. The tales of 'Okáz were carried to every nook and corner of the peninsula and the talk of 'Okáz' became the talk of the whole population of Arabia

Here therefore came all those who wanted to make a name and earn a fame throughout the country. Here came the princes from the different parts of the peninsula with a large retinue and lived in the most fashionable style in order to be called the most stylish prince of Arabia[2]. Here came the great poets and recited their poems[3]. Here delivered the great orators their best orations[4].

Here the grief-struck Arabs claimed to be called the most afflicted person in the country[5]. Here the needy sought for help and the generous gave it[6]. Here the braves were honoured.[7] Here came the various tribes living in

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1. Al-Marzuqi Vol. 2. p.
2. Al-Mazruqi Vol. 2. p. 165.
3. 'Mujam, Egypt Vol. 6 p. 203; Aghani Vol, 9. p. 176 'Amr. B. Kulthum Zuhayr and Asha recited their Okaz and al-Nabigha visited the fair regularly. Agh. Vol. 8 p. 77; Vol 9 p. 176 Vol. 10 p. 11.
4. Agh. Vol. 14. p. 40.
5. Agh. Vol. 4 p. 34.
6. Agh. Vol. 10 p. 141. عمر و بن هذو wanted help for his brother and قيس بن عبو يغوث helped him.
7. Agh. Vol. 13 p. 2.

the peninsula in the largest number possible[1] in order to show their numerical superiority, and all of them vied with one another for greatness and glory. Here taxes were collected[2], intertribal laws and postponement of strife for a certain period were considered[3], the oppressors were condemned and tribal help was denied to them[4]. Here the members of different warring tribes made friends, the elders brought their daughters and they got married[5], and the romance-loving youths pursued their objects in their own way. Here the merchants brought goods from Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia[6] and Persia and probably from Byzantium also. Here were available perfumes, skins, leather goods of different kinds, garments and almost all that the poor and the rich among the Arabs needed.[7]

'Okáz possessed, however, all the evils of a large gathering of hot-blooded Arab youths. Provocation, insult and irritation were not uncommon there. A rash young Arab sat down in the centre of the fair and stretching his legs on a thoroughfare challenged the whole of Arabia to make him behave better[8]. Another ventilated his private grievance in public and declared at the top of his voice in the most provocative fashion that such a person owed him so much money[9]. A few romance-loving youths put their heads together and made a plan to win

1. Al-Marzuqi Vol. 2 p. 166.
2. Agh. Vol. 10 p. 11.
3. Agh. Vol. 14 p. 2s. Bukh. 2. 99.
4. Agh. Vol. 10 p. 28.
5. Do. Vol 8 p. 77. Vol. 10 p. 138.
6. Do. Vol. 13 p. 135
7. Al-Marzuqi Vol. 2 p. 164.
8. Agh. Vol. 19 p. 73.
9. Do. Vol. 19 p. 74.

over a young good-looking girl. When she refused to have anything to do with them, they insulted her by playing a dirty trick which exposed her body in the open market[1].

Such careless, rash provocative actions of ill-behaved youths, at times caused some bloodshed and in some case even such wars as took long before they were finally settled. The skirmishes between the Tamimiter and the Mudaites[2] and the wars of Fajar[3] are only two of many bloody strifes the seeds of which were sown at 'Okáz.

In spite of all these and other untoward events that took place at 'Okâz, the Arabs must be given credit for the wonderful performance It was certainly wonderful on the part of Arabs-- the hot blooded, irritable, easily excitable and blood-thirsty Arabs to create a peaceful and enjoyable atmosphere in such a large market as 'Okâz in which so many tribes with almost inborn enmity between them, came in such a close contact with one another.

The fair of 'Okâz. however, with all its uses and abuses, and irritations and excitement continued for twenty days. On the 20th of Dhu'l-Qa'da the fair broke up and a large number of the business men and visitors went over to the fair of Dhu'l-Majanna at Marru'l Zahrán —a place near Mecca. This fair began on the 21st of Dhu'l Qa'da and lasted till the 29th of the same month. From the first of Dhu'l-Hijja another fair was held near 'Arafát unware as fair of Dhu'l-Majaz. This fair lasted till the 8th of Dhu'l -Hijja. The 9th and the 10th of this month were dates of the annual pilgrimage. On the 11th, 12th

1. Do. Vol. 19 p. 73.
2. Do. Vol. 18 p. 135.
3. Do. Vol. 19, p. 73-74.

and 13th a small fair was held at Mina. Here the season for fairs came to a close and the whole party dispersed.

Over and above these fairs which followed one another consistently, on well arranged consecutive dates, there were held in Arabia a few other fairs also which, so far as I can judge, were of local character. To this class belonged the fair[1] of Bedr which was held in the month of Dhu'l-Qa'da for eight days, the fair of Nitát and of Hajr which were held during the first ten days of Muharram[2].

Some of these fairs, however, were as old as human memory. Though Herodotus the father of history has not made any mention of any of them, yet Dowdones as well as some other Greek historians have referred to a largely attended fair of Arabia and have quoted their predecessors while describing it. This fair has been identified by distinguished orientalists and historians, with the Hajj itself[3].

Most of these fairs, if not all of them as one of the most eminent German Orientalists, Wellhausen, suggests[4] must have been originally connected with the annual pilgrimage to one or the other of the several temples in the different parts of Arabia—the fairs of south with the temple of Dhú Khlu's which was known as كعبة يما نية and كعبة شا مية or with that of Wadd at Dumatu'l-Jandal, and the fairs of Central Arabia with the Ka'ba in Mecca. This theory is supported by the fact that in the vicinity of the seat of every important fair there might be traced a temple or an idol.

Be the origin of these fairs what it may, their commercial importance cannot be overlooked. The fairs of south being held in important towns situated on the sea-coast

1. Wasidi.
2. Al-Biruni al Atharul-Baqiya p. 328.
3. See Dozy's Israeliten zu Mekka p. 14. et Seqq.
4. Arabichen Heidentum p. 9.

naturally became important centres of international commerce. The fairs of Central Arabia also being held just after the fairs of the south, at places situated on, or in the vicinity of the routes followed by the commercial Caravan must be given due importance as centre of business and commerce. This aspect of these fairs assumes greater permenant importance if we take into consideration the fact that Arabia had been one of the most important countries connecting different countries for a very long time, and the Arabs played a very important role in the business of Persia, India and China with Egypt, Banzantium and other countries.

It is due to the commercial importance that some of these fairs continued for long time even after the advent of Islam which brought about complete destruction of the idols and temples in the whole of Arabia. The annual fair of 'Okáz which was the first fair in central Arabia to be stopped came to an end on account of Kharijites rising 129 years after the advent of Islam, and the fair of al Huhásha continued to be held annually till 197 A. H.[1]

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1. Fathu'l Bari Vol. 8. p. 385.

PERSECUTION OF AVICENNA BY SULṬĀN-I-MAHMŪD, A MYTH.

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Interested persons with real or fancied grievances against Maḥmūd, the Sulṭān of Ghazna and conqueror of India, have fabricated numerous tales exemplifying his alleged iconoclastic zeal, religious intolerance, bigotry stinginess and tyranny in general. Of this host of fabrications two have been reiterated by his traducers and revilers so frequently that they have misled even some of the less wary among the Persian historians who, taking them for historic truths, have incorporated them in their popular works on Persian history. As in the case of many religious dogmas, repetition itself has served to authenticate them, so that they are unhesitatingly accepted by those not in a position to make independent investigations, particularly those disposed by their religious and political prejudices to welcome everything that tends to sully the reputation and blacken the memory of the above-named illustrious monarch.

These totally unfounded stories are designed to represent Maḥmūd as a greedy fanatic who is prompted by his misguided religious zeal and avarice to invade non-Muslim countries without the least provocation, reason or rhyme, and to rob them of not only material but also intellectual wealth by compelling those noted for their skill in any art or science to go to Ghazna and settle there. One of these tales accuses him of maltreating the immortal Firdausī, disappointing all his long cherished hopes by breach of a promise of a handsome reward on the completion of Shāh-nāma and then on his writing a satire and absconding

from the Sulṭān's court, hounding him from place to place upto the very moment of his death. And all this for no other reason than that Firdausī was charged by some of his enemies of being a Shī'a and a heretic. This malicious tale has now been proved beyond doubt to be a tissue of lies (1) by rof. Noldeke in his Iranische Nationalepos[1]" (1) and (2) Mr. Maḥmūd Sherānī of the Islāmiah College, Lahore, in his disquisitions published in the journal of the Anjuman-i Tarqqi-i-Urdū, called "Urdū."

The other is the story of Maḥmūd's persecution of Avicenna on acount of the latter's heterodox religious views, and this is what we are concerned with here and propose to examine carefully in order to find out what truth, if any, there is in it. It rests almost entirely on the authority of Niẓāmī-i-'Arūḍi-i-Samarqandī[2] and Md. Khāvindshāh[3]. Of the two Niẓāmī, whose historical blunders have been so ably exposed by his editor, Muḥammad bin 'Abdul Wahhāb Qazvīnī[4], can lay no claim to be regarded as a historain; and the historic worth of the writings of Khāvindshāh will clearly appear from the following observation of C. H. Ethe: "The fame of Muḥammad Khāvindshāh bin Maḥmūd, usually called Mirkhvānd (Mirchond), who died in 1498 (A. H. 903), rests on his work of seven volumes, Rauḍat-uṣṣafā or Garden of Purity, which inspite of its uncritical character and inspite of, or according to oriental taste rather on account of, its style overburdened with metaphors and phrases rich in figures, is regarded in the East as a model.[5] Niẓāmī's version being by far the older

1 Grundriss der Iranischen Philologie II, 4, pp. 151-55.
2 Chahar Maqal aed. by Md bin A. Wahhab Qazvini. pp 76 80.
3 Raudat-ussafa, Appendix, pp 45-46, pub. by Md Kazim bin Md. Mahdi Kashani, Bombay 1847.
4 Chahar Maqala, ed. by Qazvini, Preface XII—XV.
5 Grundriss d. Iran. Philologie II, 7, p. 356.

of the two, must have precedence over that of Khāvindshāh. Much as I should wish to place both the original and its English translation before the reader, economy both of time and space forbids my doing so. I must needs, therefore, be content with Prof. E. G. Browne's English rendering of the story, with the omission of what appears to me irrelevant or redundant. The story runs as follow:—

" Abul 'Abbās Māmūn Khwārazmshāh had a minister named Abul Husain ibn[1] Suhaili[2]. He was a man of philosophical disposition, magnanimous nature and scholarly tastes, while Khwārazmshāh was likewise a philosopher and friend of scholars. In consequence of this many philosophers and men of erudition, such as Abū 'Alī ibn Sinā, Abū Sahl i Masīhi, Abul Khair ibn Khammār, Abū Naṣr-i 'Arraq, and Abū Raihān-i Bīrūnī, gathered about his court.

....

....

.........And all these were, in this their service, independent of worldly cares, and maintained with one another familiar intercourse and pleasant correspondence.

But fortune disapproved of this and Heaven disallowed it; their pleasure was spoiled and their happy life was marred. A notable arrived from Sulṭān Mahmūd Yamīnud-Daulā with a letter, whereof the purport was as follows. " I have heard that there are in attendence on Khwārazmshāh several men of learning who are beyond compare, such as so-and-so and so-and-so. Thou must send them to my court, so that they may attain the honour of

1. This according to the rules of Arabic Garmmar must be bin.
2. This ought to be Suhali.

attendance thereat, while we may profit by their knowledge and skill. So shall we be much obliged to Khwārazmshāh.

Now the bearer of this message was Khwājā Husain ibn 'Alī ibn Mikā'il.........So, Khwārazmshāh assigned to Husain ibn Mīkā'il the best of lodgings and ordered him the most ample entertainment; but, before according him an audience, he summoned the philosophers and laid before them the king's letter, saying "Mahmūd hath a strong hand and a large army..........I cannot refuse to obey his orders or execute his mandate. What say ye on this matter?"

Abū Ali ibn Sinā and Abū Sahl aswered "We will not go:" but Abū Naṣr, Abul Khair and Abū Raihān were eager to go, having heard accounts of the king's munificent gifts and presents. Then said Khwārazmshāh, "Do you two, who have no wish to go, take your own way before I give audience to this man." Then he equipped Abū 'Alī and Abū Sahl, and sent them with a guide, and they set off by the way of the wolves towards Gurgān.

Next day Khwārazmshāh accorded Husain ibn 'Alī ibn Mīkā'īl an audience.......... and said "Abū 'Ali and Abū Sahl are gone, but Abū Naṣr, Abū Raihān and Abul Khair are making their preparations to appear at court.........And in due course they came into the presence of Sultān Yamīnud Daulā Mahmūd at Balkh.

Now it was Abū 'Alī (ibn Sīnā) whom the king chiefly desired. He commanded AbūNaṣr-i 'Arrāq, who was a painter, to draw his portraite on paper, ordered other artists to make forty copies of the portrait. And these he sent with proclamation in all directions, made demand of the neighbouring rulers, saying, "There is a man after this likeness, whom they call Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā. Seek him out and send to me." Abū 'Alī relates that on the fourth day a

wind arose and stirred up the dust. They lost their way and in the heat of the desert of Khwārazm Abū Sahl-i-Mahsīhī, through lack of water and thirst, passed away to the world of Eternity. Abu 'Alī went to Ṭūs, and finally arrived at Nishāpūr.

There he found a number ot persons who were seeking for Abū 'Alī. Filled with anxiety, he alighted in a quiet spot, where he abode several days, and thence he turned his face to Gurgān (Here Abū'Ali is said to have diagnosed a mysterious disease from which a young ralation of Qābūs was suffering, and when this was reported to Qābūs, he sent for Abū 'Alī). So Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā was brought before Qābūs.

Now Qābūs had a copy of the portrait, which Sulṭān-Yamīnud Daulā had sent to him (Having thus recognised the philosopher, Qābūs seated him on his own throne. At the request of Qābūs, Abū 'Alī explained how the malady was diagnosed by him). . . . .

. . . . And thereafter Qābūs maintained Abū 'Alī in the best manner possible, and thence he went to Rai, and finally became minister to Shāhanshāh 'Alāud-Daulā, as indeed is well known in the history of Abū 'Alī ibn Sīnā."

This is the version of the story given by Nizāmī-'Arūḍī. One very remarkable thing about it that strikes one at a glance is that the author does not impute any evil motive to the Sulṭān in summoning this galaxy of talents from the court of Khwārazmshāh to Ghazna. There is no hint dropped here with regard to the Sulṭān's impatient longing for chastising heresy. On the contrary he is obviously credited here with appreciation of their profound erudition and eagerness to ornament his court with their presence. In all probability it was Abū 'Alī and Abū Sahl's own spirit of

independence which, apprehending a possible curtailment of liberty and diversion of thought from customary channels, compelled them to seek refuge from the imaginary danger in hiding, in which case they must evidently thank their own wild fancy and rashness alone for all the hardships, privations and miseries borne by them during their wanderings.

The only addition made to the story by Khāvindshāh is that in sending for Abu 'Ali from the court of Khwārazmshāh the real object of the Sulṭān was to punish his reported departure from orthodoxy. Khāvindshāh's own words are:—

چون (ابوعلی) به بست و دو سالگی رسید پدرش برحمت ایزدی پیوست - وہم دران اوقات وانزمان تخلزل واضطراب بمبانی قصر دولت وشوکت آل سامان راه یافت - ابوعلی ازانجا بیرون رفته روے توجه بخوارزم نهاد - ودران آوان جمعے کثیر از فضلا وحکما مثل ابوسهل مسیحی وابوریحان بیرونی و ابوالخیر خمار وغیر ہم درصحبت وملازمت خوارزم شاه علی بن مامون بن محمد بسر میبردند - چون ابوعلی بدانجا رسید خوارزم شاه بر تربیت مشار الیه اقبال تمام نمود ووجه معیشت او مقرر فرمود - در اثنا این اوقات سلطان محمود سبکتگین بمملکت ملوک سامانی استیلا یافت - وپیش او مذمت ابوعلی کردند که مذہب او مخالف مذہب اہل سنت وجماعت است - وسلطان در دین بغایت صلب بود - خواست که شیخ رابدست آرد -

Translation:—When he (Shaikh Abū 'Alī) reached the age of twenty-two, his father got united with divine mercy (*i.e.* died). And at that time tremour and perturbation found their way to the foundations of the palace of sovereignty and glory of the Sāmānids. Abū 'Alī going out of the palace, turned the face of attention to Khwārazm. And at that time a number of philosophers and savants like Abū Sahl-i Masīḥī, Abū Raiḥān-i Bīrūnī, Abul Khair-i

Khammār and others passed their days in the society and service of Khwārazmshāh 'Alī bin Māmūn bin Muhammad. When Abū 'Alī arrived there, Khwārazmshāh paid full attention to the entertainment of the gentleman referred to and fixed his maintenance. In the midst of these circumtances Sulṭān Mahmūd-i Subuktagin got ascendency over the dominions of the Sāmānid kings and Abū 'Alī was reviled before him, that his religious views opposed to those of the followers of Sunnat and Jamā'at, and the Sulṭān was extremely rigid in the matter of faith. (So) he desired to catch hold of the Shaikh."

With a few minor divergences here and there, the rest of the story in the Rauḍat-uṣṣafā is eaxctly the same as in Chahār Maqāla.

Now when we closely examine the above anecdote, we find it full of anachronisms, inaccuracies and errors and thus worthy of but little credence. The very first word with which Nizāmī's version of it begins, namely, Abul, 'Abbās Māmūn Khwārazmshāh, involves a glaring anachronism, in as much as the prince of Khwārazm whose court was first visited by Avicenna after his departure from Bukhārā, was not Abul 'Abbās Māmūn but his elder brother 'Alī bin Māmūn. As according to the majority of his biographers Avicenna was born in 372 A.H., and had completed the age of twenty-two at the time of his father's death, this must have consequently occurred in 394-5, and as he left Bukhārā soon after this sad event on the outbreak of disturbances there, his departure must have taken place two or three years later. whereas Māmūn's accession to the throne of Khwārazm is generally believed to have taken place towards the close or on the completion of the 4th century A H. Avicenna's own autobiographical

1. Ibn-ul Qifti, Tarikh-ul Hukama, ed. by Lippert, p. 417, Leipzig 1903.

sketch, reproduced by Al-Qifti[1] as well as Ibn Abi 'Usaibi'a[1], tells us that it was 'Alī bin Māmūn who welcomed him and fixed for him an allowance sufficient to defray all his expenses during his stay in Khwārazm. The passage just referred to runs as follow:—

ثم مات والدی وتصرفت بی الاحوال وتقلدت شیئا من اعمال السلطان- ودعتنی الضرورة الی الارتحال عن
بخارا والانتقال الی کرکانج وکان ابوالحسین السهلی المحب لهذه العلوم بها وزیراً- وقدمت الی الامیر بها وهو
علی بن المامون وکنت فی زی الفقهاء اذ ذاک بطیلسان وتحت الحنک- واثبتوا لی مشاهرة دارة تقوم
بکفایة مثلی- ثم دعت الضرورة الی الانتقال الی نسا ومنها الی جاجرم راس حد خراسان ومنها الی جرجان
وکان قصدی الامیر قابوس- فاتفق فی اثناء هذا اخذ قابوس وحبسه فی بعض القلاع وموته هناک- ثم مضیت
الی دهستان ومرضت مرضا صعبا وعدت الی جرجان- واتصل ابوعبید الجرجانی بی- وانشات قصیدة
فیها بیت القائل- لما عظمت فلیس مصر واسعی لما غلا ثمنی عدمت المشتری

Translation:—Then my father died. And conditions changed with me and I undertook some services for the king. And necessity called on me to depart from Bukhārā and go to Gurgānj. And Abul Husain-il Suhali, the lover of these sciences, was the vizier there. And I was brought before the ruler there, namely 'Alı bin Māmūn. And was at the time dressed like a jurist, with a toga and a turban with a fold passing under the chin. And they fixed for me an ample monthly allowance to suffice for a man like myself. Then necessity called on me to go to Fasā and thence to Jājarm, the chief point on the frontier of Khurāsān, and thence to Jurjān. And my intention was to see the Amīr Qābūs, but in the meantime there happened the capture of Qābūs, his imprisonment in one of the forts and his demise there. Then I went to Dihistān and fell severely ill there and returned to Jurjān. And Abū 'Ubaid-i Juzjānı joined me. And I composed a Qasīdā relatiog to my condition in which there was the couplet of the speaker:—

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1. Ibn-ul Abi 'Usaibia, 'Uyun-ul Anba, Vol. II, p. 4, Al-Vahabiyyah Press 1882.

When I grew big, no town was wide enough for me,
When my price grew dear, I missed the purchaser."

Now this extract from Avicenna's autobiographical account, besides establishing the fact that it was 'Ali bin Māmūn of Khwārazm and not Māmūn bin Māmūn who so warmly welcomed the philosopher's visit and treated him with such lavish hospitality as induced the Shaikh to stay there and live under the patronage of this noble and enlightened prince for some length of time, throws light on several other points and discredits the statements of Nizāmī and Khāvindshāh relating thereto. With regard to his going away to Khwārazm, the philosopher simply says "necessity called on me to go to Fasā" etc In the absence of all clue to the nature of this necessity, we find that this is exactly the language used by him in stating the reason of his leaving Bukhārā which, we know from history, was no other than the chaos and anarchy prevailing there after the deposition of Manṣūr bin Nūh-i Sāmāni by Biktuzūn and Fāiq. We may, therefore, safely conclude that some similar conditions might have necessitated his departure from Khwārazm too. At any rate the Arabic passage quoted above refuses to support the structure erected on it by Nizāmī and Khāvindshāh.

Similarly the story of the philosopher discovering all about the amour of an extemely and stupidly bashful young man, a near retation of Shams-ul Mā'ālī Qābūs, by simply feeling the pulse, his interview with and recognition by Qābūs, the most extravagant favours and marks of respect shown and sumptuous entertainment accorded him by Qābūs, is obviously a figment of the imagination of Nīzāmī and Khāvindshāh, resting probably on the plan of treatment to be advantageously adopted in similar cases of young men suffering from the "malady of love,"

suggested by Ibn-i Sīnā in his Qānūn. The above extract clearly shows that though the sole object of the philosopher's journey to Jurjān was to have the erudite monarch's audience, the desire remaind unfulfilled, as before his arrival at Jurjān, Qābūs was seized by his rebellious troops, cast into prison and soon after murdered.

The title of Shāhanshāh conferred by Nizāmī on 'Alā ud-Daula, the cousin of Majdud-Daulā Dailamī and petty ruler of Isfahān, inspite of his splendid victories against Tājud Daula and conquest of Hamadān, seems to be wholly unjustifiable, and making Ibn i Sīnā the vizier of Alāud-Daulā betrays appalling ignorance and inexcusable disregard of historic truth. The philosopher twice acted as vizier to Shams-ud Dauala of Hamadān, the younger brother of Majd-ud-Daulā Dailamī, but never to 'Alā-ud-Daulā. Ibn-i Sīnā came to the court of 'Alā-ud-Daula after the death of Shams-ud-Daulā, when Hamadān was conquered by the former during the early part of the reign of the latter's son Tāj-ud-Daulā. No doubt the philosopher seems to have received from now to the moment of his death uniform courtesy and kindness and enjoyed the patronage of 'Alā-ud-Daulā to whom he dedicated his unique encyclopaedic work on philosophy in Persian, entitled Dānishnāmaīi 'Alā-i, but never to have acted as vizier to him.[1]

Above all the living together of Ibn-i Sīnā and Abū Raihān-i Bīrūnī at the court of Māmūn bin Māmūn and their leaving it almost simultaneously on receipt of the summons from Ghazna, is a chronological impossibility. Eduard Sachau in his German introduction to Bīrūnī's Al-Āthār-ul Bāqiyah has exposed this anachronism so beauti-

1. Chahar Maqala, ed by Qazvini, pp. 250-51, London 1910; Revised Translation of the Chahar Maqala by E. G. Browne, p. 163, para. 1, London 1921.

fully that I think I cannot do better than placing before the reader an English translation of the passage, which is as follows:—

"This story on chronological grounds is impossible, for it admits that Ibn. i Sīnā and Abū Sahl fled from Khwārazm before 403 A. H., because Ibn. i Sīnā after his arrival at Hyrcania (Jarjān), is said to have entered the service of Shams-ul Ma'ālī Qābūs who died in 403 A. H; whereas Abū Raihān and Abul Khair first left Khwārazm and went to Ghazna in 407 A. H., as will appear from what follows. In the given note events far removed from one another in regard to time and motive are in a thoughtless manner thrown together[1]."

In another paragraph Sachau writes as follows: "Regarding the destruction of independence of the principality Khwārazm, and its annexation by Mahmūd of Ghazna we possess Al-Bīrūnī's own authentic note. He gives an account of the rebellion in the land which ended with the murder of the Prince, Māmūn bin Māmūn, as an eye-witness. This murder gave Mahmūd direct cause for interference; he hurried on as avenger of his brother-in-law, quelled the rebellion and took possession of the land in the spring of 408 A. H. Khwārazm became a province of his empire. After he had punished the ringleaders and appointed one of his generals, Altūntāsh, as governor, he went back to Afganistān in the same spring and carried away with him immense booty, many prisoners who were incorporated into his Indian army and princes of the broken up royal house whom he got incarcerated in various forts.

Now most probably Abū Raihān-Birūnī, Abul Khair and Abū Nasr also happened to be (with him) in this journey."

1. Al-Athar-ul Baqiyah, ed. by Sachau, p. XXIX, Leipzig 1878.

Indeed it is very doubtful whether Avicenna and Al-Bīrūni ever met together for, according to his own authentic statement, the former left Khuārazm while 'Alī bin Māmūn was still alive, whereas the latter, according to the contemporary historian 'Al-Baihaqi,[1] served Māmūn bin Māmūn, the successor of 'Alī bin Māmūn, throughout the seven years immediately preceding the tragic end of that prince in 407 A. H. and was then taken by Mahmūd to Ghazna in 408 A. H, as stated above. No doubt there passed between the two some correspondence on scientific and philosophic questions, but this appears to have taken place before Avicenna left Bukhārā.[2]

There are two other things which demand consideration in this connection and go to completely destroy the hypothesis of Mahmūd's alleged determination to punish the heterodoxy of Ibn-i-Sīnā. Of course it was possible that his wandering *incognito* might have escaped vigilance of the Sulṭān's spies, but when on his reaching Hamadān he emerged from this oblivion and twice served as vizier to Shams-ud-Daulā, each time for a number of years, and subsequently retired to the court of Ālā-ud-Daulā (Abū Ja'afar bin Kākūya) of Isfahān and lived far the rest of his life as a highly honoured guest and adviser for the king, it was impossible that his presence there in such prominent public capacities playing such important roles should remain unknown to Mahmūd for such a length of time. And if it did come to his ears, as it was bound to do sooner or later, then how was it that the Sulṭān, burning as he was, according to Khāvindshāh, with the desire to chastise the philosopher's heresy, did not demand his surrender from these

1. Tarikh Masudi, Pub. by the Asiatic society of Bengal, 838.
2. Al-Athar-ul Baqiyeh, ed. by Sachau, P. XXXV Leipzig 1878.

petty rulers, who could no more afford to disobey his commands and thereby court certain disaster to themselves than Khwārazmshāh himself.

Another incident which deserves notice in this connection and discredits the allegation of Khāvindshāh, is the Sulṭān's visit to Rai in the last year of his reign *i. e.*, 420 A. H., described by Khāvindshāh himself with full details. The object of this expedition was to set aside the weak Dailamite prince, Majd-ud-Daulā, to make over his dominions to Ma'sud so that he might rest content with these and might not quarrel with his brother Muhammad for whom the Sulṭān wished to reserve and secure undisputed possession of Khurāsān, India and Ghazna. Mahmūd, according to Khāvindshāh, on this occasion spoliated the whole country of 'Irāq, including Isfahān,[1] and there cannot be the least doubt that Ibn-i Sīnā was there at this time, for he died in 428 A. H. and according to all his biographers spent the last 15 or 16 years of his life in the service of 'Alā-ud-Daulā. If the Sulṭān were really anxious to catch hold of the philosopher, a stroke of the pen would suffice to get the philosopher arrested and brought into his presence. This clearly shows that the Ṣulṭān had no such wish as is imputed to him by Khāvindshāh Some one might ask now "What then was Khāvindshāh's motive in deliberately bringing a false accusation against the Sulṭān, whose splendid services to Islām are so warmly appreciated by our author elsewhere?" Our reply is "The author's credulity and eager pursuit of the marvellous, to which the whole of the Appendix to his voluminous work and similar tales scattered throughout the book, like that of the pact entered

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1. Raudat-ussafa ed. by Md. Kazim bin Md. Mahdi of Kashan, p. 50, Bombay 1847.

into by Nīzām-ul-Mulk, Hasan-i Ṣabbāh and 'Umar-i Khayyām in their school days,[1] bear eloquent testimony.

A very curious thing about this supposed episode in the life of Abū 'Alī bin Sīnā is that all the reliable Arabian historians, like 'Ai-Utbi, Al-Qiftī, Qāḍī ibn-u Khallikān, Ibn-u Abī 'Usaibi'ah etc., are completly silent about it. Even Baihaqi makes no mention of it in his Tārīkh-i Mas'ūdī written in Persian. It is only the Persian writers, notorious for their indifference to truth, lack of discrimination, and taking a peculiar delight in the flights of fancy, who relate the baseless story in all its details. Possibly Shī'a prejudice against a staunch Sunnī like the Sulṭān, was also to a certain extent resposible for its invention and propagation. Like all others stories of a similar character it goes on gaining in volume with the lapse of time. Nizāmī does not ascribe any evil motive to the Sulṭān's summoning the scholars to his court, Khāvindshāh attributes it to the Sulṭān's desire to punish the philosopher for holding views opposed to strict orthodoxy, but the author of the article on Avicenna in the Nāma-i Dānishvarān, written in the reign of Nāṣir-ud-Dīn Qāchār, takes a further step and positively affirms that the Sulṭān's real intention was to inflict on the heretic the extreme punishment of apostacy, namely, death.[2]

1. *Ibid* p. 80.
2. Nama-i Danishvaran, Vol. 1, Pp. 203.

Philology Section

LINGUISTICS IN INDIA.

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All-India Oriental Conference is primarily a gathering of Indologists, and its Philological Section should in the fitness of things occupy itself mainly with the linguistic problems of India, Ancient and Modern. This however does not mean that the scope of our delibrations is restricted within narrow limits. For the linguistic problems connected with India are so many and so varied in their number and nature, and besides have so many links and ramifications outside India, that quite a vast field of enquiry presents itself as a matter of course. India has been a meeting place of races, civilisations and languages ever since the dawn of history, and even earlier; she has been a veritable *Middle Kingdom*, into which so many different types of humaniny, each with its particular language and culture, have converged. As extraneous elements introduced and naturalised in India they have their affinities outside. Then, again, the overflow of culture from India links the country also with many other and different types of culture, all of which were profoundly modified by India and even obtained a certain Indian colouring and character. The languages of all these extraneous cultures quite legitimately come within the domain of Indian Linguistics by virtue of their Indian affinities or connexions. Thus, with our Sanskrit and our Indo-Aryan languages we are connected with the Indo-European world of the West, and extra-Indian Indo-European languages in their earlier phases form a part

of the problems of Vedic and Sanskrit; our Dravidian is so far unique, but scholars have been searching for its affinities from Australia to the Ural-Altaic domain and to Asia Minor and the Mediterranean region; our Kol (or Muṇḍā) speeches are cousins of the Mon-Khmer languages of Indo-China, and of the Indonesian speeches of Malaya and of the islands beyond; the Tibeto-Burman dialects of India bring in problems of the Sino-Tibetan family; and the extinct languages of Central Asia as well as the speeches of Indo-China and Indonesia touch the fringe of Indian Linguistics through Sanskrit (and Pali) having been their inspirer and feeder. Besides, general problems of Linguistics referring to the various physiological and psychological aspects of speech can as a matter of course form the subject of our discussions whenever they have the least bearing on our Indian languages. The field is thus so vast and unlimited that we can venture to till only a corner of it—the corner of which the terrain and soil are known or expected to be known to us through our being born in it and living within it, or through our special intimate study of it.

We meet here firstly to take stock of the progress made in India in the corner of the field we are directly interested in—namely, the languages of India. But so far workers have been so few and real progress made in India so small that for the present in discusssing linguistic studies in our country we have to talk more about the *desiderata* in the different branches of Indian Linguistics than about our actual achievements. The advance that has been made so far lies largely to the credit of a few European scholars who have made the subject their own. Our meetings will consequently be, at least for some time to come, concerned with the discussing

of our plans than with other things. We shall of course be toiling, each man at his plough in his particular furrow, and the results of our investigations we shall try to make known to our fellow-workers. And when we meet each other at gatherings like the present one, we shall have occasion to ask ourselves the question—*ayi tapo vardhate?* Is our fervour and our endeavour increasing? We shall then have the opportunity of placing before our *confrères* the problems with which we may be occupied at the moment and have the advantage of their opinions and criticisms on our methods and conclusions: we shall thus be enabled to exchange notes, and to benefit through personal touch with kindred spirits, in a circle which is still restricted and select.

Compared with the other Sciences and Art, Linguistics as a Modern Science is of recent growth, and is still new to our country. Europe of course received the impetus from the discovery of our Sanskrit, and an additional impulse she derived from the study of the Ancient Indian phoneticians and grammarians whose works were a revelation in speech analysis. But while the modern Science of comparative Philology originated and was developed in Europe in the course of the ninteenth century by bringing in the historical and comparative method in explaining the facts which were being collected and correlated, India pursued her traditional methods of studying her classical language, methods in which the crystal stream of critical observation which had led to the foundation of Ancient Indian grammar was wellnigh lost sight of underneath the overgrowth of later scholasticism. The traditional method nevertheless was thorough; and this was natural enough when culture and study was as a rule bound to be limited and intensive; and the scientific basis

of this traditional method also acted as a powerful leaven. The first enquirers who analysed the ancient Aryan speech of India were no doubt pioneers, free from the burden of a stereotyped tradition and from the theological *impedimenta* that came in later. Their interest was certainly one of scientific curiosity, although in the unconscious way of all primitive searchers after truth. This was followed by a highly intellectual and self-conscious spirit of research which sought to push the haphazard enquiries started previously to their logical end in a highly specialised field. The climax of this outlook we find in Pāṇini's method. A scholastic and theological attitude soon followed, and has ever since been in possession of the field of linguistic study among our old-type scholars. The wonder, the delight and the freshness of spirit which unquestionably accompanied the first Indian grammarian's analysis of the word into syllables and sounds, or into roots and affixes, was a lost world, when the spirit of enquiry could not keep pace with the progress of a living speech, and the grammar of a dead language became merely an art of language, a discipline for its own sake, as well as a handmaiden of religious ritualism or of theological subtleties. One cannot however presume to decry or belittle the work of the ancient and medieval Sanskrit grammarians. The ancient Ṛṣis, the path-finders, laid the foundation of Sanskrit grammar, and the example they set in taking a proper stock of the language was rigidly followed by their successors. Scholars concentrated on the Sanskrit language and its usage, and the extraordinary intellect of Patañjali and others being brought to bear upon a description of the language and its detailed analysis, we have as a result a grammatical system for the clsssical language of India unrivalled in

its accumulation and accurate description of facts and in the thoroughness and detail of its technique, which still continues to be one of the foremost intellectual achievements of India. But apart from those of the linguistic speculations of the Hindu grammarians of old which sought to find out the nature of language (as typified by Sanskrit) as a phenomenon, and discussed its *rationale* from point of view of one or other of the different systems of philosophy, linguistic studies propely so-called ran along fixed grooves in India—as in all countries in ancient and medieval times. Language study either resolved itself into the Art of Grammar, which aimed at the efficient acquirement of a sacred and antiquated language through a long and rigid course of study; or it became a scholastic philosophy with a tacit acknowledgment of some accepted dogmas or theories as a necessary background for speculation. Even when it became necessary to handle the Prakrit dialects which unfolded the development of speech as a living process, and even when there was contact with foreign speeches like Persian and Greek—a contact which is so conducive to the initiation of new ideas,—with a new scholasticism, as well as an attitude of aloofness from the outside world which a rapidly frozening orthodoxy, the daughter of theology, was engendering, the foundations of historical and comparative grammar could not be laid in India; and it was a great chance missed, for the times and the spirit were both propitious The work of the old-time Indian grammarians and speculators in the philosophy of language has nevertheless an honoured place in the history of the evolution of the linguistic science, and has ample historical justification. But a true science of language such as we understand it to be at the present day was as yet far away in the womb of the future

—a science which could have access to all the aspects of the question and would collect facts from every side, and compare them and place them in their mutual relation, and supply links and hypotheses giving the history of a process. The dynamic side of language as an expression of life, which was altering with the passing centuries as the circumstances of life itself were altering, could not be expected to be clearly seen in ages which had not as yet evolved the historical sense among scholars. It was the static aspect of an unchanging norm that presented itself before linguistic enquirers who had very little notion of human history. The historical and comparative method is a new discovery. Its gradual perfection is of epoch-making importance, as it has completely altered our outlook on the cultural evolution of man in all that concerns him, including language. Proper methodology in the study of speech has been slowly evolved during the nineteenth century; and taking the fullest help as it has from kindred sciences, it would seem that in its broad principles the modern method has come to stay,—unless some revolutionary Law of Relativity were to be discovered in the physiological and psychological world with which language has to do.

Science is one, and it is not of the East or of the West. It is because certain things which are of universal application have been discovered within recent times in Europe, we would not be justified in labelling them as *European* and in regarding them as irremediably foreign, which cannot be ours. This is more true of the things of the intellect, of the spirit. In the sum total of human progress, each people brings its contribution while it is in the hey-day of its intellectual life. The torch is passed on from race to race. So that the light kindled in a

corner of Northern India—in this very Land of the Five Rivers—some two thousand five hundred to three thousand years ago, has been kept burning, and in the hands of Modern Europe it is shedding its effulgence with a brilliance greater than ever. And we that have felt drawn by that light should regard ourselves thrice happy, and consider a great part of the purpose of our earthly sojourn (on the intellectual plane) to be fulfilled, if we can bring it back once more to our motherland and illumine with new splendour our country's multiform palace of speech and explore with the help of this light from the West all its nooks and corners for the first time in history.

Our outlook is frankly modern, and European,—and yet it is Ancient Indian. For if the intellect of Ancient India stood for anything, it was for an uncompromising search after truth; and that is also the attitude of Western or Modern Science. The reward of this attitude is itself—it is the intellectual satisfaction, the joy of the dry white light of the intellect. I do not here consider the romantic pleasure in studying speech as a fact of evolutionary history, and the mystic sense in speech, which are present nevertheless in many investigators. And if we are to make a declaration of the doctrine which guide our work as well as the manner of our approaching the problems in our subject, we must admit with due emphasis that our methodology is also modern, and European. In the physical sciences, this modern or European method is the only method. In our science of Linguistics, too, where cause and effect take part equally, the soundness of the modern method is an attested fact. I need not explain the obvious, and before initiates, too. For language investigation, the outstanding characteristic of the modern method is comparison. We cannot remain *kūpamaṇḍūkas* the pro-

verbial frogs-in-the-well, in any domain of life and in its manifestations in art and science, and much less in a human science like ours. For the enquirer who will gather facts and find out laws comparison is essential—indeed, it is a part of the facts themselves. We are to work, each of us according to his ability, his preparation and his gifts, in studying the languages of India according to the modern methods. Our attitude towards the workers in the traditional way, towards our *Paṇḍitas* and *Śāstrīs, Bhikkhus and Lāmās, Dastūrs* and *'Ālims,* is one of respect and co-operation and fellowship in a field of common studies. They have earned the gratitude of the civilised world by their conserving the heritage of the past, but owing to altering circumstances the ideal type representative of their scholarship is becoming rarer and rarer. It is a matter of profound regret that the old type of scholarship cannot exist much longer. We honour and appreciate their intensive knowledge of the tradition, which alone can unlock many a precious truth about the past. We come after them, and we seek to arrange and explain, according to what we consider the right lines of exposition, the traditional information that they have zealously preserved for mankind. The modern philological, historical and comparative method of interpreting the Veda, for instance, we consider to be the only right method; but this method can never withhold from the tradition the respectful attention which is its due, and at every step it must make its reverential and grateful obeisance to Sāyaṇa and the old *Acāryas* as ancient pathmakers. The modern method is the inevitable off spring of the Time-Spirit, and the old scholars were the conservators who made the modern method possible; and all respect and gratitude also to the living scholars who embody in themselves the

spirit and the learning of the *Pūrvācāryas*, the masters of the past, and still seek to follow in their footsteps.

It must be admitted that the importance of Linguistics is not generally realised as much as the science really deserves. Intensive students of a classical language, whether in the East or in the West, have generally a very vague idea of the linguistic science. And since it is not a part of the tradition in which they have been trained, they are suspicious of it, as if the subject were an intruder in their field of studies, and claimed more attention than it honestly deserved. In justice, it must be admitted that at first there was room for suspicion. For, this newly rising science in the hand of many a scholar, more enthusiastic than sober, often behaved like a veritable *enfant terrible*, paying but scant respect to the age and prestige of tradition when it was out in its career to conquer the world. Its attitude was that of a Macaulay with the famous pronouncement that a shelfful of English books was worth the whole literature of India and Arabia. When language study properly so-called began to question the propriety of the traditional views and methods of "Philologie," it could not expect itself to be received with acclamation by orthodox scholarship; and when it became self-assertive, it was branded as a *parvenu*. A traditional repugnance was bound to grow up against it, from which it could become free in Europe itself only gradually. In Europe the greater spread of cultural education was partly responsible for it; and language study especially of the classical languages, had to ally itself with this new science, whose power had to be acknowledged, to save itself from the onslaughts of the demand for scientific and technical education. In India, with the

hot-house atmosphere of our universities, we are still in a backward position, as can be expected. Orthodox *Paṇḍitas* and scholars of Sanskrit are apathetic, and frankly contemptuous where they find the results of Linguistics to go against the traditional view Among our "English-educated" groups, the attitude certainly is not up-to-date and reasonable. Familiarity is said to breed contempt, but here the want of familiarity has done it. In our seats of learning, the linguistic science has had to seek admission by the back door, and with many apologies. Some place had to be made for it, to keep up appearances; and half a paper or less would be relegated to "Philology" in our advanced courses in a classical language like Sanskrit, or in English, and our paṇḍitas, whether in English or in Sanskrit, would all the while consider it a nuisance, and often frankly train up their pupils in that attitude. Only in this way some room could be made for the science. So long there were few to waste any tenderness over it, and there was not much advocacy for its cause either, by any striking or convincing demonstration of its value as a mental discipline and as a pathway of investigation into problems of vital interest in the cultural life of the country. Yet the indebtedness to it of most of the other human sciences that have come into being or have come to be established during the last quarter of a century or half a century should have been given a wider recognition. But Comparative Religion, or Ethnology, or Psychology, is not a popular subject. The importance of Linguistics not being obvious, there is only an imperfect appreciation of its cultural and disciplinary value. Then again, the findings of Linguistics in the domain of the past history of the race are often apt to be disconcerting. Where a general tendency has been towards a passionate exaggeration of

the glories of the past which are made to loom large in our intellectual horizon, with a magnitude invested on them by a conscious or unconscious patriotic or theological bias, anything which challenges that tendency brings with it an instinctive shock of repugnance. It is thought improper and unwholesome if it does not subscribe to shibboleths which have acquired the force of creeds. 'Hindu or Vedic civilisation—the oldest civilisation in the world,' 'The Ṛgveda —the oldest book of the world,' 'Sanskrit--the mother of all languages,' 'India--the mother of all civilisations,' and such other uncritical statements which by constant repetition have obtained the importance of unquestionable and incontrovertible truths, began to be openly assailed by this new science of language, and this cannot be expected to mitigate the antagonism to it. But the scientific outlook is uncompromisingly for the truth that is arrived at by the scientific or logical method. A little judicious pondering to national or religious vanity may be thought to be helpful in inspiring people to partriotic action, but the attitude of the man of science is in favour of the clear light of Truth, and nothing but the Truth, so far as it is possible for human reasoning to find it out, as the only right solution or fulfilment of practical difficulties or desirable aims. The words of Patañjali—*satyadevas syāmaity adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam*--in their literal and not their theological sense (namely 'Grammar is to be studied that I may have Truth for my deity'), form a fitting motto to guide students of the science of speech.

But the case for Scientific Linguistics is not so desperate in India. It is after all creating an interest. The Spirit of Curiosity is abroad, and she is opening wide the doors and windows of our mind for air and light from the outside. We are confident that our science is

going to have its rightful place among the intellectual endeavours of our country. The number of scholars who are devoting their energies in qualifying for working in it is slowly but steadily on the increase. The earnestness and enthusiasm of the new band of workers gives the highest promise for the future of the science in the country. The foundation of a *Linguistic Society of India*, in which all serious workers in Linguistics might group themselves for mutual help and corporate action, was a pious wish of ours to which Dr. I. J. S. Taraporewala as Chairman of the Philological Section of the Second Oriental Conference at Calcutta gave expression in 1922; now, thanks to the initiative of a group of scholars in the Panjab, what we have been wishing for and talking about has become an accomplished fact, and we have at last an infant *Linguistic Society of India*. The starting of this Society, which, let us hope, will bring together all the serious students of language in India working along scientific lines, I consider a great and a significant advance for the Science in our country.

In Europe, the advances in Linguistic Science were made through the study of both the living and the classical languages, but it was more through the older languages than the modern ones that the greatest progress was achieved in the initial stages. A great many of the most suggestive discoveries were made in the field of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and Gothic and of the older phases of the Modern European Languages; and some of the greatest names in the domain of Linguistics are connected with the ancient languages. The comparative study of the formal aspect of the older languages with a view to find out their genetic relations was thus more conducive to the development of the Science than anything else, at least during the

earlier part of its history, when there was a considerable romantic interest in the study of speeches of folks of olden days, the Vedic Aryas, the Hellenes of Homer, the Romans, the Germans, the Celts, ancient peoples with a certain heroic glamour about them. Now the study of the ancient and of the modern speeches go hand in hand in Europe. But the history of Linguistics in India was the other way about. The sole classical language, Sanskrit, formed the life study of the old type of scholars, and the traditional method they followed was a *cul-de-sac* for modern philology. The old grammarians seemed to have done everything: since, by far the largest percentage of words in the language were given satisfactory etymologies, and the last analysis to roots and affixes was an accomplished fact, and analysis apparently could not proceed any further. Doubtful etymologies, however, remained doubtful if scholastic explanations were not acceptable. Where so much was given, it was ungracious to ask for more. And the new outlook was absent, to view the problems properly, and to make the right sort of enquiries. There was ground for some sort of satisfaction for the student of the Language of the Gods, thanks to the labours of the Ṛṣis and the *Acāryas*. But the Modern Indian Languages were crying for attention, only there was none to hear them. So much there was which was not explained. And the Prakrits were in the middle, between the language of the Age of Gold on the one hand and those of Āryāvarta of the present Age of Iron on the other. The Prakrits were tantalising with their suggested explanations. So that it was no wonder that the first great linguistic scholar of Modern India,--a scholar who was saturated with the Sanskrit tradition—should, with a rare scientific curiosity turn his attention to the vernaculars, and should set about

trying to tell the whole history of their origin and development. Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar just fifty years ago laid the foundation of philological studies in our country in his *Wilson Philological Lectures* of 1877. But his has remained the solitary Indian name of any real eminence, embracing at one sweep so many different aspects of Indian 'Philology.' While the *Junggrammatiker* were revitalising the Science of Linguistics in Europe with their new ideas and methods, and the study of the new as well as the old languages received a fresh impetus, a handful of European scholars like Beames, Hoernle, Lyall, Trumpp, and finally, Grierson, fell under the spell of the Aryan vernaculars, and created conjointly with Bhandarkar (whose work and that of Beames were practically contemporaneous), the Comparative Philology of the New Indo-Aryan Languages. The inauguration of the *Linguistic Survey of India* by the Government of India in 1903 with Grierson as its director, which after a quarter of a century has at last been happily completed early this year, has been a great measure for the advancement of philological search in India, and has prepared the ground for a newer generation of workers. The accurate description of the living speeches, and their proper classification in the *LSI.*, has helped to clear away a great many fantastic notions among people in India and outside India about the real linguistic situation in our country. The work has been the source of a great impulse for philological studies and researches in India. Grierson's researches into the various vernaculars of India in their origin and their present state, into the Prakrits, into the borderland languages, represent a great deal of the work of permanent value which has been done in this field. And Grierson's example has been emulated by another small group of European scholars who have taken up the Modern

Indo-Aryan languages, conspicuous among whom are Jules Bloch and R L. Turner; and we must mention also L. P. Tessitori, whose premature death is an irreparable loss to Indian linguistics.

I need not enter into details about the work done in the other families of speech in India— Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic (Kol or Muṇḍā etc.), and Tibeto-Chinese. Here, too, beginning from the middle of the last century, almost all the names are European: Max Mueller, Caldwell, Hodgson, Graul, Kittel, Gundert, Pope, Forbes, Campbell, Skrefsrud, Thomsen, Bodding, Hoffmann, Sten Konow, Nottrott, Vinson, Hahn, Bray, and the rest. Work in this field, however, has been rather tentative. The problems of the Dravidian languages would seem to require rehandling with a new outlook which will not pin its faith on the assumption that Tamil best represents the old Dravidian *Ursprache*. For Kol, the enquiries of the type instituted by Bodding for Santali will be of far-reaching importance; and the researches of Jean Przyluski in connexion with the cultural contact between the Aryan world and the Austro Asiatic world are just opening out for us a new vista about the origin of the Hindu people and Hindu culture of Northern India, which may be pronounced to be epoch-making in its significance.

The reproach that Indians do not take any interest in their own languages is not true any more, thanks to the spirit of national awakening which is urging upon the necessity of progress in every line. Interest in the vernaculars and in their older literatures, the study of which inevitably led to the study of their philology, brought about the foundation by the people of Societies like the *Vaṅgīya Sāhitya-Pariṣad* of Calcutta, with branches all over the

province of Bengal, of the *Nāgarī-Pracārṇī-sabhā* of Benares, of the *Tamil-sangam* of Madras, and of similar associations in the other language areas. The work done by them, although in the by-ways of vernacular text criticism and philology, is not to be neglected. Then, most promising of all, during the last two decades the Indian Universities have been taking a more lively interest in the modern India Languages. The winning of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913 by Rabindranath Tagore, who writes first in his mother tongue Bengali, and then translates into English; the pressing of the claims of Hindustani from the Congress platform as the *Rāṣṭra-bhāṣā*, the *Qaumī Zabān* or National Speech of India to take the place of English which is the present bond of union among the educated people from the different provinces; the sense of provincial patriotism which is flowing as an under-current in the political life of a United India; the feeling that for mass education, for which the demand is becoming more and more insistent, the provincial vernacular should be the medium; the foundation of the Osmania University at Haidarabad with an Indian language, Urdu, as its medium; all these, and other reasons are giving a new importance to the vernaculars in popular thought and sentiment, which is finding its way and leavening the policy of the Universities. The necessity for a systematic study of the Indian Vernaculars is being acknowledged everywhere; and the ultimate result of it all will be highly advantageous for the advancement of Philological Research tn India. The University of Calcutta took the lead in this matter, under the guiding hand of the great Sir Asutosh Mookerjee; and here we have a true nucleus of a School of modern Indian Languages. The University of Madras started the Readerships in Dravidian Philology

which it is to be regretted were not made a permanent institution; but the *Tamil Lexicon* it is bringing out will be an abiding testimony to the spirit of research into the Dravidian languages inaugurated by the University of Madras. The new spirit is manifest everywhere. And the University of Lahore, in addition to the vernacular section of its oriental department, is noteworthy in possessing a department of Experimental Phonetics, being the first Indian University to do so.

This brings to my mind the question of the importance of this branch of linguistic investigation. We are slaves of the written word; and although in India and in Europe we do not use pictograms or ideograms but alphabets of a phonetic character, experience has shown that even among fairly educated people it requires some thinking to realise the value of the spoken word and to comprehend the nature of the written word as a symbolisation of sounds. Many people are not usually able to shake off the fetish of the orthographical form. Common sense is the most uncommon thing in the world, and it was with rare common sense that Patañjali laid down the following definition of a word—***pratīta-padārthako dhvanir loke śabda ucyate*****.................** ***dhvanis śabdah*** ('the sound by which an object is made out is called the word: the sound is the word'). The keen phonetic sense of India never forgot this dictum in ancient times: hence we have a rational system of spelling which shows a rare understanding of the sound elements of speech. This system obtains for Sanskrit and the Prakrits as preserved in MS. literature, as well as for most of the Indian languages, except in the case of few like Bengali which at some unpropitious moment evinced a desire to emulate Sanskrit. It is this absence of the phonetic sense aided by a conservative spirit that is responsible for the

system (or the want of it) in English spelling and in Modern Irish spelling than which it is hard to conceive of anything more intricate. The necessity of phonetic analysis as a basis of language study is being rapidly recognised in Europe and America, and Experimental Phonetics has come into being, to aid the Science of Linguistics. This movement is also slowly filtering down to India. The present is but a transformation of the Past, and only when we thorughly understand the Present, we can attempt to find out in what was it embedded in the bosom of the Past. Phonetics enable us to get at the real form of the spoken word; and it is the oral transmission which is the vital thing, not the grammarian's orthographic representation of an archaic or theoretical pronounciation. A fine shade of a vowel or consonant sound, a slight difference in tone, in fact all subtle *nuances* in articulation which are apt to be ignored or misrepresented in the traditional orthography, are caught in their proper character by phonetic investigation, and are faithfully transcribed and registered. Frequently it is these delicate shades of articulation that suggest or reveal to us some hidden aspect of the history of the language. Unknown and unsuspected things show themselves to the enquirer, bringing him the joy of discovery in reward of his patience. We thus find sounds not contemplated by the ancient Indian system of writing occuring in the diverse and distant dialects. The tones in Panjabi and Lahndi in connection with the *h* sound, the stops with accompanying glottal closure in Sindhi and in some forms of Bengali [g' ɟ' ḍ' d' b'] are instances in point. When and how did these sounds originate? The finding of these sounds is certainly intriguing. The phonetics of a modern language is indissolubly linked with its history, with the

character of the earlier forms of speeches connected with it, speeches preserved only in written documents. To complete the *Linguistic Survey of India*, a fresh survey, rigorously up-to-date in its phonetic side is becoming imperatively necessary. In this matter, linguistic research in India presents a terrain which is both vast and little explored, where there is room for many workers for a good number of years; and this field promises to be most fruitful with but little labour. Already detailed study has commenced in some of the more important languages by scholars working more or less independently—in Tamil, in Bengali, in Malayalam (from L. V. Ramaswami Aiyar), in Hindustani (T. Grahame Bailey and Daniel Jones) in Marathi (S. Kanhere and Lloyd Jones), in the langnages and dialects of the Punjab (T. Grrhame Bailey, Banarsidas Jain and Siddheśwar Varma, the last scholar's analysis of the phonetics of Lahndi which has been taken up for publication by the Asiatic Society of Bengal is one of the most detailed and scientifically valuable), in Shina (T. Grahame Bailey and D. L. R. Lorimer), in Santali (P. O. Bodding), and in some of the speeches of Burma (R. Grant Brown, Pe Maung Tin and Miss Lilias Armstrong.) For a proper historical investigation of a language, an accurate statement of its facts both phonetic and morphological (the latter itself dependent on the former) is the first essential thing. Herein is the scope for immediate and intensive work: and I am glad to note that the newly founded *Linguistic Society of India* having a number of trained phoneticians among its organisers has already turned its attention to this branch of Linguistics. In this connexion, I would make an earnest plea for conformation to a standard system of phonetic transcription. The alphabet of the *International Phonetic Association* appears

to be best suited for this purpose. It is based on the Roman alphabet, and it avoids the cumbersome diacritical marks as much as possible, preferring entirely new letters; and it has become more largely accepted than any other system of phonetic writing. Auxiliary Devanagari or Bengali phonetic scripts may be helpful for workers not familiar with the English language or the Roman script. But I would insist upon a knowledge and an appreciation of the Roman or European system of writing in connexion with phonetic and other linguistic work even from workers of the type of our *Paṇḍitas* and *Maulavīs*, who must be made to learn it. Like the symbols like K, Na, S, Au, Fe etc. for the elements in Chemistry, the symbols, like [k, t, ɯ, ə, x] etc., for definite types of speech sounds should also be international. Just as in teaching Chemistry through Hindustani I would not write H_2SO_4 as ह२ सओ४ or ه۲ س و۴, so in treating of the sounds of speech in general, or of a particular language and dialect in special, I would insist upon the use of a well-known international graphic system like that of the *International Phonetic Association.* Of course, what I say is the ideal that we should have before us; but just as the ideal of the Roman script for all the languages of the world, including our Indian languages, would seem to be impossible of attainment now, and as the next best thing I would advocate the alphabetical unity of our own country through the common adoption of the Devanagari alphabat by all languages and dialects, so with a view to obtain our material with the help of workers not at home in a system other than the one in which they received their training, I would welcome auxiliary phonetic scripts on the basis of the Devanagari and other Indian alphabets.

Our meetings, as I have said before, should take stock of the advance made in Indian Linguistics from session to session; and incidentally, we can draw attention to what enquiries should be taken in hand immediately in the interest of the most important linguistic problems of our country.

We might first of all take up the Aryan languages of India as the most important group. Since the publication of Bloch's work on Marathi and Turner's article on Pitch Accent in Marathi, Modern Indo Aryan Linguistics may be said to have entered a new phase, the earlier phases being represented by Bhandarkar, Beames and Hoernle, and by Grierson. The application of Phonetics to linguistic research and the study of the dialects by Indian workers show that linguistic investigation has taken the right lines of development in our country. Two scholars of the Panjab have taken up their own dialects furnishing full and accurate descriptions of them and seeking to indicate the lines of their development We are eagerly awaiting the publication of Dr. Banarsidas Jain's book on Panjabi, and Dr. Siddheśwar Varma's study of the Phonetics of Lahndi. Dr. Varma's study of Bhadrawāhī, a Western Pahāṛī dialect spoken in Kashmir State, promises to be of unique interest. Mr. Baburam Saksena is engaged in preparing his work on the history of Awadhi: we can expect it will be of great value, judging from Mr. Saksena's excellent little monograph on Lakhimpuri, and his papers on the language of Tulasīdāsa. A young friend of mine, Mr. Gopal Haldar, has written a very good study of the phonetics of the Noakhali dialect of Bengali which will be published by the University of Calcutta as the second of the 'University of Calcutta Phonetic Studies.' Mr. Basanta Kumar Chatterji's monograph on the Birbhum dialect of Bengali has been ready some time ago, and we expect it will be published duly.

For Old Western Rajasthani, a worthy successor of Dr. Tessitori has come to the field: Dr. Charlotte Krause whose edition of *Nāsaketarī Kathā* is a noteworthy production.

An important work on that comparatively neglected branch of Indo-Aryan, a branch which is practically ignored by Indian students of Indo-Aryan—namely, the Romani or Gipsy branch—is Dr. J. Sampson's *Dialect of the Gipsies of Wales*, which appeared from the Oxford University Press in 1926. This great work, the result of thirty years of labour, has preserved for science a distant Indo-Aryan speech which is on the way to extinction: and since the time of Miklosich and Paspati, it is the greatest work on Romani. It gives the phonology of the dialect and includes a history of the Romani sounds with reference to Old Indo-Aryan (Sanskrit), in this way connecting Romani with Middle Indo-Aryan and with the Modern Indo-Aryan languages; it gives also along similar lines the morphology of Romani. We have here something comprehensive in the way of the historical study of Romani as a language of Indo-Aryan origin. As Dr. Jules Bloch says of the work: 'l'indianiste n'a done qu'à approuver la methode de M. Sampson et à le remercier d' avoir bien voulu adapter lui-même son travail aux besoins de la philologie indo-aryenne.' This work should create an interest in Romani in India. As a pendant to the work, mention should be made of the important paper of Dr. R. L. Turner on 'the Position of Romani in Indo-Aryan' (Journal of the Gipsy Lore Society, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 4, 1926), which is a noteworthy contribution to the question of Romani affinities in India. The current view about the affinities of Romani is that it is connected with the Dardic speeches, but Dr. A. C. Woolner first questioned this connexion, and suggested another relationship. Dr. Turner, in this monograph of his, first

exposes his methods, then places his facts and finally concludes that Romani is connected with the Central Group of Indo-Aryan speeches which excluded the ancestors of Sinhalese, Marathi, Sindhi, Lahndi, Panjabi, Western Pahāṛī and Dardic and probably also Gujarati and Bengali; subsequently in the course of its migrations, the proto-Romani dialect became influenced by the North-Western Group of Indo-Aryan. Dr. Turner suggests further that the separation of the source-dialect of Romani from the Indo-Aryan branch took place before the 3rd century B. C. Dr. Turner's paper is most suggestive, and the matter requires more detailed working out. A great many problems of Middle Indo-Aryan are connected with the origins of Romani.

A bone of contention in Indo-Aryan Linguistics is the place of the Dardic speeches within the Aryan or Indo-Iranian branch, whether they are a distinct and a third group beside the Indo-Aryan and the Iranian, as Grierson has maintained, or whether they belong really to the Indian group, as most other scholars from Sten Konow downwards think. Dr. George Morgenstierne, the Norwegian Iranist and Indianist, has brought up the question again; and we may hope that his personal researches into the languages of Afghanistan, where he has collected an important mass of material in the Dardic languages, will help to solve the problem finally. In his introductory 'Report on a Linguistic Mission in Afghanistan' (Oslo, 1926), where he has given a clear survey of the various languages of the century, he has indicated his position, and he definitely ranges the Dardic speeches with Indo-Aryan. It will be admitted however that the Dardic speeches do present in their phonology and morphology divergences from the Modern Indo-Aryan languages of the plains. Their development, if really from

the Old Indo-Aryan (Vedic), would seem to have been in isolation from that of the rest of India. Indeed, it will mean that Grierson's postulation of an independent, or third, Dardic group of Aryan will have to restate itself as a separation of Dardic from Indo-Aryan at a comparatively early date and its subsequent free and isolated development. The publication of Dr. Morgenstierne's texts and his grammars and notes are awaited with the greatest interest. In the meanwhile, Colonel D. L. R. Lorimer's notes on Shina Grammar, Dr. Grahame Bailey's Shina Grammar, and Sir George Grierson's Kashmiri Dictionary now nearing completion and his editions of Kashmiri texts like *Halim's Tales* and the *Kṛṣṇāvatāra-līlā* indicate the most recent advances in Dardic studies.

In the field of Modern Indo-Aryan, the work that should be taken up immediately is the exact description of as many dialects as possible, with special attention to the niceties of phonetics. The best way to arrive at a morphological analysis of a spoken *patois* is to have as many *genuine* texts as possible—folk-tales (which may be a little archaic), personal narratives, actual conversations, proverbs, songs and poems,—and then to work out the grammar patiently. This is a task in which the actual speakers of the dialect (or of a dialect which is near enough) should be able to obtain the best results, at least by gathering good masses of material, with literal translation. For doing the phonetic part properly, the collector of the material should have some phonetic training, which is essential. Editions of old texts should be another item, editions which keep a proper guard on exact reproduction of the MS. where it is a single one, or on a proper collation of MSS. in which the oldest readings are paid due attention.

As old texts help to show the development of the speech, the question of these leads us to the earlier phases of Indo-Aryan, namely, to Middle Indo-Aryan (Prakrit) and Old Indo-Aryan (Sanskrit). We have not much work to boast here. Since Jacobi's editions of the *Bhavisatta-kaha* (1918) and the *Sanatkumāra-carita* (1921), and of the former work (*Bhavisayatta-kahā*) by C. D. Dalal and P. D. Gune in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series (1923), an important find of the late Middle Indo-Aryan (*Apabhraṃśa*) MSS. has been made in the Jaina monastery liabraries at Karanja in Berar by Rai Bahadur Hiralal and Mr. Hiralal Jain. These have been brought to the notice of the learned world in Rai Bahadur Hiralal's 'Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar' (Nagpur, 1926). A vein of rich ore for both Middle Indo-Aryan and New Indo-Aryan has been struck here. Sir George is continuing to give us the results of his wonderful scholarship in Prakrit also. We have to thank him for the *Prakrit Dhātvādeśas*, and also for his edition of portions of the *Prākṛta-kalpa-druma* of Rāma Tarka-vāgīśa which he has published in the 'Indian Antiquary' and elsewhere. The Central Asian documents, translations of the Buddhist canon into Prakrits other than Pali and into Buddhist Sanskrit (some of which discovered in fragments by the French Missions have been edited by my friend and colleague Dr. Niranjan Prasad Chakravarti and are now being printed in Paris) are affording us as a clue as to the language of the Original Buddhist Canon, to the language of the Buddha himself. Dr. Heinrich Lueders' proposed reconstruction of the Ancient Magadhan speech will be full of suggestive value; and the Asoka inscriptions in the new edition of Hultzsch will remain an indispensable classic with the student of Indo-Aryan philology.

For practical purposes, the extant Second Middle Indo-Aryan (Prakrit) texts have been sufficiently well analysed in the grammar of Pischel. The Pali dictionaries of the Pali Text Society, and of Trenckner now in progress at Copenhagen afford other and larger masses of material of utmost importance. From the very nature of Pali as an *Umgangsprache* with a vocabulary which is partly a mosaic —although in its grammar it is based on an old Midland dialect, an early form of Śaurasenī; from the constant intermingling of forms from diverse dialects in the Prakrit inscriptions; and from the artificial character of the later Prakrit dialects in the drama and in learned literature, it is exceedingly difficult to find out the lines of isogloss in Ancient India. The Asoka inscriptions fortunately supply us with some positive and nett information; but the first millennium after Christ, practically the entire Prakrit period, is a great disappointment. It seems that our knowledge of the distribution of the Middle Indo-Aryan dialects and of their characteristics will ultimately be solved from the study of modern languages themselves; and in this way alone we shall be able to arrive at sure results.

For Middle Indo-Aryan, Buddhist Sanskrit is an important field of study. Not much attention has hitherto been paid to this in India. My pupil and colleague Mr. Sukumar Sen has published a promising study of the Syntax of Buddhist Sanskrit (in the Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, Vol. XVII), as part of a projected work on the Historical Syntax of Indo-Aryan.

Old Indo-Aryan, fortunately for Indian Linguistics, has received the best and most careful treatment in Europe. Old Indo-Aryan and the question of Indo-European being

closely connected. I shall only mention in this field the work of H. Oertel on the Syntax of the Noun in the language of the Brhāmaṇas (in course of publication, Heidelberg, 1926), a subject in which Mr. Sukumar Sen of the University of Calcutta is also working (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1926, and Journal of the Bhandakar Research Institute of Poona, 1927, 1928). An Etymological Dictionary of Sanskrit is being waited for eargerly. The promised second edition of Uhlenbeck is long in coming. Not only the Indo-European but also the non-Aryan element in Sanskrit should receive adequate treatment in it, with the materials that have so far accumulated.

Non-Aryan loan words in Sanskrit (and in other Indo-Aryan) form a sort of liaison channel between Aryan Linguistics on the one hand and Dravidian and Austric Linguistics on the other. The work of Caldwell, Gundert, Kittel and K. Amrita Row (Indian Antiquary, 1917) have broken the ground for Dravidian. The researches of Jean Przyluski in the *Memories de la Societe de Linguistique* of Paris and in the *Journal Asiatique*, and the very suggestive paper of Sylvain Levi in the *Journal Asiatique* on Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian in India (papers which along with an article by Jules Bloch on *Sanskrit and Dravidian* have been translated into English by my friend Dr. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi and will be published shortly from the Calcutta University Press), have opened up a new field of enquiry, namely, the influence of the ancient Indian dialects (of the type of the Kol speeches or the Mon-Khmer ones) belonging to the Austro-Asiatic branch of the Austric family upon Indo-Aryan. The question of Indo-Aryan borrowings from Austric presents a new horizon in the study of the origin and development of Indian Hindu Culture—*viz.*, with reference to the Austric (Mon-Khmer or Kol) sub-

stratum in it. It is getting to be more and more convincing that the bases of our Hindu, *i. e.*, post-Vedic Culture are largely Dravidian and Austric—possibly mainly Austric in the Ganges Valley and the East, and Dravidian in the West and South—and that the Aryan elements were impositions from the top only. A great deal of our material culture, our customs and usages, as well as our religious notions and practices and our myths and lègends, such as we find established in a characteristic Hindu world as opposed to the largely Indo-European *milieu* of the Rigveda, are in their origin non-Aryan—Austric, and Dravidian. The Aryan has imposed his language, and his organisation and his mentality to some extent; and his world of religions notions has had to make a compromise with the world of the pre-Aryan gods. This line of research has come in with Linguistics,—with an enquiry into the origin of a group of words in Sanskrit which cannot be satisfactorily explained with the help of Aryan roots, and which have affinities among the non-Aryan languages of India, Indo-China and Indonesia rather than with the Indo-European speeches outside India. We cannot as yet definitely say where this line of research will lead us. But it is fraught with immense new possibilities, although its outlook and its insistence on the non-Aryan aspect of the question might shock our pro-Aryan susceptibilities.

For this line of research to be firmly based, Dravidian and Comparative Kol and Mon-Khmer Studies will have to make a real progress. The apparently early break-up of a primitive Dravidian and the very late date of the oldest Dravidian documents make the problem one of extreme difficulty. Some isolated papers on Dravidian Linguistics which can be mentioned after Caldwell's Comparative Grammar and Graul and Vinson's Tamil Grammars, as well as Gundert's Mala-

yalam Grmmar and Kittel's Kannada Grammar, are more speculative than anything else. Jules Bloch's suggestion that the Primitive Dravidian speech might realy have been a language with consonant group initially, with words of the type of *Dramila* as in Old Indo-Aryan, and not a language with an attenuated phonetic system as in Old Tamil, goes to the root of the question, makes some recent attempts at finding out the phonetic development of Dravidian nugatory. Moreover, the existing Modern Dravidian speeches have not been described and analysed in detail. Among recent endeavours, a very important one is the *Tamil Lexicon* now in progress from Madras University. A good grammar of a Dravidian speech has come out this year, that of Kui by the Rev. W. W. Winfield, from the Asiatie Society of Bangal. What we want is a series of rigorously scientific grammars of all the important Dravidian languages, complete in their phonetic analysis of the speech and in their inclusion of the Phonology, Morphology and Syntax of the colloquial dialects, with all interesting details. A series of historical and comparative grammars of Tamil Telugu and Kannada, without theorising, but only juxtaposing the oldest and the subsequent forms as found in the actual old records of the language and as actually spoken, with analogous forms from the other Dravidian speeches would be ideal. There is no lack of good models in European languages to guide us, *e.g.*, the historical and comparative grammars of Joseph Wright as published by the Oxford University Press, to mention works on a small scale only; the old literatures are there, with large portions of them already in print: and the necessary thing to do will be only to obtain the materials illustrating the modern spoken language and to correlate the whole. Will not competent Dravidian-speaking scholars be coming

forward, and by demonstrating their love for their mother tongue in this way, win also the gratitude of students of Linguistics outside?

For the Kol speeches, the Rev. P. O. Bodding of the Scandinavian Mission to the Santals, over thirty years a resident among the Santal people, has been doing work of paramount importance. His *Materials for a Santali Grammar* (Part I, Dumka, 1922) gives the most detailed description of the phonetics and phonolgy of Santali; and recently under the auspices of the Norwegian Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture at Oslo, he has been publishing a large mass of Santal folklore (the Santali text with English translation opposite) the value of which is inestimable. For this enterprise Mr. Bodding and the scientific world of Oslo responsible for it deserve the most grateful thanks of all Indologists as well as linguistic students and ethnologists. The cyclopædia of Mundari life inaugurated by Father Hoffmann when published will be another valuable mass of materials on an important Kol people and its culture.

In Mon-Khmer linguistics, the admirable editing of the old Mon inscriptions of Burma by Prof. Duroiselle and Dr. C. E. Blagden is laying by a good stock of materials. Thanks to the labours of the French Scholars, the oldest monuments of Mon-Khmer, in the Khmer and Mon inscriptions of Cambodia and Siam, are available for linguistic use. More grammars like G. Maspero's Khmer Grammar (1915) and Mrs. Leslie Milne's Palaung Grammar (1921) are wanted; and we are waitig for the further working out of this branch of Austric studies, especially in relation to Kol, by some one among the few scholars working in this field, like Pater Schmidt, Blagden, Przyluski and Maspero.

The Tibeto-Chinese speeches have not received any serious attention from the linguistic point of view. It should be, our endeavour when the opportunity is favourable to take this study. Here of course one must make a final choice, if one is to do work of any value. But if Tibetan, although of a mechanical kind, and no real language, has been quite easily combined with Sanskrit for the study of Buddhist texts (beginning with Sarat Chandra Das in India), the study of Tibeto-Chinese dialects like Newary and Bodo, even if for estimating their influence on Modern Indo-Aryan, *e.g.* Khaskura, Bengali, Assamese, should not be outside the scope of practicability. Some of the problems of Tibeto-Chinese linguistics have fascination hardly inferior to that of Indo-European—*e.g.*, the reconstruction of the pronunciation of Old Chinese, and the working out of the comparative phonology of Tibetan, Burmese, Tai, and Chinese.

In the above attempt to place before you the actual situation in linguistic studies and investigation in India, I fear I have been rather long: but considering the scope and extent of the subject, I have been hoping that you would feel indulgent. I must close now: and this I do with a sincere expression of my grateful appreciation of the honour of being asked to act as President of the Philology Section of this Conference, which enabled me to have the privilege of meeting you and afforded me the opportunity of presenting before you some of my thougts and views on the present position of the Science of Linguistics in our country.

Anthropology Section.

BUDDHIST DEITIES IN HINDU GARB.

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The Trantras of the Hindus and the Buddhists alike have merited almost universal hatred and neglect at the hand of the Indologist. But whether the Tantras are altogether divested of great possibilities in future is a question requiring careful and considerate handling. The Tantras are a product of a period between the 7th century and the 12th, though many Hindu Tantras were composed even later right upto the last century. It is also possible to declare without fear of contradiction that the Buddhists were the first to introduce the Tantras into their religion and that the Hindus borrowed them from the Buddhists, in later times, and that it is idle to say that the later Buddhism was an outcome of Śaivaism. A study of the Tantras has revealed these facts, and it is likely to yield great historical information because a great volume of the history of India especially Eastern India is buried in this literature. But at present we are not concerned with the history or the development of the Tantras or with the question as to how image worship entered into the different pantheons of the Hindus, Jains and Buddhists. But it should be pointed out that an interchange of deities took place in all the three different systems in the earlier period. Buddhism and Jainism exploited the Hindu gods in the early stage, while in the more promiscuous Tāntric age Buddhist gods were commonly ransacked. Thus interchange and mutual borrowing took place both in the early and the later stages of the different religious systems. Here, of course, without bringing much unnecessary dis-

cussion an attempt will be made to state those irrefutable arguments which prove clearly that such borrowings were an accomplished fact.

Let us take for example the instance of the Hindu deity Tārā who is included in the group of ten Mahāvidyā goddesses. These goddesses are personifications of certain Mantras or Vidyās popularly known as the Siddha Mantras as they are reputed to bestow perfection on those who constantly mutter them upto a certain number. The ten Mahāvidyā deities as recognised in Hindu Tantras are the following:—

काली तारा महाविद्या षोडशी भुवनेश्वरी ।
भैरवी छिन्नमस्ता च विद्या धूमावती तथा ॥
बगला सिद्धविद्या च मातङ्गी बगलात्मिका ।
एता दश महाविद्याः सिद्धविद्याः प्रकीर्त्तिताः ॥

Quoted from Viśvasāratantra in
Tantrasāra, Bengal edition, P. 360.

A Mantra is attached to each of these Ten deites and accordingly as the order of the letters of Mantra is changed new forms of the same deity spring forth into existence. Thus the Mantra of Tārā according to Hindu traditions is ह्रीं स्त्रीं हूँ फट् which gives rise to seven more deities according to the different permutation and combination of the different letters.

तारा चोग्रा महोग्रा च वज्रा काली सरस्वती ।
कामेश्वरी भद्रकाली इत्यष्टौ तारिणी स्मृता ॥[1]

and the following table shows the name and the Mantra of each.

1. Quoted from the Mayatantra in the Tantrasara, [illegible] Bengali Edition, P. 328.

Name.	Mantra.	Arrangement.
तारा	ह्रीं स्त्रीं हूँ फट्	1234
उग्रा	स्त्रीं ह्रीं हूँ फट्	2134
महोग्रा	हूँ स्त्रीं ह्रीं फट्	3214
वज्रा	हूँ ह्रीं स्त्रीं फट्	3124
काली	ह्रीं स्त्रीं फट् हूँ	1243
सरस्वती	स्त्रीं ह्रीं फट् हूँ	2143
कामेश्वरी	ह्रीं हूँ स्त्रीं फट्	1324
भद्रकाली	स्त्रीं हूँ ह्रीं फट्	2314

From the above it is not difficult to imagine that all the seven deities Ugrā, Mahogrā, Vajrā, Kālī, Sarasvatī, Kāmeśvarī and Bhadrakālī are but different forms of the original deity Tārā who is one of the Ten Mahāvidyās. If the origin of Tārā is Buddhist it is to be admitted that the different varieties of the same deity mentioned above should also be Buddhist. This question, therefore, leads us to the discussion as to the origin of the Hindu deity Tārā. In many Tāntric works Tārā is described: the Tārātantra, the Tantrasāra, Mahācīnācāratantra are among the many that may be cited in this connection. The Tantrasāra, calls the deity Tāriṇī or Tārā and quotes her ritual from an earlier work the Bhairavatantra. Her appearance is described in all these works in the following terms:—

प्रत्यालीढपदां घोरां मुण्डमालाविभूषिताम् ।
खर्वां लम्बोदरीं भीमां व्याघ्रचर्मावृतां कटौ ॥
नवयौवनसम्पन्नां पञ्चमुद्राविभूषिताम ।
चतुर्भुजां ललज्जिह्वां महाभीमां वरप्रदाम् ॥

खड्गकर्त्रिसमायुक्तसव्येतरभुजद्वयाम् ।
कपालोत्पलसंयुक्तसव्यपाणियुगान्विताम् ।।
पिङ्गोग्रैकजटां ध्यायेन्मौलावक्षोभ्यभूषिताम् ।।[1]

"She stands in the Pratyālīḍha attitude, is dark in complexion, wears a garland of severed heads, is short in stature, has a protruding belly and wears a tiger's skin round the loins, is youthful in appearance and *decked in five Mudrās*, is four armed, has a protruding tongue, has an awe-inspiring appearance and is a bestower of boons. She carries the sword and the knife in the two right hands and the severed head and the Utpala (blue lotus) in the two left hands. One should meditate on the form of Tārā with one tuft of hair (Ekajaṭā) brown in colour and glistering with splendour on her head which is adorned with Akṣobhya."

Tārā is here described as decked in five Mudrās as Ekajaṭā with one tuft of hair and as holding the figure of Akṣobhya on her crown. What the five Mudrās are, why is the deity designated as Ekajaṭā and why there is the figure of Akṣobhya on her crown are the three questions which cannot be satisfactorily explained in accordance with Hindu traditions. In the Tantrasāra an attempt has been made to explain the five Mudrās in the following crude manner:—

पञ्चमुद्राविभूषितामिति ललाटे श्वेतास्थिपट्टिकाचतुष्टयान्वितकपालपञ्चकभूषितामित्यर्थः ।
श्वेतास्थिपट्टिकायुक्तकपालपञ्चशोभितामिति तन्त्रचूडामणौ । शङ्कराचार्येणाप्युक्तम् ।
विचित्रास्थिमालां ललाटे कपालञ्च पञ्चान्वितं धारयन्तीमिति ।[2]

But this explanation does not seem to be convincing[3] as in that case it will be difficult to explain the epithets

1. Tantrasara, P. 315
2. Tantrasara, p. 315.
3. The ornament decsribed in the passage cited above is nothing but the Cakri or the tiara which is one of the five Mudras. See below:

षण्मुद्रामुद्रितां, चतुर्मुद्रामुद्रितां etc. with reference to deities bearing ornaments of six or four Mudrās. Why Tārā should be designated Ekajaṭā, or why she should have one tuft of hair is not explained in Hindu Tāntric works and the authors never considered that an explanation was even necessary. With regard to the figure of Akṣobhya on the crown the Toḍalatantra quoted in Tārātantra[1] (VRS. edition) tries to offer a solution. There we find:—

समुद्रमथने देवि कालकूटं समुत्थितम् ।
सर्वे देवाश्च देव्यश्च महाक्षोभमवाप्नुयुः ।
क्षोभादिरहितं यस्मात् पीतं हालाहलं विषम् ।
अत एव महेशानि ! अक्षोभ्यः परिकीर्त्तितः ॥
तेन सार्द्धं महामाया तारिणी रमते सदा ॥

This explanation to say the least is ridiculous and proves the worthlessness of the Hindu Tāntric literature and their authors. Any one who is acquainted with the classification of the Buddhist deities will be able to appreciate the hollowness and absurdity of this explanation. But more about this later on.

The Hindus have no Ekajaṭā but they have a Tārā who is regarded as a form of Ekajaṭā. They have a variety of Mudrās but none can be employed as an ornament. No other deity of the Hindus is known to have the figure of Akṣobhya or any other deity on the crown. None of the three points raised, therefore, is satisfactorily explained in accordance with the Hindu traditions.

But when we turn to the Buddhist Tāntric literature for a solution of these difficulties we find a satisfactory ex-

1. Op. cit. p. 10, footnote.

planation of all the three points stated above. In the Buddhist pantheon there is a deity Ekajaṭā by name and Sādhanas Nos. 100, 101, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127 and 128 in the Sādhanmālā (published as Nos. XXVI and XLI of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series) all refer to the worship of this fierce divinity. Ekajaṭā has several forms from two armed and from one-faced to twelve-faced and in all these forms she is differently named as Ugratārā, Mahācīnatārā Vidyujjvālākarālī, Āryā Ekajaṭā and Śuklā Ekajaṭā. Out of these the form of Ekajaṭā known as the Mahācīnatārā resembles in appearance with the Hindu deity Tārā.

As regards the second point concerning the ornament of the five Mudrās, the Sādhanamālā also offers a solution. According to a dictum the Buddhists recognized a set of six Mudrās or ornaments all made out of human bones representing the six Pāramitās, and accordingly as the one or the other of the six is dropped the deities are described as

पञ्चमुद्राविभूषितां, चतुर्मुद्राविभूषितां

The Śloka in the Sādhanamālā explaining this point runs as follows: -

कण्ठिका रुचकं रत्नकुण्डलं भस्म सूत्रकम् ।
षड् वै पारमिता एता मुद्रारूपेण योजिताः ।[1]

"The Torque, the (two) bracelets, the bejewelled ear rings, ashes and the sacred thread represent the six Pāramitās (perfection) and are applied (as ornaments) in the form of Mudrās."

A large number of deities in the Sādhanamālā are described as decked in ornaments of these Mudrās numbering from 4 to 6. Evidently there were several enumerations

1. Sadhanamala, Vol. II, p. 494.

of six Mudrās and we have been able to discover one only in verse. The six Mudrās were not definitely fixed and that the different Tantras had different enumerations. We have evidence that Cakrī or the tiara round the forehead and the girdle round the loins were included in this series of six Mudrās. While describing Heruka the author Śāntipāda describes the deity as—

शिरसि अक्षोभ्यात्मकनरशिरोघटितचक्रीधरं कर्णे अमितामात्मकनरास्थिकुण्डलिनं कण्ठे रत्नसम्भवात्मककण्ठिकायुक्तं, हस्ते वैरोचनात्मकरुचकधरं कट्यामोघसिद्धात्मकमेखलायुक्तम् etc.[1]

This shows that Heruka is decked in five Mudrās comprising the Cakrī, Kuṇḍala, Kaṇṭhikā, Rucaka and Mekhalā each presided over by one of the Dhyāni Buddhas, such as, the Cakrī by Akṣobhya, Kuṇḍala by Amitābha, Kaṇṭhikā by Ratnasambhava, Rucaka by Vairocana and Mekhalā by Amoghasiddhi. This very idea is expressed briefly in the following line in the course of the description of goddess Kurukullā.

पञ्चाङ्गं पञ्चमुद्राभरणपरिणतं पञ्चबुद्धकभेणो[2] ।

Thus though to the Hindus the word may appear to be strange and in a way unintelligible which is amply proved by the several attempts at elucidation in different Tantras and even by Śaṅkarācārya, the Mudrās as ornaments were not unknown to the Buddhists. They knew how many Mudrās can be applied in the form of ornaments, they knew their precise meaning and their precise position in the different parts of the body and could enumerate the different Dhyāni Buddhas associated with each of the five Mudrās.[3]

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1. Sadhanamala, Vol. II, p. 475.
2. Ibid. p. 391.
3. Mudra has various meanings: It may mean a figure, a coin, a token, a stamp, an appetiser (for more drink) and the woman (as in Mahamudra) Sakti and so forth.

Now with regard to the third point of having the figure of Akṣobhya on the crown of Tārā it is also to be pointed out that an explanation of this phenomenon can come only from the Buddhist sources. It is absurd to believe in the mode of explanation suggested in the Hindu Tantras, especially in the Toḍala-tantra referred to previously, that it is the figure of Śiva which appears on the crown of Tārā because Śiva is without agitation (क्षोभ) and therefore Akṣobhya. If that be so, why other Śaiva deities should not have the same miniature figure of Śiva on the crown? Why is it then that we do not come across any such miniature figure on the crown of any other deity in the Hindu pantheon? Those who are acquainted with Buddhist Iconography know it perfectly well that all deities of the Buddhist pantheon are divided generally into five classes as emanations of the five Dhyāni Buddhas: Amitābha, Akṣobhya, Ratnasambhava, Vairocana and Amoghasiddhi[1]. These deities emanating from the different Dhyāni Buddhas are required to show their origin by holding the miniature figure of their parental Dhyāni Buddha on the crown. When these emanated deities are represented in stone or metal show the miniature figure of the parental Buddha on their head. Thus Lokeśvara Mahābala, Kurukullā, etc. emanate from Amitābha; Caṇḍaroṣaṇa, Heruka, Vajraḍāka, etc., emanate from Akṣobhya; Mārīci, Uṣṇīṣavijayā, Sitātapatrā, Aprājitā, etc., from Vairocana; Khadiravaṇi, Tārā, Parṇaśabarī, Mahāmāyūrī, etc., from Amoghasiddhi; and Jambhalā, Vasudhārā, etc., from Ratnasambhava and hold on the crown a small figure of their parental Buddha. Thus when Tārā is des-

1. Indian Buddhist Iconography, Foreword, p. vii and the classification of Buddhist divinities.

cribed as मौलावक्षोभ्यभूषितां it is easy to recognise the goddess as an emanation of the Dhyāni Buddha Akṣobhya or technically speaking as belonging to the family of Akṣobhya and not of Hindu Mahādeva because he has no Kṣobha or 'agitation'.

I think it has been sufficiently indicated that the character of the Hindu deity Tārā is thoroughly Buddhist and therefore she must be regarded as of Buddhist origin. It has already been pointed out that the form of Ekajaṭā known as Mahācīnatārā amongst the Buddhists is the true equivalent of the Hindu deity Tārā. In the Sādhanamālā Mahācīnatārā is described as—

प्रत्यालीढपदां घोरां मुण्डमालाप्रलम्बिताम् ।
खर्वलम्बोदरां भीमां नीलनीरजराजिताम् ॥
त्र्यम्बकैकमुखां दिव्यां घोराट्टहासभासुराम् ।
सुप्रहृष्टां शवारूढां नागाष्टकविभूषिताम् ।
रक्तवर्तुलनेत्रां च व्याघ्रचर्मावृतां कटौ ।
नवयौवनसम्पन्नां पञ्चमुद्राविभूषिताम् ॥
ललज्जिह्वां महाभीमां संदंष्ट्रोत्कटभीषणाम् ।
खड्गकर्त्रिकरां सव्ये वामोत्पलकपालधाम् ।
पिङ्गोग्रैकजटां ध्यायान्मौलावक्षोभ्यभूषिताम्[1] ।

When this Dhyāna is compared with the Dhyāna given in the Hindu Tantras it will be seen that they are essentially the same both in form and spirit and that the Hindu Dhyāna appears to be an outcome of the Buddhist Dhyāna. As is usual with them the Buddhists composed the Dhyāna in ungrammatical Sanskrit and when it was converted to Hinduism it took a strictly grammatical form and the language became chaste and elegant. The Dhyāna contained in the Sādhanamālā was composed

1. Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 210.

by one Śāśvatavajra[1] whose time is not definitely known. But as this Dhyāna appears in a MS. which bears a date corresponding to A. D. 1165 his time cannot be later than the latter half of the 11th century. But fortunately there is another clue left to us which may determine the time of the introduction of the deity Ekajaṭā into the soil of India. In the Sādhanamālā we meet with a curious passage which says—

एकजटासाधनं समाप्तं ।
आर्यनागार्जुनपादैर्भोटेषु उद्धृतम् [2] ।

This passage however leads us to infer that Ekajaṭā-Sādhana was introduced by Nāgārjuna from the country of Bhoṭa and therefore she seems to be an entirely foreign introduction. As regards the date of this new introduction, it is not the proper occasion to bring in an elaborate discussion with regard to the date of Nāgārjuna. Suffice it to say just at the present moment that the material at hand show that Nāgārjuna flourished in the middle of the 7th century A. D.[3] So the origin of Tārā is neither Hindu nor Buddhist but it is of Tibetan extraction. Not only that the deity is foreign, but her worship and the practices connected therewith are also foreign.

The evidence of the Hindu Tantras also support the view shown above. In the Tārātantra, for instance, we read of Bhairavī asking his consort to tell her how Buddha and Vaśiṣṭha obtained Siddhi. Bhairava in reply said that by muttering the Mantra of Ugratārā Buddha and Vaśiṣṭha

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1. कृतिः श्वाश्वतवज्रस्य सेयं मेधाप्रसादनी ।
op. cit. Vol. I, p. 211.
2. Op. Cit, Vol. I, p. 267.
3. This Nagarjuna is the Tantric or the Siddha Nagarjuna and should not be confounded with the earlier Nagarjuna who was the founder of the Madhyama a School of Philosophy. For his time see Sadhanamala, Vol. II. intro p. XIV.

obtained Siddhi, Mahādeva became the Lord of the world, Durvāsā, Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Bhāradvāja and others became great poets and Bhīmasena, Arjuna and other Kṣatriyas became victorious. There we read:-

"स एव परमो देवो बुद्धरूपी जनार्द्दनः ।
उग्रतारामहामन्त्रं पञ्चार्णं परिजप्य च ॥
सृष्ट्यादिकर्मकर्त्ता च अजरामरतां ययौ ।
वशिष्ठोऽप्येनमाराध्य नक्षत्रलोकमागतः ॥"
"अनेनैव समाराध्य सर्वेशोऽभूत् सदाशिवः ।
दुर्वासा व्यासवाल्मीकिभारद्वाजादिकः कविः ॥
भीमसेनार्जुनाद्यास्ते क्षत्रिया जयिनोऽभवन् ।"[1]

In the Rudrayāmala it is said that Vaśiṣṭha being unable to obtain Siddhi after years of severe austerities, at last pronounced a curse on her. The deity thereupon appeared before him and told him that by these austerities it was impossible to obtain Siddhi but it would be easy of attainment in case one goes to Mahācīna in the country of the Buddhists and the land of the Atharvaveda:

वौद्धदेशेऽथर्ववेदे महाचीने सदा व्रज ।[2]

Vaśiṣṭha thereafter repaired to Cīnabhūmi where Buddha was residing and was indulging in all sorts of loathsome practices. Vaśiṣṭha was horrified to witness these scenes and appealed to Buddha to allay his doubts and ultimately grant him the cherished Siddhi. The following is the text of his speech before Buddha which will speak for itself:—

रक्ष रक्ष महादेव बुद्धरूपधराव्ययः ।
अतिदीनं वशिष्ठ मां सदा व्याकुलचेतसम् ॥

1. Op. Cit., pp. 1-2.
2. Taratantra (Varendra Research Society Edition), p. 22. It looks as if the Atharvaveda was the Veda of the Buddhists.

ब्रह्मपुत्रं महादेवीसाधनायाजगाम यः ।
सिद्धिमार्गं न जानामि देवमार्गोऽपरो हर ॥
तवाचारं समालोक्य भयानि सन्ति मे हृदि ।
तन्नाशय मम क्षिप्रं दुर्बुद्धिं वेदगामिनीम् ॥
वेदबहिष्कृतं कर्म सदा ते चालये प्रभो ।
कथमेतत्प्रकारं च मद्य मांसं तथाङ्गनाम् ॥
सर्वे दिगम्बराः सिद्धा रक्तपानोद्यता वराः ।
मुहुर्मुहुः प्रपिबन्ति रमयन्ति वराङ्गनाम् ।
सदा मांसासवैः पूर्णा मत्ता रक्तविलोचनाः ।
निग्रहानुग्रहे शक्ताः पूर्णान्तःकरणोद्यताः ॥
वेदस्यागोचराः सर्वे मद्यस्त्रीसेवने रताः ।[1]

Buddha was not perturbed at this direct question but gave a lecture to Vaśiṣṭha on Kulācāra and explained to him its mysteries and its utility and acquainted him with the secret rites and practices connected therewith. Vaśiṣṭha was fully convinced and soon followed the ways of Buddha and eventually attained to final perfection by an unrestrained use of the five Makāras. This is evident from the following verses:—

एतत् श्रुत्वा गुरोर्वाक्यं स्मृत्वा देवीं सरस्वतीम् ।
मदिरासाधनं कर्तुं जगाम कुलमण्डपे ॥
मद्यं मांसं तथा मत्स्यं मुद्रां मैथुनमेव च ।
पुनः पुनः साधयित्वा पूर्णयोगी बभूव सः ॥[2]

Again in the Brahmayāmala the same story is repeated with slight modifications. Vaśiṣṭha after coming to Mahācīna got frightened and disgusted at the practices current there. He was horrified to see Buddha in a deeply drunken state surrounded by thousands of women. Just at this time there was a voice from heaven which directed

1. Op. Cit., p. 23.
2. Op. Cit., p. 26.

him to follow the customs and practices current in Cīnabhūmi so that he might obtain perfection, which was unattainable in any other way. Vaśiṣṭha was mightily pleased and went to the place where Buddha was and after being initiated by him speedily obtained Siddhi. The passages in question are these:—

ततो गत्वा महाचीनदेशे ज्ञानमयो मुनिः ।
ददर्श हिमवत्पार्श्वे साधकेश्वरसेविते ॥
रणज्जघनरावेण रूपयौवनशालिना ।
मदिरामोदचित्तेन विलासोल्लसितेन च ॥
शृङ्गारसारवेशेन जगन्मोहनकारिणा ।
भयलज्जाविहीनेन देव्या ध्यानपरेण च ॥
कामिनीनां सहस्रेण परिवारितमीश्वरम् ।
मदिरापानसञ्जातमन्दमन्दावलोचनम् ॥
दूरादेव विलोक्यैनं वशिष्ठो बुद्धरूपिणम् ।
विस्मयेन समाविष्टः स्मरन् संसारतारिणीम् ॥
किमिदं क्रियते कर्म विष्णुना बुद्धरूपिणा ।
वेदवादविरुद्धोऽयमाचारोऽसम्मतो मम ॥
इति चिन्तयतस्तस्य वशिष्ठस्य महात्मनः ।
आकाशवाणी प्राहाशु मैवं चिन्तय सुव्रत ॥
आचारः परमार्थोऽयं तारिणीसाधने मुने ।
एतद्विरुद्धभावस्य मते नासौ प्रसीदति ॥
यदि तस्याः प्रसादं त्वमचिरेणाभिवाञ्छसि ।
एतेन चीनाचारेण तदा तां भज सुव्रत ॥
आकाशवाणीमाकर्ण्य रोमाञ्चितकलेवरः ।
वशिष्ठो दण्डवद्भूमौ पपातातीव हर्षितः ।
अथोत्थायाचिरेणासौ कृताञ्जलिपुरो मुनिः ।
जगाम विष्णोः शरणं बुद्धरूपस्य पार्वति ॥[1]

It is needless for me to point out that the Hindus regard the Rudrayāmala and Brahmayāmala as Tantras of the highest authority, and I should say, of the highest

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1. Taratantra, pp. 29-30.

antiquity. The evidence of these two Tantras and that of the Tārā-Tantra clearly show the Buddhist character of the deity and of the Mantra. The Buddhists on the other hand attribute their origin to the country of Bhoṭa. But everywhere the Mantra is the same: Om Hrīṃ Strīṃ Hūṃ Phaṭ. This Mantra consists of four syllables and accordingly as their order is changed it gives rise to seven more dieties named before; and consequently, if Tārā cannot be regarded as Hindu all these seven deities Ugrā, Mahogrā, Vajrā, Kālī, Sarasvatī, Kāmeśvārī and Bhadrakālī forfeit their claim to be called Hindu. Whether these deities are to be classed amongst the Buddhist or Tibetan deities is a question which should better be left unanswered.

It is well known that those who practise the Tantras look upon the Mantras with superstitious awe, and they believe that if the Mantra is changed or distorted at the time of muttering either there will be no result or it will produce great harm. The accuracy of the Mantras therefore were zealously guarded and the Mantras were handed down from preceptors to disciples so long as the Tantras were a living religion.

The Mantra which is not given by a Guru therefore should never be muttered because as they say a great sin is committed thereby.[1] The accuracy of these Mantras have been preserved in early times by means of several novel devices. The Mantras were done into mnemonic verses and were committed to memory, or the different limbs of a Mantra were separated and expressed by symbols, and by such

1. Compare for instance *Nityotsava* (GOS. No. XXIII) p. 214.
गुरोरनुज्ञामात्रेण दुष्टमन्त्रोऽपि सिध्यति ।
गुरुं विलंघ्य शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नाधिकारः सुरेश्वरि ॥

other means. Let me give a few examples stating the different devices by means of which the accuracy of the Mantra is preserved. In the Sādhanamālā for instance, we find one Mantra expressed in the following queer verse:—

आदौ चक्रधरस्ततः पिचुयुगात् प्रज्ञान्वितो वर्धनि तस्माच्च ज्वलयुग्ममस्य च परे मेधापरे वर्धनि ।
एतस्माच्चरमं धिरिद्वयमतो बुद्धिस्तथा वर्धनि स्वाहान्तः कथितः स एष सुगतैर्मन्त्रः कवित्वादिभूः ॥[1]

Now the above is nothing but the Mantra of Vajravīṇā-Sarasvatī done into verse. This Mantra runs as—

ओं पिचु पिचु प्रज्ञावर्धनि ज्वल ज्वल मेधावर्धनि धिरि धिरि बुद्धिवर्धनि स्वाहा ।

In another instance we find the following verse written in an enigmatic language making its meaning quite unintelligible.

सप्तमस्य द्वितीयस्थमष्टमस्य चतुर्थकम् ।
प्रथमस्य चतुर्थेन भूषितं तत् सबिन्दुकम् ॥[2]

The second syllable of the 7th class is R, the fourth of eighth is H, the fourth of the first is Ī and spot is M. So the woie verse is nothing but a statement of the Bīja of Sarasvatī which is HRĪM.

These are some of the devices employed in the Tāntric literature to preserve the purity of the Mantras and it should be remembered that it is the purity of the Mantra that counts much in the attainment of Siddhi. If this Mantra is distorted or changed in any unauthorized manner and muttered great harm is likely to be-fall the unfortunate worshipper. When deities are borrowed by one religion from another their followers chiefly concerned with the Mantra which they could not change and it is precisely for this reason that though the Buddhist Mahācīnatārā was borrowed by the Hindus with a different name and a

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(1) Op. Cit., p. 335.
(2) Op. Cit., p. 335.

modified Dhyāna the Mantra remained the same. It will be really a very interesting study if one could collect Mantras from the Tantras of different religions and discover how many of them are common and what their origins are.

Taking the similarity of Mantras as the basis of comparison let us investigate the origin of another deity who is claimed equally by the Hindus and the Buddhists. This is the Hindu Chinnamastā who is known differently in Buddhism as Vajrayoginī. In the Tantrasāra and the Chinnamastā-Kalpa she is described as of a very awe-inspiring external appearance. She holds her head severed by herself in her left hand and carries the Kartrī in the right, and stands in the Pratyālīḍha attitude. She is accompanied by Ḍākinī and Varṇinī both carrying the Kartrī and the Kapāla. From the severed head of the principal deity issue forth streams of blood one falling into the mouth of the severed head and two others into the mouths of the two attendants. The following extracts from the Tantrasāra will give a good idea of the appearance of this fearful deity.

छिन्नमस्तां करे वामे धारयन्तीं स्वमस्तकम् ।
पिबन्तीं रौधिरीं धारां निजकण्ठविनिर्गताम् ॥
दक्षिणे च करे कर्त्रीं मुण्डमालाविभूषिताम् ।
दक्षिणे वर्णिनीं ध्यायेत् डाकिनीं वामके तथा ॥
वर्णिनीं लोहितां सौम्यां मुक्तकेशीं दिगम्बराम् ।
कपालकर्त्रिकाहस्तां वामदक्षिणयोगतः ॥
देवीगलोच्छलद्रक्तधारापानं प्रकुर्वतीम् ।
डाकिनीं वामपार्श्वे तु कोटिसूर्यानलोपमाम् ॥
कपालकर्त्रिकाहस्तां वामदक्षिणयोगतः ।
देवीगलोच्छलद्रक्तधारापानं प्रकुर्वतीम् ॥[1]

1. Tantrasara Or. Institute MS, No. 4995, fol. 309f. Quoted from an earlier work entitled the Bhairavatantra. Also Chinnamasta-Kalpa, Or. Inst. MS. No. 1692, fol. 36f.

The above is the description of the Hindu deity Chinnamastā. Let us now quote from the Sādhanamālā the description of the Buddhist deity Vajrayoginī to discover eventually that the two descriptions in all details are identical. In the Sādhnamālā she is described as—

पीतवर्णां स्वयमेव स्वकर्त्रिकर्त्तितस्वमस्तकवामहस्तास्थिताम् दक्षिणहस्तकर्त्रिसहितां ऊर्ध्वविस्तृतवामबाहुमधोनामितदक्षिणबाहुं वासःशून्यां प्रसारितदक्षिणपादां संकुचितवामपादां भावयेत् । कबन्धान्निःसृत्यासृग्धारा स्वमुखे प्रविशति अपरे उभयोः पार्श्वयोगिन्योर्मुखे प्रविशति । वामदक्षिणपार्श्वयोः श्यामवर्णवज्रवर्णनीपीतवर्णवज्रवैरोचन्यौ वामदक्षिणहस्तकर्त्रिसहिते दक्षिणवामहस्तकर्परसहिते प्रसारितवामपादप्रसारितदक्षिणपादे संकुचितेतरपादे मुक्तकेश्यौ भावयेत् ।

It is thus apparent that the two deities though belong to different religions and are designated by two diefferent names represent one and the same goddess. It is therefore necessary to explain the origin of the deity and this can only be done by a comparison of different Mantras of the same deity.

As regards the question as to when this deity entered into one of the two pantheons it cannot be easily ascertained. The Tantrasāra is very late and Chinnamastā-Kalpa is of uncertain date. But the Sādhnamālā in this connection gives valuable date in ascertaining the antiquity of this deity. The Sādhanamālā in the first instance appears in a MS. bearing a date which corresponds to A.D. 1165. The Sādhanamālā further credits Siddha Śabarapāda with the introduction of a new cult of Vajrayoginī in the following words:—

एवं वन्द्यावर्त्तन सिद्धशबरपादीयमतवज्रयोगिन्याराधनाविधिः [2]

1. Op. cit. p. 452.
2. Op. cit. p. 456.

It is not again the purposes of this paper to discuss the dates of the different Siddhācāryas and it will suffice at the present moment to say that Siddha Śabara may be assigned to the middle of the 7th century A.D.[1] The origin of the deity Vajrayoginī therefore may be dated still earlier.

According to the cammons of Vajrayāna the Mantra of Vajrayoginī quite naturally runs as:

ओं ओं ओं सर्वबुद्धडाकिनीये वज्रवैरोचनीये वज्रवैरोचनीये हुं हुं हुं फट् फट् फट् स्वाहा ।[2]

The three Oṃ letters are given to each of the three deities, Vajrayoginī (named in the Mantra as Sarvabuddha-Ḍākinī) Vajravairocanī and Vajravarṇanī and so also the three Hum letters and the three Phaṭs. The prefix 'Vajra' shows that the deities belong to Vajrayāna. The epithet Sarvabuddha-Ḍākinī shows clearly the Buddhist character of the Mantra.

In the Hindu literature the principal deity is designated as Chinnamastā while the companions are named as Varṇini and Ḍākinī with the prefix 'Vajra' dropped altogether. According to Trantrasāra her Mantra is—

ओं सर्वसिद्धिवर्णनीये सर्वसिद्धिडाकिनीये वज्रवैरोचनीये इहावह इहावह, etc.[3]

In this also the three names Ḍākinī Varṇanī and Vairocanī all appear but why the prefixes are changed into 'Sarvasiddhi' in the first two cases we fail to understand. The change appears to be due to distortion of the Mantra from copy to copy made in later times or because at the time of the author the tradition was entirely lost seeing

1. Sadhanamala, Vol. II, intro. p. xlvi.
2. Op. cit. p. 453.
3. Op. Cit. Or. Inst. MS. No. 4995, fol. 312*a*.

that Buddhism was almost driven out of India in the beginning of the 13th century. In the Chinnamastā-Kalpa again we find a different Mantra—

श्रों वज्रवैरोचनीये सर्वबुद्धिडाकिनीये वज्रवैरोचनीये हुं हुं फट् स्वाहा ।[1]

From this it can be definitely said that the original of 'Sarvasiddhi' in the Tantrasāra represents 'Sarvabuddha' as is evident from 'Sarvabuddhi' of the Chinnamastā-Kalpa and if that position is accepted, there remains very little to show that the origin of the deity is decidedly Buddhist. The prefix 'Vajra' in a Hindu Mantra lends an additional support to this conclusion. Vajrayoginī is called Sarvabuddha-Ḍākinī because she is the consort of Heruka who is looked upon as the embodiment of the five Dhyāni Buddhas, the group being technically known as 'Sarvabudda'.

There is a third deity who is equally claimed by the Hindus and the Buddhists. This is Mañjughoṣa. The Buddhists recognize him as a form of Mañjuśrī the god of learning. Mañjuśrī is first mentioned in the smaller recension of the Sukhāvatīvyūha, which was translated into Chinese between A. D. 384 and 417[2]. Since then we find mention of Mañjuśrī in such Sanskrit works as the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, Svayambhū Purāṇa, Gaṇḍavyūha and in the accounts of the Chinese travellers Fa Hian, Hiuen Tsang and I-Tsing and his imges in the different Buddhist schools af Art such as Sāranāth, Magadha, Bengal, Nepal and Java.

In Hinduism his worship is still current in someparts of Rāḍha in Bengal and the ritual is found in several Tantras such as the Agamottara and the Kukkuṭeśvara Tantra as

1. Op. cit. Or Inst. MS. No. 1692, fol. 2b.
2. Op. cit. ed Max Muller, intro. p. iii, note 4 (1).

we learn from the Tantrasāra of Kṛṣṇānanda. Not only that the deity is claimed by both the Hindus and the Buddhists his Dhyāna also in the same wording is claimed by both. In Tantrasāra Mañjughoṣa is described as—

शशधरमिव शुभ्रं खड्गपुस्ताङ्कपाणिं
सुरुचिरमतिशान्तं पञ्चचूडं कुमारम् ।
पृथुतरवरमुख्य पद्मपत्रायताक्षं
कुमतिदहनदक्षं मञ्जुघोषं नमामि ॥[1]

Curiously enough the same Dhyāna can be found in Sādhanamālā on page 114, and what appears to be extremely strange is that while the Śloka is attributed to one Ajitamitra in the Sādhanamālā it is attributed to the highest god Mahādeva in the Kukkuṭeśvara Tantra.

In the Hindu Tantra the Mantra of Mañjughoṣa is stated as अवचतनीः which is a curruption of the original Buddhist Mantra अरपचनधीः by which Mañjuśrī gets one of his numerous names as Arapacana. The form is called Arapacana because Mañjuśrī and his four companions Sūryaprabhā, Candraprabhā, Keśinī originate from each of the five letters Arapacana. The correct Mantra therefore seems to have been preserved in Buddhist MSS. while in the Hindu Tantras the correctness has vanished, owing to the ignorance of the Gurus as well as that of the copyists while preparing copies of the Tāntric MSS.

The facts mentioned above lead one to suppose that in all these three cases the deities and the Mantras originally belonged to Buddhism and that the Hindus took them from the Buddhists And it is also certain that after the borrowing they were unable to keep up the purity and accuracy of the Mantras though they had been partially

1. Op cit. Bengali Edition, p. 368. The same Sloka appears in the Sadhanamala, Vol. I. p. 112.

successful in preserving the correctness of the form of the deities. There is seldom any Tantra in Hindu literature which is not tinged with Buddhistic ideas of Vajrayāna and its leading tenets including the Mahāsukhavāda, and it is no exaggeration to say that some of the Tantras of the Hindus like the Mahācīnakrama Tantra are entirely Buddhist in origin.

It has already been pointed out how works like Rudrayāmala and Brhamayāmala-works of the highest authority and antiquity of the Hindus-are profoundly influenced by Buddhist ideas, and how words of ordinary mortals like Ajitamitra, etc. have been put into the mouth of the highest god Mahādeva in Hindu Tantras. It is amply proved that the Buddhist Tantras greatly influenced the Hindu Tantra and it is therefore not correct to say that Buddhism was an outcome of Śaivaism. It is to be asserted on the contrary that the Hindu Tantras are nothing but baser imitations of the Buddhist Tantras.

Having established the priority of the Buddhist Tantras over those of the Hindu literature it is necessary to indicate the general principles by which Buddhist gods can be detected and separated from the Hindu Pantheon. In several places I have shown that the Vajrayānists described Mahāsukha as a state when Bodhicitta merges in Śūnya even as salt melts in water and to symbolize this the followers of Vajrayāna conceived the idea of Yuganaddha deities or deities in Yabyum, where the male and female divinities are represented as clasping each other in embrace. So these Yabyum deities are an outcome of a purely Vajrayāna concept which was pretty unknown in Hinduism before the Tāntric age and even

now does not fit in well with Hindu ideas and traditions.[1] If there be any deity of Yabyum nature in Hinduism, there is a strong suspicion that the deity may be of Budhdhist origin. When Kālī for instance is described as Viparītaratāturāṃ we have at once to regard the deity as of a definitely Buddhist origin. Kāli according to Buddhist traditions is Kādi or Kakārādi or in other words, all consonants of the Alphabet as the vowels are designated by the word Ādi or Akārādi, and it is not to be wondered at if a deity is conceived by them as Kāli belonging to the Yogatantra class and in whom all the consonants of the Alphabet are deified. In the Yogatantra and Anuttarayogatantra, it may be remarked, all deities are represented as embracing their Śaktis and feeling the bliss of Nirvāṇa.

Another important fact to be noticed in fixing the origin of deities is their Dhyāna. If the names of the deities begin with or end in the word "Vajra" the natural presumption is that the origin of such deities is Buddhist. Again where gods and goddesses are described as lustful their origin may also be regarded for certain as Buddhistic. When deities are described as decked in ornaments of Mudrās composed of human bones and representing the Pāramitās they may be taken as Buddhist. And lastly whenever gods and goddesses are described as bearing a miniature figure of one of the five Dhyāni Buddhas Amitābha, Akṣobbya, Vairocana, Amoghasiddhi and Ratnasambhava on their crown they must be taken as Buddhist in origin.

I may be accused of giving a rude shock to the followers of the Hindu faith who believe these deities to be their own but I feel sure if investigation is carried on in the lines indicated above, we shall ourselves be surprised to find an immense number of Buddhist divinities being unconsciously worshipped by us without the fact noticed by any one.

1. See Indian Buddhist Iconography, p 166.

Vernacular Section.

HINDI—A PROSPECT AND A RETROSPECT*.

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I am here owing to an unfortunate accident which has prevented my old and respected friend, Rai Bahadur Lala Sita Ram from attending this Conference. His absence means much loss not only by reason of a poor substitute in the presidential chair, but also because members of this Section miss the opportunity of meeting one whose active literary career synchronises with the modern Hindi period. Lala Sita Ram began serving the cause of Hindi in the seventies of the last century and his pen is still active. For my presence here I can plead no justification; the only excuse I can imagine is that in my own humble way I love Hindi and have an abiding faith in its future.

In explaining why he undertook to write a history of English Literature, the French *savant*, Taine said that he was impressed by its wonderful continuity. Ever since its birth, in the dim centuries after Christ's death, it had progressed almost without a break. It grew and developed and spread even as the natives of the soil emerged from savagery to civilization. It knew hardly any stage of decadence, and its history can be understood aright only if we know the spirit of the ages and the temperament of the people. That is true of every literature: if we would study it aright we must, as General Gordon said, enter into the skin of the people, know their age-long dreams and ideals and ambitions, and thus get the proper perspective. The background must be familiar to us. What is the historical background of Hindi Literature? Is it of mushroom growth, merely a local dialect, now flourishing on the gushing breath of ephemeral patronage, again languishing in the blast of power's frown? Or is it rather bound with the

*Sectional Presidential Address.

growth of India's manhood and its literature—the precious life-blood of a whole nation?

A comprehensive history of Hindi Literature belongs still to the category of *desiderata libri*; I do not forget the pioneer work of Grierson, of the author of the Śivasiṃhasaroja, of the Miśra brothers. But a full and detailed survey of literary tendencies and movements, an accurate account of the development of literary forms, a convincing narrative of the origin of the language, a consideration of foreign influences both on language and on literature,—this is still a need, and in its absence any effort at tracing the historical background is bound to be tentative. I should like, however, to repudiate the statement that is frequently made that Hindi is a new dialect, favoured by the protagonists of the Pan-Hindu movement. It is, on the contrary, fairly old, the direct lineal descendant of the vernacular in which the Aṅgas of the Jains were written three centuries before the Christian Era. These were written—some of them—in Ardha-Māgadhī, which is the same as Avadhī. Between this period and about 1000 A.D. the course of Hindi ran along streams which modern research will have to trace. In the latter year a verse translation of the Bhagavadgītā was produced by one Bhuāla. Then the next important era is the 14th century. Thenceforward a synthetic account of Hindi can be attempted. Amir Khusru, Malik Muhammad, Kabīr, Sūr, Tulsī, Abdur Rahīm, Keśava, Matirām, Bhūṣaṇa, Mīrā, Lallūlāl, Lakṣman Singh, Śiva Prasād, Hariścandra, Sītārām, Bālmukund Gupta, Pratāpanarāin Miśra, Devī Prasāda Pūrṇa, Śrīdhar Pāṭhaka, Mahāvīr Prasāda Dvivedī, Shyāmsundara Dāsa, Bālkṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Badrīnārāyaṇa Upādhyāya—the stream is unbroken, and the continuity preserved.

What, one may ask, is Hindi's special contribution to world-literature? In the vortex of literary production, is there any special note which is characteristic of Hindi? Greek provides artistic stimulus and a high theocratic atmosphere; Latin an austere devotion to the social laws; Italian a poignant, sweet, and haunting melancholy; English an insistence on plebian ethics and a zest of adventure; German a solemn seriousness and sense of human dignity; French pleasure and gaiety; Persian sensuousness and physical pleasures. What is the atmosphere that Hindi creates for us? In what mood do we go for comfort or inspiration to the poets of Hindi? What is its peculiar message? If we glance at the great works—*the opus major*—of Hindi, from Sūrsāgara, Rāmacaritamānasa, Rāmcandrikā, Lalitalalāma, the Śabdāvalis, Premsāgara, Śakuntalā, Satya Hariśchandra, Jayadrathavadha, Raṅgabhūmi, Pallava—we shall find, I think, that the contribution of Hindi is almost unique—a desire to escape from the fetters of this too, too solid flesh, a longing to get something out of mundane existence, and a firm faith in the bliss to come. It is not the shallow pessimism of the man smarting under the sense of temporary disaster, it is the deep-seated indifference of one who has kept watch over man's mortality, who has drained to the dregs the cup of life's pleasures and found it bitter in the sequel. It is not the unthinking optimism of the merry youth, unfamiliar with the weariness, the fever and the fret; it is the deliberate joy of the philosopher who, influenced by the deep power of harmony, can see into the life of things. There is, at all times, a feeling that there is a moral standard below which, if possible, we should not fall, a moral height which we should scale, if possible,

Is there, in this, if my reading of Hindi literature is right, anything that can give offence to any creed? Is there not, indeed, in most religions, the same aspiration, the same longing for Svarga, the Kingdom of Heaven, Bihiśt ? Why then should there be the mutual bickering which we see so frequently in India between the supporters of Hindi and Urdu? The former is not the language of the Hindus, any more than the latter is the property of the Musalmans. I admit at the outset the prime difficulty of script. That is an obstacle which need not deter an attempt at *rapprochement*. Many Hindus have written and are writing Urdu; many Muslims wrote Hindi in the past. Must political differences be permitted to pollute the sacred temple of Learning? In this temple, the right of entry into the *sanctum sanctorum* is possessed by all who love scholarship and respect learning. No Muslim has the right to prevent my claiming Urdu as mine, and equally no Hindu can debar a Muslim worshipping at the shrine of Hindi. What are differences of creed compared with a common love of literature? As I wrote once:

सरस्वती के उपासकों में जाति, धर्म वर्ण इत्यादि का भेद नहीं है, इस मंदिर में देवी की वीणा का स्वर सब सुन सकते हैं, आराध्य भगवती की शुश्रूषा के लिये केवल विद्यानुराग अपेक्षित है। साहित्य रसिक और काव्यमर्मज्ञ देश और भाषा की सीमाओं से बद्ध नहीं रहते। साहित्य क्षेत्र में सभी बन्धुभाव से प्रेरित होते हैं। उर्दू तो भारत वर्ष की ही है, यहीं इसका जन्म हुआ, यहीं इसका विस्तार हुआ॥

Urdu has no business to owe an extra-territorial loyalty. The late Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, in his *Asarus-Sanadid* and your own Muhammad Husaid *Azād* in his *Abe Hayāt* prove conclusively the unmixed Indian origin of Urdu. In its earlier stages it is not possible to distinguish it from the Hindi of the same period. I believe Ghālib even refers to the Urdu Dīwān as

being written in Hindi. The language of Mīr and of Vāli is mostly intelligible to the Hindu villager:

" सिरहाने ' मीर ' के आहिस्ता बोलो अभी टुक रोते रोते सो गया है "

Except the word " āhistā " the rest is pure Hindi; the earlier Urdu poets even used the Hindi metres, *Coupāi* and *Dohā.* Then, with the growth of pan-Islamism on the one hand and of pan-Hinduism on the other, the schism began, the gulf widened, until to-day we have great Iqbāl saying:

पहलूए इन्साँ में इक हंगामए खामोश है।

with only two monosyllables which are not Persian; or my pupil Sumitranandana writing verses which might almost have been part of a verse in Sanskrit. The same tendency is to be observed in Hindi and Urdu prose. Can a little common-sense not be infused into those writers who deliberately aggravate the existing differences? An Urdu writer, even if he is a Hindu, writes of Nargis, Bulbul, Rind, Karavan—although the Nargis exists for him in verse alone, the bulbul that he sees never sings, and the Karavan is visible only to travellers in weary Arabian sands. Why cannot Urdu poets bring their work more into relation with their lives, the cuckoo singing at the advent of the spring, the peacock dancing when the rain falls, the papeeha longing for its beloved, the lotus blossoming only when the sun shines? The symbolism of *Maya* and *Kafir*, of *Sayyad* and *Nakhchir*, of *Gul* and *Bulbul*, of *Waaz* and *Hur*, has been done to death; like the phrases of Osric, poets have cracked the wind of these poor symbols. A little admixture of realism will do this poetry much good. It is refreshing to find a living Lucknow poet write such lines as:

जोशे बहार तो आवे फिर जोशेजुनूं की कहत नहीं,
कूकेगी कोयल बागों में बौर आमों में आने दो।

My submission is that the attempt to divorce Urdu from India should be resisted. Simultaneously, the duty of Hindi writers is clear: they should eschew Sanskrit words where Hindi can be used—

"आप कहां रहते हैं" is surely to be preferred to आपका निवासस्थान कहा है "मेरा जाना मत रोको" is more elegant than मेरे गमन कार्य में वाधा मत डालो।

The tendency to import unnecessary classical words both in Hindi and Urdu has an exact parallel in the history of seventeenth century English. The stilted classicism of some of the writers of that period, the avoidance of common words as vulgar, the search after recondite expressions,—all these are revolting in an author like Browne, in spite of his "learned sweetness of cadence". When we come to Addison and Goldsmith, we feel like coming into the open from a hot-house. The tendency to make a vernacular look 'learned' is natural. When the common language aspires to the same dignity as a classical language, the external trappings, the non-essentials assume an unwarranted importance. In a new language this is perhaps inevitable; but in Hindi and in Urdu—the latter is only the Hindi of Persian-knowing Indians—which have a history of several centuries behind them, this is unnecessary and injurious.

Nothing is more mistaken than the impression that the range of Hindi is narrow. Even these names that I have enumerated—and I have picked them up at random—indicate the varied character of its literature. Fiction, the drama, essay, short-story, satire, history, criticism—of all these we have several examples. Of poetry, in all its forms—the epic, lyric, heroic, dramatic—there is a rich store-house. Criticism, as we understand it now, is of quite recent growth even in Europe:

there is hardly any appeal now to the hoary authority of Aristotle, Horace, Quintilian or Boileau. As a modern writer puts it, in criticism the only law is that there shall be no law. Old Hindi writers on rhetoric and poetics found no such license; they had no hankering after unchartered freedom; they rejoiced in self-imposed fetters. But now the tendency even in Hindi is to disregard all rules; to regard every writer as being a law unto himself; to make criticism 'romantic' and 'free' with a vengeance. Unbalanced, unbaked enthusiasm rubs shoulders with unabashed undiscriminating abuse; personal prejudice is made to do duty for literary evaluation. "That way madness lies"; and a note of warning may here be sounded.

I have put down a few disjointed thoughts—which is all I have been able to do at a few hours' notice. But I hope I have succeeded in suggesting some lines of thought. If I were addressing an audience of young students instead of, as now, one of learned scholars, I would bid them to take to the scientific and systematic study of the vernaculars. A rich and virgin field spreads around us; much useful research is possible and indeed urgently called for; in some matter investigation is possible only by the students of Hindi. There is no need to cross the seas for this; here and only here is this research possible, and though the task is new and heavy, the guerdon is rich.

PANJABI DRAMA.

Norah Richards, Banuri, Via, Palampur, Kangra Valley, Punjab.

Punjabi Drama is perhaps too comprehensive a term to be used with reference to the Drama that is in its infancy in this Province . . . . . . In the Punjab, Drama, in its widest sense has yet to be created . . . . . I but stand here to give assurance that towards that creation a beginning has been made.

Drama, as an inclusive term, connotes a period of either short or long duration during which a group of plays have been shown in public and have thereby become vitalized by popular enjoyment, by criticism and praise, and also by condemnation. This is not a contradiction in terms, for a play that is worthy of condemnation often has a glorious resurrection. Drama, then, is a term inclusive of various plays by various authors, a period of full activity, and the reaction of that activity in the minds and on the feelings of those that have witnessed them. Without a period of activity and a lapse of time from which to review and get a true perspective of that activity, there can be no Drama in the comprehensive sense. Greek Drama calls forth in our minds the immediate vision of a group of dramatists, of great plays, great audiences; and a religious, political and social stirring that were the direct outcome of that activity. Drama, being a synthesis of all the arts from the lowest to the highest, occupies the hands and skill of the artisan and craftsman, the living personality of the actor, the voice of the poet, and the sublime faculty of the musician: but above all and beneath all it owes its vitality simply and solely to average man. A play, however great, is still-born until it has breathed life into an audience. Giving life it receives life. Hence, for the purpose

of our subject the only plays dealt with in detail will be those that have seen the light of day by having been performed in public—creations that have themselves become creative in terms of life, by virtue of the response they have evoked in the thoughts and feelings of living audiences.

A Punjabi play I take to be one that represents the life of Punjabis, written in the Punjabi language—or dialect. Translations of plays are not included within this term, nor dramatic poems in Punjabi. Only those plays will be dealt with that are original and well constructed, and that have won their way through to a limited or unlimited public. Plays that could be fully expressed through no other linguistic medium than Punjabi.

Provincial Drama is an exalted form of Folk Drama . . . . . The Hardy Players of Dorsetshire in England are a typical instance of exalted Folk Drama, and the Lancashire School of Drama is another . . . . . The common people of the county of Dorset, play themselves as portrayed by one of themselves, through the genius that was Thomas Hardy . . . . . No translation of a Hardy Wessex play could possibly do justice to it, since the Dorsetshire dialect is part of its warp and woof. . . . . . So with a Punjabi play. . . . . . The Lancashire dramatic movement differs from that of Dorsetshire in that although its plays are provincial or rather county plays, the players themselves are not of the common people but professional actors. . . . . It is exalted Folk Drama nevertheless.

Folk Art in the Punjab impinges on the domain of Drama at religious and seasonal festivals, but at these times it is not the common people who are portrayed but divine or semi-divine beings and heroes, these characters usually being shown in 'set

groupings in which the spoken word has no place. . . . . . There is, however, another form of Folk Drama that has a distinct relation to our subject. . . . . The strolling players known as ***Rhās Dhārias*** reflect to some extent the lives of the people in their acting but mainly in comic interludes. . . . . It is only cultivated moderns, that deem life in its ordinary aspect to be a theme worthy of high forms of art, and not merely a sufficient cause for laughter in farcical scenes sandwiched between the acts of a connected play, as so frequently is done in professional theatrical plays and in their imitations by amateurs. . . . . These farces, however, are often the most vital and interesting parts of a theatrical performance, because they do reflect the life of the day. . . . . . . The grotesque vein in which they are often written, and the comicality of the acting are indicative of great promise for the future, when playwriters shall have developed the art of satire and when actors shall have become more subtle . . . . These scenes, which are written in Urdu, would gain immensely in quality if the language used was of the province in which they were played. . . . . . A farce in Punjabi would find a more ready response in the Punjab than a farce in Urdu, but it would be too much to expect of an interprovincial company that it should be able to play in the various provincial dialects. . . . . . As long, therefore, as the professional stage in the Punjab is served by Parsees and Gujratis we must be content with Urdu as a dramatic medium, being the nearest approach that we have so far to a common language for non-English speaking persons in India.

Among the conservative, an idea is prevalent that realistic modern plays are a fall from the type of play that dealt with mythical beings and legendary heroes. . . . . . It is interesting and illuminating to remind ourselves in this connection of the

secularization of Greek Drama by Euripedes . . . . . Aeschylus preserved its sacred character, whereas Sophocles did not allow the religious purpose to predominate, but Euripedes deliberately secularized, or shall we say humanized, the Drama of his day. . . . . . For this he came in for much opposition from contemporaries, and for ridicule at the hands of Aristophanes. . . . . . We know to-day that Euripedes was a modern, responding to the call of the Future, unresisting to the laws of evolution. . . . . Haigh, in his Tragic Drama of the Greeks, writes that

> "The general tendency of artistic development as shown by the history of every national art and literature, is to begin by pursuing the grand and lofty and mysterious, but to end with the accurate imitation of real life. . . . . . In spite of temporary ebbs and flows, the general set of the current is in this direction. Euripedes, therefore, in obeying this universal impulse, showed his instinctive appreciation of the conditions under which he had to work. . . . . . The ideal tragedy had run its course, the time for the more realistic drama had arrived. . . . . . That he should have seen this fact so clearly and should have used this opportunity, is a proof of his genius and sagacity, rather than a just subject for censure."

I am aware that in quoting these lines, I have broached a controversial subject that has but an indirect bearing on the theme of this paper, but the quotation serves to hint to us that the secularization of the Drama, or rather its humanization is not a fall. May it not be that Drama rises as it descends from the gods and from kings to common humanity?

The Punjabi language appears to be a medium well suited to realism; and the times through which we are passing provide

domestic and social themes in plenty that are eminently suitable for realistic dramatic treatment. . . . . It is not inconceivable, however, that as the art of the theatre develops in our province, a Punjabi writer of plays may arise able to tackle heroic, imaginative, and poetic themes in his own language. . . . . . Translations into Punjabi of classic poetic plays from Sanskrit and Persian, and free adaptations of Shakespeare are evidence of an attempt to express in Punjabi a state of mind that transcends the homely and local, and encourages us in the belief that Punjabi may in time serve for dignified and imaginative expression in original plays dealing with universal themes.

The earliest attempt, possibly, at a pure Punjabi play was made about twenty years ago when *Buddhe-di-Malt* was staged. . It dealt with the subject of marriages between old men and young girls. . . . . . It was a composite work, being the result of the writing endeavours of several persons. . . . . . The play was unpublished and no record of it remains. . . . . It contained the root of the matter, by being a realistic reflection of the life of the day, but it is not very likely that it was a disciplined work of art.

There is no evidence to show that before 1912 Punjabi plays were taken seriously by either writers or players. . . . . So far, experimental work in Punjabi Drama has been limited mainly to educational groups, with university professors as organziers and university students as actors.

A systematic attempt to create a new school of drama in the Punjab had its inception in the year 1912 at a college in Lahore. . . . . . Play-writing competitions were held and the winning plays performed yearly at the College break up. . . . . . These plays were largely inspired by the Abbey Theatre movement in

Ireland. . . . . Lady Gregory's *Spreading the News* was played as a model and the competition that followed was only for one-act plays, it being the aim of the organizers to develop the art of play-construction, which demands greater exercise of discipline in a play that preserves the unities of time and place. . . . . These competitions continued for a period of three years. . . . . Eighteen plays in all were submitted for competition. . . . . . Three won prizes and three were highly commended.

The first play was entitled ***Karāmāt*** and was written by a Science student. . . . . It depicted the clash between scientific and superstitious methods of treating disease. . . . . This play gained the distinction of being banned by the Censor, in the person of the Principal of the College, who feared that it would offend Hindu sentiment. . . . . The writer of *Karāmāt*, is now a renowned scientist and University Professor of Chemistry in Lahore. The banned play was eventually played in Urdu in the United Provinces.

The second play was ***Dūlhan*** It dealt with the subject of child-marriage, conveying with masterly touch the atmosphere of a village home and the problem of the marriage. . . . . . In this play a marriage is arranged between a very old man and a young girl of marriageable age. When the girl knows the fate in store for her she runs away from home. . . . . The father who knew the opposition he would receive from his womenfolk had made secret arrangements, and sprang the news on his wife at the last moment. . . . . . When the marriage procession arrived to take away the bride she had flown, and her little sister, six years of age, was snatched from the floor where she was playing with her dolls, enveloped in the red *sālū* and carried off to the heart-breaking lament of her mother. . . . . . The student who wrote this play is now a distinguished English scholar in the Provincial

Educational Service. He is also a recognized Punjabi enthusiast and a coming playwright.

The third prize play was *Dīnā-ki-Barāt* . . . . This play laid emphasis on the wanton extravagance incurred for marriage celebrations. . . . . All the characters in the play were Mohammadans with exception of the Hindu Shāh, with whom Dīnā, madans with the exception of the Hindu Shah, with whom Dina, the bridegroom, came into conflict over money matters. . . . . The marriage procession was about to be formed when the Shāh arrived demanding the settlement of his accounts, and the clash occurred followed by the intervention of the police . . . . . Dīnā had assaulted the Shāh, was arrested and carried off to the *thānā*. . . . . The procession that should have been one of jubilance was one of sorrow, in which the rear was brought up by wailing women . . . . . The writer of *Dīnā-ki-Barāt* entered the legal profession in which his decided dramatic gifts lie buried.

During this period a college satire was written and produced, entitled *Kitchen* X. Y. Z., the authors being A. B. & C. . . . . . . This was a piece of collaboration in which three professors wrote the first part that satirized students and professors, and the latter part that was aimed at college hostel servants, and particularly at cooks, was written in collaboration by various students guided by A. B. and C. . . . . . It was a rollicking success, and some of the arrows went so true to their mark that a supersensitive student at the close rose to protest, saying that students had been insulted, and he tried to make a speech. . . . . . His protest drew a peal of laughter from the student audience, for the too easy insulting of students had been one of the points of ridicule. . . . . . A scene was avoided by the presence of mind and ready wit of one of the professor-authors, who, to the delight of the audience, leapt onto the stage and said that *he* would make the speech for he also had been insulted!

Another innovation that belongs to this period was the introduction of a vernacular prologue to every play performed, Shakespearian or otherwise. . . . . . The prologue varied but always contained the three characters of a goddess, a svāmī, and a student. . . . . The goddess was the inspirer of the new dramatic movement, the svāmī represented Old India, and the student, New India. . . . . . The scene was always a street scene where the shrine of the goddess was situated, and the svāmī and the student were always on their way to do *pūjā* to the goddess in their own way. . . . . The remaining characters were street vendors and passers-by. . . . . . This prologue gave endless scope for drollery and was usually written by a student, most probably in collaboration with other students.

In 1916 circumstances arose which necessitated a change in the method of dramatic endeavour. . . . . . What had been a movement associated with one particular college was reorganized on an intercollegiate basis, in which the writing of plays was not so easily controlled. . . . . During the first year under the new regime the Shakespeare Tercentenary was celebrated by the production of a Midsummer Night's Dream, under the joint auspices of the Punjab University and the newly formed society. An original mythological play was also produced. It will be seen that the altered circumstances led to a lapse in Punjabi play writing. . . . . . The intercollegiate basis devoid of university control bristled with difficulties, and play production was abandoned. In 1919 a magazine was founded that appeared as an annual, dealing mainly with the art of the theatre. . . . . It also stood for the development of Indian art in every sphere. . . . Two issues of the annual had appeared when in 1920 the society was taken over by the University of the Punjab, under whose direction the third and last issue was brought out. During the se-

cond period of activity a playwriting competition drew a play from Bawa Budh Singh entitled *Daler Kaur*. . . . . . It was the dramatization of a romantic incident in which a Punjabi girl, disguised as a boy, enlisted in the Great War to be with her lover. . . . . Ill luck attended this play. . . . . It was rehearsed under great difficulties during the influenza epidemic of 1918, and eventually abandoned on the very eve of production because of the epidemic. . . . . . It received, however, the compliment of being plagiarised by one of the students who had been rehearsed in it, whose play was produced at a neighbouring college under the title of *Victoria Cross*.

The scene of the third and present period of the movement towards the development of Punjabi Drama is the Government College of Lahore, under the direction of Professor Guru Datt Sondhi, where, so far, the outstanding Punjabi production has been *Subhadrā*, by the author of *Dūlhan*--Professor Ishwar Chandra Nanda. . . . . . This play deals with the problems of Hindu widowhood. . . . . . It has evoked enthusiastic response and is in constant demand for public production. . . . . Prof. Sondhi has done valuable and stimulating work in translation from modern plays and from Shakespeare. . . . . He has also succeeded in getting an Indian play written and produced—Bhiṣma Pratigyā, by Hakim Ahmad Shuja. Though the linguistic medium was Urdu, and it therefore does not strictly come within our survey, it is worthy of note that it belongs to a wider sphere than the provincial, to which the word national is not inappropriate.

The remarkable popular success of *Subhadrā* has started a fourth period in the movement, that in all probability will succeed in raising the tone of plays produced by professional theatrical companies, and that will undoubtedly result in a new

school of drama in which educated professional actors will play for educated and cultured audiences.

The inspiration of the dramatic movement that had its inception in 1912 was foreign, its result has been national, and its tendency is towards realism in the theatre.

There is another dramatic awakening that must be included within this survey, for though it is frankly propagandist in its aims it is definitely more than mere propaganda . . . . . It is an unmistakable realization of the power of the Drama, and has allied itself to the rural awakening that is so evident on every hand in our province. . . . . . A very real passion for agricultural progress and rural reconstruction is finding expression in the acted play. . . . . . This expression, crude as it is, appears to be instinct with a passion for Drama . . . . . . In the New Age that is upon us dramatic values will have to be reconsidered, as indeed all art values. . . . . . Art for Art's sake, is a slogan of the past . . . . Art for Life's sake is our modern war cry . . . . . . In objects and in buildings, the merely ornamental is being superseded by right construction in the service of Beauty, as mere amusement in the theatre is being enhanced by right thought and social passion. . . . . . . Art for its own sake has no dynamic value, but Art for Life's sake might renew the world.

The remarkable thing about this so-called Rural Uplift Drama is, that it is instinct with dramatic development; for in addition to realism—burlesque, satire, and symbolism are struggling for expression. . . . . . . Enlightened deputy-commissioners encourage the production of plays in the interest of rural construction, organized mainly by schoolmasters and acted by clerks and handicraftsmen for masses of agriculturists and peasants. . . . . . It will be seen that this movement is an advance upon the academic in having a broader basis and touching a wider audi-

ence, also in passing beyond the bounds of realism to the fantastic realm of burlesque, the biting witticisms of satire, and the imaginative atmosphere of symbolism.

Three examples will serve to show the advance beyond realism and the enhanced possibilities of a less fettered mode of dramatic expression. . . . . . So far, Rural Uplift Drama appears to express itself in a variety performance of detached items in the form of dramatic dialogues, short scenes, and skits. . . . . The three items that I propose to give as examples were all on the same programme given at Sonipat in connection with an Agricultural Show held last March.

The first item named *Mother India* was in the form of a dialogue . . . . . Mother India, personified, calls for Soil, also personified as a woman. . . . . . . A dialogue follows in which the cow-dung problem is discussed, ways and means being suggested for enriching the soil. . . . . . After the exit of Soil, Mother India calls for a little band of Inspectors, among whom are the District Inspector of Schools and the Health Officer. . . . . . She asks them to stand and deliver, saying what they are doing for her children. . . . . . This gave the Inspectors, who appeared as themselves, an opportunity of making propaganda speeches to an attentive audience. . . . . . After Mother India had addressed them and placed her children in their care they withdrew and the curtain fell.

The second item was called *The Villager Bound.* A single figure of a villager stood in the centre of the stage bound by ropes tied to every part of his body. . . . . . These ropes that were secured by visible helpers in the wings, bore large labels upon which were written the things that kept him down, such as excessive expenditure at funerals and weddings, early

and unsuitable marriages, the unwise use of cow dung, the inflictions of disease, the curse of dirt, lack of sanitation and so on. . . . . . The villager delivered himself of a lugubrious soliloquy in high flown Urdu.

The third item was a burlesque entitled *Damodar,* the name of a humbugging beggar in the guise of a ***sādhu*** . . . . . When the curtain rises Damodar and his two disciples are having a wild dance and rollicking fun. . . . . . They are interrupted by the wailing of a woman, heard off, whose child was down with small-pox. . . . . . She was imploring her son to go to the *bhagat,* Damodar for a cure . . . . . . The disciples call to her in loud voices saying that Damodar was doing *pūjā* and must not be disturbed, and the wild dance continues. . . . . . Eventually a young villager arrives and approaches Damodar in fear and trembling. . . . . . Damodar gives him a fantastic cure for his little brother—a long list of ridiculous things including a yard of purple velvet that was to be torn into shreds for him to swallow in some equally ridiculous decoction. . . . . . The villager goes off well pleased trying to remember the long-winded instructions he had received. . . . . . As soon as he has gone the unholy three resume their rollicking dance, and the curtain falls to rise again on a scene in which the stricken child is lying on a ***chārpāi,*** and leaning over him, seated on the same *charpai,* is his mother with a neighbour, wailing . . . . . . To them enters the son with the cure . . . . . . The women attempt to administer it, singing a song meanwhile to Rāni Mātā . . . . . . The boy of course dies.

Each of these three items contain an idea that could be fashioned into disciplined dramatic art form.

The inspiration of this new dramatic movement is national and its tendency imaginative rather than imitative . . . . . . It is

too early to see its effect, but it is quite likely that it is itself a reaction to the dramatic activities of the academic group since its prime movers and enthusiasts are men who have passed through the University of the Punjab, since 1912.

In conclusion I would draw attention to the fact that all the world over there is a clash and an impending struggle in the theatre between the professional and the amateur. . . . . . . The professional theatre has become so highly commercialized that art therein is becoming strangled and too often the theatre is a place to shun, a place that comes in for just criticism and condemnation from moralists and artists . . . . . The amateur is going to be the salvation of the theatre—but not the amateur of the past who was but a reflection of the commercial stage and to whom theatricals were a mere frivolous pastime. . . . . The amateur of to-day is one who justifies his calling by being a true lover, to whom frivolous amusement comes second to creation . . . . . . He may, in time, permeate the professional stage with his spirit and redeem it.

Provincial Drama is the first step towards *National Drama* . . . . Development, like Charity, begins at home.

The history of the movement towards the creation of Punjabi Drama clearly indicates the part that academic institutions supported by their Universities might do towards the development of Provincial Drama.

ما کے دودھ سے پرورش پائیں۔

اسی سلسلے میں یہ تجویز شاید بے جا نہ ہو کہ اس اجلاس شعبۂ اردو کی یادگار میں پنجاب میں انجمن ترقی اردو کی شاخ قائم ہو جو متفقہ کوشش سے پنجاب میں اردو کی قدیم نشوونما کی تحقیقات کرے اور پروفیسر شیرانی نے جس کام کا آغاز "پنجاب میں اردو" لکھ کر کر دیا ہے اس کو انجام تک پہنچائے۔

لطف و کرم کا مکرر سپاس مہر خاتمہ ہے۔



ہیں ہیں۔ اگرچہ بعض نے اُن میں سے بہت کچھ ترقی بھی کی ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ
عربی فارسی کی آمیزش صرف اُردو ہی میں تو نہیں۔ ملک کی دوسری زبانیں بھی
اُنہی سے فیض یاب ہیں، مثلاً بنگالی۔ بابو صاحب کی جس تحریر کا اوپر حوالہ دیا گیا
ہے اُسی میں ایک مایۂ ناز بنگالی مُصنّف کی نسبت لکھا ہے "اس شخص کی تحریر
گویا ایک قسم کی پچیکاری ہے جس میں فارسی کو بنگالی کے ساتھ وصل کیا ہے"
اس مؤلّف کی تصانیف کو مضمون نگار نے بنگالی کے 'ادبی جواہرات' میں شامل
کیا ہے۔ ترقی یافتہ مرہٹی زبان میں "پچیس ۲۵ فی صدی الفاظ فارسی کے ہیں۔
(رسالۂ اُردو اپریل ۱۹۲۱ء) گوشہ نشین زبان "کوکنی" میں بھی دس فی صدی
"سامی" الفاظ (عربی فارسی) ہیں۔

(رسالۂ اُردو اکتوبر ۱۹۲۲ء)

ینی تال کے قریب سرد ہواؤں سے جب میدانی تپش سے جُھلسے ہوئے مسافروں
کے تن بدن میں جان آتی ہے تو اُن کی آنکھیں ایک روح پرور چشمے سے ٹھنڈی ہوتی
ہیں جو سنگ مرمر کے شفاف گئو مکھ سے گرتا ہے۔ اس چشمہ پر سنسکرت کا یہ مقولہ
لکھا جس کا ترجمہ اُردو میں بھی درج ہے "جو کوئی آدمی پانی کے چشمہ کو نقصان
پہنچاتا ہے وہ دوزخ میں داخل ہوتا ہے" کیا یہ رشیوں کا قول ہماری عبرت
کے لئے کافی نہیں جو ادب کے سرچشمہ کو جو پریم کا امرت پلاتا تھا، زہر
آلود کرتے ہیں۔ کیا اس کا وقت ابھی نہیں آیا کہ ہم محض ملک اور نیشن کی
بہبودی کے لئے ٹھنڈے دل سے اس پر غور کریں کہ جو زبان رفتہ رفتہ ترقی کرکے
ملک کی عام زبان بن چکی ہے جدید علوم و فنون کی درس تدریس کی استعداد پیدا کر چکی
ہے اُس کی سرپرستی کریں۔ اور سب کے سب مل کر پھر اس بادۂ الفت سے سرشار
نظر آئیں۔ ہمارے بچے بقول ایک ماہر تعلیمات کے سوتیلی ماں کا دودھ چھوڑ کر سگی

آرزو سے قائم ہوتا ہے ۔ اُن کے ساتھ رائے انند رام مخلص ہیں ٹیک چند بہار ہیں ۔ متوسلین میں بندرابن راقم ہیں ۔ اپنے وقت میں راے سرپ سنگھ دیوانہ اُستادِ وقت ہیں ۔ جن کے ایک شاگرد جرأت کے اُستاد بھی ہیں ۔ یعنی حسرت گلزار نسیم کے مؤلف نسیم لکھنوی کو سارا ہندوستان مانے ہوئے ہے ۔ علیٰ ہذا القیاس ۔

یہ تو شعرار تھے ہندو امرار نے بھی قدر دانیوں سے دل بڑھاکر کمال کی سرپرستی کی ۔ راجہ شتاب رائے ناظم بنگال و بہار کی قدر دانی مشہور ہے ۔ اردو شعر بھی کہتے تھے ۔ اُن کے بیٹے راجہ بہادر متخلص بہ راجہ اُردو کے شاعر تھے ۔ میر تقی میر جن کے ممنون کرم ہیں اُن میں راجہ جگل کشور بھی ہیں ۔ مہاراجہ چندو لال کی قدر دانیاں آج تک ضرب المثل ہیں ۔ پٹنہ میں دورِ آخر میں کنور سکھراج بہادر نے دو معاصر تھے شاہ اُلفت حسین فریاد اُستاد سید محمد علی شاد مرحوم کے ، اُردو کے ایسے مشاعرے کئے کہ اب تک یاد ہیں ۔ ہر مشاعرے میں تین چار ہزار روپیہ خرچ کرتے تھے ۔

(حیات فریاد از شاد)

آج بھی دکن میں یمین السلطنت مہاراجہ سرکشن پرشاد کی سرکار قدر دانِ شعرار ہے ۔ جب تک اُردو کا ادبی دَور رہا یہ میخانۂ الفت و با مہر و نشان رہا ۔ دفتری دَور میں دوسرے ہی رنگ کھلے ۔ اور ہی بحثیں چھڑیں ۔ نتائج آج آنکھوں کے سامنے ہیں ۔

زیادہ شکوہ عربی فارسی کی آمیزش کا ہے ۔ افراط ہر چیز میں بری ہے ۔ آمیزش اعتدال کی حد تک رہ کر بھی قابل اعتراض ہو تو سوال یہ ہے کہ اُردو کو زبانِ علم بننے کی قوت کس نے بخشی ۔ ہمارے ملک میں ہزاروں زبانیں ہیں جن کی تفصیل سر جارج گرائرسن کی ایک شتر بار تصنیف میں سمائی ہے ۔ مگر یہ سب کی سب اپنے ہی دائرے

تاریخ میں تلسی داس کی ایک دستی تحریر کا عکس شامل کیا ہے۔ یہ فارسی خط میں ہے جس میں ایرانی شان ہے۔ سرِ لوح "اللہ اکبر" لکھا ہے۔ اس سے سمجھ لو کہ تلسی داس کے ادب میں کیا رنگ جلوہ فرما تھا۔ ادب اُردو اِسی اُلفت کے سایہ میں پرورش پاتا رہا۔ ہندوستان میں طوائف الملوکی ہوئی۔ سارا ملک میدان کارزار تھا تاہم اوّل تو "مہاپاپ" ہندو مُسلمان سوال پیدا ہی نہیں ہُوا دوسرے ادب کی مجلسیں اُلفت کے وہ میخانے تھیں جہاں دلوں کی ساری کلفتیں دُور ہو جاتی تھیں ؎

دِماغ دل دریں جائگاہ ہے چاق میگردد
خدا آباد تر سازد خراباتِ محبت را

ذکرِ میر جو حال میں انجمن ترقی اُردو نے شائع کی ہے ملاحظہ ہو۔ یہ میر تقی میر کی لکھی ہوئی آپ بیتی کہانی ہے۔ وقت وہی ہے کہ سلطنتِ مغلیہ کا شیرازہ بکھر چکا۔ ہر طرف سے حوصلہ مندی تلواریں کھینچ کر میدان میں آ کودی۔ خود میر صاحب بھی لڑائی کے معرکوں میں شریک ہیں۔ مگر ساری کتاب پڑھ کر فرقہ بندی یا تفریق مذہب کی بُو بھی دماغ میں نہیں آتی۔ مثلاً پانی پت کا درّانی معرکہ میر صاحب تفصیل سے بیان کرتے ہیں۔ مگر ایک حرف ایسا نہیں لکھتے جس سے نفرت یا تنگ خیالی عیاں ہو۔ ایک موقع پر لکھتے ہیں "حقیقتِ ہر دو لشکر آن کہ اگر دکھنیاں جنگ گریز کہ طور قدیم آنہا بود می جنگیدند اغلب کہ غالب می گردیدند"۔

مرزا غالب کے جس تیر اُلفت کے گھائل میر مہدی مجروح ہیں اُسی کے کشتہ مرزا ہرگوپال تفتہ ہیں۔ اسی نشۂ اُلفت کی رسائی تھی کہ ادب اُردو کی پرورش ہندو مُسلمانوں نے مِل کر ابتدا سے آخر تک کی۔ اُردو شُعرا کے تذکرے دیکھو۔ شمالی ہند میں پہلا دورِ خان

لکھا ہے کہ اس لٹریچر کی قدر ہمایوں بادشاہ کے زمانہ سے شروع ہوئی۔ سب سے پہلے ملک محمدؒ جائسی نے میدان ترقی میں قدم رکھا۔ شاہانِ مغلیہ بہت بڑے مربی ان زبانوں کے تھے۔ اُن کے زوال کے ساتھ یہ بھی تباہ ہوگئی۔ مرہٹوں کا زمانہ اِن زبانوں کی ادبی ویرانی کا تھا۔ خلاصۃً۔ ذرا اس جان پرور عالم کو دیکھو کہ اکبری نورتن کے جوہر فرد خان خانان کی مجلس میں ایک طرف عرفی ونظیری کی تربیت وقدر دانی ہورہی ہے۔ دوسری جانب سورداس اور تلسی داس (رامائن کے مؤلف) کی۔ اکبر جہاں سلطنت کو بڑھارہا ہے وہاں فنونِ لطیفہ کی پرورش میں بھی مصروف ہے۔ فن تعمیر مقبرہ ہمایوں تک ترقی کرگیا ہے جس کی دوسری منزل آگرہ کا تاج تھا۔ فن مصوّری میں چینی اور ہند دونوں مصوّریاں مل کر وہ چہرے تیار کررہے ہیں جن پر نادرہ زمانی منصور اور میر کلاں کو ناز ہے فن موسیقی میں میاں تان سین کی قدردانی ہے جو گوالیار کے مشہور عارف باللہ حضرت محمدؒ غوث کے دامن شفقت کے سایہ میں اکبری دربار میں پہونچتے ہیں۔ فارسی ادب سحر حلال کا رنگ پیدا کر رہا ہے۔ فیضی کی نلدمن تصنیف ہورہی ہے تو تلسی داس رامائن لکھنے میں مصروف ہیں۔ گرائرسن نے تلسی داس کی تعریف جس بلند آہنگی سے کی ہے اُس سے زیادہ مشکل ہے۔ لکھا ہے۔ کہ "گوتم بدھ کے بعد ہندوستان نے ایسا سپوت پیدا نہیں کیا۔ توحید اور صحت نظر نے اُس کے کلام کو حقیقت کا رازدان بنا کر بقائے دوام کا خلعت دیا"۔ سوال یہ ہے کہ توحید اور صحت نظر کہاں سیکھی ؟

جواب واقعات سے سُنو۔ اسی اکبری دربار میں۔ توحید تو وہی ہے جس نے بنگالی ادب کو سنبھالا۔ صحت نظر میں مغلوں سے کوئی بازی لے جائیگا ؟ واقعات بابری اور تزک جہانگیری میں اس کا روشن ثبوت دیکھ لو۔ گرائرسن نے اپنی مذکورۂ بالا

اُس کے حُسن کی لطافت اور نفاست کی تصویر اس خوبی سے کھینچی گئی ہے کہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ اس سے بلند تر پایۂ کمال کا حاصل کرنا ممکن نہیں ۔۔۔ اس زمانہ میں سررابندرو ناتھ ٹگور نے اسی وشنوی چمن سے گُل چینی کی ہے ۔۔۔ بنگال میں ایک خاص بات یہ تھی کہ ہندؤں کے ساتھ مُسلمانوں نے بھی علم ادب کی ترقی میں ساتھ دیا۔ اس زمانہ میں اِن دونوں قوموں میں باہمی مدارات اور رواداری کے خیالات اس قدر قوی تھے کہ آج کل کے سیاسی معاملات میں حصّہ لینے والوں کو اس سے سبق حاصل کرنا چاہئے۔ بہت سی بنگالی تصنیفیں موجود ہیں جن میں ایسے مسلمان بزرگوں کے حالات درج ہیں جنھیں ہندو مُسلمان دونوں مقدس سمجھتے تھے۔"

ایک اور موقع پر لکھتے ہیں :—

"ہماری زبان اور علم ادب دراصل ملک کی ملی جُلی آبادی اور ہندو مسلمانوں کی مشترکہ ملکیت ہے[1]۔"

اِسی مضمون کے حواشی کے نمبر ۳ تشریح میں بیان کیاہے کہ بنگالی ادب کی ترقی میں اسلامی توحید نے حصّہ عظیم لیا۔

اب ایک دوسرے دیسی ادب پر نظر ڈالئے، یعنی برج بھاشا۔ گرائرسن کی جس تاریخ کا ہم نے اوپر کئی جگہ حوالہ دیا ہے اُس میں مغلیہ سلطنت کے عہد کو برج بھاشا، بیسواڑی اور بہاری زبانوں کا دَور اقبال (Augustan Age) بتایا ہے ۔

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[1] مضمون ڈاکٹر دینش چندر سین رسالہ اُردو جولائی ۱۹۲۲ء ص ۴۲۴ و ۴۲۰، ۴۳۰۔

اِس فہرست پر ایک نظر ہی ثبوت اس امر کا ہے کہ عہد مذکور میں ہندو اور مسلمانوں نے کس طرح ملکر باہمی کوشش سے صنعت، زبان، اور آئین کو ترقی دی۔ امن اور خوش حالی نے جو شگفتگی دلوں اور دماغوں میں پیدا کی اُس کا جلوہ جمنا کے کنارے تاج کی صورت میں اور بزم عیش میں قالین و شال کی شکل میں نمایاں ہوا۔ اِسی ربط کی بہار نے اُردو ادب کو ہندوستان کے ایک سرے سے دوسرے سرے تک مقبول بنا دیا۔ آج ریاست میسور میں اُردو اسکول جاری ہیں۔ گزشتہ سال آل انڈیا مسلم ایجوکیشن کانفرنس کا اجلاس مدراس میں ہوا تو اُس میں ایک رزولیوشن یہ پاس ہوا کہ اندھرا یونیورسٹی میں اُردو میں تعلیم کا بھی اہتمام ہو۔ ہندوستان کے باہر کابل کے کالج میں اُردو کی تعلیم کا انتظام ہے[1]۔ حجاز کی بندرگاہ جدّہ میں ایک دہی بیچنے والے حبشی کو صدا لگاتے سُنا "دہی لو دہی"۔ آسام بھی جہاں مسلمانوں کی سلطنت کو کبھی استقلال حاصل نہیں ہؤا، اُردو کے زیرنگیں آجاتا ہے۔ یہ تسلیم ہے کہ نہ صرف اُردو کی ترقی عہد گزشتہ میں ہوئی بلکہ تمام دیسی زبانوں نے فیض پایا۔ بنگالی زبان کی نسبت بنگال کے مشہور اہلِ قلم ڈاکٹر دنیش چندر سین رائے بہادر لکھتے ہیں:—

"ہمارے علم ادب کا سب سے ممتاز دَور چوتھا ہے جس کا آغاز وشنویوں سے ہوتا ہے جنھوں نے سولھویں صدی عیسوی میں اسلام کے اثر سے متأثر ہوکر سوسائٹی کے شیرازہ کو اتحاد و اخوت عامّہ کے اُصول پر دوبارہ درست کیا۔ وشنویوں کے ادب میں فطرت انسانی کی نزاکت

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[1] سیاحت نامہ منشی شمس الدین صاحب۔

کافی ہے ۔ زمانہء مابعد میں کیا ہوا۔اُس کی کیفیت حال کے سب سے زیادہ مشہور ملکی مورخ کی زبانی سننی مناسب ہوگی ۔پروفیسر جادو ناتھ سرکار نے سال حال کے آغاز میں جو پُرمغز تاریخی لکچر مدراس یونیورسٹی کی سرپرستی میں بمقام مدراس بہ عنوان (India Through The Ages) دیئے اُن میں مُسلمانوں کے عہد کی حسب ذیل دس نعمتیں شمار کی ہیں ۔خلاصۃً

(۱) بیرونی ممالک سے ازسرِنو تعلقات ۔

(۲) اندرونی امن ۔

(۳) انتظام کی یکسانی ۔

(۴) شرفا میں خواہ کسی مذہب کے ہوں لباس و رسم کی یکسانی ۔

(۵) انڈو سیریسین دستکاری جس میں قرونِ وسطیٰ کے ہندو اور چینی اسکول سموئے گئے ہیں ۔ایک نئی طرزِ عمارت ۔لطیف مصنوعات کی ترقی (یعنی شال، پچیکاری کمخواب، ململ، قالین وغیرہ)

(۶) ایک عام زبان جس کا نام ہندوستانی یا ریختہ ہے ۔اور سرکاری نثر کی طرز (جو زیادہ تر ہندو منشیوں نے تحریر فارسی میں ایجاد کی اور جس کو مرہٹہ چٹ نویسوں نے بھی اپنی زبان میں رائج کیا)

۷ ۔ ہماری دیسی زبان کا عروج جو اس امن اور مالی خوش حالی کا نتیجہ تھی جو دہلی کے شہنشاہی کے دَور میں نصیب ہوئی ۔

۸ ۔ توحیدی مذہب کا احیاء اور تصوف ۔

۹ ۔ تاریخی ادب

۱۰ ۔ ملکی اور جنگی آئین میں ترقیاں ۔

(عربی سے ترجمہ ہوئیں) فلسفہ ۱- تاریخ ۴- جملہ ۵

(فارسی سے ترجمہ ہوئیں) تاریخ ۵ -

ستر کتابیں ترجمہ ہونے کے بعد بعض زیر نظر ثانی ہیں یا طبع ہو رہی ہیں۔ اِن میں ۹ ڈاکٹری کی ہیں اور ۱۹ انجینری کی- ۶۵ کتابیں زیر ترجمہ ہیں- جملہ ۲۴۶- علاوہ تراجم کے ۱۸ کتابیں تالیف ہو چکی ہیں- ہندوستان کی اکثر یونیورسٹیوں نے جامعۂ عثمانیہ کو تسلیم کر لیا ہے اور انگلستان میں شمالی مجموعے نے (Northern Groups) اکسفورڈ اور کیمبرج اور لندن کی یونیورسٹیاں یہاں کے طلبا کو اسی رعایت سے اپنے یہاں داخل کرتی ہیں جس رعایت سے ہندوستان کی دوسری یونیورسٹیوں کے طلبا کو داخل کرتی ہیں- انگلستان کے انڈین سول سروس کے امتحان میں بھی جامعۂ عثمانیہ کے طلبا کا داخلہ حکومتِ ہند منظور فرما چکی ہے -

خاتمہ

میں ممنون ہوں کہ آپ نے میری پریشان بیانی صبر و تحمل سے سماعت فرمائی۔ مجکو اُردو کے متعلق ماضی و حال کی جو داستان کہنی تھی عرض کر چکا۔ اب مذکورۂ بالا بیان پر ایک نظر اور چند خیالات کا اظہار خاتمۃ الباب ہے -

اُردو کی جو تاریخ مختصراً میں نے عرض کی ہے اس سے واضح ہوا ہوگا کہ اس زبان کی پیدائش دیسی اور پردیسی زبانوں کے میل جول سے ہوئی ہے۔ زبانوں کا یہ میل جول ابتدا ہی سے اُس ربط اور اُنس کا نتیجہ تھا جو اہلِ زبان کے باہم پیدا ہُوا۔ تاریخ سندھ کا جو واقعہ شروع میں عرض کر چکا ہوں وہ ابتدائی ربط کے ثبوت کے لئے

بہت صبر آزما کام وضع اصطلاحات کا تھا۔ اس پہ جاں فشاں مباحث ہوئے۔ اس مشکل حل کرنے کے لئے مختلف علوم کے ماہر علما کی ایک کمیٹی شعبۂ ہذا کے ساتھ ہے جو وضع اصطلاحات کی خدمت انجام دے رہی ہے۔

مہر ۱۳۲۸ف م اگست ۱۹۱۹ء میں "کلیۂ جامع عثمانیہ" (عثمانیہ یونیورسٹی کالج) کا افتتاح ہوا۔ پہلا امتحان انٹرمیڈیٹ کا ۱۹۲۱ء میں اور بی اے کا ۱۹۲۳ء میں ہوا۔ اب یونیورسٹی ایم اے تک تعلیم دے رہی ہے۔ شعبۂ فنون میں حسب ذیل فنون کی تعلیم جامعۂ عثمانیہ میں بزبان اردو ہو رہی ہے۔ تاریخ (مشرقی و مغربی قدیم و جدید)۔ فلسفہ، معاشیات، ریاضیات (نظری و عملی)۔ طبعیات، کیمیا، قانون، نباتات، حیاتیات، انجینئری، طب (ڈاکٹری) ممتحن باہر کے علما بھی ہوتے ہیں ان علما کی جو رپوٹیں نتائج امتحان کی بابت موصول ہوتی ہیں ان میں تسلیم کیا گیا ہے کہ طلبا نے خوب سمجھ کر پڑھا اور ان کے جوابوں سے خیالات کی جدت اور تازگی ظاہر ہوتی ہے۔ متعدد انٹرمیڈیٹ کالج اس یونیورسٹی سے ملحق ہو چکے ہیں جن میں ایک زنانہ بھی ہے۔ مستقل عمارت کے لئے چودہ سو ایکڑ زمین حاصل ہو چکی ہے۔ ایک کروڑ روپیہ مصارف کے لئے منظور فرمایا گیا ہے۔ سالانہ مصارف دس لاکھ روپیہ سے زائد ہیں۔

دارالترجمہ نے اب تک ایک سو گیارہ کتابیں حسب ذیل علوم کی شائع کی ہیں:۔

(انگریزی سے ترجمہ ہوئیں) فلسفہ ۹۔ قانون ۱۴۔ سائنس ۲۴۔ ریاضی ۱۵۔ معاشیات ۲۔ تاریخ ۳۵۔ جغرافیہ ۲۔ جملہ ۱۰۱۔

مطابق ۲۶ر اپریل ۱۹۱۷ء میں حسب ذیل درج ہے:-

"ممالک محروسہ کے لئے ایک ایسی یونیورسٹی قائم کی جائے جس میں جدید و قدیم مشرقی و مغربی علوم و فنون کا امتزاج اس طور سے کیا جائے کہ موجودہ نظامِ تعلیم کے نقایص دور ہو کر جسمی، دماغی و روحانی تعلیم کے قدیم و جدید طریقوں کی خوبیوں سے پورا فائدہ حاصل ہوسکے۔ نیز جس میں علم پھیلانے کی کوشش کے ساتھ ساتھ ایک طرف طلبا کے اخلاق کی درستی کی نگرانی ہو۔ اور دوسری طرف تمام علمی شعبوں میں اعلیٰ درجہ کی تحقیق کا کام بھی جاری رہے ۔ اس یونیورسٹی کا اصل اُصول یہ ہونا چاہئے کہ اعلیٰ تعلیم کا ذریعہ ہماری زبان اُردو قرار دیا جائے، مگر انگریزی زبان کی تعلیم بھی بحیثیت ایک زبان کے ہر طالب علم پر لازمی گردانی جائے"

"غور و خوض کے بعد اس فرمان واجب الاذعان کی تعمیل میں محکمۂ تعلیمات سرکار عالی نے فوراً جامعہ کی عملی تجویز کو عمل میں لانے کے لئے ابتدائی کام شروع کیا ۔ اور اُس کے شعبۂ فنون و دینیات کی نصاب پر غور کرنے کے لئے کمیٹیاں قائم کی گئیں۔ اور اُن کمیٹیوں نے نصابوں کے جو مسوّدے تیّار کئے وہ انگلستان اور ہندوستان کے تعلیمی حلقوں میں گشت کرائے گئے ۔ اور ترقی خواہانِ جامعہ کو اس امر کے علم سے اطمینان ہؤا کہ تعلیم کے متعلق جن نتائج پر وہ پہونچے تھے اُن کو تعلیم کے سربرآوردہ ماہروں نے کم و بیش پسند کیا"

"جامعہ کا یہ پہلا تعمیری کام تھا کہ ایک شعبۂ تالیف و تراجم قائم ہوا جس میں اولاً آٹھ قابل مترجموں کا تقرر عمل میں آیا۔ اور یہ کام ملک کے ایک مشہور ادیب اور مصنّف کی نگرانی میں دیا گیا۔"

نشان اب تک باقی ہیں۔ ایک مکمل نسخہ ستہ شمسیہ کا میرے یہاں مطبع اسلامیہ مدراس کا چھپا ہوا ہے جو ۱۲۷۳ھ مطابق ۱۸۵۶ء میں شائع ہوا ہے۔ اس سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ رسالے پبلک میں مقبول بھی ہوئے۔ اس کے علاوہ اور بھی شخصی کوششیں سائنس کو زبان اُردو میں لانے کی ہوتی رہیں۔ چنانچہ ڈی ٹاسی اپنے لکچر (۱۳ر دسمبر ۱۸۵۰ء) میں لکھتا ہے۔ "ہندوستانی زبان کی اُن کتابوں میں سے جو حال میں شائع ہوئی ہیں بہت سی سائنس جغرافیہ قانون اور دوسرے علوم پر ہیں"۔ دہلی کالج نے بھی علمی تراجم کی خدمت انجام دی تھی۔

اسی سلسلے میں سر سیّد احمدؒ خان مرحوم و مغفور نے ایک منظم اور باقاعدہ کوشش سنٹفک سوسائٹی قائم کرکے فرمائی۔ یہ سوسائٹی بمقام غازی پور ۱۸۶۳ء میں قائم ہوئی۔ "ڈیوک آف آرگائل وزیر ہند اس کے مربی (پیٹرن) تھے اور ممالک مغربی و شمالی اور پنجاب کے لفٹنٹ گورنر نائب مربی۔ اور دُور دراز صوبوں کے بہت سے رئیس اور ذی عزّت ہند و مسلمان ارکان"۔ اس سوسائٹی نے قریب چالیس۴۰ کے چھوٹی بڑی علمی اور تاریخی کتابیں انگریزی سے اُردو میں ترجمہ کرائیں (حیات جاوید حصّہ دوم ص۲۶) مگر یہ تمام کوششیں نورِ علم کے پھیلانے میں وہی مرتبہ رکھتی ہیں جو سورج نکلنے سے پہلے روشنی کا ہوتا ہے۔ ابھی طلوعِ آفتاب کا انتظار تھا جو عثمانیہ یونیورسٹی کی شکل میں طالع ہوُا۔

جامعِ عثمانیہ اس عہد کا ایسا شان دار اور نتیجہ آفرین کارنامہ ہے جس نے علاوہ علوم و فنون کی حقیقی خدمت کے زبانِ اُردو کو اس قابل بنا دیا ہے کہ علمی زبانوں کی مجلس میں شامل ہو سکے۔

اِس یونیورسٹی کے قیام کا مقصد حضور نظام کے فرمانِ مبارک مترشّدہ ۲۴ رجب المرجب ۱۳۳۵ھ

ہیں اس کی معلومات سے طالبوں کو کچھ کچھ فائدہ میسر ہوئے۔کسواسطے کہ اگر بڑی بڑی کتابوں کا ترجمہ ہوگا تو طالبوں کے ذہن پر اُس کے مطالعہ کا بار ہوگا۔۔۔۔ چنانچہ ان دونوں میں بحسب مدعا چند رسالے مختصر علوم فلاسفہ کے بطریق سوال و جواب کے لکھے ہوئے ریوے رنٹ چارلس صاحب کے انگریزی زبان میں جو ۱۸۱۸ء میں بیچ شہر لندن کے چھاپے گئے تھے بہم پہنچے ۔۔۔۔ میر امان علی دہلوی اور غلام محی الدین حیدر آبادی اور مسٹر جونس اور موسی تنندوسی کو جو ملازمانِ سرکار ہیں حکم کرتے ہیں آیا کہ اُن علوم مذکورہ کو زبان انگریزی سے اُردو زبان میں ہمارے روبرو ترجمہ کریں چنانچہ بفضلِ حق سبحانہ تعالےٰ یہ چھ رسالے ترجمہ ہوئے مگر بعضے اسمار انگریزی اصطلاح کے جو زبان عربی اور فارسی میں نہ میسر ہوئے اُن کو اُسی زبان اصلی پر بحال رکھنے میں آیا"۔۔۔۔

یہ رسالے ۱۲۵۶ھ میں سرکار شمس الامراء کے چھاپہ خانہ میں ٹائپ میں چھپے ہیں۔ منجملہ ستۂ شمسیہ کے دوسرا پانچواں اور چھٹا رسالہ میرے پاس بھی ہے۔اشکال اور نقشوں سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ بہت اہتمام اور صحت کے ساتھ مثل انگریزی نقشوں کے چھاپے گئے ہیں۔ایک دلچسپ بات یہ بھی ہے کہ ان رسالوں کا طرز املا بجنسہ وہی ہے جو آج کل رائج ہوا ہے اور جس کو پنجاب سے منسوب کرتے ہیں۔یائے معروف اور یائے مجہول اور اظہارِ نون اور اخفائے نون کا املا ٹھیک آج کل کے قاعدے کے بموجب ہے۔نیز ناموں پر اور خاص خاص الفاظ پر خط بھی کھنچا ہوا ہے۔شمس الامراء بہادر نے صرف ترجمہ اور اشاعت پر ہی اکتفا نہیں کی بلکہ اُن کی تعلیم کے لئے ایک مدرسہ بھی جاری کیا جس کا نام مدرسۂ فخریہ تھا جس کے مٹے ہوئے سے

کوششیں جاری رہی ہیں۔ جہاں تک ہم کو معلوم سب سے اوّل نمایاں کوشش حیدر آباد دکن کے مشہور امیر کبیر نواب شمس الامراء فخرالدین خان بہادر نے کی۔ نواب صاحب ممدوح نے ۱۲۵۵ھ (مطابق ۱۸۳۹ء) میں یعنی آج سے تقریباً سو برس پہلے سائنس کی انگریزی کتابوں کا اردو میں ترجمہ کرایا۔ ان میں سے ایک مجموعے کا نام (شمس الامراء کی مناسبت سے) ستۂ شمسیہ ہے۔ یہ چھ رسالے حسب ذیل علوم کے ہیں :- (۱) جرثقیل (۲) ہیئت (۳) علم آب (۴) علم ہوا (۵) علم انظار (۶) علم برق و گیلوی نزم و مقناطیس۔ ان رسالوں کے ترجمہ کی کیفیت خود نواب صاحب کے الفاظ میں سننے کے قابل ہے :-

"حمد و نعت کے بعد بندۂ نیاز مند درگاہ ایزدی کا فخرالدین خان المخاطب بہ شمس الامراء اس طور پر گزارش رکھتا ہے کہ اکثر اوقات کتابیں چھوٹی بڑی علوم فلاسفہ کی جو زبان فرنگ میں مرقوم ہیں بسبب میلان طبیعت کے کہ بہت اس طرف شوق رکھتا تھا میری سماعت میں آئیں۔ اس جہت سے چند مسائل دن کے ازبر تھے۔ اور اگرچہ بعضے علوم فلاسفہ زبان عرب و عجم میں بھی مشہور ہیں۔ چنانچہ علم جرثقیل اور علم انظار وغیرہ۔ مگر اس قدر نہیں ہیں کہ جیسا اب اہلِ فرنگ نے ان کو دلائل اور براہین سے بدرجۂ کمال اثبات کیا ہے۔ بلکہ بعض علوم اہل فرنگ میں ایسے رواج پائے ہیں کہ ان کا نام بھی یہاں کے لوگوں نے نہیں سُنا۔ چنانچہ علم آب اور ہوا اور برق اور مقناطیس اور کیمسٹری وغیرہ اس واسطے مدت سے ارادہ تھا کہ مبتدیوں کے فائدے کے لئے کوئی کتاب مختصر جامع چند علوم کی زبان فرنگ سے ایسی ترجمہ کی جائے کہ فرصت قلیل

اقتصادیات ایک - مذہب ایک - جملہ ۳۴ - اس وقت انجمن علاوہ اور تالیفات کے ان متعدد تصنیفوں کی تیاری میں مصروف ہے:

(الف) انگریزی سے اُردو - یہ مبسوط اور مکمل لُغت ہوگی - اس کی تیاری میں مختلف انگریزی لغات سے مدد لی گئی ہے - تکمیل ہوچکی - طباعت کا اہتمام ہورہا ہے -

(ب) پیشہ وروں کے اصطلاحات کی لُغت - یہ بھی تیار ہے - صرف تصویروں اور نقشوں کی تکمیل باقی ہے -

(ج) لغت زبانِ اُردو -

(د) لغت زبان دکنی -

کتابوں کے علاوہ دو سہ ماہی رسالے بھی انجمن شائع کرتی ہے -

اوّل - اُردو - جو بہترین اُردو ادبی رسالہ کہا جاسکتا ہے جس کے مضامین نے اُردو ادب کا پایہ بہت بلند کر دیا ہے -

دوم - سائنس - اس میں خالص سائنس کے مضامین ہوتے ہیں مقصد یہ ہے کہ سائنس کے مسائل وخیالات اُردو داں پبلک میں مقبول بنائے جائیں - انجمن ملک کے اُردو کتاب خانوں کی کتابوں سے مدد کرتی ہے - انجمن کی شاخیں (یعنی کتاب خانے) سارے ملک میں قائم ہیں جن کی تعداد اس وقت ۹۶ ہے -

۳ - جامعۂ عثمانیہ (عثمانیہ یونیورسٹی) | عام طور پر یہ خیال ہے اُردو زبان میں صرف شعر و شاعری کا ذخیرہ متقدمین کی کوشش سے جمع ہوا - علوم و فنون کے سرمایہ کی طرف توجہ نہیں کی گئی - مگر یہ خیال قلت معلومات پر مبنی معلوم ہوتا ہے - واقعہ یہ ہے کہ قریباً ایک صدی سے اُردو کو سائنس کے سرمایہ سے باپایہ بنانے کی

تیس سے زیادہ ہے۔ اور باعتبار تقسیم علوم۔ سیرۃ، فلسفہ، تاریخ علوم، تاریخ و آثار اور ادبیات کی ہیں۔ معارف نامی رسالہ ماہوار شائع ہوتا ہے جو باعتبار خوبی مضامین کے بہترین رسالوں میں شمار ہو سکتا ہے۔ اور جس نے علمی مضامین کا باوقار نمونہ اُردو میں پیش کیا ہے۔ آمدنی کا بڑا حصہ مستقل ہے۔ گزشتہ سال باون ہزار سے زاید کی آمدنی تھی۔ رفقا کی دو قسمیں ہیں۔ ایک وہ جو خود اعظم گڑھ میں قیام کرکے تصنیف و تالیف میں مہارت حاصل کرتے ہیں۔ اُن کے قیام کے واسطے دارالمصنّفین کی عمارت میں۔ مکانات مُہیّا ہیں۔ دوسرے وہ علمار ہیں جو باہر رہ کر اپنی تصانیف سے دارالمصنّفین کو فیض یاب فرماتے رہتے ہیں۔ بے مبالغہ کہا جا سکتا ہے کہ ملک کے بعض بہترین دماغ اس علمی مجلس میں کار فرما ہیں۔

(۲) **انجمن ترقی اُردو** | اس انجمن کا اصل مقصد یہ ہے کہ "زبان اُردو کو مشرقی و مغربی علوم و فنون سے بذریعہ ترجمہ و تالیف مالامال کیا جائے" یہ انجمن بھی ایک باضابطہ مجلس کے زیر نگرانی کام کر رہی ہے۔ جس کے صدر سرسیّد کے نامور پوتے نواب مسعود جنگ بہادر ہیں۔ ارکان میں ڈاکٹر سر تیج بہادر سپرو جیسے ادب دوست بھی شامل ہیں۔ ۱۹۰۳ء میں قائم ہوئی۔ سب سے پہلے سکرٹری علامہ شبلی مرحوم تھے۔ اب ملک کے مشہور محقق ادیب مولوی عبدالحق صاحب ہیں۔ چند روز مولوی عزیز مرزا مرحوم نے بھی اس خدمت کا سرانجام کیا تھا۔ ۱۹۱۳ء سے اورنگ آباد (ریاست حیدرآباد) اس مجلس کا مستقر ہے۔ اس وقت تک حسب ذیل علوم و فنون کی کتابیں انجمن شائع کر چکی ہے:-

(۱) شعر و سخن ۸ | (۲) قواعد زبان و لغت ۷
(۳) تعلیم و تربیت ۴ | (۴) تاریخ و سیر ۱۰۔ سائنس ۶ فلسفہ ۲

کی زبانِ عام تناسب کے مطابق ہندوستانی کے نام سے مشہور ہوں[۱] ان مباحث کے مختلف پہلوؤں پر اور اُن کے آثار و نتائج پر غور و تامل بمقابلہ کسی طویل لفظی بحث کے زیادہ مناسب اور نتیجہ خیز ہوگا۔

موجُودہ ادبی اور علمی ادارات

اب تک ہم نے جو کچھ لکھا اُس کا تعلق اُردو کے دَورِ ماضی سے تھا۔ اس حصّہ میں ہم بعض دَورِ حاضرہ کے مہتم بالشان اُردو کے کارناموں پر روشنی ڈالنی چاہتے ہیں۔

(۱) دار المصنّفین اعظم گڑھ | زمانۂ حال میں جتنی تعلیمی اور علمی اُردو ادب کی اشاعت کی جو کوششیں ہو رہی ہیں اُن میں یہ مجلس ممتاز شان رکھتی ہے۔ یہ مجلس علامہ شبلی مرحوم کے "خیال" کی تعمیل ہے۔ علامہ مرحوم کے انتقال کے بعد اُن کے خاص تلامذہ اور احباب نے ۱۹۱۵ء میں اس کی بنیاد ڈالی۔ خود علامہ مرحوم نے گوشہ نشین اعظم گڑھ کو اس مجلس کا مقام تجویز کرکے اپنے دو بنگلے وقف کر دیئے تھے۔ دار المصنّفین ایک مجلس کے تحت انتظام ہے جس کے ارکان ملک کے ایسے علم دوست افراد ہیں جن کو علم کا صحیح ذوق ہے۔ نواب عماد الملک بلگرامی مرحوم اپنے حیات تک صدر نشین رہے۔ مولوی سیّد سلیمان صاحب ندوی ناظم ہیں اور مولوی مسعود علی صاحب مہتمم۔ یہ کہنا بے جا نہ ہوگا کہ یہی دونوں روح رواں ہیں۔ عربی اُردو و انگریزی کتابوں کا وسیع کتاب خانہ ہے، پریس ہے اور ان سب ضرورتوں کے واسطے دار المصنّفین کی خود اپنی پختہ عمارتیں ہیں۔ اب تک جو کتابیں شائع ہوئی ہیں اُن کی تعداد

[۱] Same objection to the Modern style of Official

ڈھو کے بنانا چاہتے ہیں جیسے وے ندی میں پڑنے سے پہلے پہاڑ سے ٹوٹنے کے وقت رہتے ہیں اور مولوی صاحب اپنے عین قاف کام میں لانا چاہتے ہیں۔ کہ بےچارے لڑکے بلبلاتے بلبلاتے اونٹ ہی بن جاتے ہیں۔ پر تماشا یہ ہے کہ ادھر تو مولوی صاحب یا پنڈت جی ایک لفظ صحیح کرنے میں یا پردیسی ہونے کے قصور میں سے کالے پانی جانے کا حکم دیتے ہیں۔ اور اُدھر تب تک لوگ سنو لفظوں کو بدل کر کچھ کا کچھ بنا دیتے ہیں۔ اس دیس کی بولی کا فارسی عربی ترکی اور انگریزی لفظوں سے خالی کرنے کی کوشش ویسی ہی ہے جیسے کوئی انگریزی کو یونانی رومی فرانسیسی ایمانی وغیرہ پردیسی لفظوں سے خالی کرنا چاہے۔ یا جیسے وہ ہزاروں برس پہلے بولی جاتی تھی اُس کے اب بولنے کی تدبیر کرے[1]۔" ایک اور ماہر زبان کی رائے سُنا کر اس داستان کو ختم کرتا ہوں۔" تمام تر کوشش یہ کرنی چاہیئے کہ ملک کی زبان اُردو رہے۔ یعنی تیس چالیس برس اُدھر کی اُردو جس کی بنیاد ہندی ہے۔ بیرونی الفاظ کی بے تکلف آمیزش کے ساتھ، کیونکہ یہی وہ شکل ہے جس میں وہ خود بخود منشکل ہوئی ہے۔ اُس کے رنگ برنگ ہونے کو برداشت کرنا بلکہ سراہنا چاہیئے۔ در آں حالے کہ مصنوعی یکسانیت ناکامی کے مرادف ہوگی۔ ۔۔۔ بہت تھوڑا زمانہ گذرا کہ ہندو اور مُسلمان دونوں کی زبان کا ایک ہی روز مّرہ تھا اگرچہ ہندو ابتدائی موانست اور شاید ایسے مضامین کی قدرتی نوعیت کی وجہ سے بھی جن کا تعلق دیومالا سے ہو فطرۃً (لیکن نہ لازم یا ننا سب طور پر) زیادہ سنسکرت کے الفاظ استعمال کرتے اور مُسلمان اپنی مذہبی نوعیت سے زیادہ فارسی کے الفاظ۔ اب عین وقت ہے کہ یہ خیالی امتیاز پھر وحدت میں ڈبو دیا جائے اور ملک

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[1] تتمہ بزبانِ اُردو صرف نحو مذکورۂ بالا۔

اور پراکرت کی مبولوی سنسکرت سے ناواقف تھے اور انہوں نے یہ بات نظرانداز کی کہ ہماری زبان کی بنیاد ایں ہے۔ اسی طرح پنڈت سامی اثرات مابعد کے قبول کرنے کی تاب نہ رکھتے تھے۔ یہاں سے وہ اُردوئے فارسی نکلی جو سرکاری دفتروں میں ہے جس کو عام آبادی نہیں سمجھ سکتی ہے۔ اسی طرح پریم ساگر کی خالص ہندی ناقابل فہم ہے۔ ایک تو قومیت سے اس قدر عاری ہے کہ مقبولِ عام نہیں ہوسکتی دوسری طفلانہ انداز میں اُن واقعات سے انکار کرتی ہے جن کے اثر سے اُردو ایک زبان بن گئی۔ نتیجہ بد اس کا یہ ہے کہ بجائے عام دیسی زبان کے اسکول گریمر بنانے کے یا بالفاظ دیگر ایک ایسی عام گریمر کی جو فارسی اور ناگری دونوں حرفوں میں بے کھٹکے لکھی جائے ــــــــــ۔ ہمارے یہاں دو متضاد اور مخالف جماعت کی کتابیں ہیں ایک مسلمان اور کایستھوں کے لئے، دوسرے برہمنوں اور بنیوں کے لئے"۔ دوسری جگہ لکھتے ہیں "نادان مولویوں اور پنڈت دونوں کی یہ بڑی بھول ہے کہ ایک تو سوائے فعل اور حرفوں کے باقی سب الفاظ صحیح فارسی عربی کے کام میں لانا چاہتے ہیں اور دوسرے صحیح پانن کی ٹکسال کی کھری کھرّی سنسکرت گویا یہ جو ہزاروں برس سے ہم ہی لوگ ہزاروں حالتوں کے سبب سے ہزاروں رد و بدل اپنی بولی میں کرتے چلے آئے ہیں وہ اُن کے رتی بھر بھی لحاظ کے قابل نہیں بلکہ اس دستور کی جسے ایک طبعی قانون کہنا چاہیئے اُن کے آگے کچھ گنتی ہی نہیں۔ سخت مشکل سنسکرت لفظوں کو جو ہزاروں برس دانت ہونٹھ جیبھ سے ٹکراتے گول مٹول پہاڑی ندی کی بٹیاں بن گئے ہیں پنڈت جی پھر ویسے ہی کھردرے سنگمارے کی طرح نکیلے پتھر کے

لہ اُردو صرف و نحو کا انگریزی دیباچہ مطبع سرکاری آلہ آباد ۱۸۷۵ء مؤلفہ راجہ شیو پرشاد۔

لئے ہندوستانی کا نام قرار دے لیا ہے۔ اور شمال کے مسلمانوں کی زبان یعنی ہندوستانی اُردو۔ ممالک مغربی و شمالی کی سرکاری زبان قرار دی گئی ہے۔ ہندوستانی زبان۔ یا ہندوستانی (یعنی ہندوستان کی زبان) کی یہ تفریق (یعنی ہندی اور اُردو) مذہب سے پیدا کی ہے۔ اور اس لئے عام طور پر یہ کہا جا سکتا ہے کہ ہندی ہندوؤں کی اور اُردو مسلمانوں کی زبان ہے[1]۔"

فورٹ ولیم کالج اور دیگر یورپین ادبی سرگرمیوں کا منجملہ بہت سے نتائج کے جو ایک نتیجہ زبان کی تفریق کا پیدا ہوا اس کا قصہ ستارۂ ہند راجہ شیو پرشاد کے قلم کی زبانی سنئے راجہ صاحب کی نسبت گرائرسن نے لکھا ہے "وہ اپنی اس کوشش کے لئے مشہور ہیں کہ ہندوستانی زبان کے ایک ایسے طرز کو عام فہم بنا دیں جس کو وہ آگرہ دلی اور لکھنؤ یا خاص ہندوستان کی عام بولی کہتے ہیں جو فارسی سے گراں بار اُردو اور سنسکرت سے گراں بار ہندی کے درمیان میں ہے۔ اس کوشش نے ایک گرماگرم اور ہنوز غیر منفصل مباحثہ باشندگان ہند کے درمیان پیدا کر دیا ہے[2]"۔ غرض راجہ صاحب لکھتے ہیں "یہ عجیب بات ہے کہ ہماری دیسی زبان متواتر ایسے دو خطوں میں لازماً لکھی جائے جیسے فارسی اور ناگری ہیں۔ ایک سیدھی طرف سے لکھا جاتا ہے دوسرا الٹی طرف سے لیکن یہ بالکل انوکھی بات ہے کہ اس کی گریمریں بھی دو ہوں۔ یہ حماقت ڈاکٹر گلکرسٹ کے وقت کے پنڈتوں اور مولویوں کی بدولت وجود میں آئی۔ وہ مامور تو اس امر پر تھے کہ بالائے ہند کی عام زبان کی ایک عام صرف و نحو بنائیں۔ مگر انہوں نے دو گریمریں بنا دیں ایک خالص فارسی عربی کی دوسری خالص سنسکرت

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[1] رسالہ اُردو جولائی ۱۹۲۸ء ترجمہ خطبہائے ڈی ٹاسی مترجمہ نواب مسعود جنگ بہادر

[2] Grierson, IX.V.P.148

ہوئی ہے؎ ڈی ٹاسی کے بیان پر بھی ایک نظر مناسب ہے۔ یہ مشہور فرانسیسی مصنف ادبی بیان میں مؤلفین و شعراء کے مذہب کا تعین ضروری سمجھتا ہے۔ سنّی شیعہ کی تصریح کرتا ہے۔ نصرتی کو برہمن بنا دیتا ہے۔ زبان کی تقسیم بھی اسلامی اور ہندوی کرتا ہے۔ اپنے خطبہ دوم (۱۸۵۱ء) میں کہتا ہے "ہندوستانی زبان کی ہندوی اور اسلامی شاخوں کا علم ادب صرف کثیر ہی نہیں بلکہ مختلف نوعیت کا بھی ہے۔ سنسکرت کے فریق سے (جن کی زبان ہندوستانی ہے) ہمیں شکنتلا کا قصہ ملیگا۔ فارسی کا فریق (جن کی زبان اسلامی ہندوستانی ہے) ولی کا دیوان پیش کریگا۔ اب رہا خالص ہندوستانی فریق اس سے ایک کتاب "مہر و ماہ" آپ کو سناؤنگا۔ جسطرح ہندوستانی لکھنے کے دو طریقے ہیں ایک فارسی حروف مسلمان ہندوستانی کے لئے دوسرا دیوناگری ہیں ہندو ہندوستانی کے لئے۔ ہندوی اور مسلمانی دونوں شاخوں میں نظم مقفیٰ ہوتی ہے۔

ایک قصہ نظم میں جس کا نام "لخت جگر" ہے بال مکند سکندرآباد کے رہنے والے نے لکھا ہے۔ اگرچہ یہ شخص ہندو ہے کہ اس کے نام سے ظاہر ہے۔ مگر اس نے تصنیف اُردو ہی میں کی ہے۔ اور آپ کو معلوم ہے کہ اُردو شمال میں مُسلمانوں کی ہندوستانی ہے۔ یہاں سوال ہوسکتا ہے۔ کہ کیا سکندرآباد نواحِ دہلی میں بھی ہندو مُسلمانوں کی بولی جُدا جُدا تھی؟

تیسرا لکچر ۵ دسمبر ۱۸۵۲ء "ہندوستانی اہلِ ہند کی زبان ہے۔ مگر یہ زبان اپنے حقیقی حدود سے باہر بھی بولی جاتی ہے۔ خصوصاً مسلمان اور سپاہی اسکو تمام جزیرہ نمائے ہندوستان میں، نیز ایران، تبت اور آسام میں بھی بولتے ہیں۔ اہلِ یورپ ہندی سے ہندؤں کی بولی مُراد لیتے ہیں جس کے لئے ہندوی بہتر ہے اور مسلمانوں کی بولی کے

Grierson's Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan ص ۔ X p-107

مؤلفین کے برخلاف اُردو تحریر سے عربی فارسی کے ثقیل اور غیر مانوس الفاظ نکال کر سنسکرت کے کم اور برج بھاشا کے زیادہ سلیس اور عام فہم الفاظ داخل کئے اور اپنی کتابیں دیوناگری رسم خط میں لکھ کر ہندی نثر نویسی کے اعلیٰ نمونے قوم کے آگے پیش کئے[1]"

گرائرسن کی شہادت ملاحظہ ہو "۱۸۰۳ء میں گلکرسٹ کی زیر تعلیم للوجی لال نے مخلوط اُردو میں (جو اکبر کے لشکری شاگرد پیشہ کی اور بازار کی جہاں تمام قوموں کے آدمی جمع ہوتے تھے) زبان تھی پریم ساگر لکھی۔ اس کی خصوصیت یہ تھی کہ مولف نے اسم اور حروف ربط ہندی الاصل بجائے عربی و فارسی الاصل کے استعمال کئے۔ اس کا نتیجہ عملاً ایک نو ایجاد بولی ہوئی جس کی گریمر اگرچہ نمونۂ سابق کے مطابق تھی مگر محاورہ بالکل بدل گیا۔ یہ نئی زبان جس کو یورپین ہندی کہتے ہیں ہندوستان کے ایک سرے سے دوسرے سرے تک بطور ہندوؤں کی زبان عام (لنگوا فرینکا) کے اختیار کر لی گئی اور اس کی ضرورت تھی جو پوری ہوگئی۔ یہ زبان مسلمہ ذریعہ ادبی نثر کا تمام شمالی ہند میں بن چکی ہے۔ اگرچہ بوجہ اس کے کہ وہ کہیں کی بولی نہیں نظم نگاری میں کام نہیں آئی اگرچہ بڑی سے بڑی ذہانت نے اس کی کوشش کر لی ہے مگر کامیاب نہ ہوئی۔ لہذا شمالی ہند میں آج کل ادب کا یہ لاثانی عالم نظر آتا ہے کہ اُس کی نظم ہر جگہ مقامی بولیوں میں لکھی جاتی ہے۔ خصوصاً برج بھیواڑی اور بہاری میں اور اُس کی نثر ایک یکساں مصنوعی بولی میں جو کسی ہندی نژاد کی مادری زبان نہیں اور جس کو اُس کے ایجاد کنندوں کی سرپرستی نے بزور منوا لیا۔ اس لئے کہ اُس میں ابتدائی جو کتابیں لکھی گئیں وہ نہایت عام پسند حیثیت کی تھیں۔ اور اس وجہ سے کہ اُس نے ایسا میدان پا لیا جس میں وہ علانیہ طور پر مفید ثابت

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[1] ارباب نثر اُردو ص۲۵۱

سرعت کے ساتھ تمام ملک میں پھیل گیا۔ یہ زمانہ ہندی زبان کی پیدائش کا تھا جو انگریزوں کی ایجاد تھی جس کا پہلا استعمال تالیف نثر میں گلگرسٹ کی زیر تعلیم ۱۸۰۳ء میں للو جی لال نے کیا جو پریم ساگر کے مؤلف تھے[1]۔ اس بحث کی مناسبت سے فورٹ ولیم کی خدمات ادبی پر پھر ایک نظر ڈالنی مناسب ہے۔ اٹھارویں صدی کے خاتمے پر لارڈ ولزلی کے عہد میں فورٹ ولیم کالج سرکاری افسروں کو یورپین اور دیسی زبانوں کی تعلیم دینے کے واسطے قائم ہوا۔ ڈاکٹر جان گلگرسٹ اُس کے صدر مقرر ہوئے جن کی سرپرستی میں بہت سی اُردو کتابیں لکھی گئیں اسی دور میں اُردو کے لئے "ہندوستانی" کا لفظ سندی ہوگیا۔ چنانچہ جان گلگرسٹ نے اپنی مشہور "انگریزی ہندوستانی" ڈکشنری لکھی جو کلکتہ سے ۱۷۹۲ء میں شائع ہوئی۔ علیٰ ہذا القیاس "ہندوستانی علم اللسان[2]"۔

میر امن باغ و بہار میں لکھتے ہیں "جان گلگرسٹ صاحب نے ۔۔۔ فرمایا کہ قصے کو ایسی ٹھیٹ ہندوستانی گفتگو میں جو اُردو کے لوگ ہندو مسلمان عورت مرد۔ لڑکے بالے۔ خاص عام آپس میں بولتے چالتے ہیں ۔۔۔"

فورٹ ولیم کی سرپرستی کی جہاں اُردو نثر ممنون ہے وہاں للو جی لال کی تصانیف بھی ہیں جن کا خاص کارنامہ یہ ہے کہ "اُنہوں نے اپنی کتابوں کے ذریعے زبان اور طرز بیان کا ایسا پسندیدہ نمونہ پیش کیا کہ متأخر ہندی اہل قلم نے اِسی پر اپنی تحریروں کی بنیاد رکھی۔ ان دونوں (للو جی لال اور سدل مسرا) نے اس زمانہ کی عام اُردو

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[1] Grierson's The Modern Vernacular Literature pp. VIII و XXII.

[2] ارباب نثر اُردو ص۱۷ و ۲۰

خصوصاً اور اُس حصۂ ملک کی بولی سے جو آگرہ و دہلی کے نواح میں ہے فارسی الفاظ وجملوں کی آمیزش سے بنی۔ اور جو دوسرے غیر ملکی الفاظ کے قبول کرنے کو بھی تیار ہے۔ اس کا نام اُردو بھی ہے۔ یہ زبان عرصہ دراز تک مسلمانوں کی زبان عام (Langua franca) تمام ہندوستان میں خصوصاً رہی۔ اور اب بھی اُس کو یہ امتیاز ملک کے بڑے حصے اور خاص جماعتوں میں حاصل ہے۔ اولڈ فیشن کے اینگلو انڈین اس کو مورز کہتے تھے[۱]۔ اب ہندی کے معنی سُنوہ بہت ہی عام طور پر یورپین ہندوستان کی اُن زبانوں کو کہتے ہیں جو فارسی محاورات سے مقابلہ ہندوستانی کے کمتر متغیر ہوئی ہیں جو خصوصاً ممالک مغربی وشمالی (اب صوبجات متحدہ شروانی) کے دیہاتی رقبے ہیں اور اُن کے سرحدی مقاموں میں بولی جاتی ہیں۔ ہندی کا سب سے قدیم کلام "چاند بردائی" کی مشہور نظم ہے"۔ گرائرسن نے اپنی کتاب میں جس کا نام "ہندوستان کا موجودہ دیسی ادب" ہے تین زبانوں سے بحث کی ہے۔ مارواڑی' ہندی اور بہاری' ان کی نسبت لکھا ہے کہ "زبانیں' ہندوستان' کی ہیں جس سے مراد راجپوتانہ میان دوآب جمنا و گنگا کنارۂ دریاے کوسی تک ہے"۔ یہ بھی لکھا ہے کہ "میں نے پردیسی ادبی اُردو کو خارج از بحث رکھا ہے"۔ اسی مستند ماہر زبان کا ایک اور فقرہ قابل غور ہے جس کا خلاصہ یہ ہے کہ " انیسویں صدی کا نصف اوّل جو مرہٹوں کی حکومت سے لیکر غدر کے زمانہ تک رہا۔ ایک ممیز عہد ہے۔ گزشتہ صدی کی ادبی تباہی کے بعد یہ ترقی اور تجدّد کا دَور تھا۔ شمالی ہند میں اسی زمانے میں عملاً مطبع کا ظہور ہوا۔ اور تُلسی داس کی روح کی رہنمائی سے صحیح قسم کا ادب

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[۱] Hobson-Jobson pp. 417, 418, 639, 640, 415, 584.

"قواعد زبان اُردو" (دریائے لطافت انشاء دیباچہ) ۔ داغ ؎

نہیں کھیل اے داغ یاروں سے کہدو
کہ آتی ہے اُردو زبان آتے آتے ۱؎

یہ بحث کہ ہندی کی جگہ پر اُردو نے کیوں قبضہ کیا، آگے ملاحظہ ہو۔

۴۔ ہندوستانی | چوتھا نام ہماری زبان کا "ہندوستانی" ہے اور یہ خالص یورپین پیداوار ہے ۔ اس نام میں خاص غور کی ضرورت ہے اس لئے کہ بعض پیچیدہ مسائل اسی کے استعمال سے پیدا ہوگئے ہیں ۔

سب سے پہلے پرتگیزوں نے سترہویں صدی عیسوی میں ہماری زبان کا نام "انڈوستان" (Indostan) رکھا ۔ یہ وہ زمانہ ہے کہ مسلمان 'مور' کہلاتے تھے۔ اسی صدی میں زبان کو 'انڈوستانی' بھی بول جاتے تھے' مور' بھی کہہ دیتے تھے ۔ ۱۶۹۷ء میں ہندوستانی زبان (Hindostani Language) کا لفظ پایا جاتا ہے ۔ ۱۷۲۶ء میں ایک مورخ لکھتا ہے "یہاں کی (ہندوستانی) زبان 'ہنڈوسٹانڈ' (Indostanda) یا 'مورز' ہے ۔ اٹھارہویں صدی تک عام طور پر ہندی زبان کا نام 'مورز' رہا جیسا کہ تامل کا "ملابار" اور بنگالی" کا بنگال" اُردو کو اسی طرح 'انڈوستان' کہتے تھے ۔ اور یہ بھی سن لو کہ شاہی فوج کے افسر اس نیک بخت کو کالی زبان (Black Language) کہتے تھے ۔ سیاہ تالو تو سُنا ہوگا 'سیاہ زبان' بھی سُن لو ۔ ہندوستانی کے معنی بھی سُننے کے قابل ہیں "ہندوستانی ۔۔۔۔ اس ملک کی زبان ہے ۔ مگر فی الحقیقت بالائے ہند کے محمدیوں کی زبان اور بالآخر دکن کے محمدیوں کی زبان جو میان دوآب کی ہندی بولی سے

۱؎ نور اللغات و امیر اللغات +

مفرد است"۔ میر سجادؔ "شاعرِ خوب ریختہ"۔ فغاں "شعر ریختہ خوب می گوید" پاک باز "در مجمع شاعرانِ ریختہ"۔ ولی "در ریختہ خود بکار ببر"۔ سید عبدالوالی "میدانِ ریختہ" غرض ہر جگہ ریختہ ہی ریختہ ہے اُردو کہیں نہیں۔ میر حسن کا تذکرہ سخن آفرینانِ ہندی زبان "اوّل ریختہ از زبانِ دکھن رواج یافتہ"۔ (احوال متقدمین) احمد گجراتی کے حال میں "در زبانِ سنسکرت و بھاکا میگویند کہ تصانیف بسیار دارد۔۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ "دو سہ ریختہ ہم گفتہ"۔ میر محمد حسن کلیم ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ "ترجمہ فصوص درزبان ریختہ کردہ ۔کتابے در نثرِ ہندی نثر ایجاد نمودہ چنانچہ یک فقرہ بیاد ماندہ ۔قلمی می نماید۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔کل کے دن تھے بادشاہ وزیر۔ آج کے دن ہو بیٹھے ہیں اندھے بصیر ۔ ایسی دولت سے زینہار۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔۔ فاعتبروا یا اولی الابصار) " (غرض ہر جگہ یہاں بھی ریختہ ہی ریختہ ہے ۔علیٰ ہذا القیاس قیام الدین قائم کے تذکرہ میں۔

بعض اہل الرائے کا قول ہے اور مجکو اس سے اتفاق ہے کہ عام طور پر لفظ اُردو زبان کے لئے رفتہ رفتہ اٹھارویں صدی کے آخر میں استعمال ہونا شروع ہُوا۔ عہد شجاع الدولہ و آصف الدولہ میں سید عطا حسین نے "نو طرز مرصع" تالیف کی۔ اس میں ایک ہی صفحہ میں اپنی زبان کے لئے "ریختہ" "ہندی" "زبان اُردوے معلیٰ" استعمال کرتے ہیں خالی "زبان اُردو" یا اُردو وہاں بھی نظر سے نہیں گذری۔ اس کے بعد رفتہ رفتہ محض لفظ اُردو زبان کے لئے استعمال ہونے لگا۔ مصحفی ؎

خدا رکھے زباں ہم نے سُنی ہے میرؔ و مرزاؔ کی
کہیں کس مُنہ سے ہم اے مصحفیؔ اُردو ہماری ہے

ؔلہ نکات الشعراء

سے یورپ میں آیا اور "ہورڈ" (Hoard) بن گیا۔ دریائے والگا کے کنارے سرائے (ملک روس) میں یا تو خاندان کی محلسرا اُردوے معلّا کہلاتی تھی (Golden Ordu) "تاش قند اور خوقند میں اب اُردو "قلعہ کے معنی میں مستعمل ہے[1] اسی لئے دلّی کا "قلعہ اُردوے معلّیٰ کہلایا ہوگا۔ اگرچہ دلی میں سلطنت کی ابتدا غلاموں سے ہوئی اور عرصہ تک قائم رہی۔ یہ غلام ڈال کے ٹوٹے ہوئے ترک تھے۔ تاہم اُردو کا لفظ اپنے لغوی معنی میں مغلوں کی آمد سے پہلے ہندوستان میں رائج نہیں ہوا۔ جہاں تک عہد بالا کے متعلق کتابیں دیکھی گئیں یہ لفظ نظر سے نہیں گزرا انتہا یہ کہ مذکورۂ بالا کتاب بحر الفضائل نے وہ ترکی الفاظ بھی لکھے ہیں جو اساتذہ کے کلام میں مروج تھے مگر اُس نے بھی اُردو کا لفظ نہیں لکھا۔ حالانکہ باب الف میں دوسرے ترکی الفاظ مذکور ہیں۔ اُردوے قدیم کے مؤلف نے موید الفضلاء کے حوالہ سے سکندر لودی کے عہد میں اس کا استعمال بتایا ہے۔ مگر پروفیسر شیرانی نے اس کو مجروح کردیا ہے۔ قطعی طور پر اس لفظ کا استعمال عہد بابری سے پایا جاتا ہے[2]۔ اس سے صاف ظاہر ہے کہ اُس وقت تک اُردوے معلّیٰ "قلعہ شاہی کے واسطے مخصوص تھا۔ زبان کے لئے عام طور پر استعمال نہیں ہوتا تھا۔ دیکھو سودا کے حال میں میر صاحب فرماتے ہیں "سرآمد شعرائے ہندی اوست" (نکات الشعراء) سرآمد شعراے اُردو نہیں فرماتے۔ اسی بیان میں فرماتے ہیں "شاعرِ ریختہ ملک الشعرائی ریختہ او را شاید"۔ یہاں بھی ملک الشعرا زاردو نہیں۔ خواجہ میر درد کے حال میں لکھا ہے "مجلسِ ریختہ کہ بخانۂ بندہ بتاریخ پانز

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[1] Hobson-Jobson by Col. Henry Yule A.C. Burnell London 1903 H 639, 640.

[2] رسالہ اُردوے قدیم ص۳

بادشاہ لشکر ہی میں رہتے تھے۔ اس لئے دربار و سراپردہ بھی لشکر ہی میں ہوتا تھا۔ اس امتیاز خاص سے شاہی لشکر "اردوئے معلّٰی" کہلایا اور بارگاہ و سراپردہ کا نام اردوئے معلّٰی ہوا۔ یہ تو عام بات ہوئی۔ دیکھنا یہ ہے کہ یہ لفظ ہماری زبان کے لئے بجائے ہندوی اور ریختہ کے کب سے رائج ہوا۔ جن مورخین اُردو نے عہد شاہجہانی کو اُردو کے نشو و نما کا عہد قرار دیا ہے وہ شاہجہاں کے اُردوے معلّٰی کی مناسبت سے اس کا اُردو نام رکھا جانا تجویز فرماتے ہیں[1]۔ مگر اس کی کوئی سند نہیں کہ عہد مذکور میں اس زبان کا نام اُردو تھا۔ انتہا یہ کہ دلّی کے اُردو بازار کا نام بھی اس عہد میں یہ نہ تھا[2]۔ ہم نے اوپر ثابت کیا ہے کہ ابتداء سے آخر تک ہماری زبان کا نام ہندی رہا۔ جب ولیؔ دکنی نے مضامین فارسی کی چاشنی ہندی نظم میں پیدا کی تو خاص ادبی و شعری زبان کو ریختہ کہنے لگے۔ اُس وقت تک بھی اُردو کا لفظ اس زبان کے لئے مستعمل نہ ہوا تھا چنانچہ میر تقیؔ میر میر حسنؔ دہلوی قیام الدین قائمؔ نے اپنے اپنے تذکروں میں کلام اُردو کے لئے ریختہ ہی کا لفظ استعمال کیا ہے۔

اُردو کا لفظ اس مفہوم میں استعمال نہیں کیا۔ ذکر میر اور تذکرہ نکات الشعراء میں میر صاحب لکھتے ہیں۔ "در فن ریختہ کہ شعریست بطور شعر فارسی بزبان اُردوے معلّٰی شاہجہاں آباد دہلی"۔ (دیباچہ نکات الشعراء) ریختہ کہ شعریست بطور شعر فارسی بزبان اُردوے معلّٰی بادشاہ ہندوستان" (ذکر میر) کیا اس سے یہ نتیجہ اخذ ہوسکتا ہے کہ اُردو کا مولد و ماوٰی دربار تھا نہ بازار اور اُردو اُردو بازار سے نہیں نکلی بلکہ اُردو بازار اُردو کے لئے بنایا گیا ہے۔ چنگیز خان اور ہلاکو کی دھاک ایک عالم میں بیٹھی ہوئی تھی قیاس ہے کہ اُسی اثر سے یہ لفظ روس کے ملک میں پہونچا اُورڈا (Orda) کے روپ میں۔ وہاں

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[1] آثار الصنادید [2] ایضاً بحوالہ تاریخ مرآت آفتاب نما

چنانچہ از نوشتہ کہ بخط ہندوی بشجاع قلمی گردیدہ بود"

(۲) ریختہ | یہ نام بمقابلہ "ہندی" کے بہت جدید ہے۔ اور بظاہر محمدؐ شاہ بادشاہ دہلی کے عہد میں بارھویں صدی ہجری کے وسط میں رائج ہوا۔ ولی دکنی کا شعر ہے :-

یہ ریختہ ولی کا جاکر اُسے سُنا دو

رکھتا ہے فکر روشن جو انوری کی مانند"

یہ خیال رہے کہ ریختہ در اصل نظم اُردو کا نام تھا۔ اور زیادہ تر اسی زبان کے لئے استعمال ہوا جو نظم کی یا شعر کی تھی، زیادہ عام کہو تو فصحا کی۔ چنانچہ میر تقی میر نکات الشعراء کے خاتمے میں لکھتے ہیں:- "بدانکہ ریختہ بر چندیں قسم است"۔ اس کے بعد یہ چھ قسمیں لکھی ہیں :-

(۱) ایک مصرعہ فارسی دوسرا ہندی (۲) نصف مصرعہ ہندی اور نصف فارسی (۳)۔ حروف و فعل فارسی استعمال کریں (۴) فارسی ترکیبیں مستعمل ہوں (۵)۔ ایہام (۶) انداز جو میر صاحب کا مختار ہے جس میں ادا بندی فصاحت و بلاغت شامل ہے۔

محمدؐ قیام الدین قائم۔ اپنے تذکرہ مخزن نکات میں کہتے ہیں کہ "ذکر و بیانِ اشعار و احوال شعرائے ریختہ"

شاہ عبد القادر صاحب کی جو عبارت اوپر نقل ہوئی وہ بھی یہ امتیاز ظاہر کرتی ہے۔ یہی وجہ تھی کہ مشاعرہ کے مقابل میں (جو اس عہد میں فارسی کلام کے لئے ہوتا تھا) "مراختہ" کا لفظ ایجاد ہوا۔ حاکم لاہوری اپنے تذکرہ "مردم دیدہ" میں خانِ آرزو کے حال میں لکھتے ہیں: "مراختہ در خانۂ خانِ آرزو پانزدہم ہر ماہے می باشد" خواجہ میر درد کے حال میں لکھا ہے "با شعر ربط بسیار دارد و بسیار ریختہ کہ الحال در ہندوستان رواج دارد"۔

(۳) اُردو | سب جانتے ہیں کہ یہ لفظ ترکی ہے لشکر کے معنی میں۔ ابتداءً مغل اور ترک

"کل ہم تمہارے یہاں گئے تھے"۔۔۔۔ دیگر "لو" کہ ہندی بجائے "بگیر" یہ مستعمل است" علیٰ ہذا القیاس" اخیر زمانہ تک بھی یہ نام باقی رہا۔ چنانچہ جان گلگرسٹ نے جو بیاض اُردو شعراء کے منتخب کلام کی جمع کی تھی اس کا نام "بیاضِ ہندی" رکھا اور ایک اور اُردو کتاب کا نام "اتالیق ہندی"[1]

مرزا غالب کے خطوط کے ایک مجموعے کا نام "اُردوئے معلیٰ" ہے تو دوسرے کا نام "عود ہندی"، یہی وجہ ہے کہ زبان ہندی (اُردو) کو ملکی دوسری دیسی زبانوں سے ممتاز کرنے کے لئے ایک اور لفظ "ہندوی" رائج تھا۔

آٹھویں صدی ہجری کی ایک لغت کی کتاب ہے "بحر الفضائل فی منافع الافاضل" اس میں عربی، فارسی، ترکی کے اُن الفاظ کے معنی دیسی زبان میں بھی بتائے ہیں جو اساتذہ و شعرائے فارسی کے کلام میں رائج تھے۔ صدہا جگہ دیسی زبان کے لئے "ہندوی" کا لفظ استعمال کرتا ہے۔ مثلاً خردل۔۔۔۔ ہندوی رائی گویند خرس۔۔۔۔ در ہندوی ریچھ گویند علیٰ ہذا القیاس[2]۔

فرشتہ اپنی تاریخ میں ابراہیم عادل شاہ کے ذکر میں لکھتا ہے۔" و دفتر فارسی برطرف ساختہ ہندوی کرد۔ محمد شاہ بادشاہ دہلی کے عہد میں راجہ ایامل نے عالمگیر کے رقعات مرتب کراکر "دستور العمل کار آگہی" نام رکھا تھا۔ ۱۱۵۶ھ میں یہ مجموعہ مرتب ہوا۔ اس میں ایک رقعہ کی تمہید ہے "در ایامیکہ شجاع بدفعہ اوّل در مقابلۂ عالمگیر بادشاہ ہزیمت خوردہ، فرار نمود۔۔۔۔۔ و از اتفاقات در آں ایّام نوشتہ خط ہندی اعلیٰ حضرت کہ بنام شجاع فرستادہ بدست آمدہ بود۔" اور رقعہ مذکور کی عبارت یہ ہے۔ "عرضی۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ از سبب گرفت وگیر خطوط استفسار نشدہ بود

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[1] ارباب نثر اُردو ص۱۰۷ [2] بحر الفضائل مؤلفہ محمد بن قوام بلخی نسخہ کتاب خانۂ آصفیہ۔

اسی "دلبر" کی زبان سے مذکورۂ بالا زبانوں کے اشعار سنوائے ہیں۔ اُس میں ایک شعر ہندی بھی ہے جس کا پہلا مصرع یہ ہے ع

گہ ہندی گویدم پانی پہن روٹی کہن[1]

(۲) ترجمہ شمائل الاتقیا (جو ۱۱۴۷ھ میں دکن میں ترجمہ ہوئی) "اپنی حیات کے منجبہ اشارت کئے تھے جو شمائل الاتقیا کتاب کوں ہندی زبان میں لیاوے"[2]۔

(۳) ترجمہ معرفت السلوک "کتاب معرفت السلوک جو تصنیف مغفرت پناہی حضرت شیخ الشیوخ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ہے فارسی زبانوں اُسے ہندی زبانوں بیان کر"[3]

(۴) شیخ عبدالحق محدث دہلوی زاد المتقین الی سلوک الدین مؤلفہ ۱۰۰۰ھ میں فرماتے ہیں:

"با ہندیاں در تقریر فارسی تکلف نہ کنند وہم بزبان ہندی اکتفا فرمایند"[4]۔

(۵) ترجمۂ قرآن شاہ عبدالقادر دہلوی: "اس واسطے اس بندۂ عاجز عبدالقادر کو خیال آیا کہ جس طرح ہمارے والد بزرگوار شیخ ولی اللہ بن عبدالرحیم محدث دہلوی ترجمہ فارسی کر گئے ہیں سہل و آسان ویسے ہی اب ہندی زبان میں قرآن شریف کو ترجمہ کرئیے۔ الحمد للہ والمنۃ کہ ۱۲۰۵ھ میں میسر ہوا۔ ـ ـ ـ دوسرے یہ کہ اس میں زبان ریختہ نہیں بولی بلکہ ہندی متعارف تا عوام کو بے تکلف دریافت ہو"[5]۔

میر تقی میر نے نکات الشعراء میں زبان اُردو کو ہندی لکھا ہے، چنانچہ آگے آتا ہے۔ انشاء اللہ خاں کے زمانہ میں اگرچہ اُردو کا لفظ رائج ہو چلا تھا تاہم وہ اس زبان کے لئے ہندی کا لفظ بھی استعمال کرتے جاتے ہیں۔ دریائے لطافت میں لکھتے ہیں: "دریں عبارت ہندی

[1] کلیاتِ سعدی مطبوعہ بمبئی ۱۲۵۶ھ ص ۱۰۔ [2] دیباچہ ترجمہ شمائل الاتقیا، نسخہ کتاب خانہ آصفیہ [3] ترجمہ معرفت السلوک نسخہ کتاب خانہ آصفیہ [4] اردو قدیم حکیم شمس اللہ قادری [5] مقدمہ ترجمہ قرآن شاہ صاحب مطبوع

سلطنت لکھنؤ کی تباہی پر نواب خلد آشیاں کے زیر سایہ رامپور میں بزم ادب آراستہ ہوئی ۔ دہلی لکھنؤ کے ارباب فن جمع ہوئے ۔ اساتذۂ لکھنؤ میں سے امیرؔ، منیرؔ، بحرؔ، جلالؔ وغیرہ جلوہ فرما ہوئے ۔ دلّی کا نام داغؔ نے روشن کیا۔ اس اجتماع سے پھر ایک کا اثر دوسرے پر ہوا ۔ ان مشاعروں نے اسیر جیسے پرانے اُستاد کے انداز کلام کو بھی اچھوتا نہ چھوڑا ۔ امیرؔ و جلالؔ کا تو انداز ہی بدل گیا ۔ دونوں اُستادوں کا اوّل و آخر کلام مقابلہ کرکے پڑھو تو یہ فرق صاف نظر آئیگا ۔ آج لکھنؤ میں کلام غالب کا جو ذوق ہے وہ عیاں ہے، بیان کی حاجت نہیں ۔ اس ربط کا دل گیر سماں یہ ہے کہ دہلی و لکھنؤ کی اُستادی کے آخری علم بردار داغؔ و امیرؔ حیدرآباد کی ایک نامور درگاہ میں پہلو بہ پہلو آرام فرما ہیں ۔

ہماری زبان کے نام

یہ بحث اپنے نتائج کے اعتبار سے بہت اہم ہے ۔ اس لئے اُس کا بیان میں نے ضروری خیال کیا ۔

(۱) ہندی | آج جو زبان اُردو کے نام سے مشہور ہے اُس کا اصلی اور مقبول عام قدیم نام "ہندی" ہے ۔ یعنی جو زبان دیسی اور پردیسی زبانوں کے اختلاط وربط سے ہندوستان میں پیدا ہوئی اُس کا نام ہندی قرار پایا ۔ اور عہد قدیم سے لیکر اب سے کچھ زمانہ پیشتر تک اُس کا یہی نام رہا ۔ ذیل کی شہادتیں اس مدعا کو ثابت کرینگی ،

(۱) شیخ سعدی شیرازی نے ایک قطعہ لکھا ہے جس میں، ترکی، گازرونی، تازی، کاشی، قزوینی، شیرازی، وغیرہ زبانوں میں اشعار لکھے ہیں اُس کا مطلع ہے ؎

دلبرے دارم نکو مانندۂ شمس و قمر   دلربائے جانفزائے قندخائے چوں شکر

سے علم و فن کے مُستند سرمایہ سے گراں بار فرمایا۔ بادش بخیر اسی صحبتِ علمی کے فیض
سے خواجہ حالی مرحوم نے اُردو شاعری کو جدید طرز سے آشنا کیا اور مسدس حالی لکھ کر
سرسید کی کوشش کو گراں بہا مدد پہنچائی ۔

دہلی و لکھنؤ میں نے اوپر بیان کیا ہے کہ دلی کی بربادی کے بعد اَدبِ اُردو کی خدمت
کا سہرا لکھنؤ کے سر پر بندھا اور اربابِ ذوق نے وہ خدمت کی کہ لکھنؤ زبان کی
دوسری ٹکسال قرار پایا[1]۔

حریفوں نے دلی اور لکھنؤ کو باہم خوب لڑایا ہے۔ اور بڑے بڑے معرکے گرم کئے
ہیں مگر واقعہ یہ ہے کہ یہ دونوں مرکزِ ادب گویا ان معرکوں سے بے خبر اپنے اپنے
طرز پر خدمتِ ادب میں سرگرم رہے ہیں اور ایک دوسرے پر برابر اثر ڈالتا رہا ہے۔
لکھنؤ نے تہذیبِ زبان میں زیادہ حصہ لیا ہے تو دلی نے تخیلِ شعر کا علم بلند رکھا ہے۔
تھوڑی سی تفصیل ملاحظہ ہو۔ لکھنؤ میں پہلا دور تو شعرائے دہلی کا تھا جن میں میر و مرزا ممتاز
ہیں۔ ناسخ نے علم استقلال بلند کیا اور زبان کی اصلاح کی ان کے بعد ہی مومن دہلوی
کی یادگار نسیم دہلوی لکھنؤ پہنچے، بزمِ اُستادی آراستہ کی ناسخ نے جو اصلاح زبان کی تھی اُسکو
قبول کیا ساتھ ہی دہلوی تخیل کو قائم رکھا۔ میر حسن کے خاندان نے اپنی خاندانی خصوصیات
ادبی کو برابر قائم رکھا۔ اُن کے پوتے میر انیس اپنے مخصوص محاوروں کی بابت فرماتے
"یہ میرے گھر کی زبان ہے۔ حضرات لکھنؤ اس طرح نہیں فرماتے"[2] یہیں سے انیس و دبیر
کے کلام کا فرق سمجھ سکتے ہو۔ ذرا اس پر غور کرو کہ ناسخ کے حریف آتش دہلوی نژاد تھے۔
شاید یہی فرق ہے کہ "ورائے شاعری چیزے دگر" کی شرح میں غالب لکھتے ہیں :-

"ناسخ کے ہاں کمتر اور آتش کے یہاں بیشتر یہ تیز نشتر ہیں"[3]۔

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[1] دیکھو دیباچہ "میر اللغات" [2] آبِ حیات ذکر میر انیس مرحوم [3] تذکرہ گلِ رعنا حالِ آتش

فوراً کہا "لکھو" نہ انگشت را با سبا بہ ضم کردہ سطبری چوب نمود"۔

اس دور کے بعد اُردو کا دور تھا۔ اٹھارویں صدی کے آخر میں فورٹ ولیم میں ادب اُردو کی ترقی و تعلیم کا اہتمام کیا گیا۔ ترجمہ اور تالیف کے ذریعہ سے نثر کی اکثر نظم کی کمتر کتابیں تیار کرائی گیئں۔ مشہور روزگار ڈاکٹر جان گلکرسٹ کے مہتمم تھے ان کتابوں کی تیاری سے زیادہ تر مقصد یہ تھا کہ ملکی و جنگی انگریز حکام اُن کو پڑھکر امتحان دیں اور ہندوستانیوں کی باتیں سمجھیں۔ اسکے بعد انگریزی کے لئے میدان صاف تھا۔ یہاں یہ تذکرہ دلچسپ ہوگا کہ اُردو ادب نے دو قلعوں میں تربیت پائی۔ ایک دلّی کا قلعہ معلّیٰ دوسرا کلکتہ کا فورٹ ولیم۔ قلعہ معلّیٰ میں شاہ عالم ثانی سے لے کر ابوظفر بہادر شاہ کے عہد تک کا زمانہ پستی و بربادی کا زمانہ تھا۔ سلطنت برائے نام تھی بلکہ بد نامی تھی۔ تاہم تیموریوں کا ذوق ادب اس حال میں بھی کارفرما رہا۔ قلعہ معلّیٰ کی زبان اُردوئے معلّیٰ ٹھیری اور کمال کے لئے ٹکسال۔ میر تقی میر لکھتے ہیں "ریختہ کہ شعر بیت بطور شعر فارسی بزبانِ اُردوے معلّیٰ بادشاہ ہندوستان" فیض تربیت یہ تھا کہ غالبؔ ذوقؔ سے اساتذہ اُسی صحبت میں بنے۔ آخر میں داغؔ دہلوی نے نام پایا۔ فورٹ ولیم کی تربیت نے میرامّن، سید حیدر بخش حیدری، شیر علی افسوس وغیرہ وغیرہ سے نثر اُردو کی قابلِ قدر بہت سی کتابیں لکھوا کر شائع کیں۔ تاہم وہاں کے فیض تربیت سے میرامّن یا افسوس بھی نہ بن سکے۔ یہ بیان تشنہ کمال رہیگا اگر اس کوشش ادبی کا ذکر نہ کیا جائے جو سرسید اور اُن کے قابل رفقا نے ایک تیسرے قلعہ علی گڑھ کے زیر سایہ کی سرسید کے قلم نے اُردو زبان کو علمی، اخلاقی، سیاسی، ادبی غرض گونا گوں زندہ مضامین کے بیان کی قوت بخشی سنٹیفک سوسائٹی قائم کرکے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ سے

لہ ذکر میر صفحہ

کی اور اپنے طرز خاص کو رائج کیا۔ بڑا کمال یہ کہ کسی حال میں رہے (خوش حال یا بد حال) خدمت فن کا اہتمام جان کے ساتھ رہا۔ انہی بزرگوں کی کوشش سے نظم اُردو نے وہ مرتبہ پایا کہ اپنی مقبولیت اور کامیابی پر اُس کو بجا ناز تھا۔ نثر ہنوز سرپرستی سے محروم تھی۔ رفتہ رفتہ اُس کا سامان بھی بہم پہونچ گیا۔ اٹھارویں صدی کے آخر میں انگریزی سلطنت کے استحکام اور وسعت نے کاروباری زندگی کو تازہ کیا۔ آئین کی مضبوطی نے نظام سلطنت کو از سر نو فروغ بخشا۔ ضرورت ہوئی کہ دماغ خیالی میدانوں سے نکل کر عملی زندگی کی فضا میں جوہر دکھائیں۔ ایک جانب یہ تھا۔ دوسری جانب حکومت کی ضرورتیں نئے حکاّم کو ملکی زبانوں کے سیکھنے پر مجبور کر رہی تھیں۔

تدریجی رفتار دیکھو۔ ابتداءً جب کمپنی نے شاہ عالم سے دیوانی کے اختیارات حاصل کئے تو علمی عدالتی زبان عربی تھی۔ عدالتی اس لحاظ سے کہ فیصلوں کا مدار عربی فقہ کی کتابوں پر تھا۔ اس ضرورت سے اوّل کمپنی نے عربی کی خدمت کی ایک مدرسہ کلکتہ میں دوسرا مدراس میں قائم ہوُا۔ قاضی القضاۃ، صدر الصدور، منصف و مفتی بڑے بڑے علماء وقت ہوتے تھے۔ مفتی صدر الدین خان۔ مولانا فضل امام۔ قاضی القضاۃ ارتضیٰ اعلیٰ خان کے نام مثالاً پیش کئے جا سکتے ہیں۔ اس کے بعد عربی کی جگہ فارسی نے لی۔ ہدایہ وغیرہ فقہ کی مستند کتابوں کا ترجمہ فارسی میں ہوُا تقریرات فارسی میں مدون ہوئیں۔ اُس زمانے کے انگریز کیسے کیسے ماہر ہوتے تھے اس کے اندازہ کے لئے یہ دلچسپ واقعہ سنو۔ ایک فوجداری کے مقدمہ میں گواہ اظہار دے رہا تھا۔ سررشتہ دار لکھ رہا تھا آلۂ ضرب کی موٹائی کے سوال میں گواہ نے اپنے ہاتھ کا انگوٹھا کلمے کی انگلی سے ملا کر بتایا کہ لکڑی اس قدر موٹی تھی۔ سررشتہ دار کا قلم رُک گیا۔ اور سوچنے لگا کہ کیا لکھوں یورپین حاکم نے

ختم کردیا۔ وہ کہتے ہیں کہ جو "چیز" "ورائے شاعری" ہے وہ فارسی گو ہندیوں کے یہاں معدوم ہے۔ لیکن ہندی گویوں کے یہاں ہے۔ چنانچہ چند شعر اس کے ثبوت میں لکھے ہیں جن میں ایک شعر مومن کا بھی ہے ؎

تم مرے پاس ہوتے ہو گویا   جب کوئی دوسرا نہیں ہوتا

اس دور کے ختم ہوتے ہوتے زمانہ نے پلٹا کھایا۔ تیموری تخت پر شکست آئی۔ طوائف الملوکی کی آندھیاں چلنے لگیں۔ باغ ادب کی بلبلیں پریشان ہوئیں۔ جس طرح آندھیاں بہت سے بیج ایک جگہ سے اڑا کر دوسری جگہ ڈال دیتی ہیں۔ اور وہاں گلزار کھل جاتے ہیں، حوادث کی ان آندھیوں نے یہی سلوک ادب اردو کے ساتھ کیا۔ اردو کے اہلِ کمال پریشان ہوکر دلّی سے نکلے تو مرشد آباد سے دکن تک پھیل گئے۔ لکھنؤ، فرخ آباد، ٹانڈہ، رامپور، پٹنہ، مرشد آباد، حیدرآباد، کرناٹک، میسور ہر جگہ ان اُستادوں کے دم قدم سے بزم ادب آراستہ ہوگئی وہ خود تو برباد ہوئے، مگر ادب کی انجمن آباد کر گئے۔ اہم واقعہ یہ ہے کہ اٹھارویں صدی میں اردو آسام میں بھی رائج ہوگئی ۔ حالانکہ انگریزی عملداری سے پہلے وہاں سیاسی خارجی اثر بہت کم کامیاب ہوسکا تھا۔[1] شیر کا حصہ لکھنؤ نے پایا۔ لکھنؤ کا امن۔ دلّی سے قرب سب سے زیادہ مجمع اہلِ کمال کا یہیں ہوا۔ سونے میں سہاگہ وہ تہذیب جو فرماں روایانِ اودھ اور شرفائے اودھ کی متفقہ کوشش سے پیدا ہوئی۔

ان اسباب نے ادب میں لکھنؤ کو دلّی کا حریف بنا دیا۔ اس پر بھی ایک نظر ڈالو کہ اگلے اُستادوں نے خدمتِ فن کس طرح فرمائی اوّل تو کاہش اور جان بازی سے خود اپنی تربیت کرکے اُستادی کے مرتبہ تک پہونچے۔ صاحب طرز ہوئے۔ تاثیر کلام سے دلوں کو مسخر کیا۔ شاگردوں کی تربیت

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[1] Islamic culture of Hydrabad, July 1928. P. 342.

کی آتش شوق کو بھڑکا سکو گے ۔ ولی نے اس نکتہ کو سُن کر اپنے کلام کا انداز بدل دیا۔ یہ پہلا قدم تھا اُس وادیٔ جنون کی طرف جس کے مجنون میرؔ و مرزاؔ اور غالبؔ و ذوقؔ بنے۔ اس انداز نے تمام ہندوستان میں آگ لگادی اُردو شاعری کو مقبول عام بنادیا [1]۔ پنجاب کا رنگ بدل جاتا ہے [2]۔ دکن میں بادِ شمالی چلنے لگتی ہے۔ بالاجی نائک ذرّہؔ تخلص اورنگ آبادی (معاصر میر غلام علی آزادؔ) کی ایک غزل بطور نمونہ ملاحظہ طلب ہے

میں غبارِ رہِ دلدار ہوں اللہ اللہ
خاکِ نقشِ قدمِ یار ہوں اللہ اللہ

کیوں نہ جا نافے میں خجلت سے چھپے مشکِ ختن
نکہت طرّۂ خمدار ہوں اللہ اللہ

رشک سے کیوں نہ دلِ طورِ تجلّی سے جلے
سُرمۂ نرگسِ بیمار ہوں اللہ اللہ

دارِ مژگاں پہ جوں منصور اناالحق گویاں
شیشۂ اشک پری وار ہوں اللہ اللہ

میں شہیدِ نگہِ یار ہوں اللہ اللہ
بسملِ خنجرِ دلدار ہوں اللہ اللہ

تپ ہجرت سے بن گئی ہیں نم خوں
تشنۂ شربتِ دیدار ہوں اللہ اللہ

رُخ و رخسار کا عاشق ہمیشہ سیتی
زلفِ مشکین کا میں ہار ہوں اللہ اللہ

ذرّہ خورشید لقا سینتی ہوا ہوں گلزار
سرد ہوں اور گُل گلزار ہوں اللہ اللہ

(دیگر)

مت آئیو اسے وعدہ فراموش تو اب بھی
جس طرح کٹے روز گزر جائیگی شب بھی

حاصل کلام اس ذوق نے اُردو نظم کو وہ ترقی دی کہ مرزا غالبؔ کی نازک دماغی نے بھی (جو ہندوستان کے تمام شعراء فارسی کے باستثناء امیر خسروؔ منکر ہیں) اُس کے سامنے سرِ تسلیم

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[1] "پنجاب میں اُردو" صفحہ ۲۲ [2] دیوان ہندی بالاجی نائک متخلص بذرّہ کتاب خانہ آصفیہ نمبر ۵۳۔

ایران سے ہندوستان میں آکر فیض یاب ہوئے مثلاً عرفیؔ و نظیری۔ انکے لطف کلام کو اُن کے وہ ایرانی معاصر نہ پاسکے جو ایران ہی میں رہے۔ مثلاً محتشمؔ کاشی جس کی بے نمکی کی شکایت شیخ علی حزیںؔ نے لکھی ہے۔ یہ تحقیق ہے کہ عرفی و نظیری، ہندوستان آکر خان خانان اور ابوالفتح کی صحبت میں عرفی و نظیری بنے (ملاحظہ ہو دیباچۂ کلیات عرفی) بہرحال یہ دل اویز ہوش رُبا رنگ جہانگیر کے عہد تک قائم رہا اور یہ وہ رنگ تھا جس کی نسبت ع

"ورائے شاعری چیزے دگر ہست"

کہا گیا ہے۔ طالبؔ آملی اس دَور کا خاتمۃ الباب تھا۔

شاہ جہانی دَور کے شعرا نے متانتِ کلام اور مثالیہ شاعری سے میدان روکا۔ کلیم اور قدسی کے دیوان شاہد ہیں۔ یہ انداز اُن پر ختم ہوگیا۔ عہد عالم گیری کے لئے یہ بھی باقی نہ رہا۔ محض قافیہ پیمائی رہ گئی۔ ایک شاعری پر کیا منحصر ہے، سارے فنون لطیفہ پر پانی پھر گیا۔ بہرحال شاعری رہی "ورائے شاعری چیزے دگر" رخصت ہوگئی۔ اس بد مذاقی کی حد جعفر زٹلیؔ کے کلام سے جا ملی۔ جو بیّن ثبوت اس امر کا ہے کہ متین کلام میں گرمئی سخن باقی نہ رہی تھی، اور وہ ضیافتِ طبع کا سامان بہم پہنچانے سے عاجز ہوچکا تھا۔ ہندوستان پر کیا انحصار ہے جب ایران میں صفویہ سلاطین کا ادب آموز دربار نہ رہا سناٹا ہوگیا۔ وہاں بھی حزین کے بعد قاآنی کو الگ کرلو تو مشاعرے ویران نظر آئینگے۔ نہ تیموری و صفوی رہے نہ پھر کمال پروان چڑھا۔ غرض فطرتِ انسانی ذوقِ ادب کی جویا تھی۔ ہندیوں کا فارسی کلام اس میدان میں سپر ڈال چکا تھا۔ ہندی شاعری قدم بڑھا رہی تھی۔ یہی وقت تھا کہ ولیؔ دکنی دلّی پہونچے۔ جہاں فارسی بے زبان تھی، وہاں اُن کی بھاشا کون سُنتا۔ اُن کی کس مپرسی دیکھ کر ایک اہلِ دل نے اُن کو یہ نکتہ بتایا کہ آتش پارسی سے اپنے کلام کو گرماؤ تو اہلِ مذاق

نے ہندی کی ترقی کی رفتار تیز کرنے میں برق و باد کا کام دیا۔ قطب شاہیوں میں سلطان محمدؐ قطب شاہ ۹۸۸ھ تا ۱۰۲۰ھ صاحب کلیات تھا اُس کی کلیات کا ضخیم نسخہ (جو قطب شاہی خاندان کے شاہی کتاب خانہ کا ہے) حیدر آباد میں موجود ہے۔ عادل شاہیوں میں علی عادل شاہ بھی (۹۶۵ھ تا ۹۸۸ھ) ہندی کا شاعر تھا۔ اس دَور میں دکن تو ہندی زبان کی وہ خدمت کر رہا تھا جس کا مجمل بیان اوپر ہوُا۔ لیکن (جہاں تک علم ہوُا ہے) شمالی ہند فارسی ادب کے ذوق میں سرشار تھا۔ اس کی وجہ غالباً یہ تھی کہ جس کثرت سے ایران کے اہلِ کمال دلّی میں آئے دکن نہ پہنچ سکے۔ اس کا سبب دربار دہلی کی قوی کشش اور قدر دانی تھی۔ معتدا بمقابلہ دکن کے دلّی پہنچنا آسان بھی تھا۔ یہ مانا کہ "خاکِ پاک" بے جا پور کو ملک قمیؔ اور ظہوری پر ناز ہے اور بجا ناز ہے۔ لیکن دلّی کا سرمایۂ ناز اس سے بہت بڑھا ہوُا ہے۔

یہ دَور ختم ہوُا تو اُتّر دکن ایک ہو گئے۔ شہنشاہ عالمگیر نے اورنگ آباد کو دارالسلطنت بنایا۔ اس طرح اورنگ آباد ہی شمالی اور دکنی اہلِ کمال کا مرجع بَن گیا۔ اس جامعیت نے اُردو کی نشو و نما میں ابر بہاری کی تاثیر دکھائی۔ اورنگ آباد اور نواح اورنگ آباد کی زبان اب تک بمقابلہ دکن کے دوسرے حصّوں کے دلّی کی زبان سے زیادہ ملتی جُلتی ہے۔ اورنگ آباد ہی کو یہ فخر ہے کہ اُس کی خاک سے دلیؔ دکنی اُٹھا جس کی نظم کے سامنے ہمعصر فارسی کلام کا رنگ ماند پڑ گیا اور اُردو شاعری نے فارسی کی جگہ لے لی۔ اِس کے کیا اسباب ہوئے؟ یہاں اس کی بحث دلچسپ ہوگی۔ مُغلوں نے جو قوت اور ذوق ؔگاہ فنونِ لطیفہ کی تربیت و پرورش کی فیاض ازل کی بارگاہ سے پائی تھی، اُس میں اب تک وہ فرد ہیں۔ اسی تربیت کے اثر سے فارسی تغزل میں وہ لطف و رنگینی پیدا ہوئی کہ خود ایران اُس کے پیدا کرنے سے قاصر رہا۔ جو اہلِ کمال

کی شہوت کوں عنبر جا کا خرچنا سو۔ پیر طبیب کامل ہونا نبض پچھان کردوا دینا"
عہد بہمنیہ سے لے کر عادل شاہی اور قطب شاہی عہد تک دکنی ہندی برابر ترقی کرتی رہی سب سے اوّل نثر رائج ہوئی اسکے بعد نظم۔

نظم میں سب سے پہلی کتابیں دسویں گیارہویں صدی ہجری کی دستیاب ہوتی ہیں۔ان میں ملک الشعراء نصرتی کی مثنوی گلشن ہند ہے جس میں منوہر کنور اور مدمالتی کی عشقیہ داستان نظم کی ہے۔یہ مثنوی ۱۰۶۸ھ میں تمام ہوئی ع

"مبارک ہے یو ہدیۂ نصرتی"

تاریخ تصنیف ہے۔ڈی تاسی نے اگرچہ نصرتی کو برہمن لکھ دیا ہے تاہم واقعہ یہ ہے کہ وہ پشتینی مسلمان تھا اور سپاہی زادہ۔چنانچہ خود لکھتا ہے: ؎

بحمد اللہ کرسی بکرسی مری چلے آرے ہیں بندگی میں تری

یہ شعر خواجہ بندہ نواز کی منقبت میں ہے۔نمونۂ کلام ؎

غریباں نوازندہ اے بے نیاز یو عاجز کی سُن عرض کر سرفراز
کہ عاجز ہوں ہو عاجزی پر شفیق ہدایت کوں توفیق مجھ دے رفیق
نہ موجود ہونے کے مختار تھے نہ اس زندگی کے ہوس دار تھے
منجے مست کر دے محبّت کا جام کہ دُنیا کا غم دل تے بسروں تمام

(مناجات گلشن عشق)

خود دکن کی مختلف سلطنتوں کے فرماں فرما ہندی میں صاحبِ تصنیف ہوئے ہیں۔اور اس میں کوئی شبہ نہیں ہے کہ اُن کے شوق و قدر دانی

ؔ مطبوعہ تاج پریس حیدرآباد دکن

ان پردوں کو بھی چاک کردے۔ اس اُفق پر سب سے اوّل کوکبۂ خسروی بلند ہوتا ہے۔ اُن کے کلام کے جو نمونے دستیاب ہوسکے ہیں وہ صاف ظاہر کرتے ہیں کہ ساتویں صدی ہجری میں ہندی زبان خاصی ترقی کرکے دوسری زبانوں سے نمایاں امتیازی خصوصیت حاصل کرچکی تھی۔ نمونہ کلام:

زرگر پسرے چو ماہ پارہ — کچھ گھڑیئے سنواریئے پکارا
نقدِ دلِ من گرفت و بشکست — پھر کچھ نہ گھڑا نہ کچھ سنوارا

یہی زمانہ ہے کہ علاء الدین خلجی نے انتہائے دکن تک اپنی سلطنت کا دائرہ وسیع کیا۔ یہ سیاسی اثر کی وسعت ہندی زبان کی مزید وسعت کا سبب تھی۔ خلجی کے بعد محمد شاہ تغلق نے دکن کا رُخ کیا۔ دیوگیر کو لے کر دولت آباد بنایا اور دلّی دولت آباد میں جا بسائی۔ دلّی والے اپنی زبان بھی اپنے ساتھ لے گئے۔ اُتر اور دکن کا یہ سیاسی تعلق بہت ہی جلد ٹوٹ گیا۔ خود محمد تغلق ہی کے عہد میں علاء الدین نے بہمنی سلطنت کی بنیاد جمادی اور سیاسی تعلق کے ساتھ ساتھ دکنی ہندی کا رشتہ شمالی ہندی سے منقطع ہوگیا اور دکنی ہندی نے اپنی دکنی بہنوں کے ساتھ مل کر زندگی بسر کی۔ اس وقت جو ذوق اُردو ادب کی خدمت کا حیدر آباد دکن میں پیدا ہوگیا ہے اُس کے اثر سے بہت سی کتابیں قدیم ہندی کی دستیاب ہوچکی ہیں ان میں سب سے پہلی تصنیف اسی دَورِ بہمنی کی ہے اور وہ معراج العاشقین ہے جو نویں صدی ہجری کی تصنیف ہے یعنی آج سے پانچسو برس پہلے کی اور جس کی نسبت قوی شہادت خواجہ بندہ نواز کی تصنیف ہونے کی پائی جاتی ہے۔ نمونہ اُس کا یہ ہے:۔

"یعنی واجب کے اَنگ سوں غیر نہ دیکھنا سو۔ حرص کے کان سوں غیر نہ سُننا سو حسد نک سوں بدبوئی نہ لینا سو۔ بغض کی زبان سوں بدبوئی نہ لینا سو۔ کینیا

ق المسالک میں کہتا ہے ۔ ولسان اھل المنصورۃ والملتان ونواحیھا العربیۃ والسندیۃ ولسان اھل المکران الفارسیۃ والمکرانیۃ (دیکھو ص ۲۳۲ چھاپہ لیڈن ۱۸۷۳ء)

ترجمہ:۔منصورہ اور ملتان اور ان کے اطراف والوں کی زبان عربی اور سندھی ہے اور مکران والوں کی فارسی مکرانی ۔

ظاہر ہے کہ اس میل جول کا اثر سندھی زبان پر ہؤا ہوگا ۔ اور غالب ہؤا ہوگا ۔ اس اثر میں قوت اُس اُنس اور ربط نے بخشی جو عربوں اور سندھیوں کے درمیان اس عرصے میں پیدا ہوگیا تھا اور جس کا ثبوت یہ ہے کہ محمدؐ بن قاسم فاتح سندھ کی وفات پر کرج والوں نے اُس کا بُت بنا کر پرستش کی ۔شاعروں نے مرثئے لکھے[1] ۔یہی اثر اُردو زبان کا سنگ بنیاد بے خدشہ قرار پا سکتا ہے ۔افسوس ہے کہ ابھی تحقیق کا قدم سندھ تک نہیں پہنچا ۔ اس لئے اس عہد کی نو پید اسندھی زبان کے نمونے ہماری دسترس سے باہر ہیں ۔میں نے تھوڑی سی کوشش کی جو کامیاب نہ ہوئی ۔ اہلِ نظر کی تلاش و فکر کا یہ میدان ہنوز منتظر ہے ۔

سندھ کے بعد پنجاب کا دَور تھا ۔ ان دونوں دَوروں کا مقام اجتماع قدرتی طور پر ملتان تھا ۔ظاہر ہے کہ دوسرا دَور نئی زبان ہندی کا بھی یہیں شروع ہؤا ہوگا ۔اگرچہ یہ دَور بھی تشنۂ تحقیق ہے ۔تاہم ہم کو ممنون اور شکر گزار ہونا چاہئے پروفیسر اختر شیرانی کی جاں فشاں تحقیق کا جنھوں نے " پنجاب میں اُردو " لکھ کر تحقیقات کو وسعت بخشی اور بتایا کہ پنجاب نے اپنے دَور میں کیا کیا خدمتیں اُردو کی کی تھیں ۔ اس جدید تحقیق سے ایک نیا باب تاریخ اُردو میں اضافہ ہؤا ۔ پنجاب سے سلطنت دلّی میں منتقل ہوئی ۔ غلاموں سے لے کر مغلوں کے عہد تک اکثر دلّی ہی دارالسلطنت رہی ۔اس طویل زمانے میں نئی ہندی زبان کی پرورش وہیں ہوتی رہی ۔ افسوس ہے کہ وہاں کے نشو و نما کے بھی اکثر دَور پردۂ تاریکی میں ہیں ۔کاش علمی روشنی

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[1] تاریخ ہند سید ہاشمی شائع کردہ جامع عثمانیہ ص ۱۵۳ و تاریخ سندھ مؤلفہ عبدالحلیم شرر

ہو کر بڑھی ہیں ۔ کبھی مٹ کر فنا ہوئی ہیں ۔ ایک بہت بڑا انقلاب جو تاریخی روشنی سے پہلے ہوا مگر لسانیات کو بر زبان یاد ہے کہ وسط ایشیا سے آریانسل کی نقل و حرکت کی صورت میں نمایاں ہوا ۔ یورپ اور ایشیا کی زبانوں پر خصوصاً جو گہرے اثرات اِس انقلاب کے ہوئے وہ اتنے وسیع اور دوُر رس تھے کہ کتابوں کی موٹی موٹی جلدوں میں بھی اُن کی تفصیل نہیں سماتی ۔ زبان سے گزر کر وہ نقل و حرکت دنیا کے لئے بہت سے روحانی، سیاسی، معاشرتی وغیرہ انقلابات کا پیام تھی ۔ ایک اور عظیم الشان انقلاب جو تاریخ کو خوب یاد ہے وہ تھا جو تقریباً آج سے ڈیڑھ ہزار برس پہلے جزیرہ نمائے عرب کے تپتے ریگستانوں میں رونما ہوا ۔ اُس انقلاب سے مجھکو یہاں صرف اُسی حد تک بحث کرنی چاہئے جس حد تک وہ ہماری زبان سے تعلق رکھتا ہے ۔ سب سے اوّل اس انقلاب نے عربی زبان کو ایام جاہلیت کے محدود ادبی و خیالی دائرے سے نکال کر اعلیٰ سے اعلیٰ روحانی، ملکی، علمی، اخلاقی، ادبی وغیرہ وغیرہ مطالب و مضامین کے بیان کی قوّت بخشی ۔ عربی نے فارسی کو سنبھالا، توحید سے آشنا کیا، تاریخ نگاری کا سلیقہ بخشا، تصوّف سکھایا ۔ ادب کا پایہ اتنا بلند کیا کہ فردوسی سعدی آفتاب و ماہتاب بن کر نور افشاں ہوئے ۔ یہی وہ دو آتشہ مئے ناب تھی جس نے ہمارے ملک ہندوستان میں بزم افروز ہوکر دیسی زبانوں کے رگ و ریشہ میں گرمئی حیات پیدا کی اندرونی اور بیرونی بولیوں کا سب سے پہلا سنگم سندھ کا ملک ہے جہاں ۹۲ھ / ۷۱۱ء میں عرب آئے اُنکی زبان عربی تھی اس لئے اسی زبان کا رواج اُن کے عہد میں ہوا اور سندھی کے دوش بدوش زبانوں پر رواں ہوئی ۔ ابن حوقل نے پانچویں صدی ہجری میں عربی اور سندھی دونوں کو سندھ میں رائج پایا چنانچہ اپنے سفرنامہ المسالک

اس سلسلے میں سب سے اوّل تاریخ اُردو پر اجمالی نظر مناسب ہوگی۔ بیشک عموماً اردو زبان کا گہوارہ شاہ جہانی عہد قرار دیا گیا ہے۔ ملاحظہ طلب مثلاً آثار الصنادید۔ تذکرہ آبِ حیات۔ دریائے لطافت، جب یہ کتابیں لکھی گئیں تحقیقات کی حد یہی تھی۔ اب کہ مختلف کوششوں نے مزید راستہ صاف کیا تو دَورِ شاہجہانی سے بہت دُور سرحد نظر آنے لگی۔ چنانچہ موٴلف تذکرہ گُلِ رعنا نے تحقیق کا قدم آگے بڑھایا۔ یہ تو کھُلی ہوئی بات ہے کہ اُردو زبان ہندوستان کی دیسی بولیوں اور بیرونی زبان کی آمیزش سے بنی ہے۔ یہ بھی ظاہر ہے کہ جب اور جہاں اوّل یہ میل جول ہوا وہیں اور جب ہی اُردو زبان کی بنیاد پڑی۔ یہ دیکھنے سے قبل کہ بنیاد کا آغاز کب ہوا اور کہاں ہوا یہ دیکھ لینا مناسب ہوگا کہ کیوں کر ہوا تاکہ سبب اور مُسبّب کی کڑیاں باہم مل جائیں +

حضرات! عالم میں جو عظیم الشان تغیرات قدرت کے ہاتھوں وقتاً فوقتاً ہوتے رہتے ہیں وہ پیش خیمہ ہوتے ہیں بڑے بڑے انقلابوں کا۔ ملکوں اور قوموں کی نئی نئی زندگیوں کا۔ قسم قسم کی جدید حالتوں کا۔

برسات سے پہلے جو ہوائی طوفان مان سون کے نام سے سمندر میں برپا ہوتا ہے، وہ کیسی تازہ عظیم الشان زندگی دنیا کو بخشتا ہے۔ چٹیل میدان ہرے بھرے کھیت بنجاتے ہیں۔ دریا موجیں مارتے ہیں۔ گویا زحمت راحت کی تازگی سے بدل جاتی ہے۔ علیٰ ہذا القیاس

اسی طرح جو تاریخی تغیرات کرۂ زمین کے مختلف حصّوں میں وقتاً فوقتاً ہوتے رہے ہیں وہ انسانی زندگی میں بڑے بڑے انقلابوں کا باعث بنے ہیں۔ حکومتوں کا نقشہ بدلا ہے۔ تہذیب و تمدّن کو آگے بڑھایا ہے۔ علوم و فنون کو ترقی بخشی ہے۔ اسی سلسلے میں زبانیں بھی متاثر ہوئی ہیں۔ کبھی پیدا

بعض رسالے پڑھے الفاظ کے جوڑ بند جس طرح اس فن میں جدا کئے جاتے ہیں اُس کو دیکھ کر نگاہ میں یہ سماں پھر گیا کہ باغ میں ایک تازہ پھول دل فریب ہو۔ ہُوا اور فضا دونوں اُس کے دم سے فیض یاب ہوں۔ نباتات کے ایک عالم تشریف فرما ہوں۔ پھول کو نگاہ غور سے دیکھیں، چُنیں، پنکھڑیاں الگ الگ کریں۔ ہر پنکھڑی کو چیر کر اُس کی رگیں شمار کریں۔ خلاصۂ تحقیقات کا حق ادا فرمائیں۔ فن کو ترقی بخشیں۔ یہ جو کچھ ہوا بجا ہوا مگر پھول کی رعنائی پر تو چُھری چل گئی۔ بعینہٖ یہی عالم لِسانیات کے مباحث میں نظر آیا۔ جن الفاظ کی رعنائی غالبؔ و آتشؔ کے یہاں "کفِ گل فروش" پر خندہ زن تھی اُن کو لسانیات کی قینچی کے نیچے اُسی طرح پارہ پارہ پایا جس طرح پھول عالمِ نباتیات کی چٹکی میں تھا۔ حاشا اس بیان سے کسی فن کی شان میں گستاخی منظور نہیں۔ کہنا یہ ہے کہ اپنا اپنا ذوق ہے اپنا اپنا مقصود۔ عطّار کو گلاب کھینچ کر خوشی ہوئی کہ مریضوں کی خدمت کا سامان ہوا۔ مگر ایک جان سوختہ چلّا اُٹھا سہ

گلوں کی کھینچ کے عطّار نے خراب کی بُو
کہاں وہ اُن کا پسینہ کہاں گُلاب کی بُو

یہیں سے ہے کہ میں نے لِسانیات پر ادبیات کو ترجیح دی۔

شرفائے ادیب! ادبیات کے سلسلے میں میرا مقصد یہ نہ ہوگا کہ اُردو ادب کا تفصیلی جائزہ لوں۔ اصناف ادب کی ترقی یا تنزل پر گفتگو کروں۔ اُنکے نمونے دکھاؤں۔ فرق مراتب ظاہر کروں۔ اس کے لئے طویل بحث درکار ہے اور وسیع وقت۔ اور سچ یہ ہے کہ یہ بحث بہت کچھ ہو بھی چکی ہے۔ بس یہ چاہتا ہوں کہ اُن بعض مباحث پر روشنی ڈالوں جو حال میں ظہور پذیر ہوئی ہیں۔ اور جنھوں نے ہماری زبان کی رفتارِ ترقی پر گہرا اثر ڈالا ہے۔

خطبۂ صدارت

شعبۂ اُردو

آل انڈیا اورینٹل کانفرنس (لاہور)

اجلاس پنجم ۱۹۲۸ء

صدر یار جنگ محمد حبیب الرحمن خان شروانی

ادب نواز شرفا! ذرہ نوازی کا شکر کس زبان سے ادا کروں۔ ایک خاکسار کو بزم ادب میں یاد فرمایا صدر میں جگہ بخشی۔ حسنِ اتفاق ملاحظہ ہو۔ اُردو کے دو قدیم گہوارے، لاہور اور دکن۔ ناچیز کے انتخاب نے پُرانے تعلقات تازہ کئے حیدرآباد آج بھی ترقیٔ اُردو کا مرجع ہے۔ جامعہ عثمانیہ نے اُس کی عظمت کا سکّہ بٹھا دیا۔ پاؤش بخیر انجمن ترقی اُردو بھی وہیں پھلی پھولی۔ اور یہ سب کچھ شہریارِ دکن خلد اللہ ملکہ کے زیر سایہ ہو رہا ہے۔ لاہور نے بھی زمانۂ حال میں اُردو کی خدمت میں نمایاں حصّہ لیا ہے۔ رسالہ مخزن نے جدید تعلیم یافتہ دماغوں کو ملکی ادب کی جانب مائل کیا۔ اقبال کا پرچم اقبال اُن میدانوں میں لہرایا جو قدیم ادیبوں کی دست رس سے باہر تھے۔

حضرات! جس مراسلے نے صدر نشینی کا مژدہ مجھ کو سُنایا اس میں یہ مشورہ بھی تھا کہ مجھ کو اختیار ہوگا کہ خطبۂ صدارت میں خواہ لسانیات سے بحث کروں یا ادبیات سے۔ واقعہ تو یہ ہے کہ لسانیات کے فن میں خاکسار محض کورا ہے۔ حال میں

INDEX.

INDEX

I

K.

O

P

Statement of Accounts of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, Lahore.

Receipts and Payments from 28th March 1928 to December 1930.

RECEIPTS.

	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Donations from members of the Reception Committee	5,155 0 0	
Ordinary Membership-fee	896 8 0	
Delegate-fee	45 0 0	
		6,096 8 0
Grant by :—		
Punjab Government	1,000 0 0	
Panja niversity	2,500 0 0	
Malerkotla State	500 0 0	
Kapurthala State	1,000 0 0	
Rewah State	200 0 0	
Bahawalpur State	500 0 0	
Patiala State	1,000 0 0	
Mysore State	500 0 0	
Kashmir State	1,000 0 0	
Bikaner State	500 0 0	
Jodhpur State	500 0 0	
		9,200 0 0
Interest received	410 4 0	
For Taxila Trip	834 14 0	
Drama (Gate money)	12 0 0	
Exhibition (Gate money)	37 4 0	
Miscellaneous	11 12 0	
		1306 2
Total	—	16,602 10 0

PAYMENTS.

	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Establishment	1,397 1 0	
Printing and Stationery	8,565 13 6	
Postage	323 14 6	
Travelling	1,011 15 0	
Tonga hire, etc.	130 6 6	
Hire of Furniture	248 1 0	
Entertainment	1,278 6 0	
Ligh	24 0 0	
		12,979 9 6
Drama expense	806 6 6	
Exhibition	976 9 3	
Mushaira	431 9 0	
Taxila Trip	818 4 0	
Badges	215 9 0	
		3,248 5 9
Exchange	7 14 0	
Auditors fee	50 0 0	
Miscellaneous	242 14 0	
		300 12 0
Balance in hand with the Central Bank of India, Lahore, in current account	—	73 14 9
Total	—	16,602 10 0

LAHORE:

6th December, 1930.

ISHWAR DAS,
Hony. Treasurer,
5th Indian Oriental Conference.

The following sums of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference remain with Mr. A. C. Woolner, Hon. Treasurer, Indian Oriental Conference.

INCOME.	Rs.	A.	P.	EXPENDITURE.	Rs.	A.	P.
1. 15th December 1928. Balance received from the Honorary General Secretary, R. B. Dr. K. S. Aiyangar	2,540	12	6	27th May 1930.—Paid to the Honorary General Secretary	115	13	0
2. 20th February 1930. Cheque received from the Honorary General Secretary	1,500	0	0	Balance	3,924	15	6
Total ...	4,040	12	6	Total ...	4,040	12	6

Statement of Account of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference (submitted by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute) upto the end of 31st March 1929.

RECEIPTS.	Rs.	A.	P.	EXPENDITURE.	Rs.	A.	P.
1. Subscriptions from members as per list attached	70	0	0	1. Expenditure in connection with railway and freight charges for bringing the Conference volumes	32	13	0
2. Face-value of the reports of the Conference, Vols. II, III, and IV that were sold at the Institute upto 31st March 1929	447	0	0	2. 1/3 of face-value given as depot percentage to the Institute as per details below ... (i) Discount to purchasers 51-10-0 (ii) Balance to the Institute proper 97-6-0	149	0	0
3. Interest upto 31st March 1929	1	14	4	Total ...	181	13	0
Total ...	518	14	4	Balance on 1st April 1929	337	1	4
					518	14	4

Supplement.

THE VIMALARATNALEKHA

or

AN EPISTLE TO KING NAYAPĀLA OF MAGADHA

from

DĪPAṄKARA ŚRĪJÑĀNA

with

SANSKRIT RECONSTRUCTION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

By

ANATHNATH BASU
Visvabharati, Santiniketan.

INTRODUCTORY.

Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna will ever be remembered in the annals of India as one of the greatest torchbearers of Indian culture to other lands. His name stands foremost among all those honoured names of Buddhist monks and preachers who carried the banners of Buddhism across the boundaries of India to distant lands beyond seas and mountains, suffering innumerable hardships and facing grim death in their noble adventures. Dīpaṅkara may be said to be the father of Tibetan Buddhism though Śāntirakṣita had first preached the doctrine there, three centuries before him. For it was really he who first organised Buddhism in Tibet, which had degenerated through the influence of the native Bon religion after Śāntirakṣita and Padmasambhava had done the spade work. The influence exercised by Dīpaṅkara on Tibetan thought and culture cannot be over-estimated;

they named him Jo-bo-rje (the Supreme Lord, Skt. Prabhu, Swvāmin) and Atīśa (the Great Lord). Under his guidance the Lamas of Tibet discovered what is called the "real and sure path of the exalted excellence." And it was the great Dīpaṅkara's disciple, Brompton, who under his guidance became the founder of the first grand hierarchy of Tibet. Even to-day he is remembered with deep veneration all over higher Asia or wherever Tibetan Buddhism prevails.

Dīpaṅkara was the greatest Buddhist scholar of his age and his profound knowledge of Buddhism, both Hīnāyāna and Mahāyāna, as well as of the Hindu Schools of philosophy, were recognised by the Buddhists of the land and King Nayapāla of Magadha, in recognition of his vast erudition and wisdom, made him the high priest of the great University of Vikramaśilā. Nayapāla (circa 1025 A.D.) had succeeded Mahīpāla, the well-known Pāla ruler of Magadha and founded a monastery in Vikramaśilā after Nālanda. He wanted to make it another great centre of Buddhist culture after its prototype at Nālanda; and he invited the renowned scholars of the time to join it. Dīpaṅkara was the greatest of them. The Vikramaśilā Mahāvihāra under such distinguished professors soon became renowned as a great seat of Buddhist learning and attracted students from different parts of the Buddhist world.

It was at the earnest and importunate requests of the King of Tibet that Dīpaṅkara at the advanced age of sixty gave up the charge of the Mahāvihāra and proceeded to Tibet with the blessings of the Goddess Tārā, in the year 1040 A.D. For thirteen long years he incessantly propagated the faith and established it in the hard soil of Tibet. In 1053 A.D., he breathed his last in the Nethan monastery of Tibet, far away from his native home amidst foreigners whom he had made his own by his wisdom and character. In his "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow" the late Sarat Chandra Das has narrated the story of his life gathered from Tibetan sources.

Dīpaṅkara was a profound scholar of Tibetan, and he wrote and translated numerous philosophical treatises in Tibetan. The Bstan-Ḥgyur (Tanjur) alone contains the names of about two hundred works, both original and translations, ascribed to him.

But no work of Dīpaṅkara has yet been found outside Tibet and the Sanskrit originals of these are possibly lost for ever. The Tibetans were, however, very faithful translators, and with the help of these translations we can almost reconstruct these lost works. As yet none of them have been reconstructed and this is the first attempt of the kind.

In this paper I have tried to reconstruct the lost Sanskrit original of one of his works in Sanskrit prose, though I feel a verse-reconstruction would have been far better. I have also added an English translation of the same at the end.

In this letter which he wrote to King Nayapāla, (Tib. ཉི་རྡུ་པ་ལ་)[1] Dīpaṅkara enumerates the duties of a Buddhist. It is a collection of moral maxims for the guidance of devout Buddhists and speaks of the excellences of moral observances. The underlying philosophy is the Mādhayamika theory of *śūnyatā.*

The name of the Sanskrit work has been preserved in Tibetan as it was the custom of the translators to give the transliteration of the Sanskrit title of work first and then to translate it into Tibetan.

The title of the present work is "Epistle which speaks of the pure gem."

The Tibetan translation occurs twice in the Bstan-Ḥgyur,

[1] I have taken ཉི་རུ་པ་ལ as a mistaken Tibetan transliteration of the name Nayapāla, though the mistake seems to be repeated in the translation. It is a well-known historical fact that King Nayapāla of Magadh was the patron of Dīpaṅkara and it is quite usual that Dīpaṅkara wrote this epistle to his royal patron. S. C. Das has also accepted Nayapāla as a contemporary of Dīpaṅkara (op. cit.). Cordier has also accepted this identification of Nayapāla with ཉི་རུ་པ་ལ (cf. P. Cordier, *Catalogue du Fonds tibetain*, Troisième Partie, pp. 360, 429).

once in the section ངེ་ (Ṅe) and then again in གི (Gi) in the མདོ (Mdo) portion of the collection (see Cordier: *Catalogue du Fonds tibetain,* Troisième Partie, pp 360 and 490). But these two versions differ only very slightly.

The original Sanskrit letter contained forty *ślokas* as is mentioned in the colophon; in Tibetan it appears in verses of 4 × 7 syllables, though twice we have 5 lines each containing 7 syllables for one *śloka* (viz. Nos. 21 and 29). The last verse is translated in 4 lines of 11 syllables and the one preceding that in 4 lines of 9 syllables. (One xylograph. x^2, gives a variant reading of this verse which has 11 syllables in each line).

From the colophon of the work and the Tibetan index at the end of the Bstan-Ḥgyur we can gather that it was written by Sthaviramahāpaṇḍita Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna to king Niryaphala (i.e. Nayapāla) and that Dīpaṅkara himself translated the work with the help of a Tibetan Lo-tsa-ba Bhikṣu Jayaśīla (ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་རྒྱལ་བ).

The Tibetan version of a letter like this named བཤེས་པའི་སྤྲིན་ཡིག (' Friendly Epistle ') was translated into English and published in the Journal of the Pali Text Society (1886) by Dr. Wenzel. This letter was written by Nāgārjuna to King Udayana and is of the same nature.

In preparing this edition of the text I have used two xylographs (Bstan-Ḥgyur, Mdo, Ṅe(x^1) and Gi(x^3)) of the Narthang Edition, belonging to the Visvąbharati Library.

॥ དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་ཕྲིན་ཡིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ ॥

॥ विमलरत्नलेखः ॥

རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ།

བི་མ་ལ་ར་ད་ན་ལེ་ཁ་ན་མ།

བོད་སྐད་དུ།

དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་ཕྲིན་ཡིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ།



भारतभाषायाम्

विमलरत्नलेखो नाम ।

भोटभाषायाम्

द्रि म मेद् प रिन पो छेऽइ फ्रिन चेस व्य व ।

བླ་མ་[1]ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

རྗེ་བཙུན་[2]མ་སྒྲོལ་མ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

गुरवे नमः ।

तारादेव्यै नमः ॥

---

1 X^2 adds རྣམས་ལ *i.e.* the plural form.

2 X^1 reads བརྫུན and X^2 བཙྫུན only for the correct reading བཙུན.

1.

a མ་ཧཱ་ག་ཏིར་[1] སྐུ་བལྟས་[2] ནས།

b སངས་རྒྱས་བསྟན་པ་འཕེལ་མཛད་ཅིང་།

c རྒྱལ་སྲིད་ཆོས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱོང་མཛད་པ།

d ཉིར་ཡ་པ་ལ་[3] རྒྱལ་གྱུར་ཅིག །།

a महागति(?)कायं दृष्ट्वा

b बर्द्धयन् बुद्धशासनम् ।

c धर्म्मेण पालयन् राज्यं

d नयपालो नृपोऽभवत् ॥ १ ॥

2.

a ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་སྔོན་ཆད་སྦྱིན་པ་དང་།

b དགེ་བ་བཅུ་དང་གསོ་སྦྱོང་[4] དང་།

c བཟོད་དང་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་ལ་གོམས་པས།

d ལྷ་ ཁྱོད་ད་ལྟ་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས། །།

a त्वया पूर्व्वं दानं

b दश कुशलानि पोषधः ।

c क्षान्तिवीर्य्यञ्चाभ्यस्तमिति

d देव त्वमधुना सम्पन्नः ॥ २ ॥

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[1] The first word in the two xylographs is indistinct, but possibly read མཧཱ་ཀཱ་ཏི.

[2] X[2] reads བཏམས which is not clear.

[3] In the Sanskrit reconstruction here as well as in the colophon I have used नयपाल instead of the Tibetan transliteration of the same. The reasons for this have been mentioned in the introduction.

[4] X[2] reads སྦྱོར which is not correct and gives no sense.

3.

a བླ་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་ལུང་དང་།
b མདོ་སོགས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་འབྲང་འདི།
c གུས་པས་སྤྱི་བོས་བླང་མཛོད་དང་།
d བདག་གཞན་གཉིས་ལ་ཕན་པར་འགྱུར།།

a गुरूणामाज्ञां
b धर्म्मानुगतं सूत्रादिकञ्चेदम् ।
c भक्त्या शिरसा गृहाण
d आत्मपरयोर्हितं भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥

4.

a ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཐམས་ཅད་རྣམ་སྤངས་[1]ཤིང་།
b སྒྲུབ་ལ་ནན་ཏན་ཆེ་བར་མཛོད།
c གཉིད་རྨུགས་ལེ་ལོ་རྣམ་སྤངས་ཤིང་།
d རྟག་ཏུ་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་འབད་[2]པར་བྱ[3]།།

a विवर्जयन् सर्व्वसंशयं
b सिद्धये कुरु महायत्नम् ।
c निद्रालुत्वं तन्द्राञ्च विवर्जयन्
d नित्यमुद्यमं कुर्या वीर्याय ॥ ४ ॥

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1 X[1] reads སྤྲང་ which is not correct.

2 X[1] gives འབར but this is not better.

3 These two lines *i.e.* c.d. are quoted in S. C. Das's Dict. p. 492 from *Hbrom* 13.

5.

a དྲན་དང་ཤེས་བཞིན་བག་ཡོད་པས།

b དབང་པོ་འི་སྒོ་རྣམས་རྟག་ཏུ་བསྲུང་།

c ཉིན་མཚན་དུས་སུ་[1]ཡང་དང་ཡང་།

d སེམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བརྟག་པར་བྱ།།

a **स्मृतिज्ञानाप्रमादेन**

b **सदेन्द्रियद्वाराणि रक्षेत् ।**

c **अहोरात्रं पुनःपुन-**

d **श्चित्तसन्तानं परीक्षेत ॥ ५ ॥**

6.

a རང་སྐྱོན་རྟོགས་[2]ལ་མིག་བཞིན་བྱ།

b གཞན་སྐྱོན་རྟོགས་[3]ལ་ལོང་བ་བཞིན།

c དྲན་དང་ང་རྒྱལ་མེད་པ་དང་།

d སྟོང་ཉིད་རྟག་ཏུ་བསྒོམ་པར་བྱ།།

a **स्वदोषज्ञानं चक्षुरिव कुर्यात्**

b **परदोषज्ञानं त्वन्धवत् ।**

c **स्मृतिमनहङ्कारं**

d **शून्यताञ्च सदा भावयेत् ॥ ६ ॥**

---

1 X^2 has གསུམ which would mean 'three' giving here no sense.

2.3 X^1 and X^2 both read རྟག.

7.

a བདག་གི་[1]ཉེས་པ་བསྒྲག་བྱ་ཞིང་།
b གཞན་གྱི་འཁྲུལ་པ་བཙལ་མི་བྱ།
c གཞན་གྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་བསྒྲག་པར་བྱ།
d བདག་གི་ཡོན་ཏན་སྦ་བར་བྱ།།

a कुर्यात् स्वदोषकीर्त्तनं
b नापरस्य भ्रान्तिमनुसन्दध्यात् ।
c कीर्त्तयेदपरस्य गुणं
d आत्मगुणन्तु गोपयेत् ॥ ७ ॥

8.

a རྙེད་དང་བཀུར་སྟི་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།
b ཁོང་[2]གྲགས་རྟག་ཏུ་སྤང་བར་བྱ།
c བྱམས་དང་སྙིང་རྗེ་བསྒོམས་བྱ་ཞིང་།
d བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་ནི་བརྟན་པར་མཛོད།།

a त्यजेल्लाभं सत्कारञ्च
b नित्यमात्मख्यातिं त्यजेत् ।
c मैत्रीं करुणाञ्च भावयेद्
d बोधिचित्तं स्थिरं कुरु ॥ ८ ॥

9.

a མི་དགེ་བཅུ་ནི་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།
b རྟག་ཏུ་དད་པ་བརྟན་པར་བྱ།

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1 X[1] has གེས.

2 X[1] has ཁེ but this would give no meaning.

c འདོད་པ་ཆུང་ཞིང་ཆོག་ཤེས་དང་།

d བྱས་ལ་[1]དྲིན་དུ་གཟོ་བར་བྱ།།

a दशाकुशलानि हेयानि

b सदा श्रद्धा दृढीकार्या ।

c मनागपि प्रियं सन्तोषः

d कृतानुकम्पा च स्मर्त्तव्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

10.

a ཁྲོ་དང་ང་རྒྱལ་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

b དམན་པའི་སེམས་དང་ལྡན་པར་བྱ[2]།

c ལོག་པའི་འཚོ་བ་རྣམ་སྤང་ཞིང་།

d ཆོས་ཀྱི་འཚོ་བས་འཚོ་བར་བྱ།།

a क्रोधो गर्वश्च प्रहातव्यं

b कार्या च हीनचित्तता ।

c मिथ्याजीविका विवर्जनीया

d धर्मजीविका जीवितव्या ॥ १० ॥

11.

a ཟང་ཟིང་ཐམས་ཅད་རྣམ་སྤང་ཞིང་།

b འཕགས་པའི་ནོར་གྱིས་ཕྱུག་པར་བྱ།

c རྟག་ཏུ་འདུ་འཛི་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

d དགོན་པ་ལ་ནི་གནས་པར་བྱ།།

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[1] X[1] has པ.

[2] X[1] has གནས.

a सर्वमामिषं विवर्जयेद्

b आर्यधनेन (आत्मानं) सम्पन्नं कुर्य्यात् ।

c सदा समाजं त्यजेद्

d अरण्ये निवसेत् ॥ १ १ ॥

12.

a འཁྲུལ་བའི་ཚིག་རྣམས་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

b རྟག་དུ་དག་ཉི་བསྡམས་པར་བྱ།

c བླ་མ་མཁན་པོ་མཐོང་བའི་ཚེ།

d གུས་པས་རིམ་གྲོ་བསྙེད་པར་བྱ།།

a त्यजेद् वाचमसम्बद्धां

b नित्यं स्यात् शुद्धसंयतः ।

c गुरूपाध्यायदर्शने

d श्रद्धया परिचर्यां कुर्यात् ॥ १ २ ॥

13.

a ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་སྐྱེས་བུ་དང་།

b གང་ཟག་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མིག་[1]ཅན་དང་།

c ལས་དང་པོ་ཡི་སེམས་ཅན་ལ།

d སྟོན་པའི་འདུ་ཤེས་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱ།།

a विशिष्टे पुरुषे

b धर्मचक्षुषि पुद्गले ।

c आदिकर्म्मिकसत्त्वेषु च

d शास्तृसंज्ञामुत्पादयेत् ॥ १ ३ ॥

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1 X^1 has མིང་ but the above reading of X^2 only gives a clear meaning.

14.

a སྡུག་བསྔལ་དག་གིས་གདུངས་པ་དང་།

b སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐོང་བའི་ཚེ།

c བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་ནི་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྟེ།

d ཕ་མ་བུ་ཚའི་འདུ་ཤེས་བསྐྱེད།།

a **दुःखतप्तानां**

b **सर्व्वेषां सत्त्वानाञ्च दर्शने ।**

c **बोधिचित्तमुत्पाद्य**

d **मातृपितापुत्रसंज्ञाञ्चोत्पादयेत् ॥ १४ ॥**

15.

a འཇིག་རྟེན་བྱ་བ་ཀུན་སྤངས་ཏེ།

b རྟག་ཏུ་ཏིང་[1]འཛིན་བསྒོམ་པར་མཛོད།

c སྡིག་པའི་གྲོགས་པོ་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

d དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་མཛོད།།

a **सर्वं लोककृत्यं त्यक्त्वा**

b **नित्यं समाधिभावनां कुरु ।**

c **त्यज पापमित्रं**

d **कल्याणमित्रमाश्रय ॥ १५ ॥**

16.

a ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་འཆལ་བའི་དགེ་སློང་དང་།

b ཆོས་ཀྱི་[2]ཕོངས་པ་གཞན་དག་དང་།

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[1] X[1] reads ཏེ which has no sense.

[2] X[2] has གྱིས.

c སྡིག་པ་སྤྱོད་པ་མཐོང་བའི་ཚེ།
d དེ་དག་ཡལ་བར་དོར་མི་བྱ།།

a **दुःशीलभिक्षूणाम्**
b **अन्येषां धर्म्महीनानाम् ।**
c **पापाचाराणाञ्च दर्शने**
d **तेषां निग्रहान्न विरमेत् ॥ १६ ॥**

17.

a མི་དགེའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་།
b སྡིག་པའི་གྲོགས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་།
c དཀོན་མཆོག་གསུམ་དང་བླ་མ་དང་།
d མཁན་པོ་སློབ་དཔོན་མི་གུས་དང་།།

18.

a བྱས་ལ་དྲིན་དུ་མི་གཟོ་དང་།
b ཚེ་འདི་འབའ་ཞིག་དྲན་པ་དང་།
c གཞན་ཡང་དད་པ་ཆུང་བ་དང་།
d ཞག་གསུམ་འདས་པར་གནས་མི་བྱ།།

a **सर्व्वैरकल्याणमित्रैः**
b **सर्व्वैः पापसहायैः ।**
c **रत्नत्रये गुरा-**
d **वुपाध्याय आचार्ये च श्रद्धाहीनैः ॥ १७ ॥**

a अकृतज्ञै-

b रैहिकबुद्धिभिः ।

c परत्राल्पश्रद्धैश्च

d दिनत्रयातिक्रमेण न वसेत् ॥ १८ ॥

19.

a སྣང་དང་མི་བདེའི་ས་སྤང་ཞིང་།

b གང་དུ་བདེ་བར་འགྲོ་བར་བྱ།

c གང་ལ་ཆགས་པ་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

d ཆགས་པ་མེད་པར་གནས་པར་བྱ།།

a दृष्ट्वामशुभां भूमिं परित्यज्य

b यत्र शुभं गन्तव्यम् ।

c यत्र रागस्तत् परित्याज्यम्

d अनासक्तं वसेत् ॥ १९ ॥

20.

a ཆགས་པས་བདེ་འགྲོ་མི་ཐོབ་ཅིང་།

b ཐར་པའི་སྲོག་ཀྱང་གཅོད་པར་བྱེད[1]།

c གང་དུ་དགེ་བའི་བཤེས་གནས་པ།

d དེར་ནི་རྟག་ཏུ་གནས་པར་བྱ།།

a रागो हि सुगतिमप्रापयन्

b मोक्षजीवनं छिनत्ति ।

c यत्र कल्याणमित्रं वसति

d तत्र नित्यं वसेत् ॥ २० ॥

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1 X[1] reads བྱ, which is incorrect.

21.

a བླ་མ་རྟག་ཏུ་བརྟེན་པ་དང་།

b རྟག་ཏུ་མདོ་སྡེ་བལྟ་བར་བྱ།

c ཐོག་མར་བརྩམས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ།

d དང་པོར་དེ་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཞིང་།

e གཞན་དུ་གཉིས་ཀ་[1]འགྲུབ་མི་འགྱུར།།[2]

a गुरुं सदाश्रित्य

b नित्यं सूत्रनिकायमवलोकयेत् ।

c आदौ यदारब्धं

d प्रथमं तदेव साधयितव्यम् ।

अन्यथा नोभयं सिध्यति ॥ २१ ॥

22.

a གཞན་དུ་སྡིག་པ་བཤགས་པ་དང་།

b བསོད་ནམས་མཆོག་ལ་འབད་པར་བྱ།

c འཇིག་རྟེན་སྤྱོད་དང་མཐུན་[3]པ་དང་།

d རྟག་ཏུ་ཕ་རོལ་སེམས་བསྲུང་མཛོད།།

a अन्येषु पापदेशनायां

b परमपुण्ये च यतेत ।

c वृत्तानुकूलं लोकं

d सदा परलोकचित्तञ्च रक्षेत् ॥ २२ ॥

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1 X[1] has གཉི་ག which means the same thing.

2 This is the first verse which contains five lines, the other one being No. 29

3 X[2] reads འཐུན which means the same thing.

23.

a གང་ཚེ་མཐོ་བའི་སེམས་སྐྱེས་ཚེ།

b དེ་ཚེ་ང་རྒྱལ་བཅག་བྱ་ཞིང་།

c གང་དུ་བག་ཡོད་བྲལ་བའི་ཚེ།

d བླ་མའི་གདམས་[1]ངག་དྲན་པར་བྱ།།

a **यदा चित्तमुन्नतं जायते**

b **तदा गर्वं छिन्द्यात् ।**

c **अप्रमादविरहे**

d **गुरूपदेशः स्मर्त्तव्यः ॥ २३ ॥**

24.

a ཞུམ་པའི་སེམས་ནི་བྱུང་བའི་ཚེ།

b སེམས་ཀྱི་གཟེངས་ཀྱང་བསྟོད་པར་བྱ།

c ཤེས་རབ་པ་རོལ་ཕྱིན་དྲན་ཏེ།

d སྤྲོས་པ་མ་ལུས་ཞི་བར་མཛོད།།

a **लीनचित्ते जाते**

b **चित्तोन्नतिमपि प्रशंसेत् ।**

c **स्मृत्वा प्र[illegible]तां**

d **निखिलप्रपञ्चोपशमं कुर्यात् ॥ २४ ॥**

25.

a གང་དུ་ཆགས་སྡང་ཡུལ་བྱུང་ཚེ།

b སྒྱུ་མ་སྤྲུལ་པ་བཞིན་དུ་བལྟ།

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[1] X[2] has གདམ only which is incorrect.

c མི་སྙན་ཚིག་རྣམས་ཐོས་པའི་ཚེ།

d བྲག་ཆ་[1]ལྟ་བུར་མཁྱེན་པར་མཛོད།།

a यदा रागद्वेषविषयो जायते

b मायाप्रपञ्चवत् पश्येत् ।

c निन्दावाक्यश्रवणे

d प्रतिश्रुत्कावज्जानीयात् ॥ २५ ॥

26.

a ལུས་ལ་གནོད་པ་བྱུང་བའི་ཚེ།

b སྔོན་གྱི་ལས་སུ་བལྟ་བར་བྱ།

c བས་མཐའ་དགོན་པར་རབ་གནས་ཤིང་།

d རི་དྭགས་ཤི་བའི་རོ་བཞིན་དུ།།

27.

a གང་དུ་ལུས་ཀྱང་མི་ཤེས་པར།

b བདག་གིས་བདག་ཉིད་སྦྲ་བར་བྱ།

c རྟག་ཏུ་ཡི་དམ་བརྟེན་པར་བྱ།

d འདོད་དང་གནོད་སེམས་གཉིད་དང་རྨུགས།།

28.

a ལེ་ལོ་སྙོམས་ལས་སེམས་བྱུང་ཚེ།

b དེ་ཚེ་བདག་ལ་དྲན་བགྲང་ཞིང་།

c བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་སྙིང་པོ་དྲན་བྱ་དང་།

d མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འཆི་བ་བསམ།།

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[1] X[1] has ཚ which gives no meaning.

a कायपीडोद्भवे
b पूर्वकर्मावलोकयेत् ।
c प्रान्तारण्ये प्रवसन्
d मृगशाववत् ॥ २६ ॥

a यत्र केनापि न ज्ञायते
b [तत्र] आत्मनात्मानं गोपयेत् ।
c स्वेष्टदेवतामाश्रयेत्
d कामे व्यापादे मिद्धे स्त्याने ॥ २७ ॥

a आलस्ये तन्द्रायाञ्च यदा चित्तमुत्पद्यते
b तदा स्वपापं गणयेत् ।
c व्रतं हृदि स्मरेद्
d अनित्यतां मृत्युञ्च भावयेत् ॥ २८ ॥

29.

a གཞན་གྱི་མདུན་དུ་གནས་པའི་ཚེ།
b ཞི་ངས་[1]གསོང་པོར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱ།
c ཁྲོ་གཉེར་ངོ་འཛུམ་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།
d རྟག་ཏུ་འཛུམ་ཞིང་གནས་པར་བྱ།
e རྟག་ཏུ་གཞན་ལ་དགའ་བྱ་ཞིང་།།

a अन्यस्य पुरतोऽवस्थानकाले
b शान्तमृजु च भाषेत ।
c भ्रूकुटिमुखेन हास्यं प्रहातव्यं ।
d सदा स्मितेन स्थातव्यं
e नित्यमन्येषु प्रीतिश्च कार्या ॥ २९ ॥

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[1] The two xylographs read ཞེ་དེས which has no meaning.

30.

a སེར་སྣ་མེད་ཅིང་གཏོང་ལ་དགའ།

b རྟག་ཏུ་ཕྲག་དོག་སྤང་བར་བྱ།

c གཞན་གྱི་སེམས་ནི་བསྲུང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

d རྩོད་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤང་བར་བྱ།།

a अमात्सर्य्येण त्यागे प्रीतिं कुर्यात् ।

b नित्यमीर्ष्या प्रहातव्या ।

c अन्यस्य चित्तं रक्षेत् ।

d सर्व्वे वादाः प्रहातव्याः ॥ ३० ॥

31.

a ངོ་དགའ་མེད་ཅིང་གསར་འགྲོགས་མེད།

b རྟག་ཏུ་གཟུངས་[1]ནི་ཐུབ་པར་བྱ།

c རྟག་ཏུ་བཟོད་དང་ལྡན་པ་དང་།

d འདོད་པ་ཆུང་ཞིང་ཆོག་ཤེས་མཛོད།།

a परिचयेन विना नूतनेन सङ्गं न कुर्यात् ।

b सदा मन्त्रे समर्थः स्यात् ।

c सदा क्षान्तिमान्

d अल्पकामश्च सन् सन्तोषं कुर्यात् ॥ ३१ ॥

32.

a གཏོལ་པ་ཟུན་གྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་སོ།

b ངོ་ཚ་ཤེས་དང་ཁྲེལ་[2]ཡོད་དང་།

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1 X[1] reads བཟུངས which is not correct.

2 X[1] reads འཁྲེལ which is not correct.

c ཕ་རོལ་མགུ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན།

d དང་གི་སྡོམ་པ་བསྡམས་[1]པར་མཛོད།།

a चण्डालदाससंज्ञः स्यात्

b लज्जाज्ञानेऽपत्रपायां ।

c तस्यां परलोकाराधनायाञ्च यतेत ।

d आत्मसंयमं कुर्यात् ॥ ३२ ॥

33.

a གཞན་ལ་[2]བརྙས་པ་སྤང་བྱ་ཞིང་།

b གུས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་གནས་པར་བྱ།

c གཞན་ལ་གདམས་ངག་བྱེད་པའི་ཚེ།

d སྙིང་རྗེ་ཕན་སེམས་ལྡན་པར་མཛོད།།

a परावज्ञा प्रहातव्या

b श्रद्धाशीलेन तिष्ठेत् ।

c परोपदेशकरणे

d कारुण्योपकारचित्तः (तत्) कुर्यात् ॥ ३३ ॥

34.

a སངས་རྒྱས་ཆོས་ལ་གུས་པ་དང་།

b དམ་ཆོས་ནམ་ཡང་སྤང་མི་བྱ།

c རྟག་ཏུ་དཀོན་མཆོག་གུས་པ་དང་།

d འཁོར་གསུམ་ཡོངས་སུ་དག་པར་མཛོད།།

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1 X² has བསྡམ .   2 X² reads ཡ which is incorrect.

a बुद्धधर्म्मे श्रद्धां
b सद्धर्म्मंश्च न जातु त्यजेत् ।
c नित्यं रत्नत्रये श्रद्धां
d संसारत्रयं च परिशुद्धं कुर्यात् ॥ २४ ॥

35.

a སྔོན་དུ་སྙིང་རྗེ་སོང་བ་ཡིས།
b ཉིན་དང་མཚན་མོ་ལན་གསུམ་དུ།
c མཆོད་པ་བདུན་དུ་རབ་གྲགས་པའི།
d ཕུང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་གདོན་པར་མཛོད།།

a पूर्वं करुणागतो
b ऽहोरात्रं त्रिकालः ।
c प्रसिद्धस्याराधनासप्तकस्य
d स्कन्धत्रयं ग्टह्णीयात् ॥ २५ ॥

36.

a འགྲོ་བའི་སྡུག་བསྔལ་བསལ་འདོད་པས།
b སྨོན་ལམ་རྒྱ་ཆེན་གདབ་པ་དང་།
c སེམས་ཅན་སྨིན་དང་བྱང་ཆུབ་འདོད།
d ཐམས་ཅད་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཆེན་པོར་བསྔོ།།

a जगद्दुःखनिराकरणकाम
b उदारप्रणिधानं स्थापयेत् ।
c सत्त्वपरिपाकं बोधिश्चेच्छेत् ।
d सर्वं महाबोधौ परिणामयेत् ॥ २६ ॥

37.

a དུས་ནི་རིང་པོར་དམ་བཅས་ནས།

b རྟག་ཏུ་བརྩོན་དང་ལྡན་པར་བྱ།

c དེ་ལྟར་མཛད་ན་ཚོགས་གཉིས་པོ།

d རྫོགས་འགྱུར་སྒྲིབ་གཉིས་ཟད་པར་འགྱུར།།

a चिरं प्रतिज्ञाय

b सदोद्योगी भवेत् ।

c एवं कृते द्विवर्गः

d सम्पद्यत आवरणद्वयञ्च क्षीयते ॥ ३७ ॥

38.

a མི་ལུས་ཐོབ་པ་དོན་ཡོད་ཞིང་།

b མཐོང་བའི་ཆོས་ལ་མྱ་ངན་འདའ།

c བདག་དང་གཞན་དོན་རྫོགས་གྱུར་ན[1]།

d དམ་པ་ཉིད་[2]ནི་ཐོབ་པར་འགྱུར།།

a नरदेहलाभः सार्थको भवति ।

b दृष्टधर्म्मे निर्व्वाणं भवति ।

c स्वपरार्थः सम्पद्यते ।

d परमतत्त्वं च प्राप्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

---

1 X² reads ནས but this reading is better.

2 X² reads གཉིས which gives no meaning.

39.

a སོས་ཀའི་[1] ཁུ་བྱུག་གཞོན་ནུ་སྙན་སྒྲོག་ཅེས།

b རྨ་བྱ་གཞོན་ནུ་སྐད་སྙན་མི་སྒྲོགས་སམ[2]།

c མཁས་པ་མང་པོས་གསུངས་པ་ཡོད་མོད་ཀྱིས[3]།

d རྒྱལ་པོ་གདུང་བ་བཅད་ཕྱིར་བྲིས་པ་ཡིན[2]།།

a निदाघकोकिलपोतः मधुरं कूजतीति

b किं मयूरपोतो न मधुरं कूजति ।

c यद्यपि बहुभिः पण्डितैरुक्तं

d (तथापि) राज्ञां व्यसनच्छेदाय लिखितमिदम् ॥ ३९ ॥

40.

a ཕན་སེམས་ལྡན་པའི་གཏམ་འདི་ལེགས་པར་དགོངས་མཛོད་ལ།

b རྟོགས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་སྐྱེ་བོ་གཞན་འདང་[4]སྨྲ་བར་མཛོད།

c རྟག་ཏུ་ལྷ་དྲུག་དྲན་མཛོད་དམ་ཚིག་[5]གཙང་བར་མཛོད།

d རྒྱལ་སྲིད་ཆོས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱོང་མཛོད་བདག་ལ་བཟོད་པར་མཛོད།།

a हितापेतत्वेमां कथां श्रेयोऽभिप्रायेण कुरु ।

b अन्यस्मायपि मतिमते जनाय कथय ।

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1 X^2 reads སོ་གའི *which means the same thing.*

2 In X^2 these two lines (*a*,*b*) read as:—

སོ་གའི་ཁུ་བྱུག་གཞོན་ནུ་སྐད་སྙན་སྒྲོགས་ཞེས་ཏེ།

རྨ་བྱ་གཞོན་ནུ་སྐད་མི་སྙན་པ་མི་སྒྲོགས་མིན།

It means the same thing that the only difference being that this version makes the two lines contain 11 syllables instead of 9 syllables as the following two do.

3 X^2 reads ཀྱི but our reading (that of X^1) is better.

4 X^1 reads ལ.

5 X^2 reads ཚིགས.

c नित्यं षड्देवताः स्मर शुद्धं व्रतमाचर ।

d राजं धर्म्मेण पालय आत्मानं च क्षमं कुरु ॥ ४० ॥

དྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་རིན་པོ་ཆེའི་ཕྲིན་ཡིག་[1]བྱ་བ།

གནས་བརྟན་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་དི་པཾ་ཀ་ར་ཤྲཱི་ཛྙཱ་ནས།

རྒྱལ་པོ་ནི་ར་པ་ལ་ལ་བརྫངས་པ་ཤློ་ཀ་བཞི་བཅུ་པ་[2]རྫོགས་སོ།།

དུས་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་བླ་མ་དེ་ཉིད་དང་།

ལོ་ཙཱ་བ་དགེ་སློང་ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་རྒྱལ་བས་བསྒྱུར་བའི།

ཤློ་ཀ་བཞི་བཅུ་[3]པའོ།།

विमलरत्नलेखो नाम

स्थविरमहापण्डितदीपङ्करश्रीज्ञानाद्

राज्ञे नयपालाय प्रेरिता श्लोकचत्वारिंशत् सम्पूर्णा ॥

तस्मिन्नेव काले तेनैव गुरुणा

परिवर्त्तकेन भिक्षुणा जयशीलेन च परिवर्त्तिता

श्लोकचत्वारिंशत् ॥

---

1 X[1] reads ཡེ.

2-3 These པ would mean "fortieth" instead of "forty" (བཞི་བཅུ) which is apparently meant here.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

1.

Ruling his kingdom virtuously and causing the precepts of the Buddha to prosper, having seen * * * figures, the King Nayapāla lives.

(To him the following letter is addressed.)

2.

Thou hast before this given gifts and observed the noble observances and practised forgiveness and perseverance. Oh Lord! thou hast now attained perfection (in grace, glory, and wealth).

3.

Accept with reverence with your head the precepts of teachers and this *sutra* which follows religion. (Thereby) good will come both to you and others.

4.

Leaving all doubts make great endeavour for success. Leaving off sleepiness and indolence you should always try to attain energy.

5.

You should always guard the passages of the senses by watchfulness, remembrance, and knowledge. You should day and night, again and again, examine the continuity of the mind (i.e. its movements).

6.

Be like the eye in seeing your own faults and like a blind man in seeing others.. You should always meditate on *sūnyatā*, remembrance, and non-egoism.

7.

You should speak out your own faults and should not search into other people's errors. You should praise other people's virtues and should hide your own.

8.

You should give up profit and respect (from others), and always extolling your own self. You should always meditate on mercy and love and keep the mind fixed on *bodhi* (wisdom).

9.

The ten evil acts should be given up and faith should be made firm. You should remember even the least of beloved things, contentment and kindness done unto you.

10.

Anger and pride should be given up and the mind should be made lowly. Bad livelihood should be given up and you should live a noble life.

11.

You should give up all objects of enjoyment and should make yourself rich in noble wealth. Society should always be given up and you should live in forests.

12.

You should give up irrelevant speech and should be always pure and restrained. When seeing the preceptor and the teacher you should serve them with reverence.

13.

Noblemen, persons who see into inner meaning of things and pioneers, these you should regard as teachers.

14.

When seeing those who are oppressed by sufferings and all living creatures you should affix your mind to *bodhi* (perfect knowledge) and should regard them as the parents regards their children.

15.

You should give up all duties of the people and should always meditate on *samādhi*. Bad company should be given up and good company should be kept.

16.

When seeing bhikṣus of evil character and others devoid of religion and practisers of evil you should incessantly try for their suppression.

17. 18.

You should not live for more than three days with evil companions and helpers in sin, and those who have no respect for the three jewels, the preceptor, the teacher, and the spiritual guide—and those who believe in this world only and (also) those who have little faith in the next world.

19.

Leaving the land which is bad and unholy you should go where there is virtue. Leaving that where there is attachment one should live unattached.

20.

Attachment without giving welfare cuts the life of emancipation. You should always live where good friends do.

21.

Always taking the help of the preceptor one should ever look into the collection of *sūtras*. What has been

begun first should be finished first; otherwise neither of the two is finished.

22.

One should speak of one's own sins to others and strive for great merit. He should look to the well-being of the world which is favourable to his own mode of life and should keep the mind towards the next world.

23.

When the mind becomes elevated one should give up pride. When one is left without virtuous people he should meditate on the words of the preceptor.

24.

When the mind becomes indifferent you should praise even haughtiness. Remembering the *prajñāpāramitā* you should make cessation of the whole phenomenon.

25.

When there is occasion for attachment and hatred you should look at it as a creation of illusion. When hearing words of reproach (or censure) you should take it as echoes.

26. 27, 28.

When there is affliction of the body you should remember former actions. Living in outlying forests you should hide yourself like the beasts hiding their carcasses so that you may not be known by others. You should always seek refuge in (your own) tutelary deity and when the mind is drawn towards lust, malevolence, sloth and drowsiness, laziness and sleepiness, then count your own sins. You should keep in your mind the solemn vows and remember death and transient existence.

29.

While remaining before others you should speak calmly and straightforwardly. Laughing with a wrinkled face should be given up and you should always remain smiling. You should always feel love towards others.

30.

Being from jealousy one should love to sacrifice. Envy should always be given up. You should observe other people's wishes and give up all disputes.

31.

You should not keep new company without acquaintance. You should always be able in (practising) *mantras*. You should always practise contentment by being forbearing and of little desire.

32.

You should regard yourself as a *Caṇḍāla* (an outcaste) and a servant. You should strive for knowing what is modesty, for modesty and for adoration in the next world. You should restrain yourself.

33.

You should give up despising others. You should be reverential. While giving precepts to others you should do that with your mind full of mercy and benevolence.

34.

Respect for the religion of the Buddha and the good religion should never be given up. You should always pay reverence to the three jewels and make the three worlds pure.

35.

First with a compassionate mind you should take up day and night the threefold divisions of the well-known sevenfold worship.

36.

Wishing to remove the sufferings of the world you should offer prayer and wish for *bodhi* and for making immature people mature. You should cause everything to move towards great *bodhi*.

37.

Having promised long you should always be diligent. Thus doing the two pursuits of life are fulfilled and the two obstructions are removed.

38.

Thus) the attainment of the human body meets with its objects. In this life *nirvāṇa* is (realised). The object of one's own and others' is fulfilled and the highest truth is realised.

39.

Because the young cuckoo of the summer cooes sweetly, is it that the young peacock does not send forth its sweet cry ? Though spoken by many learned men yet this is (again) being written for removing the evil passion of the King.

40.

Wishing welfare act up to this discourse of a well-wisher. Speak this unto other wise men also. Always remember the six deities and keep pure the solemn vows. Rule the kingdom virtuously and make yourself bearable.

27

The forty verses

of

The Vimalaratnalekha,

sent from

Sthaviramahāpaṇḍita Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna

to

King Nayapāla,


are finished,

and at that very time, by the selfsame preceptor

and

the translator Bhikṣu Jayaśīla

were they translated.



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